


2002/2003 Annual Report



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
African Social and Economic Trends

2002/2003 Annual Report

Global Coalition for Africa

“Security is no longer a simple task of defending borders. It has been broadened to a more robust construct of ‘human security.’”

African Social and Economic Trends
Global Coalition for Africa



AFRICAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

Annual Report 2002/2003
of the Global Coalition for Africa



Global Coalition for Africa
1919 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W., Suite 550
Washington, D.C., 20006, USA
Tel. (1) (202) 458-4338
Fax. (1) (202) 522-3259
<http://www.gca-cma.org>

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The Global Coalition for Africa
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 550
Washington, DC 20006

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FOREWORD

The period since our last Annual Report saw a number of political and economic developments of considerable interest and significance to Africa. The launching of the African Union (AU) in July 2002 at its inaugural Summit in Durban, South Africa was one such notable event. Among other things, the AU Summit approved the establishment of a Peace and Security Council – a welcome step that underlined the appropriate recognition, by African leaders, of the interlinkage between security and stability and sustainable development.

There is now a justifiable if cautious optimism that the major conflicts in Africa are progressively winding down. In Angola, a long-drawn out civil war has effectively ended. Despite the scars of a particularly vicious civil conflict, Sierra Leone is making a commendable transition toward stable and participatory governance. In both the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudan, significant progress has been made toward finding workable solutions to the hitherto seemingly intractable conflicts. In each case, we commend the parties to the conflict, and African leaders for their constructive role in assisting the protagonists to arrive at an acceptable accommodation. Other cases of instability, including the serious conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, are also being addressed by African leaders usually through their respective regional conflict management mechanisms. While we welcome the support provided by the international community, we believe that much more substantial and concrete assistance needs to be provided than has been forthcoming to date.

Notwithstanding the distorted image of Africa as conflict-ridden, the vast majority of countries are free of conflict. Their preoccupation is to embark on a path of more rapid economic growth. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has rightly come to be recognized as the expression of Africa's collective determination to develop and integrate into the global economy. We note the progress made by NEPAD, as exemplified by the endorsement of its initial action plan by the Summit of the AU. The organs of NEPAD have spearheaded the further elaboration of its various initiatives, the mobilization of public consensus behind it in Africa, and the strengthening of external partnership in support of its programs.

At a number of key international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference on Financing for Development, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the international community has expressed solidarity with Africa, and pledged to support the development strategies and programs of African countries, along the lines indicated in NEPAD. The G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, has adopted an Africa Action Plan, again by way of response to Africa's adoption of the NEPAD framework for development. Implementation should hence become the area of focus, and the GCA will use its forum and constituency to help promote and monitor such implementation. In this spirit and to help popularize the initiative, the most recent GCA Policy Forum had "NEPAD and Security" as its principal theme.

We thank Minister Eveline Herfkens of the Netherlands and Minister Maria Minna of Canada, who have stepped down as Co-Chairpersons, for their contributions to the work of the GCA. We welcome Minister Susan Whelan of Canada and Minister Hilde F. Johnson of Norway who agreed to join us as Co-Chairpersons during 2002.

Finally, we take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah – who resigned from his position as Executive Secretary to take up a high-level responsibility within the United Nations – for his many years of invaluable service to the GCA. After an extensive search process, we are pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. Hage Geingob, former Prime Minister of Namibia, as the new Executive Secretary. We are convinced that the GCA will benefit greatly from his outstanding abilities and experience.

GCA Co-Chairpersons

*Festus Mogae, Meles Zenawi,
Alpha Oumar Konaré, Frene Ginwala,
Clare Short, Susan Whelan, and
Hilde. F. Johnson*

ABOUT THE GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA

The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) is a North-South forum that brings together leaders from Africa and their principal external partners to examine Africa's most critical social and economic development issues. It seeks to promote consensus on policies and programs of action and monitor the results. The GCA is based on the premise that Africa can grow only if there is effort from within, but that it also needs sustained and well-coordinated outside support and strong collaboration with its external partners. With sweeping changes around the world, the GCA strives to keep Africa on the global agenda and to mobilize the necessary international support to match Africa's commitments to economic and political change.

Policy guidance for the GCA is provided by its co-chairpersons, who also determine the GCA's work program on an annual basis. The GCA Co-Chairpersons are President Festus Mogae of Botswana, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Former President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali, Speaker Frene Ginwala of the South African National Assembly, Secretary of State Clare Short of the United Kingdom, Minister Susan Whelan of Canada, and Minister Hilde F. Johnson of Norway. Former President Sir Ketumile Masire of Botswana, former Minister Jan Pronk of the Netherlands, and former World Bank President Robert McNamara are Co-Chairpersons Emeritus. The Secretariat, based in Washington D.C., is headed by Mr. Hage Geingob.

The GCA's ultimate governing body is a plenary of all its members—involving African governments and their bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental partners—which met for the third time in Gaborone, Botswana, in October 2001. Between plenary meetings the GCA's work is guided by a Policy Forum comprising representatives of African and Northern countries, together with representatives of international and regional organizations, including the African Union, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the European Union, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the Africa Department of the International Monetary Fund, and the Africa Region of the World Bank.

The GCA's agenda is focused on the following broad themes:

- Peace and security, including conflict management and security sector reform.
- Governance and transition to democracy, including anti-corruption, democratic accountability and peaceful political succession.
- Sustainable growth and integration into the global economy, including regional integration, the private sector, and agriculture.

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OVERVIEW

There are promising signs that some of Africa's long-standing conflicts are being brought to an end. This is a welcome development, given that armed conflict in a limited number of countries has fostered a negative image of Africa as a continent beset by instability and suffering. It is hoped that continuing endeavors to find solutions to other conflicts, particularly in West Africa, will yield equally positive results. It is needless to add that concerted and sustained efforts will be necessary to avoid future conflicts and to settle differences through dialogue and negotiation before violence can erupt. With peace the continent will be able to shift its focus to promoting social and economic development.

The way conflicts are brought to an end affects the ability of post-conflict countries to maintain peace. Agreements that do not address the underlying causes of conflict, or that impose peace from outside, rarely last. Although mediators can help conflicting parties reach an acceptable and workable solution, peace can be assured only by the protagonists themselves. But peace is not merely the absence of war. Countries coming out of conflict face the very real challenges of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. Part II of the report specifically focuses on these issues.

Conflicts obviously have many causes, but in Africa political and economic exclusion rank high. Both preventing conflict, and creating a real sustainable peace, lie in the ability of countries to create transparent, accountable, and inclusive systems of governance. Equitable and sound governance is necessary for building a partnership based on equality and trust between governments and citizens. Although the majority of countries have yet to achieve this partnership, some have made substantial progress.

The promotion of democratic principles and practice is linked to issues of peace and good governance. Establishing electoral democracy after years of single-party rule throughout much of the continent is an achievement that deserves recognition. The challenge now is to deepen democracy and make it a reality for the majority of people. For many, democracy has not yet led to tangible results in meeting people's basic needs or improving their well-being. Political leaders need to find

ways of listening to communities and responding to their concerns, while civil society organizations and the political opposition have a responsibility to work with governments and to hold them accountable. In Africa as elsewhere, genuine democratic participation is a potent safeguard against civil disaffection, unrest, and armed conflict.

This Report indicates that progress on the continent, in political transition and in economic growth, is mixed. Some countries are moving ahead and deepening reforms. Others have experienced setbacks. Obviously those making progress should be encouraged and rewarded. But support is also needed—particularly from Africa’s development partners—for those that are lagging behind. This is not to say that the same level or type of assistance should be provided to all countries. But selectivity by the international community should not marginalize countries where reform has been slow. They, too, should be encouraged to take necessary measures to improve their governance and economic performance.

In this regard, appropriate benchmarks and targets should be established for different groups of countries—the strong reformers, the slow reformers, and countries coming out of conflict. Progress toward achieving targets could then form the basis for assessment. The process of peer review under NEPAD could adopt this more inclusive approach.

While it will not be possible for all countries to move ahead at the same pace, it is important that African leaders and governments make determined efforts to implement sound policies that promote broad-based development. Equally important is that such efforts are recognized and supported by their partners. The commitments at various international conferences in 2002 are promising, but we must ensure that they are followed by action. The GCA will use its meetings to broaden understanding of NEPAD and to promote sustained effort and concerted action by all parties.

Hage Geingob
Executive Secretary

PART I: REVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The major political event of 2002 was the formal launch of the African Union (AU) at its inaugural Summit in July in Durban, South Africa. Also of considerable importance was the Summit's passing the Declaration on the Implementation of NEPAD, which formally embraced NEPAD as an initiative of the AU and encouraged its implementation by member states. Both the AU and NEPAD place considerable emphasis on the need for democratization, good governance and the resolution of violent conflict. The Summit adopted the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. It also adopted the African Peer Review Mechanism, intended to establish governance benchmarks and monitor the progress of participating governments in meeting them.

The new charter of the African Union continues to give pride of place to the principles of sovereign equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for borders existing on the achievement of independence. But the charter also gives the African Union collective authority to intervene in situations of armed conflict—and to vigorously encourage member governments to open their societies to popular choice, transparency, accountability, and fairness in the distribution of resources.

Of special interest to both Africa and the international community is the new African Union Peace and Security Council, with a mandate to be the first intervener in violent internal conflict or in anticipation of such outbreaks. The principle of African intervention to prevent, manage, and resolve internal conflicts had already been accepted by the predecessor Organization for African Unity. Now, the Heads of State of the African Union have made this mandate more explicit, backing it with political resolve that includes the authorization for military intervention if necessary. This new Council has clearly been empowered to forge partnerships for peace with international agencies—in view of the possible need for external material assistance.

The African Peer Review Mechanism is intended to establish governance benchmarks and monitor them

Managing conflict

Perhaps the single greatest impediment to sustainable development in Africa has been violent internal conflict. During the year, there was progress in bringing to an end Africa's three most intractable and long-lasting wars—in Angola, the Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, Sierra Leone, with the assistance of the international community, continued to consolidate its peace process.

There was progress in bringing to an end Africa's three most intractable and long-lasting wars

Thanks to intensive mediation by Kenya in the Sudan and South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo—and strong support from the AU, the UN, and major western powers—these two conflicts have moved into ceasefire modes. And negotiations have begun on such substantive issues as power sharing, resource distribution, and transitions leading to new democratic dispensations. The peace processes, though still fragile in both countries at the end of 2002, represented considerable progress toward negotiated solutions.

In Angola the death in combat of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi led to a definitive end to a fratricidal war that began in 1975. As UNITA strives to transform itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party, the nation faces the enormous challenges of reintegrating former combatants, rebuilding its devastated infrastructure, and reviving its once-rich agricultural sector. Peace is likely to increase demands on the government to account for earnings from Angola's exceptionally lucrative oil and gems—and to use more resources to begin reconstruction and provide basic services to a war-devastated population.

In contrast to these positive developments, armed rebellion broke out in Côte d'Ivoire in October 2002, just as the country was beginning to make tentative progress after two years of turmoil caused by the 1999 military coup. French intervention stabilized the military situation, and subsequent negotiations led to an agreement for a neutral prime minister, with power-sharing between the Gbagbo government and the rebel leadership. The outlook for stability has recently been improving. But there is little doubt that events since 1999 have set back the prospects for a culture of democracy in Côte d'Ivoire, which is now deeply divided.

In other chronic conflict countries—Somalia, Burundi, Central African Republic, and Liberia—tensions remain high, and sporadic violence has become commonplace. The number of refugees and inter-

nally displaced persons continues to grow. The underlying causes of conflict—such as ethnic exclusion, poor governmental leadership, corruption, and external sponsorship of rebel groups—were still not being fully addressed in any of these countries, signaling little hope for an end to hostilities. Clearly, conflict resolution remains a significant challenge for the African Union, the regional integration organizations, Africa’s donor partners, and the United Nations.

The status of democratization

After decades of government under single-party rule, the transition to multiparty democracy is neither trouble-free nor uncomplicated. This is true in all regions of the world, not just in Africa. Vested interests in the status quo, especially in ruling parties and their partners in government-owned and some associated private enterprises, find it difficult to adjust to the free choice, openness, and equal opportunity that are the essence of democracy.

Some countries in Africa continued making progress in democratization. Some continued to stagnate. And some were reversing earlier gains. Major setbacks occurred in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire, regarded in the not-so-distant past as among the more stable and promising countries on the continent.

Elections on their own do not make a democracy. But they are a fundamental part. Although the picture of transparency and fairness was mixed, the fact that a number of countries held elections clearly shows that popular suffrage has become part of the political landscape. The mixed picture shows the transition to pluralistic politics takes time—and is fraught with difficulties.

Mali celebrated its third free and fair election since the end of its one-party state in 1990, with the outgoing President Alpha Oumar Konaré respecting the two-term constitutional limit. The incumbent ruling party was replaced in the parliament by a coalition and in the presidency by retired General Amadou Touré. Taking power after a peaceful transition, Mali’s new leaders have declared their determination to build on the accomplishments of their predecessors.

In Kenya the overwhelming popular sentiment for change resulted in a resounding presidential and parliamentary victory for Mwai Kibaki,

The transition to multiparty democracy is neither trouble-free nor uncomplicated

leader of the National Rainbow Coalition, a group of parties united in their opposition to the Kenya African Union (KANU), which had held power since 1964. Kenya made the transition from a one-party state, to a multiparty state, to a democratic transfer of power over 11 years. KANU, now in the opposition, has younger leaders serious about their role in the democratic process.

In Madagascar wrangling over the outcome of elections threatened to divide the country and lead to economic dislocation. But despite the violence, the country managed to avoid a descent into armed conflict. Following a recount of ballots, the High Court ruled that Marc Ravalomanana had won the presidency by a very narrow margin. His party decisively won legislative elections in December 2002, and stability was restored.

In Sierra Leone even with the Revolutionary United Front threatening a boycott, elections were held according to schedule with the participation of all opposition parties and high voter turnout—all without the violence that had marred previous elections. The vote easily returned President Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party to power, even though the security forces apparently voted against them. Although opposition parties complained of fraud, they accepted the outcome.

In Zimbabwe a deeply flawed presidential election, replete with violence and intimidation, resulted in widespread criticism. Since the flawed election, economic decline and impoverishment have deepened, with civil liberties curtailed and media restrictions tightened. Neighboring countries have been affected by the economic and political spillover, including an increase in illegal cross-border migration. Against the background of deep economic and social distress caused by unsound and regressive governmental policies, Zimbabwe's instability hurt its tourist trade and that of its neighbors. The instability also reduced prospects for foreign direct investment in Africa's most productive subregion.

Presidential term limits remain controversial. In Mali and Kenya, Presidents Konaré and Moi accepted to step down when their constitutionally mandated terms expired. In Mozambique, President Chissano reiterated his intention to accept constitutional term limits, leaving the way for others to contest elections in 2004. In Malawi and Namibia, where incumbent leaders also face term limits, it is less clear whether

they will step down or whether their supporters will try to bring about constitutional changes that will allow them to seek another term.

In Togo the prospects for democratic change became even bleaker during the year as President Eyadema announced that he would seek a change in the constitution to eliminate the two-term constitutional limit for the head of state. In Cameroon the ruling RDPC won a landslide victory against divided opposition parties. This further entrenches the power of President Paul Biya, who has held office since 1982 and is entitled to two more terms under the 1997 constitution.

In most countries, there is more promotion and protection of human rights and broader expansion of civil liberties. Because of this progress, the deterioration in Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire, and the lack of improvement in Liberia, are so apparent. In addition, the emphasis placed by the AU and NEPAD on human rights, democracy, and improved governance signals that these principles are now accepted.

The advance of good governance

Throughout Africa good governance practices continue to take root and flourish, especially in countries collaborating with international financial institutions on poverty reduction programs. Budgetary processes, privatizations, and procurement and contracting are being conducted with greater transparency to the public and greater accountability to parliaments. But institutional weaknesses and capacity constraints continue to limit the consolidation of good governance in many countries. NEPAD's emphasis on governance underscores its importance, and the African Peer Review Mechanism can facilitate best practices (box 1).

African countries enjoying strong revenue streams from oil production continue to be the most recalcitrant in introducing good governance practices. Budgetary transparency is lacking in Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, and concerted efforts to improve governance are needed in Angola now that its protracted civil war has ended. In Nigeria some progress has been made under its democratically elected civilian government, but this has to be sustained and expanded. All these countries have to move to address the serious challenges of countering entrenched corruption if their resources are to improve well-being of the majority of their citizens.

Institutional weaknesses and capacity constraints limit the consolidation of good governance

BOX 1. THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

Under the umbrella of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) were adopted and later endorsed by the July 2002 African Union Summit.

The Declaration has two components—one on Democracy and Good Political Governance, and one on Economic and Corporate Governance. For both preestablished codes, standards, and indicators of “good governance” are the yardsticks for judging countries through the APRM.

Membership in the APRM is voluntary, and countries that accede to the mechanism will open themselves to reviews and assessments. After an initial base review, there will be periodic assessments.

After considerable debate and some controversy (including that between NEPAD’s promoters and their G-8 counterparts), political governance is to be handled by organs of the AU, while economic and corporate governance is to be managed under the NEPAD framework. A small group of eminent persons will oversee the review process, supported by a secretariat and relevant experts. Some initial “teething” problems are expected as the APRM is operationalized.

Greater political openness has focused attention on the corruption that continues to beset many African countries. There is now more recognition that corruption is a major impediment to development, and citizens are less willing to tolerate corrupt practices. The AU’s convention on preventing and combating corruption is expected to be adopted at its 2003 Summit, and most countries have introduced anti-corruption measures. But there has been little real progress in curbing powerful vested interests or in reducing corruption.

Foreign investors looking for opportunities in Africa frequently cite the rule of law as a high priority in estimating risk. In this too African countries continue to make progress on a very long and difficult road. Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia offer positive examples of the exercise of judicial independence. And the ability of Mozambique’s judicial system to deal professionally with a high-profile murder case signals change. In Burkina Faso the courts have a strong record of protecting small businesses from illegal and capricious government actions. In Zimbabwe the court system continues its struggle to defend its independence against encroachment from political authorities.

Although there has been progress, legal systems continue to suffer from the lack of resources and limited capacity—and challenges to the rule of law have increased. Transnational criminal networks have taken advantage of widespread poverty, weak institutions, and porous borders. And some African countries have become major transit points for drug trafficking, often with the smuggling of gems and weapons. Most countries lack the resources or capacity to deal with well-financed, sophisticated criminal networks on their own, suggesting that greater collaboration is needed among African governments and with the international community.

Overall, progress in democratization, good governance and conflict resolution in Africa continues to be uneven. Nevertheless, the number of countries with positive outlooks continues to increase and the foundations are being laid for future progress. Compared with even ten years ago, political freedom has expanded significantly in most countries. Even in those where democracy is least well-developed, leaders realize that they can no longer act with impunity—and that they must now take steps to legitimize their regimes.

The number of countries with positive outlooks continues to increase and the foundations are being laid for future progress

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Overall economic trends

Sub-Saharan Africa achieved real GDP growth of 3.0 percent in 2000 and 2.9 percent in 2001, clearly inadequate when viewed against the 7 percent minimum growth rates needed to reduce poverty enough to reach the Millennium Development Goals. And the group of countries not producing oil—a large majority of Sub-Saharan nations—had growth rates lower than the regional average. Among the factors that account for the poor performance: the slowdown, indeed recession, in most of the industrial countries, reducing demand for African exports; the significant decline in international prices of non-oil commodities; and the adverse impact of drought on agricultural production, particularly in Southern and Eastern Africa. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, badly hurt the service sectors, especially tourism.

South Africa grew by 3.4 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2001, and Nigeria by 3.8 percent and 3.9 percent. Nigeria's results could have been even better if OPEC production limitations had not prevented it from fully

Average savings and investment rates remain low

benefiting from higher oil prices. The small but growing number of African countries that recorded fairly strong growth included Botswana, Madagascar, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Cameroon.


Among the other countries, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe all had very low or negative growth results. Côte d'Ivoire has been suffering from coups and instability since 1999. In Kenya corruption and bad governance contributed to feeble performance before the democratic elections at the end of 2002. It is hoped that Kenya's new reformist government will reverse recent negative economic trends. Zimbabwe's significant declines in GDP resulted from insecurity related to poor governance and the disruption of agricultural production following the government's radical land redistribution measures.

For domestic resource mobilization, the record has been quite dismal. The average savings rate for the region has remained at around 16–17 percent of GDP for the last 20 years. Excluding Nigeria and South Africa, savings in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa fluctuated around 13–15 percent. Investment rates have also been very low, with the average for the region remaining at around 17–18 percent of GDP since 1980. Although a few countries, including the oil exporters, have done better than the average, overall savings and investment rates for Sub-Saharan Africa showed no improvement in 2000–01. Such low levels will not produce the 7 percent growth rates needed for countries to reach the Millennium Development Goals.

Agriculture

Much of the explanation for Sub-Saharan Africa's disappointing growth performance may lie in agriculture, a significant part of most African economies. Per capita agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa has been static or declining over the last 20 years, while developing countries as a whole achieved 40 percent growth in per capita production (figure 1). The reasons for the stagnation of African agriculture include poor policies, inadequate infrastructure, low resource allocation, insufficient inputs, and weak rural service-delivery institutions. In addition, man-made calamities of bad governance, violent conflict, and insecurity negatively affect economic activity, including agriculture. The spread of HIV/AIDS has also hurt agricultural production.

**FIGURE 1. AFRICA'S STAGNANT PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
(1980 = 100)**



Source: World Bank: *Global Development Finance 2002*, from FAO Statistical Office.

African agriculture is also subject to unfavorable weather. Severe drought has devastated the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and more recently Southern Africa—with fairly regular frequency. Southern Africa—particularly Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—suffered drought in the last two years. The Horn was under one of its more intensive spells of drought in 2001 and continuing into 2002 and 2003, with Ethiopia and Eritrea affected most severely. More than 30 million people faced serious food shortages, bordering on famine.

Exports

Export growth for Sub-Saharan Africa—at 4.2 percent in 2001—appears to have been adequate. But much of the growth in overall trade is a result of the major price increases enjoyed by oil exports. Indeed, commodities other than oil suffered steep price declines and falling demand. For their prices in 2000 were 40 percent below 1996 levels. And some commodities had further price declines in 2001, with coffee down 30 percent and cotton 20 percent (box 2).

Implementing NEPAD's initial action plan

The New Partnership for Africa's Development, or NEPAD, provides a timely and comprehensive framework to review and reconsider the con-

BOX 2. PLUNGING COFFEE PRICES

The fall in coffee prices in the last few years has been dramatic, reaching their lowest point in 40 years. Real coffee prices in 2001 were a quarter of what they were in 1960. A major reason for the recent fall in prices is the rapid growth in production, leading to excessive supply. In the 1990s Vietnam increased its annual coffee production from 1.5 million bags to 15 million bags, becoming the second largest producer. Brazil, long the largest producer, also increased its production by adopting significant technology improvements and by shifting some of its production to regions where there is no frost.

With consumption in industrial countries almost stagnant, the mismatch between supply and demand naturally led to a steep decline in producer prices. African producers could not compensate for the lost export earnings through higher export volumes, because their production remained static. Nor could they move up the value chain and engage in roasting and processing, both tightly controlled by big multinational companies.

Source: Oxfam International, Mugged: Poverty in Your Coffee Cup, 2002.

continent's development strategies. The leadership and ownership demonstrated by African countries in formulating and promoting NEPAD has been widely applauded. In 2002, NEPAD's initial action plan was approved at the inaugural Summit of the African Union. And each African country is to formulate its own development plan with the full involvement of key stakeholders.

The UN General Assembly and the international community as a whole broadly support NEPAD. The G8 countries at their Kananaskis (Canada) Summit of June 2002, announced their own African Action Plan to support NEPAD and are working closely with African governments on its implementation.

For countries the main task is to formulate or modify national development strategies in line with the NEPAD framework—and to then monitor progress in implementing them. To the extent that projects and programs are to be executed at the regional level, adequate institutional arrangements will be needed, and that will require strengthening of regional institutions.

NEPAD's growth targets of at least 7 percent a year may not be easily reached, at least in the near term, with the average for the region at around 3–4 percent in recent years. Meeting the financing gap—estimated at 12 percent of the continent's annual GDP—could also prove a challenge, requiring much more concerted mobilization of domestic and external resources.

External resource flows

As elaborated in detail in the NEPAD framework document, improved market access, deeper and more comprehensive debt relief, enhanced foreign direct investment, and significantly more official development assistance are the main channels for mobilizing external resources. But even under the most optimistic scenario, there will be a lag before significant incremental resources start to flow. Persistent follow-up and continual campaigning may be needed with respect to several of these sources. As NEPAD recognizes, the political, security, governance, and institutional environment in African countries is a key determinant of whether additional resource flows will be forthcoming.

New international processes and events may affect the prospects for many of these external resource flows. One was the launching of WTO-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. The Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha—the Doha Development Agenda—promises to work toward an agreement whereby developing countries benefit from the “increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates.” The work program adopted at Doha covers agriculture, services, market access for nonagricultural products, a review of TRIPS (particularly waiving intellectual property rights in certain essential medicines), and enhanced technical assistance to the least developed countries. But as of late 2002 the negotiations appeared to be falling far short of what developing countries expected.

Whatever the outcome of the trade negotiations, market access for African agricultural and nonagricultural products needs to be addressed. The potential benefits of market access can be seen from a review of the export and investment response that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the United States has stimulated. The AGOA provisions became fully operational only in 2000, but of some 35 eligible Sub-Saharan countries 17 have already qualified for apparel export benefits, leading to a 28 percent increase in their export earnings. Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, and Uganda are among the main beneficiaries. Other current and potential beneficiary countries include Mauritius, Madagascar, Namibia, Ghana, and

*Market access for
African products
needs to be
addressed*

Foreign direct investment is an important contributor to the growth and diversification of exports


Cape Verde. South Africa, in addition to sharing from growth in African exports of apparel, saw a several-fold increase in its exports of passenger cars to the United States.

The EU's "everything but arms" commitment for duty-free and quota-free access for the least developed countries to the European market is expected to trigger parallel growth in African exports. Duty-free and quota-free access to the markets of industrial countries can stimulate the diversification of African exports, particularly toward more value-added light manufactures. But the barriers to market access that persist in developed countries continue to discourage that diversification.

Foreign direct investment—and the market and technology knowhow usually associated with it—is an important contributor to the growth and diversification of exports. And NEPAD places strong emphasis on its mobilization, as do such other recent international forums as the UN Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002).

According to UNCTAD annual FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa were \$6–8 billion in 1997–99. After slipping to \$5.8 billion in 2001, they jumped to \$11.8 billion, mainly because of the share transfer between two South African companies (Anglo-American and De Beers). Without that transaction, FDI flows would have been much the same as in 2000. The main sources (or home countries) for FDI to Africa are the United States and such EU countries as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The main host countries continue to

FIGURE 2. FDI INFLOWS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



Source: UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2002*.

be South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria, with oil and gas the main beneficiary in the latter two. Sudan has recently emerged as a notable FDI recipient, following its entry into the league of oil exporters. Other countries receiving significant inflows were Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Lesotho. The improved market access possibilities created by AGOA and the EU's "everything but arms" policy may stimulate further FDI into Africa.

In the long term the bulk of external resource inflows is likely to be FDI, but the more immediate reality is that official development assistance (ODA) remains more important. The latest declarations by both the EU and the United States—particularly in the runup to the Conference on Financing for Development—indicate that the principal donors will make some effort to reverse the recent decline in ODA as a percentage of donor GNP and in absolute terms, from around \$19 billion a year in the early 1990s to just under \$14 billion by the end of the decade. Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden continue to meet the UN benchmark of 0.7 percent of GNP. But the new willingness of other donors to increase ODA is welcome. Sub-Saharan countries and other interested parties might thus monitor how quickly and significantly the increases occur.

Related to ODA levels is debt relief. The HIPC mechanism has now covered virtually all the low-income countries eligible for debt relief, but some aspects of the debt problem require reconsideration. African countries still seek a more inclusive approach to eligibility. They also would like to see deeper debt relief. Moreover, the recent decline in export earnings for most of the non-oil commodity exporters calls for a re-examination of the debt service status of HIPC countries to re-establish the sustainability of their debt.

*The new willingness
of donors to increase
ODA is welcome*

PART II: CHALLENGES TO POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION

Armed conflict has been one of the main obstacles to development in Africa. But a number of countries are now making determined efforts to end drawn-out conflicts. They must somehow fulfill the need to address humanitarian emergencies yet not be held captive to relief and dependency as they move into an era of post-conflict reconstruction.

Although post-conflict countries are shaped by their history, geography and stage of development—as well as the effects of the conflict—they tend to share characteristics that affect reconstruction. They tend to be heavily indebted, economically fragile, highly dependent on external financial assistance, and possessing limited resources to meet enormous needs. Their governments have low legitimacy. They face damaged social, economic and physical infrastructure, severely depleted human resources, and extremely weak state institutions. And as a result of war, agricultural production has often been acutely disrupted. Large numbers of people have been displaced. And society has become militarized, fragmented, and deeply divided.

One lesson of post-conflict reconstruction is that there can be no single approach, because each conflict has its own dynamics. The approach must fit the conflict and distinguish among interstate wars (Eritrea, Ethiopia), local rebellions (Senegal), collapsed states (Somalia), and countries with widespread or protracted internal conflict (Sudan, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Liberia). Post-conflict interventions need to both deal with the legacy of war and the underlying causes.

In countries coming out of conflict, communities must rebuild, private sectors must revitalize, and states must transform—not easy processes. Four key challenges:

- Demilitarization and security sector reform.
- Reestablishment of the rule of law and effective governance.
- Economic reconstruction, revitalization, and reform.
- Social and institutional rehabilitation and development and human capacity building.

Complex though each one of these is, post-conflict reconstruction requires a systemic assault on all fronts in order to turn the proverbial

One lesson of post-conflict reconstruction is that there can be no single approach

corner. Underpinning all reconstruction efforts is the need for the root causes of conflict to be addressed, if peace is to be sustained and a return to hostilities avoided.

DEMILITARIZATION AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Without security, there can be no peace and development. The corollary is also true: peace and development are key ingredients to achieving security. With so much hostility in and around them, African countries find it difficult to maintain peace even when it has been achieved. So one of the first priorities of reconstruction must be to reinstate a sense of security in the country for all people, both rural and urban.

Security is no longer a simple task of defending borders. The very concept of security has been redefined by globalization's downside, broadened to a more robust construct of "human security." In today's more interconnected world, information, money, people, and goods cross borders with ease and impunity, working for both good and evil. New security challenges arise from state and nonstate actors, from governments and opposition movements, from transnational corporations and transnational criminal networks. They come in the form of debt, disease, destruction, disinvestments, and disenfranchisement. Motivated by greed, grievance, and simple neglect, the threats affect countries, subregions, and in some cases the whole continent. Each vector of insecurity plays a special role in the destruction and therefore in the reconstruction of societies.

National security can be reestablished only in a broader framework by reasserting the state's monopoly over the forces and means of coercion: the military, police, and intelligence services, and the legal, judicial, and penal system. Creating a state that is transparent, efficient and accountable to its citizenry is the key to ensuring that such a monopoly works in the interest of all. Given the general weakness of state institutions in postwar countries, this is not easily done. Expectations of what can be achieved, and in what time frame, have to take the difficulties into account.

Demilitarizing—and addressing the privatization of violence—is essential to ensure a minimum of security. This requires three inter-related activities:

One of the first priorities of reconstruction must be to reinstate a sense of security in the country for all people, both rural and urban

- Independent monitoring of a cease-fire.
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to facilitate the incorporation of government and rebel forces into new national military or police forces—or their transition to productive civilian life.
- Removing light weaponry, landmines and other unexploded ordnance.

By accomplishing these tasks, governments and the international community rid post-conflict states of threats to their already weakened condition. But accomplishing them is difficult. In the past, overly optimistic timetables, inadequate resources, and unrealistic assessments of the ease of reintegration have led to problems.

Sierra Leone presents a compelling case for the centrality of disarmament and demobilization, given the number of combatants—some 75,000. But part of the problem—and the reason for the uneven record of demilitarization in post-conflict African countries—is that countries coming out of war offer few employment opportunities to former combatants. Ethiopia and Eritrea are both undergoing major demobilization programs and budgetary realignments to support productive areas of social and economic development. But their success depends on having former combatants make the transition to civilian life. In Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the lawlessness accompanying conflict makes peace difficult to sustain, unless former combatants feel that they benefit from it.

Post-conflict demobilization needs to be undertaken as part of broader security sector reform. An army of national unity, comprising former government and rebel troops can overcome grievances and engender a spirit of loyalty to the state. It can also improve public confidence in the military. In contrast, a post-conflict military that mirrors ethnic or social cleavages will do little to promote lasting peace.

Security sector reform has to be based on a clear assessment of security needs, and include the training and institution-building to create an effective, professional military. In most post-conflict societies, attention has to go to civil security, with police forces as a basis for maintaining peace. For both the military and the police, security reform also has to lead to greater accountability and transparency—and to demo-

cratic oversight of security forces. This oversight is not easy to achieve given the weakness of parliaments in post-conflict states, but it must be pursued.

Only when security is established can the process of rebuilding the state and its key institutions begin. Security is also a prerequisite for economic and social recovery. Without it people are unlikely to invest in their own lives and communities. And although some wartorn countries have attracted external investment, it has tended to be short-term and speculative, or concentrated in extractive industries. Few investors are willing to make long-term commitments outside oil and minerals unless some security is restored.

Security is a prerequisite for economic and social recovery

REESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE

Improving governance in post-conflict countries, necessary for enhancing the functioning of government and expanding the delivery of services, is also the key to building public confidence. The recognition of clear property rights is a signal of the reestablishment of the rule of law—as well as an economic signal to would-be investors, domestic and foreign. Uganda’s Commission for the Return of Properties to Departed Asians was a landmark legal and political action that signaled the end of lawlessness and the return of economic security.

Elections—if free and fair—confer legitimacy on the post-conflict government that assumes power. Sierra Leone, a war-ravaged country now at peace for over a year, still has far to go. But the recent election—in which the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group participated and lost to the incumbent government—was a significant step forward, even if flawed. Rwanda is now moving toward multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections, and Angola is also preparing for the first elections following the end of the war.

Though important, elections do not always mean better governance, as postwar Liberia demonstrates. So, while events in Rwanda and Sierra Leone are promising, there is no guarantee that the political and civil liberties of citizens will be sustained, or that governmental transparency and accountability will prevail. Nor do elections ensure that peace will be maintained, as events in the Republic of Congo attest. Although a national referendum for a new constitution and

*Control of revenues
from resources can
prolong conflict*

national elections took place without major incident, peace was broached by fighting between government and rebel forces in the Pool region. Tens of thousands of people were forced to flee. The country now faces a staggering debt burden and growing food insecurity and impoverishment.

The institutional decay that characterizes wartorn countries means that effective systems to guard against corruption are usually lacking, while the economic and social disruption caused by war lends to the entrenchment of corrupt practices. By undermining the state and its institutions, corruption contributes to conflict and makes reconstruction more difficult. This is particularly evident in resource-rich countries, where control of revenues from resources can prolong conflict or undermine efforts to sustain peace. Sierra Leone, Angola, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo all face enormous challenges of effectively managing their natural resource wealth and putting measures in place to counter ingrained corruption.

The most important international response in helping countries address corruption may be to ensure transparency in transactions and revenue flows, especially revenues from high-value natural resources. The oil sectors in Angola and the Republic of Congo illustrate the failure to do this. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project holds out a potentially useful mechanism for addressing this issue. It is also necessary for OECD countries to implement international anti-corruption measures, in line with the 1997 Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

Particularly following prolonged or severe conflict, issues of justice and reconciliation are central to the maintenance of peace. But there are tensions between focusing on past injustices and moving ahead, and the desire for retribution can make reconciliation hard to achieve. Truth and reconciliation processes are a popular way of promoting accountability for past actions and creating the basis for reconstruction. Given the limited experience of such processes, their effectiveness is hard to gauge.

In Rwanda transitional justice has been enacted through the traditional Gacaca system of community peer deliberation. Although in its early days, it combines truth telling and communal systems of

reparation and reconciliation—and may finally put the past behind in a publicly acceptable manner. In Sierra Leone the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is trying to create an impartial record of the conflict, address impunity, and respond in part to the needs of the victims. By promoting healing and reconciliation, it hopes to prevent a repetition of violations and abuses. This is extraordinarily ambitious. But even if not all its aims are achieved, the process may help to promote social cohesion through the public recognition of the trauma of war and the crimes committed. In the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia, where so many factions have been in conflict, it would undoubtedly be harder for any such process to determine who should be held accountable.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND REFORM

Economic recovery in post-conflict societies is based on security and the rule of law—or, at a minimum, on the perception that they are being worked on. This requires a functioning state. High debt, weak fiscal management, and limited investment (both domestic and foreign)—all characteristics of post-conflict states—make it more difficult for governments to return to enduring peace and development. And yet, governments are also under pressure to demonstrate results, so that people can see and feel the benefits of peace. So the pace and sequencing of the economic reform agenda are critical. Physical infrastructure destroyed or neglected during years of conflict has to be rebuilt early to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons, to provide access to markets, and to encourage private sector activity.

States trying to rebuild after conflict need an integrated approach for fiscal, social, and regulatory policies, with a conscious strategy of balancing equity with adjustment. Tradeoffs between efficiency and stability need to be managed in a way that does not compromise either—or lead to renewed warfare. Balancing growth with targeted employment generation, especially for youth, and tightly managing public expenditures is necessary to meet post-conflict challenges. Although post-conflict countries need considerable external assistance, they should determine the reform agenda themselves—to promote national pride and resilience, the intangibles of sustained recov-

States trying to rebuild after conflict need an integrated approach for fiscal, social, and regulatory policies

The shift to investment in infrastructure, particularly in physical and human capital, is critical

ery. At times, external partners have expected post-conflict governments to address the gamut of economic reform and development issues, without understanding the constraints. It is only through economic growth that governments can make headway in post-conflict recovery.

Post-conflict governments have to focus on the distribution of expenditures, especially for agriculture, industry, and trade. The shift to investment in infrastructure, particularly in physical and human capital, is critical. Producer-to-market linkages are essential—not just for opening areas of trade to all segments of society but for promoting balanced development. It is the bridge across the Zambezi linking northern and southern Mozambique, the road connections between Gulu and Kampala to Mombasa, and the north-south rail links in Sierra Leone that will bring lasting peace and prosperity. Because regional infrastructure and trade linkages between countries can facilitate economic recovery, the regional dimensions of recovery must also be borne in mind.

The impact of state policies and investment on employment has to be taken into account in efforts to consolidate the peace and ensure the transition to reconstruction and sustained development. Aside from agriculture, the informal and small and medium enterprise sectors have the greatest potential for job creation. A focus on agriculture alone may be insufficient in countries where young people, alienated from the land by combat or displacement, seek urban or off-farm work. Sending them back to the farms may be neither desirable nor feasible. Instead, investments to promote the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises can help post-conflict recovery and prevent recurrent conflict. This means finance, training, information, and most important, market linkages. Countries such as Rwanda are now emphasizing smallholder cash crops (tea and coffee) to increase consumption power and regenerate sustainable livelihoods among the poor. In the same vein, Sierra Leone is trying to stimulate small-scale mining.

Even where agriculture is a mainstay in reconstruction, a return to normalcy cannot be assured. A year after peace was restored to Sierra Leone, the country still did not produce enough food for people to live on, even though agriculture provides employment for two-thirds of the population. Displaced farmers are returning to their farms, but without seeds and tools. Those producing crops find themselves undercut

by cheap imports or by middlemen unwilling to give them a fair price. Government policies have to address such issues to restore agricultural productivity and competitiveness.

Economic reforms must be paced and sequenced in a manner that promotes sustainable livelihoods for the majority of people. The all-too-swift removal of subsidies in a fragile post-conflict environment can have damaging effects. Removing the food subsidy in Sierra Leone fell heavily on an army that had not been paid for months. This led to a coup with part of the army uniting with the rebels to prolong the war another three years. Removing the cashew subsidy in Mozambique may have been sound policy in normal circumstances, but it did not help in a country that had just emerged from a protracted civil war with an already devastated economy and expected to absorb more than 100,000 demobilized combatants.

Immediately after conflict, it is important to provide safety nets at the community level, increasing purchasing power through transfers. But countries should not think that cash and in-kind payments to war-affected populations, or community development projects, would spur the recovery of smallholder agriculture and microenterprises. Domestic and foreign private investment will be required to sustain agricultural rehabilitation. There is no substitute for infrastructure investments, financial intermediation, information channels, and other market linkages. Communities can prosper only when investment creates new capacities for production and trade, generating more employment.

In resource-rich states the post-conflict challenge appears to be more one of transparent and accountable domestic resource mobilization, governance, and public expenditure management. Because several African conflicts are resource-related, it is essential that the revenues from state-controlled resources be used to promote peace and enhance public well-being. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline project—an emerging partnership of government, the private sector, and civil society—is a model for post-conflict countries to consider. The World Bank and private investors (led by Exxon) are financing the infrastructure. MIGA is providing investment risk insurance. The oil profits are held in trust, to be spent for the social good. Independent civil society bodies monitor the entire scheme.

STRENGTHENING SOCIAL COHESION

Once peace has been established, people begin returning to communities that often are wartorn and socially divided. War traumatizes victims and perpetrators, breaks trust, and weakens social cohesion. Just as destroyed buildings must be rebuilt or rehabilitated, so the fragmented social structures must be rewoven. Reconstruction programs and projects have to be designed with sensitivity to inclusiveness, social capital, and reconciliation through reconstruction.

A significant challenge is to promote reconciliation and social cohesion

Resettling refugees and internally displaced persons is one of the first tasks following the end of war. Although many people return willingly, they are unlikely to settle unless they have the means to earn a living. Some, particularly the young, find it difficult to adjust or readjust to traditional social structures. Tensions can arise between returnees and surrounding communities if returnees are perceived as receiving special treatment. This is worsened if people return to find their land taken by others, who may themselves have been displaced from elsewhere. Not all returnees manage the transition well, though they generally face fewer adjustment problems than demobilized ex-combatants.

A significant challenge in the aftermath of war is to promote reconciliation and social inclusion. Different societal groups have different perceptions of war, all formed by their experiences. It is difficult for people to recognize that others, whom they may regard as responsible for the violence, also have rights that must be respected and protected. Yet unless all elements of society engage in the process of reconciliation, the potential for a return to hostilities is real. Peace accords are essentially political agreements; genuine reconciliation has to take place within society. That is why governments have to place more emphasis on civil society in developing sustainable livelihoods, in helping communities to be the subjects and not just the objects of social transformation, and in mediating social and economic tensions before they become violent.

Most countries coming out of conflict face a challenge of dealing with young people deprived of education because of war. Large numbers of undereducated and unemployed young men are a potential force for destabilization. In addition, child soldiers have to overcome the trauma of war and be integrated into society. Liberia exemplifies the

problems of dealing with child soldiers perhaps most pointedly. But the issue faces many countries coming out of war, even though both governments and rebels routinely deny using children as combatants. Many children became caught up in war against their will. Others found that continued violence was the only way to earn a living. Some countries, such as Mozambique, have been fairly successful in working with child soldiers and encouraging their reintegration into communities. Their experience could be useful for others.

Civil society groups, and especially women, can help to promote peace at the local level and strengthen the common interests that bind people and communities. Nongovernmental organizations are important players, but they clearly need to be differentiated from the broader civil society. They can be extraordinarily constructive, but they can also be counterproductive. It is not simply social capital that matters—it is the nature of social capital and the extent to which it provides crosscutting rather than exclusionary ties.

*Early investments
in education and
health can have
a high impact*

REVITALIZING BASIC SERVICES

In addition to rebuilding physical infrastructure to permit economic activity to restart, early investments in education and health can have a particularly high impact. Even small investments can make a discernible difference. The challenge is to maintain and extend progress as the county moves out of the initial phases of recovery and reconstruction.

School enrollment ratios for the continent are still unacceptably low, and typically even lower in post-conflict countries. Primary education is accessible to only half of the continent's school-age children. And only half of those enrolled complete the full primary cycle. In 2002 only 16 countries—the majority of them at peace—have achieved universal primary education. Another 16 have a gross enrolment ratio between 70 percent and 98 percent. The remaining 15 countries—12 of them in or emerging from prolonged conflict—have enrolment ratios between 31 percent and 67 percent.

Given the need for state capacity, to focus only on primary school enrolment in wartorn countries would be shortsighted. Special programs to develop critical technical and managerial skills—and attract professionals from the diaspora—should be seen as equally important.

There is an important role for Africa's partners in rebuilding social infrastructure following conflict

For countries coming out of war, the education crisis is generally matched by a calamitous health situation. Health services are usually severely disrupted, and destroyed transport networks further limit the access of isolated communities to health care. In addition, dense concentrations of people pushed off their land as a result of war usually lack adequate clean water and sanitation, while poor nutrition also compounds vulnerability to infectious diseases. Improving provision of basic health care is thus, like education, one of the most pressing issues faced by post-conflict countries.

Closely associated to the war-accelerated breakdown of basic services is the lack of access to medicines for those suffering from HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious disease. Because armed conflicts facilitate the spread of HIV/AIDS, the virus leaves its distinctive mark where prevalence rates are already high. Sub-Saharan Africa has 29.4 million adults and children living with the disease, the most of any region.

For countries coming out of war, the potential impact of the pandemic on post-conflict reconstruction is severe. Efforts to rebuild the institutional capacity of post-war countries are frustrated as skills and experience are lost faster than they can be created. Some war-affected countries display relatively low rates of HIV/AIDS, such as Angola with 5.5 percent and the Democratic Republic of Congo with 4.9 percent. But it may be that the extent of the problem has not been uncovered—and that peace will increase HIV/AIDS transmission, as travel becomes easier and people return home. So, a major public health concern for post-conflict countries is to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS as reconstruction gets under way.

There is an important role for Africa's partners in rebuilding social infrastructure following conflict. Foreign technical assistance should be twinned in every sector with a clear, time-bound concrete program for passing on skills and systems to local counterparts. In addition, Africa's partners should seriously consider covering the recurrent salary costs for significant periods for service workers in health, education, sanitation, and the police. Although long-term dependency on foreign assistance should not be encouraged, that assistance is essential to guard against a collapse of services and ensure consistency, reliability, and predictability in their provision.

PROMOTING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: NEW INSTITUTIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS

For post-conflict reconstruction to be viable in African countries, partnerships must flourish among governments, the private sector, civil society, and regional and international organizations. The consensus today is that partnerships work best where the aid regime supports the devolution of delivery systems, empowers local communities, and puts Africans in charge of their own development efforts, with international partners recognizing and reinforcing country leadership and responsibility. This concept of partnership clearly informs NEPAD.

Countries need to be encouraged and supported to maintain peace—to avoid future conflicts. The African Union Constitutive Act recognizes the importance of peace and security to the development of the continent, and envisages a greater role for the AU in promoting and maintaining it. NEPAD, the AU's instrument for economic and social development, also recognizes peace and security as prerequisites for development. The NEPAD initial action plan proposes a Peace and Security Initiative to support the efforts and conflict management mechanisms of the African Union and the regional economic communities.

Because conflict in one country has repercussions for its neighbors, the AU and NEPAD have suggested that regional and institutional mechanisms include preventive measures and address the post-conflict needs of the continent. Given the links between security and development, NEPAD's economic agenda is perhaps as important as its political goals. Embarking on an economic agenda that encourages foreign direct investment, trade, and private sector activity as soon as is feasible can support the long-term growth and development needed to reinforce and maintain peace.

These new institutional arrangements represent a positive change. A broad concept of human security underpins the visions of both the AU and NEPAD to promote constructive change on the continent. By emphasizing peace, security, and political governance, the AU and NEPAD send a clear message that African countries and leaders are responsible for the future development of the continent. And that means managing conflict and building the conditions for sustainable peace.

SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

The tables use symbols to mark SPA countries (*)—those participating in the Strategic Partnership with Africa—and CFA countries (+)—those with their exchange rates fixed to the French franc. Technical notes for the tables are given at the end of the tables.

SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

ECONOMIC GROWTH

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	REAL GDP GROWTH						1.1
	Average annual percentage change						
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001	
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.2	3.6	1.7	2.4	3.0	2.9	
Excluding South Africa	2.4	4.3	2.0	2.8	2.7	3.4	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.6	4.0	2.4	2.8	2.5	3.3	
Angola	—	—	3.5	1.3	3.0	3.2	
Benin*+	2.8	1.9	3.1	4.7	5.8	5.0	
Botswana	9.2	15.1	10.9	5.2	8.6	6.3	
Burkina Faso*+	4.0	3.6	3.8	4.4	2.2	5.6	
Burundi*	4.5	3.4	4.4	-1.9	-0.9	3.2	
Cameroon*+	0.2	7.0	4.8	1.5	4.2	5.3	
Cape Verde	—	3.4	9.9	5.7	6.8	3.3	
Central African Republic*+	3.3	2.4	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.5	
Chad*+	1.1	0.2	6.0	2.3	0.6	8.9	
Comoros*+	—	—	2.9	1.2	-1.1	1.9	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.2	0.2	2.1	-5.1	-6.0	-4.5	
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.7	5.0	5.4	1.3	8.2	2.9	
Côte d'Ivoire*+	9.3	7.6	0.1	2.8	-2.3	-0.9	
Djibouti	—	—	—	-1.4	0.7	—	
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	20.0	16.9	1.3	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	5.3	-12.1	9.7	
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.9	4.3	5.4	7.7	
Gabon+	4.5	11.3	0.7	2.7	2.0	2.5	
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.7	3.6	3.3	5.6	6.0	
Ghana*	1.3	0.4	2.0	4.2	3.7	4.0	
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.1	2.3	3.6	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	3.4	3.2	1.4	7.5	0.2	
Kenya*	7.9	6.9	4.0	2.0	-0.2	1.1	
Lesotho	3.3	9.8	4.1	4.1	3.3	4.0	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	4.8	0.6	0.3	2.1	4.8	6.0	
Malawi*	5.3	6.2	2.1	3.6	1.7	-1.5	
Mali*+	2.0	4.9	0.2	3.5	4.5	-1.1	
Mauritania*	4.4	1.9	1.9	4.0	5.1	4.6	
Mauritius	—	—	5.2	5.2	5.3	2.6	
Mozambique*	—	—	-0.9	6.2	1.6	13.9	
Namibia	—	—	1.0	4.5	3.3	2.7	
Niger*+	-1.0	0.6	-0.6	2.2	-1.4	7.6	
Nigeria	-2.0	5.5	0.2	2.7	3.8	3.9	
Rwanda*	7.8	4.5	2.8	0.0	6.0	6.7	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.8	3.0	3.0	
Senegal*+	0.7	2.7	2.9	3.6	5.6	5.7	
Seychelles	—	—	—	1.6	-5.4	-8.1	
Sierra Leone*	2.6	2.1	0.8	-4.3	3.8	5.4	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	5.5	3.1	1.4	1.9	3.4	2.2	
Sudan	0.6	5.5	0.7	6.2	6.1	6.9	
Swaziland	—	5.3	5.9	3.3	2.2	1.6	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.2	5.2	5.7	
Togo*+	7.2	3.5	1.7	1.8	-1.9	2.7	
Uganda*	—	—	2.3	6.8	3.5	4.6	
Zambia*	1.4	1.8	1.1	0.7	3.6	4.9	
Zimbabwe	5.8	2.7	4.0	1.9	-4.9	-8.4	
North Africa	5.2	6.5	4.2	3.4	3.5	4.3	
All Africa	4.5	4.4	2.4	2.7	3.2	3.4	
Comparator countries	3.8	4.7	7.9	7.8	6.4	6.1	
China	2.0	4.8	10.6	10.0	7.9	7.3	
India	4.6	3.4	5.7	5.9	3.9	4.5	
Indonesia	5.9	7.8	5.8	3.8	4.9	3.3	
South Asia	4.6	3.4	5.6	5.5	4.2	4.4	
East Asia	4.2	6.1	7.5	7.5	6.9	5.5	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA		1.2				
	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.5	0.8	-1.2	-0.3	0.6	0.6
Excluding South Africa	-0.3	1.5	-0.9	0.1	0.3	1.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.9	1.2	-0.5	0.2	0.1	0.9
Angola	—	—	0.2	-1.8	0.1	0.3
Benin*+	0.6	-0.5	0.0	1.8	3.1	2.3
Botswana	6.1	11.1	7.1	2.4	6.8	5.1
Burkina Faso*+	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.9	-0.3	3.1
Burundi*	2.5	2.0	1.6	-4.1	-2.8	1.3
Cameroon*+	-2.1	4.2	1.9	-1.0	2.0	3.1
Cape Verde	—	2.7	8.2	3.2	4.0	0.6
Central African Republic*+	1.4	0.2	-1.3	-0.6	0.9	0.1
Chad*+	-0.7	-1.7	3.3	-0.6	-2.1	5.8
Comoros*+	—	—	0.3	-1.4	-3.6	-0.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.0	-2.5	-1.1	-8.1	-8.5	-7.1
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.0	2.1	2.4	-1.7	5.2	0.1
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.1	3.4	-3.5	-0.2	-4.9	-3.3
Djibouti	—	—	—	-4.4	-1.3	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	16.9	13.8	-1.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	2.5	-14.3	6.9
Ethiopia*	—	—	-2.1	2.0	2.9	5.2
Gabon+	4.4	7.8	-2.2	0.0	-0.6	0.0
Gambia, The*	1.6	2.3	0.0	-0.1	2.3	3.0
Ghana*	-0.5	-1.9	-1.4	1.8	1.3	1.9
Guinea*	—	—	—	1.5	0.1	1.3
Guinea-Bissau*	—	0.7	0.9	-0.9	5.2	-2.0
Kenya*	4.4	3.1	0.4	-0.6	-2.4	-1.0
Lesotho	1.2	7.5	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.6
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	-2.0	-2.3	-0.8	1.6	3.0
Malawi*	2.7	3.0	-1.1	1.5	-0.4	-3.5
Mali*+	-0.4	2.8	-2.2	0.9	2.1	-3.4
Mauritania*	2.1	-0.5	-0.7	1.0	1.6	1.4
Mauritius	—	—	4.3	4.0	4.2	1.5
Mozambique*	—	—	-2.5	3.8	-0.6	11.5
Namibia	—	—	-2.2	2.0	1.0	0.7
Niger*+	-3.7	-2.3	-3.7	-1.2	-4.6	4.2
Nigeria	-4.6	2.6	-2.8	-0.1	1.3	1.5
Rwanda*	4.4	1.2	-0.3	-1.9	3.5	4.5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	-0.7	0.8	0.9
Senegal*+	-2.0	-0.2	0.1	0.9	2.9	3.2
Seychelles	—	—	—	0.1	-6.8	-9.4
Sierra Leone*	0.8	0.1	-1.2	-6.4	1.8	3.3
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	3.3	0.9	-1.1	-0.1	1.7	1.2
Sudan	-1.8	2.5	-1.9	3.8	4.2	4.9
Swaziland	—	2.2	2.7	0.2	-0.3	-0.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	0.3	2.7	3.4
Togo*+	2.6	1.3	-1.6	-0.9	-4.9	-0.1
Uganda*	—	—	-0.1	3.5	0.8	2.0
Zambia*	-1.5	-1.3	-2.0	-1.9	1.4	2.9
Zimbabwe	2.4	-0.6	0.2	-0.2	-6.7	-9.8
North Africa	2.5	3.9	1.5	1.4	1.7	2.6
All Africa	1.8	1.6	-0.4	0.2	0.9	1.1
Comparator countries	2.2	3.5	4.9	4.5	4.4	3.7
China	-0.7	2.9	9.0	8.9	7.2	6.5
India	2.2	1.0	3.4	4.0	2.0	2.7
Indonesia	3.5	5.2	3.9	2.1	3.2	1.8
South Asia	2.1	1.0	3.3	3.5	2.3	2.5
East Asia	1.5	4.0	5.8	6.2	5.9	4.5

— Not available.
 * SPA country.
 + CFA country.
 Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS		1.3					
	Percentage of GDP						
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001	
Sub-Saharan Africa	17.0	20.9	18.2	16.2	18.7	17.3	
Excluding South Africa	14.5	19.9	14.7	15.0	19.3	17.1	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	15.8	18.8	13.1	12.8	15.6	14.9	
Angola	—	—	24.0	29.5	63.1	45.7	
Benin*+	1.2	0.5	-2.4	4.2	5.9	6.5	
Botswana	2.3	25.2	35.3	39.2	39.0	38.2	
Burkina Faso*+	1.1	3.0	-1.0	8.6	7.3	9.6	
Burundi*	5.0	3.3	3.1	-3.3	-5.7	-4.8	
Cameroon*+	11.3	18.3	24.1	19.1	20.3	20.5	
Cape Verde	—	-29.0	-5.8	-7.4	-19.0	-13.5	
Central African Republic*+	7.2	4.2	-1.1	4.7	7.8	11.2	
Chad*+	10.3	6.2	-8.1	-0.8	1.5	0.8	
Comoros*+	—	—	-4.5	-3.8	-1.4	-0.2	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0.0	0.0	45.3	8.3	5.4	6.2	
Congo, Rep. of*+	5.0	12.0	31.9	33.9	57.7	61.1	
Côte d'Ivoire*+	29.0	27.4	19.6	16.8	17.3	16.9	
Djibouti	—	—	—	-5.4	-5.3	—	
Equatorial Guinea*+	29.4	8.1	-33.3	29.4	74.0	90.4	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	-34.4	-28.4	-19.2	
Ethiopia*	—	—	6.8	4.8	-0.1	2.2	
Gabon+	—	54.3	44.3	41.3	28.3	50.3	
Gambia, The*	0.6	2.3	6.5	4.4	2.7	0.9	
Ghana*	9.2	10.2	4.8	7.7	3.3	5.8	
Guinea*	—	—	16.4	15.0	16.9	20.4	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	-6.7	-0.9	-0.8	-10.5	-11.2	
Kenya*	19.1	20.2	16.1	12.3	3.8	4.2	
Lesotho	-29.1	-57.8	-65.4	-33.1	-20.2	-14.8	
Liberia	38.5	33.5	16.5	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	3.7	4.2	2.9	5.2	7.7	12.3	
Malawi*	1.5	14.4	12.7	2.8	0.5	-1.0	
Mali*+	7.9	2.2	-0.4	7.8	7.3	9.4	
Mauritania*	32.8	5.7	3.1	9.1	18.4	14.0	
Mauritius	—	20.4	19.4	24.2	23.8	23.7	
Mozambique*	—	—	-10.3	-2.7	11.9	19.2	
Namibia	—	—	18.1	10.6	12.3	11.9	
Niger*+	2.6	6.7	7.3	2.8	3.3	3.2	
Nigeria	8.4	22.7	17.5	25.0	34.0	26.9	
Rwanda*	2.0	6.0	5.0	-4.3	1.4	1.9	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	2.7	-16.2	-16.8	-3.6	2.0	
Senegal*+	5.3	7.8	0.1	10.3	10.8	12.0	
Seychelles	—	26.9	24.1	20.7	26.2	8.3	
Sierra Leone*	—	—	13.6	0.3	-8.1	-12.3	
Somalia	5.0	0.3	-6.3	-12.5	—	—	
South Africa	21.7	22.4	23.6	17.5	17.7	17.5	
Sudan	12.2	9.6	5.0	13.7	20.0	13.9	
Swaziland	24.6	30.7	9.8	4.6	4.5	6.3	
Tanzania*	—	—	8.8	2.7	9.2	8.3	
Togo*+	24.2	27.7	12.3	6.8	4.1	3.6	
Uganda*	13.6	10.0	2.3	4.4	6.9	6.1	
Zambia*	43.2	33.2	14.0	7.4	8.3	9.8	
Zimbabwe	16.8	19.2	16.5	15.8	14.8	9.8	
North Africa	27.1	32.7	28.4	21.5	25.1	24.9	
All Africa	19.3	24.0	21.8	18.0	21.1	20.3	
Comparator countries	10.0	24.7	28.7	30.4	28.9	28.9	
China	—	30.5	34.7	40.7	39.9	40.0	
India	15.2	18.7	19.8	21.1	21.4	21.3	
Indonesia	4.8	25.0	31.6	29.4	25.2	25.5	
South Asia	13.8	15.8	16.8	19.2	19.7	19.4	
East Asia	—	27.8	31.6	36.2	35.7	35.2	

— Not available.
 * SPA countries.
 + CFA countries
 Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT		1.4				
	Percentage of GDP					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.2	20.4	17.3	17.0	17.5	18.4
Excluding South Africa	14.3	20.3	16.7	18.6	19.1	20.1
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	14.6	18.5	16.4	18.2	18.2	18.3
Angola	—	—	14.8	24.7	35.4	34.0
Benin*+	10.9	15.5	15.1	16.8	18.9	19.2
Botswana	24.0	41.4	30.0	27.8	17.0	22.0
Burkina Faso*+	9.6	21.3	19.7	24.4	25.5	25.4
Burundi*	7.2	8.2	16.6	11.2	9.1	6.9
Cameroon*+	12.7	21.4	23.8	16.4	16.4	17.8
Cape Verde	—	38.0	43.5	27.8	19.3	17.8
Central African Republic*+	19.4	15.0	10.9	11.6	10.8	14.0
Chad*+	14.3	14.9	6.3	15.5	17.0	42.6
Comoros*+	—	—	28.8	17.0	13.1	13.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	12.3	16.4	11.7	12.3	4.2	5.1
Congo, Rep. of*+	28.1	29.7	32.5	25.6	21.0	27.2
Côte d'Ivoire*+	20.2	24.1	16.5	10.7	10.6	9.9
Djibouti	—	—	—	10.7	12.9	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	17.0	17.2	0.0	53.6	37.5	15.0
Eritrea*	—	—	—	24.0	35.7	35.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	14.3	14.8	15.3	18.0
Gabon+	—	46.4	34.6	26.1	26.1	30.5
Gambia, The*	9.5	12.0	19.7	19.6	17.0	17.9
Ghana*	12.8	10.2	7.8	21.3	23.7	24.0
Guinea*	—	—	16.1	18.6	22.1	22.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	21.3	32.0	24.6	16.0	21.7
Kenya*	18.5	23.6	20.3	16.1	13.7	12.8
Lesotho	11.0	21.9	39.8	52.7	39.5	36.8
Liberia	18.4	25.6	14.0	—	—	—
Madagascar*	9.1	9.8	10.6	12.9	15.0	15.5
Malawi*	15.9	27.2	19.4	16.7	12.5	10.9
Mali*+	17.3	15.5	17.2	22.5	22.6	22.2
Mauritania*	14.4	19.8	27.5	20.6	30.3	26.7
Mauritius	—	30.1	23.5	28.4	26.0	25.7
Mozambique*	—	—	8.1	23.9	39.6	41.6
Namibia	—	—	17.4	22.5	24.0	24.5
Niger*+	8.1	15.6	15.3	9.2	10.8	11.5
Nigeria	13.5	22.9	16.5	20.7	22.7	27.6
Rwanda*	8.3	11.7	15.3	15.0	17.5	18.4
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	10.2	15.8	42.5	43.5	49.9
Senegal*+	8.2	14.6	12.1	17.1	19.8	20.0
Seychelles	—	—	22.1	30.7	30.6	37.2
Sierra Leone*	—	—	12.2	6.5	8.0	7.9
Somalia	11.8	20.4	28.8	15.5	—	—
South Africa	20.5	20.8	18.9	14.7	14.8	15.0
Sudan	12.7	15.1	14.3	18.2	17.7	17.7
Swaziland	21.3	27.4	26.7	21.7	19.8	18.6
Tanzania*	—	—	16.8	20.4	17.6	17.0
Togo*+	15.1	28.1	19.5	17.9	20.9	20.7
Uganda*	12.7	9.7	8.5	16.5	19.8	20.0
Zambia*	28.7	30.2	16.1	15.0	18.7	20.0
Zimbabwe	16.8	18.9	17.3	17.8	12.6	7.8
North Africa	18.4	27.2	29.0	24.4	24.3	24.4
All Africa	16.1	21.7	21.1	19.5	20.1	20.7
Comparator countries	15.7	24.0	28.8	29.2	25.3	26.8
China	21.7	30.6	35.4	38.3	37.3	39.1
India	16.1	19.7	22.6	23.6	24.0	24.2
Indonesia	9.2	21.6	28.3	25.6	14.6	17.0
South Asia	15.7	18.2	21.6	22.7	22.9	22.9
East Asia	19.6	27.7	32.0	34.1	30.0	31.5

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL AGRICULTURAL GROWTH		1.5				
Average annual percentage change in value added						
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	1.9	2.0	2.6	3.2	3.1
Excluding South Africa	—	1.4	1.9	2.9	3.1	3.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	2.1	2.7	2.6	2.9
Angola	—	—	—	-1.3	9.3	18.0
Benin*+	—	1.4	4.6	5.5	6.4	3.1
Botswana	12.0	8.9	0.6	-1.0	-2.2	3.4
Burkina Faso*+	—	1.2	3.6	3.7	-3.8	7.0
Burundi*	-1.9	4.1	3.1	-0.9	3.8	3.8
Cameroon*+	5.4	3.5	2.8	5.0	4.5	5.5
Cape Verde	—	15.9	14.2	4.3	3.6	1.5
Central African Republic*+	2.5	2.2	1.5	3.6	6.2	4.0
Chad*+	2.2	-0.5	2.7	3.9	-3.5	4.1
Comoros*+	—	—	4.0	3.0	15.3	3.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.7	2.5	0.9	-2.8	-5.4
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.2	2.6	3.5	1.1	5.4	7.7
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.2	2.4	0.0	3.1	12.9	-1.6
Djibouti	—	—	—	0.6	2.0	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	6.5	9.4	5.9
Eritrea*	—	—	—	1.2	-43.2	35.7
Ethiopia*	—	—	-0.4	2.4	2.2	11.5
Gabon+	—	—	1.5	-1.0	3.7	4.3
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.0	0.8	4.5	12.0	12.0
Ghana*	2.8	-0.1	0.6	3.2	2.1	3.7
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.1	-1.0	2.4
Guinea-Bissau*	—	1.1	3.2	3.7	4.0	1.2
Kenya*	8.1	4.8	3.2	1.2	-2.0	1.2
Lesotho	—	2.1	0.6	1.3	-1.9	-1.6
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.2	2.2	1.9	0.8	4.0
Malawi*	-1.2	4.9	1.5	6.6	5.7	-8.5
Mali*+	-1.5	4.0	2.2	2.5	5.5	-12.0
Mauritania*	-1.3	-1.7	2.7	4.5	2.8	-0.2
Mauritius	—	—	3.7	-0.3	0.6	-23.3
Mozambique*	—	—	7.3	4.3	-10.3	14.0
Namibia	—	—	2.0	4.4	11.4	-0.4
Niger*+	0.2	-4.6	1.7	3.0	-8.4	14.7
Nigeria	-4.1	0.9	2.2	3.6	5.2	5.1
Rwanda*	4.7	7.3	0.8	2.7	9.1	8.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	3.7	2.6	2.7
Senegal*+	0.9	2.1	1.8	2.3	11.5	6.9
Seychelles	—	—	-2.5	-0.8	2.0	1.5
Sierra Leone*	1.8	4.9	3.5	-5.5	2.2	3.8
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.5	2.9	2.6	0.2	3.8	1.0
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	—	-2.1	2.1	0.9	-2.3	1.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.4	3.4	5.5
Togo*+	6.2	0.9	5.7	3.6	-4.6	4.8
Uganda*	—	—	1.5	3.8	4.1	4.9
Zambia*	0.9	2.7	3.6	3.2	1.4	-2.4
Zimbabwe	—	1.2	2.8	3.6	3.0	-12.0
North Africa	4.2	2.7	4.0	1.9	-3.9	—
All Africa	2.4	2.1	2.6	2.4	1.1	4.8
Comparator countries	3.4	2.2	4.5	3.3	1.4	2.0
China	1.6	2.2	6.1	4.0	2.4	2.3
India	5.2	1.7	2.9	2.9	-0.2	2.0
Indonesia	4.2	3.9	3.5	1.9	1.7	0.6
South Asia	4.9	1.6	3.0	3.0	1.3	1.4
East Asia	2.7	3.1	4.8	3.2	2.4	2.0

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL INDUSTRIAL GROWTH		1.6					
Average annual percentage change in value added							
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001	
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.7	3.9	1.2	1.5	3.2	2.9	
Excluding South Africa	—	5.0	1.4	2.2	4.1	3.8	
Excluding South Africa & Nigeria	—	—	3.8	2.5	3.2	4.6	
Angola	—	—	—	3.4	3.5	4.1	
Benin*+	—	1.5	4.2	4.5	8.9	9.1	
Botswana	18.3	23.6	14.0	3.9	14.4	8.3	
Burkina Faso*+	—	2.8	4.1	4.1	7.8	3.3	
Burundi*	—	6.4	5.1	–3.8	4.1	16.1	
Cameroon*+	6.3	7.7	8.8	–0.9	5.0	6.5	
Cape Verde	—	3.0	13.3	5.0	12.2	4.5	
Central African Republic*+	7.9	4.6	1.3	0.8	9.1	4.0	
Chad*+	1.6	0.9	7.4	2.2	0.5	12.4	
Comoros*+	—	—	–2.3	6.5	47.5	1.0	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.3	2.4	–9.2	–1.7	3.8	
Congo, Rep. of*+	9.3	10.0	6.8	3.0	4.4	–1.9	
Côte d'Ivoire*+	10.4	9.8	4.8	3.5	–9.5	–2.4	
Djibouti	—	—	—	–5.3	1.0	—	
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	45.6	20.1	–1.4	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	12.8	–6.4	6.4	
Ethiopia*	—	—	1.2	4.3	1.8	5.8	
Gabon+	—	—	0.4	2.6	1.7	2.0	
Gambia, The*	2.6	5.1	4.0	2.4	5.0	9.0	
Ghana*	5.2	0.1	1.1	2.8	3.8	4.0	
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.5	4.8	4.9	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	2.1	0.7	–2.2	4.0	6.5	
Kenya*	8.7	9.6	3.7	1.7	–1.2	0.7	
Lesotho	—	28.5	4.4	7.4	16.8	7.9	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	—	0.3	–0.6	2.4	5.6	7.6	
Malawi*	5.4	6.7	2.1	2.0	–0.5	1.1	
Mali*+	1.9	2.3	4.6	7.1	7.5	20.0	
Mauritania*	7.7	0.9	4.4	2.1	6.7	1.4	
Mauritius	—	—	7.6	5.7	4.8	5.8	
Mozambique*	—	—	–4.5	13.1	4.3	34.1	
Namibia	—	—	–0.4	2.2	–0.6	1.6	
Niger*+	4.9	11.6	–1.6	1.9	2.0	2.4	
Nigeria	0.1	10.4	–2.7	1.4	6.7	1.4	
Rwanda*	2.1	3.8	3.8	–3.3	3.4	7.6	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.6	3.4	4.2	
Senegal*+	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.8	7.3	6.8	
Seychelles	—	—	3.3	8.9	2.5	3.0	
Sierra Leone*	–1.0	–2.5	0.0	–3.9	5.1	5.6	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	5.1	2.7	1.0	0.8	2.3	2.0	
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Swaziland	—	7.4	8.6	3.9	1.2	1.6	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.5	7.3	6.5	
Togo*+	10.7	7.1	0.6	2.1	5.0	0.2	
Uganda*	—	—	4.4	11.5	6.5	5.4	
Zambia*	1.8	2.0	0.8	–3.2	2.9	9.2	
Zimbabwe	—	2.0	2.6	–0.2	–9.8	–9.8	
North Africa	8.1	5.7	3.0	3.4	7.0	—	
All Africa	5.8	4.5	1.8	2.2	4.7	2.7	
Comparator countries	4.9	7.4	9.4	10.5	8.6	7.4	
China	2.3	8.0	11.6	13.1	9.6	8.7	
India	4.6	4.5	6.7	6.3	6.3	4.5	
Indonesia	12.8	10.7	6.8	4.8	5.9	3.3	
South Asia	4.5	4.6	6.6	6.1	5.7	4.6	
East Asia	6.0	8.8	8.4	10.1	8.9	6.6	

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

	GDP DEFLATOR					
	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–01	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.2	12.2	11.2	9.4	10.4	7.1
Excluding South Africa	5.7	13.4	10.1	9.5	13.9	6.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.7	13.6	9.3	9.1	10.3	9.3
Angola	—	—	—	606.4	408.0	127.7
Benin*+	1.9	9.4	2.8	7.8	3.2	3.1
Botswana	2.7	10.0	12.6	8.9	7.4	4.4
Burkina Faso*+	0.4	8.4	4.3	4.1	3.2	4.8
Burundi*	0.9	10.7	4.5	11.9	22.6	13.4
Cameroon*+	9.5	8.5	7.3	4.7	1.1	3.0
Cape Verde	—	8.1	12.1	4.7	0.3	4.0
Central African Republic*+	4.4	10.3	9.7	4.1	2.4	3.0
Chad*+	3.2	7.2	2.2	6.5	3.4	7.7
Comoros*+	—	—	7.3	3.6	7.2	9.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37.9	24.6	57.3	889.4	630.1	386.6
Congo, Rep. of*+	3.9	8.2	2.6	8.0	46.2	-14.5
Côte d'Ivoire*+	2.5	11.9	4.8	7.8	-0.2	2.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	3.9	2.4	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	15.3	52.2	39.8
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.0	19.3	13.7
Ethiopia*	—	—	5.0	6.5	1.7	-7.0
Gabon+	5.6	15.8	3.4	5.6	28.5	-11.7
Gambia, The*	0.9	10.4	16.4	4.5	3.7	7.2
Ghana*	6.2	29.4	45.6	26.5	27.2	34.6
Guinea*	—	—	—	6.4	8.9	5.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	5.7	49.1	30.9	3.3	-5.1
Kenya*	1.5	9.6	9.4	13.5	7.7	11.3
Lesotho	3.1	8.4	12.6	9.7	8.6	5.7
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	9.3	17.9	17.8	7.2	9.0
Malawi*	1.8	8.7	14.5	31.4	25.2	26.1
Mali*+	12.0	9.2	6.1	6.4	-1.1	5.2
Mauritania*	1.2	9.3	8.7	6.2	10.7	5.4
Mauritius	—	—	9.5	7.0	5.0	6.1
Mozambique*	—	—	36.2	31.3	11.7	11.3
Namibia	—	—	13.6	8.8	11.3	9.2
Niger*+	-0.1	9.3	3.9	5.3	4.5	4.0
Nigeria	2.5	16.4	15.1	27.2	25.4	6.0
Rwanda*	17.0	14.4	3.9	13.4	3.3	0.2
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	46.3	7.8	8.6
Senegal*+	1.7	7.9	7.7	4.1	0.7	2.9
Seychelles	—	—	—	3.9	8.0	6.7
Sierra Leone*	3.4	11.4	49.9	33.3	6.2	6.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	4.5	11.9	15.5	9.9	7.0	7.5
Sudan	5.7	13.9	36.8	59.5	4.8	4.8
Swaziland	—	11.9	10.8	12.3	12.5	8.4
Tanzania*	—	—	—	20.8	7.4	6.6
Togo*+	2.6	8.8	5.9	6.4	1.3	3.4
Uganda*	—	—	116.0	13.0	5.9	7.4
Zambia*	13.8	5.5	33.5	53.8	30.0	24.3
Zimbabwe	1.6	7.8	11.2	27.5	59.9	70.1
North Africa	2.1	8.7	9.7	6.3	4.1	2.8
All Africa	3.2	12.2	11.2	9.0	7.4	9.7
Comparator countries	58.5	18.8	8.6	15.6	10.9	12.3
China	-0.4	1.1	5.6	6.2	0.9	0.0
India	6.6	8.3	8.0	7.7	4.1	6.0
Indonesia	194.5	20.5	8.6	15.8	11.1	12.6
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL GNP PER CAPITA					1.8
	Average annual percentage change			Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average GNP per capita (millions of 1995 US\$) 1999–2001
	1970–88	1989–2001	2001		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.5	-0.3	1.7	652 (1974–76)	542.8
Excluding South Africa	-0.5	0.0	1.1	352 (1976–78)	308.9
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	0.0	1.0	351 (1980–82)	330.2
Angola	—	-1.8	4.4	666 (1980–82)	417.7
Benin*+	0.4	1.6	1.9	410 (1999–2001)	410.3
Botswana	7.0	2.4	4.6	3,848 (1999–2001)	3,848.2
Burkina Faso*+	1.1	1.8	3.1	245 (1999–2001)	245.0
Burundi*	1.5	-3.9	2.0	206 (1990–92)	138.6
Cameroon*+	4.8	-1.8	4.1	971 (1985–87)	638.7
Cape Verde	10.1	2.8	2.1	1,503 (1999–2001)	1,503.4
Central African Republic*+	-1.2	-0.8	1.0	471 (1976–78)	334.4
Chad*+	-1.4	-0.7	5.9	260 (1970–72)	220.6
Comoros*+	—	-1.4	0.4	441 (1983–85)	361.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	-2.6	-9.2	—	364 (1972–74)	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	3.7	-4.0	-1.3	1,013 (1984–86)	545.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	-1.3	0.0	-2.2	1,136 (1977–79)	685.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	8.1	—	700 (1997–99)	-689.2
Eritrea*	—	2.5	6.6	162 (1997–99)	147.0
Ethiopia*	—	1.6	5.3	117 (1981–83)	114.5
Gabon+	-0.2	-0.4	0.5	7,309 (1975–77)	3,792.4
Gambia, The*	1.0	0.0	2.6	381 (1976–78)	369.1
Ghana*	-2.5	1.7	3.2	466 (1970–72)	405.9
Guinea*	—	1.8	0.7	592 (1999–2001)	592.2
Guinea-Bissau*	-0.2	-1.4	5.1	226 (1995–97)	176.9
Kenya*	1.4	-0.1	-1.0	339 (1996–98)	326.5
Lesotho	4.7	-0.4	1.7	730 (1995–97)	685.7
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-2.6	-0.5	3.5	386 (1970–72)	242.6
Malawi*	0.2	1.2	-3.1	164 (1998–2000)	163.4
Mali*+	-0.1	0.9	-3.8	309 (1977–79)	277.7
Mauritania*	-0.8	1.4	7.1	490 (1999–2001)	490.2
Mauritius	—	4.1	1.1	3,775 (1999–2001)	3,775.0
Mozambique*	—	3.7	9.4	186 (1999–2001)	186.1
Namibia	—	2.4	1.2	2,447 (1999–2001)	2,446.7
Niger*+	-2.4	-1.4	4.3	385 (1970–72)	203.9
Nigeria	-1.7	0.5	1.5	294 (1977–79)	228.1
Rwanda*	1.7	-2.3	4.1	330 (1981–83)	240.9
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	-0.7	-0.9	342 (1986–88)	308.9
Senegal*+	-0.6	0.9	3.4	604 (1970–72)	598.5
Seychelles	—	-0.2	-4.5	6,956 (1996–98)	6,161.6
Sierra Leone*	-0.4	-5.5	3.3	345 (1980–82)	150.0
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.0	-0.1	3.6	4,490 (1980–82)	3,912.7
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	2.9	0.3	-0.8	1,644 (1995–97)	1,574.4
Tanzania*	—	0.6	3.8	189 (1999–2001)	189.4
Togo*+	-0.3	-1.0	0.3	433 (1978–80)	321.2
Uganda*	—	3.7	2.5	350 (1999–2001)	350.3
Zambia*	-2.7	-1.8	3.6	669 (1970–72)	382.4
Zimbabwe	-0.8	-0.2	-9.2	703 (1972–74)	585.8
North Africa	2.8	1.4	2.8	1,545 (1999–2001)	1,545.4
All Africa	0.4	0.1	2.0	730 (1980–82)	716.1
Comparator countries	5.7	6.9	5.5	452 (1999–2001)	451.9
China	6.4	8.5	6.3	733 (1999–2001)	732.9
India	—	—	—	—	—
Indonesia	4.4	2.5	4.1	1,070 (1995–97)	949.6
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	5.2	5.7	4.8	1,231 (1999–2001)	1,230.5

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA		1.9		
Average annual production of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses (kilograms)				
	1974–79	1980–89	1990–2001	
Sub-Saharan Africa	350.9	320.5	378.2	
Excluding South Africa	338.8	312.4	381.9	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	319.8	294.0	301.2	
Angola	320.3	232.3	273.0	
Benin*+	516.1	499.9	688.1	
Botswana	119.5	56.7	45.7	
Burkina Faso*+	199.9	212.8	247.3	
Burundi*	384.8	380.8	327.2	
Cameroon*+	366.9	292.8	305.1	
Cape Verde	40.6	85.5	69.8	
Central African Republic*+	555.0	400.9	326.0	
Chad*+	240.4	226.2	242.6	
Comoros*+	—	191.0	193.6	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	555.9	561.4	461.0	
Congo, Rep. of*+	419.0	403.2	304.4	
Côte d'Ivoire*+	559.8	497.1	458.0	
Djibouti	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Equatorial Guinea*+	241.7	225.1	252.9	
Eritrea*	0.0	0.0	73.3	
Ethiopia*	0.0	0.0	158.4	
Gabon+	500.5	459.6	399.9	
Gambia, The*	107.9	136.0	112.2	
Ghana*	406.2	400.8	684.0	
Guinea*	335.0	263.3	271.6	
Guinea-Bissau*	186.3	241.6	232.4	
Kenya*	293.3	220.9	182.3	
Lesotho	192.5	130.9	149.0	
Liberia	338.4	308.1	177.0	
Madagascar*	516.1	514.6	441.3	
Malawi*	384.7	300.1	361.6	
Mali*+	202.7	216.7	251.8	
Mauritania*	49.0	74.9	87.4	
Mauritius	13.8	20.4	15.6	
Mozambique*	381.5	339.8	366.3	
Namibia	270.2	254.9	206.5	
Niger*+	355.0	340.4	310.0	
Nigeria	414.3	384.5	694.7	
Rwanda*	390.6	379.9	270.0	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	162.4	123.6	163.2	
Senegal*+	178.9	156.6	127.7	
Seychelles	3.3	2.2	2.0	
Sierra Leone*	247.0	199.4	157.4	
Somalia	59.9	81.5	46.4	
South Africa	501.7	426.8	325.5	
Sudan	183.8	152.1	154.0	
Swaziland	228.0	196.5	126.8	
Tanzania*	501.7	528.4	392.1	
Togo*+	482.7	424.3	445.3	
Uganda*	538.6	449.0	414.7	
Zambia*	345.8	252.1	219.3	
Zimbabwe	351.2	298.9	203.6	
North Africa	226.3	215.0	248.6	
All Africa	327.2	300.9	355.2	
Comparator countries	356.7	374.5	394.9	
China	440.8	462.8	490.7	
India	241.8	253.6	272.0	
Indonesia	314.7	369.0	393.8	
South Asia	—	—	—	
East Asia	—	—	—	

— Not available

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization data.

REAL EXPORT GROWTH					2.1	
	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1999–2001
	1970–88	1989–2001	2000	2001		
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.4	4.4	3.3	4.2	113,617 (1999–2001)	113,616.9
Excluding South Africa	2.1	4.1	0.2	4.9	69,528 (1999–2001)	69,528.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.1	4.1	0.7	4.7	56,577 (1999–2001)	56,577.2
Angola	—	6.2	–3.9	0.2	5,248 (1998–2000)	5,201.6
Benin*+	2.4	3.9	8.1	7.8	522 (1999–2001)	521.6
Botswana	14.0	3.6	17.2	7.8	3,195 (1999–2001)	3,194.5
Burkina Faso*+	3.8	0.9	–9.8	0.1	393 (1998–2000)	363.0
Burundi*	3.2	9.0	31.7	19.9	270 (1999–2001)	269.8
Cameroon*+	10.0	2.3	–5.0	1.9	3,160 (1999–2001)	3,160.4
Cape Verde	7.1	11.2	29.2	14.1	152 (1999–2001)	152.2
Central African Republic*+	2.1	9.1	28.2	–9.5	288 (1998–2000)	276.8
Chad*+	0.3	0.7	13.4	–0.2	289 (1995–97)	277.4
Comoros*+	—	0.5	20.4	10.7	55 (1992–94)	41.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.2	–2.3	–3.7	2.0	3,433 (1987–89)	2,633.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	7.0	3.9	3.6	5.0	1,690 (1999–2001)	1,689.9
Côte d'Ivoire*+	6.0	2.2	–6.7	–1.2	4,629 (1997–99)	4,472.2
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	42.2	23.3	12.8	628 (1999–2001)	628.2
Eritrea*	—	–0.6	47.7	55.3	173 (1995–97)	117.0
Ethiopia*	—	5.8	23.6	–1.6	1,240 (1999–2001)	1,239.6
Gabon+	3.8	3.0	–3.6	1.7	2,973 (1996–98)	2,648.7
Gambia, The*	3.7	1.9	9.9	20.5	240 (1999–2001)	239.9
Ghana*	–5.7	9.9	–2.3	0.3	2,869 (1999–2001)	2,868.9
Guinea*	—	4.2	3.0	3.3	983 (1999–2001)	982.6
Guinea-Bissau*	0.3	15.5	33.4	6.6	88 (1999–2001)	87.5
Kenya*	1.2	2.9	8.9	6.8	3,124 (1993–95)	3,063.1
Lesotho	6.8	9.2	–6.7	40.4	325 (1999–2001)	325.2
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	–2.5	4.3	15.4	6.0	951 (1999–2001)	951.3
Malawi*	3.6	3.8	–5.7	3.7	562 (1997–99)	522.6
Mali*+	6.9	8.5	–3.6	–5.1	831 (1999–2001)	831.0
Mauritania*	4.0	0.8	11.9	8.0	544 (1985–87)	520.3
Mauritius	—	5.8	4.8	–2.0	2,647 (1999–2001)	2,646.9
Mozambique*	—	15.0	15.0	60.0	780 (1999–2001)	779.6
Namibia	—	4.5	2.9	4.9	1,965 (1999–2001)	1,965.0
Niger*+	–1.2	2.4	—	—	577 (1976–78)	393.7
Nigeria	–0.4	4.3	–1.6	5.6	14,280 (1996–98)	13,106.2
Rwanda*	7.2	–3.2	9.4	39.9	262 (1985–87)	180.4
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	3.9	8.3	3.8	17 (1999–2001)	17.1
Senegal*+	1.1	2.9	10.5	6.6	1,949 (1999–2001)	1,949.0
Seychelles	—	5.6	14.8	3.2	520 (1999–2001)	519.5
Sierra Leone*	–7.7	–25.6	7.0	13.2	941 (1970–72)	12.5
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.6	4.8	8.2	3.1	44,126 (1999–2001)	44,126.3
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	4.8	2.5	–10.8	10.3	1,155 (1997–99)	1,096.7
Tanzania*	—	9.8	18.4	17.8	1,277 (1999–2001)	1,277.0
Togo*+	4.1	–0.1	–0.9	–1.3	499 (1987–89)	449.2
Uganda*	—	13.0	–0.7	6.2	1,270 (1999–2001)	1,269.6
Zambia*	–1.9	2.6	–14.4	29.0	2,181 (1976–78)	1,730.9
Zimbabwe	5.3	8.1	–16.6	–3.6	3,510 (1998–2000)	3,326.5
North Africa	4.1	4.3	7.4	3.2	71,600 (1999–2001)	71,600.3
All Africa	2.1	4.4	4.6	3.9	181,823 (1999–2001)	181,823.3
Comparator countries	10.2	9.0	26.0	4.2	335,211 (1999–2001)	335,211.0
China	15.8	9.5	32.0	5.0	223,626 (1999–2001)	223,626.4
India	5.3	11.0	5.0	3.3	56,201 (1999–2001)	56,200.7
Indonesia	3.0	5.9	26.5	1.9	62,480 (1996–98)	55,383.9
South Asia	5.3	9.4	6.8	5.1	80,684 (1999–2001)	80,684.3
East Asia	7.8	9.5	22.4	–0.1	546,331 (1999–2001)	546,331.3

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL IMPORT GROWTH

2.2

	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1999–2001
	1970–88	1989–2001	2000	2001		
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.5	4.6	5.4	7.9	123,814 1999–2001)	123,813.8
Excluding South Africa	-0.7	4.0	4.5	7.2	85,447 1999–2001)	85,447.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	3.5	1.6	3.9	66,946 1999–2001)	66,946.1
Angola	—	6.9	5.8	5.1	4,484 1999–2001)	4,483.8
Benin*+	1.5	3.4	7.4	5.6	947 1979–81)	800.0
Botswana	7.1	4.4	4.5	7.8	2,926 1999–2001)	2,926.2
Burkina Faso*+	4.9	1.7	-12.6	1.0	837 1998–2000)	779.8
Burundi*	6.4	2.6	40.3	-5.7	386 1999–2001)	386.3
Cameroon*+	8.0	4.2	16.1	11.7	2,957 1999–2001)	2,957.3
Cape Verde	6.4	7.5	14.0	-4.4	390 1999–2001)	390.2
Central African Republic*+	1.8	-3.6	13.4	-6.2	307 1990–92)	186.2
Chad*+	1.3	-1.1	8.1	166.9	683 1999–2001)	683.4
Comoros*+	—	1.4	-5.1	6.1	103 1995–97)	99.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.9	-4.3	17.2	10.0	4,463 1987–89)	2,994.7
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.6	2.0	3.8	0.7	2,427 1982–84)	1,618.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	3.5	2.1	-1.4	-4.0	4,170 1978–80)	3,775.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	29.2	7.8	-64.9	939 1998–2000)	807.7
Eritrea*	—	6.5	-14.1	6.4	611 1997–99)	589.9
Ethiopia*	—	4.2	6.3	-1.8	2,096 1999–2001)	2,096.4
Gabon+	7.2	0.3	2.3	2.3	2,884 1983–85)	1,963.9
Gambia, The*	0.9	2.9	8.4	21.8	335 1979–81)	314.4
Ghana*	-4.6	9.6	-17.3	2.0	4,180 1997–99)	4,080.4
Guinea*	—	1.6	3.5	4.0	1,030 1999–2001)	1,030.0
Guinea-Bissau*	-1.4	-0.4	36.0	-5.8	160 1972–74)	118.9
Kenya*	-1.8	6.8	18.1	-1.2	3,674 1999–2001)	3,673.6
Lesotho	8.7	1.5	-1.6	4.9	1,183 1995–97)	967.2
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-4.0	5.2	21.9	11.8	1,749 1970–72)	1,492.3
Malawi*	-1.4	0.1	-16.4	4.7	842 1991–93)	755.6
Mali*+	7.8	2.8	11.9	-6.3	1,120 1999–2001)	1,120.0
Mauritania*	6.4	1.7	14.8	4.8	676 1999–2001)	675.8
Mauritius	—	5.9	6.0	1.3	2,997 1999–2001)	2,996.7
Mozambique*	—	5.7	0.0	3.0	1,701 1999–2001)	1,701.2
Namibia	—	3.1	2.3	6.5	2,359 1999–2001)	2,358.6
Niger*+	2.9	-3.6	—	—	1,163 1980–82)	427.8
Nigeria	3.4	5.8	16.0	18.9	29,965 1980–82)	18,405.2
Rwanda*	9.4	5.3	-11.4	4.0	499 1997–99)	460.5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	-0.4	-1.1	23.8	49 1989–91)	47.1
Senegal*+	2.3	1.8	5.4	5.2	2,307 1999–2001)	2,306.5
Seychelles	—	11.3	-5.7	2.4	596 1999–2001)	596.2
Sierra Leone*	-6.2	-10.7	85.0	61.3	582 1970–72)	74.5
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	-0.6	6.1	7.4	9.2	38,752 1999–2001)	38,752.1
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	6.9	3.8	-8.0	4.7	1,418 1996–98)	1,323.2
Tanzania*	—	1.7	0.1	8.1	2,108 1999–2001)	2,107.7
Togo*+	6.4	-0.5	-2.7	5.5	820 1986–88)	703.7
Uganda*	—	10.4	6.3	0.7	2,199 1999–2001)	2,199.2
Zambia*	-6.3	0.0	-20.1	27.2	3,933 1970–72)	1,382.3
Zimbabwe	3.1	8.2	-21.6	-0.7	3,703 1997–99)	3,272.6
North Africa	5.1	2.8	6.2	4.4	66,881 1999–2001)	66,881.2
All Africa	2.7	4.0	5.6	6.7	190,810 1999–2001)	190,809.6
Comparator countries	14.6	7.8	19.3	10.9	301,678 1999–2001)	301,678.0
China	14.6	7.9	24.8	13.0	187,602 1999–2001)	187,602.2
India	6.9	8.6	5.0	7.0	68,921 1999–2001)	68,921.0
Indonesia	10.4	5.9	21.1	8.1	64,369 1996–98)	45,154.7
South Asia	5.5	7.6	4.9	6.7	101,252 1999–2001)	101,251.5
East Asia	7.7	8.1	20.9	3.4	472,450 1999–2001)	472,450.0

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

	Index (1995=100)					
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-2001	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	103.4	122.5	128.5	102.1	112.3	107.8
Excluding South Africa	—	152.1	142.3	104.4	123.9	115.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	117.8	99.1	110.0	104.9
Angola	—	—	129.5	91.8	125.0	109.1
Benin*+	104.8	96.3	82.1	88.1	82.0	82.2
Botswana	—	91.7	91.5	110.6	142.5	129.8
Burkina Faso*+	81.5	55.1	66.5	89.3	76.2	83.2
Burundi*	120.6	175.5	132.9	74.2	61.1	44.5
Cameroon*+	112.0	108.7	94.6	94.4	110.5	115.5
Cape Verde	—	62.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Central African Republic*+	186.3	158.4	136.1	95.4	51.9	53.9
Chad*+	154.9	140.0	119.1	99.0	79.9	109.5
Comoros*+	—	—	109.5	97.6	115.9	118.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	82.3	85.4	109.6	95.4	125.3	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	251.1	181.1	192.1	123.6	179.0	156.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	170.4	177.8	117.9	97.5	104.4	102.8
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	113.0	122.0	269.6	100.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	97.1	98.6	97.4
Ethiopia*	—	—	90.4	93.6	81.1	79.4
Gabon+	90.3	129.8	191.6	103.5	80.2	112.9
Gambia, The*	153.8	145.4	111.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ghana*	155.0	147.1	135.5	97.0	94.2	100.5
Guinea*	—	—	135.7	101.6	86.1	99.5
Guinea-Bissau*	—	148.6	181.7	103.7	78.0	69.8
Kenya*	123.0	115.6	80.5	92.6	91.9	88.0
Lesotho	99.0	116.0	104.9	98.7	100.0	100.0
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	164.2	160.1	118.0	107.1	126.1	148.4
Malawi*	196.6	213.8	156.2	109.3	94.7	95.6
Mali*+	139.1	104.9	108.5	99.7	88.2	95.2
Mauritania*	115.1	94.4	83.2	100.6	98.0	96.2
Mauritius	—	—	97.3	104.8	108.7	112.6
Mozambique*	—	—	145.1	91.8	76.8	79.1
Namibia	—	—	151.8	97.1	95.7	98.0
Niger*+	102.3	93.7	178.2	102.6	—	—
Nigeria	60.8	151.7	230.9	127.1	180.1	157.0
Rwanda*	55.1	59.4	55.6	81.3	90.5	71.8
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	200.3	113.0	107.7	132.4
Senegal*+	115.2	103.2	101.9	100.0	90.5	91.0
Seychelles	—	—	81.7	91.5	102.2	79.9
Sierra Leone*	63.6	62.7	80.4	159.8	300.8	379.3
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	77.3	98.2	102.4	99.0	95.6	100.0
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	118.5	104.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tanzania*	—	—	139.7	103.0	102.7	95.1
Togo*+	220.5	144.5	130.6	108.7	100.6	106.8
Uganda*	—	—	119.9	75.1	83.7	78.1
Zambia*	284.9	185.0	102.5	72.2	52.5	56.1
Zimbabwe	—	118.5	92.0	101.1	103.1	103.6
North Africa	122.2	157.6	158.1	104.7	115.5	115.7
All Africa	105.1	129.1	136.7	102.9	113.2	110.4
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	123.9	112.1	99.5	89.6	89.8
India	—	123.0	123.1	108.6	102.1	103.4
Indonesia	—	57.2	112.0	102.8	105.1	105.4
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
 * SPA country.
 + CFA country.
 Source: World Bank data.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, VALUE

2.4

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports (millions of current US\$)							
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	557.7	2,314.5	2,064.8	2,893.6	3,035.1	3,129.8	3,469.1	2,929.6
Excluding South Africa	525.3	2,242.6	1,930.6	2,484.5	2,609.3	2,841.1	3,218.4	2,693.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	465.2	1,656.3	1,442.6	2,277.8	2,325.3	2,384.1	2,748.2	2,188.0
Angola	13.8	93.7	43.5	77.4	104.6	82.2	85.0	56.2
Benin*+	4.5	17.0	15.5	70.0	51.5	44.8	25.6	45.3
Botswana	3.7	28.8	22.0	56.9	68.0	62.5	50.8	51.8
Burkina Faso*+	7.4	23.2	36.0	38.7	40.8	52.3	70.0	58.5
Burundi*	0.9	7.7	7.4	9.1	2.7	3.5	6.0	4.0
Cameroon*+	12.8	34.3	24.2	47.0	11.0	42.2	51.1	42.5
Cape Verde	4.7	11.3	9.0	15.6	12.7	22.9	11.5	10.2
Central African Republic*+	1.9	3.9	5.7	10.4	4.2	9.2	8.7	7.0
Chad*+	3.2	3.3	20.5	14.9	20.8	16.0	9.0	9.0
Comoros*+	2.8	5.4	3.9	15.7	10.5	10.6	8.4	15.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	35.5	76.9	65.2	101.0	89.0	93.8	75.0	39.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.0	21.4	19.0	30.3	27.9	39.7	40.9	27.5
Côte d'Ivoire*+	52.2	164.3	96.4	199.0	167.3	176.5	183.0	167.4
Djibouti	2.9	12.9	13.6	18.4	15.0	15.0	17.0	27.2
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.5	0.9	2.9	1.1	1.0	2.3	4.0	2.3
Eritrea*	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	39.3	38.5	33.6	11.6
Ethiopia*	0.0	0.0	0.0	136.7	86.1	43.0	92.4	83.5
Gabon+	1.6	9.2	15.3	30.3	33.1	24.5	18.7	17.7
Gambia, The*	1.7	9.0	12.0	28.8	28.8	24.7	25.6	23.4
Ghana*	28.7	54.8	29.1	55.9	66.7	54.7	81.6	76.7
Guinea*	10.6	61.4	28.0	110.8	73.6	81.0	72.9	70.0
Guinea-Bissau*	7.5	5.6	5.4	18.6	21.9	11.6	13.0	6.1
Kenya*	10.5	85.8	41.0	66.7	101.3	311.5	204.3	114.6
Lesotho	7.0	33.9	25.4	70.3	66.9	51.1	57.7	59.2
Liberia	14.4	38.7	38.6	35.1	44.6	24.8	25.7	20.8
Madagascar*	17.1	34.5	34.8	36.0	26.5	31.7	35.0	36.3
Malawi*	3.7	11.2	5.9	63.6	43.4	33.7	86.1	63.2
Mali*+	25.2	42.1	55.5	25.4	21.1	32.0	29.6	26.2
Mauritania*	10.1	26.0	47.3	52.2	68.2	77.2	163.6	100.0
Mauritius	20.2	56.1	36.6	51.8	88.3	55.2	51.0	60.2
Mozambique*	14.6	83.0	111.9	116.0	85.5	60.5	85.1	54.2
Namibia	3.7	7.6	8.6	45.4	42.9	29.8	21.2	28.6
Niger*+	2.4	24.7	47.2	21.9	20.3	21.1	57.5	34.1
Nigeria	60.1	586.3	488.1	206.6	283.9	457.0	470.1	505.5
Rwanda*	1.0	8.5	11.9	26.6	49.7	29.8	38.1	20.8
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.8	1.4	2.6	1.6
Senegal*+	63.0	114.4	92.2	192.1	219.4	152.6	208.1	207.9
Seychelles	1.6	3.7	2.4	6.6	7.9	9.6	8.0	8.9
Sierra Leone*	11.9	22.5	30.7	83.9	90.6	87.8	89.9	84.0
Somalia	8.1	69.5	46.3	28.1	37.4	33.7	51.0	25.5
South Africa	32.4	71.9	134.2	409.1	425.9	288.7	250.8	236.1
Sudan	26.2	71.1	202.5	96.6	109.1	146.6	153.8	79.5
Swaziland	0.0	0.0	4.4	10.6	8.9	21.9	16.8	27.6
Tanzania*	5.8	112.9	53.8	50.0	38.1	67.2	80.6	105.0
Togo*+	3.5	12.1	10.1	15.3	19.8	21.3	52.4	49.6
Uganda*	3.2	15.2	3.8	4.2	6.0	37.5	53.0	46.0
Zambia*	7.0	108.6	32.0	30.9	41.7	35.5	125.0	27.9
Zimbabwe	3.2	26.7	22.6	42.2	107.7	59.0	68.3	53.3
North Africa	511.1	2,599.7	2,969.3	3,766.3	3,983.8	3,652.2	3,003.2	2,442.5
All Africa	1,068.8	4,914.2	5,034.1	6,659.9	7,018.9	6,781.9	6,472.3	5,372.1
Comparator countries	1,944.8	4,586.8	2,079.2	6,675.4	6,090.8	3,267.8	3,397.7	3,676.3
China	1,108.7	3,598.0	1,729.2	4,783.1	4,018.5	1,936.4	1,557.3	1,203.1
India	373.1	127.7	56.9	3.9	114.3	268.2	294.9	592.6
Indonesia	462.9	861.1	293.2	1,888.4	1,958.1	1,063.1	1,545.5	1,880.6
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization—Trade data, BESD.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, SHARE OF EXPORTS

2.5

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services							
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.7	2.9	4.2	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.8	3.1
Excluding South Africa	3.8	4.3	6.1	4.4	3.9	4.3	5.7	4.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.9	5.2	5.3	5.2	4.7	4.8	6.0	4.5
Angola	—	—	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.6	2.4	1.0
Benin*+	5.7	7.7	6.2	17.3	14.8	12.9	6.4	11.8
Botswana	3.9	5.1	3.0	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.0	1.9
Burkina Faso*+	17.3	13.4	23.2	12.7	14.8	19.6	19.4	20.4
Burundi*	2.6	9.5	5.8	7.1	5.4	3.7	8.4	6.5
Cameroon*+	3.5	1.8	0.9	2.3	0.5	1.8	2.2	1.9
Cape Verde	31.7	58.9	29.1	16.6	11.3	17.7	10.6	8.9
Central African Republic*+	2.4	1.9	3.2	4.5	2.3	4.7	4.9	6.0
Chad*+	3.1	1.9	16.7	4.6	7.4	5.6	2.8	3.7
Comoros*+	—	50.4	20.0	34.2	24.7	27.6	32.6	53.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.3	3.2	3.3	6.3	4.9	8.9	4.1	1.4
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.3	2.1	1.5	2.2	1.6	2.3	2.8	1.6
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.8	4.6	3.0	4.8	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.3
Djibouti	—	—	—	9.1	7.4	7.1	7.0	10.9
Equatorial Guinea*+	1.5	—	12.0	1.2	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	13.9	20.6	18.9	30.4	17.7
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.0	17.4	10.9	4.3	8.9	9.1
Gabon+	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9
Gambia, The*	6.5	8.7	12.1	15.4	15.5	13.4	12.1	11.8
Ghana*	5.4	14.6	6.1	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.1
Guinea*	—	—	—	14.5	10.0	10.5	9.5	9.2
Guinea-Bissau*	139.3	39.6	38.8	62.8	77.0	20.6	43.6	10.9
Kenya*	1.5	4.2	2.6	2.3	3.3	10.5	7.2	4.3
Lesotho	37.7	37.4	62.3	35.4	29.8	18.7	23.8	27.4
Liberia	4.4	6.3	8.3	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	7.3	6.4	9.9	4.7	3.2	4.1	4.3	4.0
Malawi*	3.0	3.6	2.2	15.0	8.3	5.9	15.3	12.7
Mali*+	43.9	16.0	25.2	4.9	4.0	5.0	4.7	4.1
Mauritania*	6.5	10.0	11.5	9.9	13.5	17.9	41.0	27.1
Mauritius	—	13.4	8.7	2.6	4.0	2.3	2.2	2.5
Mozambique*	—	21.7	87.8	33.1	24.7	15.7	21.0	13.4
Namibia	—	—	—	2.6	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.8
Niger*+	1.6	4.0	15.8	6.8	6.0	7.0	15.6	10.6
Nigeria	2.5	3.1	10.7	1.7	1.7	2.8	4.4	3.9
Rwanda*	3.0	5.0	6.5	40.0	59.7	20.7	34.3	18.4
São Tomé and Príncipe*	16.1	26.4	30.9	28.8	35.7	11.5	21.5	9.7
Senegal*+	18.2	14.2	12.5	12.4	13.8	10.3	13.5	14.4
Seychelles	—	3.7	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.0	2.1
Sierra Leone*	8.4	8.9	24.2	51.8	55.2	78.2	95.1	91.1
Somalia	11.5	34.7	83.5	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.7
Sudan	5.8	8.8	28.3	—	23.6	28.4	30.0	10.1
Swaziland	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.0	0.9	2.0	1.6	2.8
Tanzania*	—	—	12.3	4.6	3.3	5.3	7.0	8.8
Togo*+	2.6	2.1	2.7	3.6	4.1	4.9	11.1	10.9
Uganda*	1.1	6.3	0.8	0.6	0.8	4.5	8.4	6.3
Zambia*	0.6	6.8	3.9	2.5	4.1	3.0	14.5	4.0
Zimbabwe	—	1.7	1.8	1.6	3.5	1.9	2.6	2.1
North Africa	5.8	5.5	8.2	6.6	6.4	5.7	5.1	3.9
All Africa	3.8	4.0	6.0	4.6	4.3	4.1	4.4	3.5
Comparator countries	27.8	8.4	3.3	2.7	2.3	1.1	1.1	1.1
China	—	21.9	5.9	3.1	2.5	1.0	0.8	0.5
India	11.0	1.1	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.6	1.1
Indonesia	12.8	3.2	1.4	3.6	3.3	1.8	3.1	3.8
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

GROSS CONCESSIONAL AID FLOWS

3.1

	Percentage of recipient country GDP						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1999	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.8	2.1	3.6	3.5	2.6	1.7	1.8
Excluding South Africa	2.6	2.9	4.9	6.7	4.4	2.7	2.9
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.5	4.6	6.1	8.1	5.3	3.4	3.6
Angola	—	—	1.0	5.2	3.1	1.3	1.3
Benin*+	6.3	7.0	6.1	8.7	8.6	3.9	5.5
Botswana	11.2	14.3	9.5	8.0	9.2	8.2	0.5
Burkina Faso*+	12.0	14.7	12.3	11.4	7.5	3.2	3.3
Burundi*	0.3	12.6	12.3	18.2	9.2	10.5	13.7
Cameroon*+	2.8	3.3	2.2	1.9	2.0	0.0	0.4
Cape Verde	0.0	0.0	17.2	3.2	8.1	0.0	0.0
Central African Republic*+	1.0	2.4	5.0	10.8	3.4	3.0	3.3
Chad*+	9.0	3.2	13.8	13.4	10.1	7.2	4.8
Comoros*+	—	20.6	50.0	15.9	7.7	4.2	4.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.7	2.8	4.3	6.3	0.1	0.9	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	1.6	2.9	3.9	1.7	0.5	0.7	0.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.0	0.4	2.4	6.7	2.3	1.1	1.1
Djibouti	—	—	8.9	15.8	13.6	9.4	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	6.2	—	20.7	7.8	0.6	0.1	0.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	7.1	29.7	7.8	14.6
Ethiopia*	—	—	12.4	10.9	9.6	9.3	12.7
Gabon+	1.9	0.4	2.0	1.3	0.9	0.3	0.4
Gambia, The*	4.2	11.4	18.2	20.6	18.2	15.6	14.3
Ghana*	2.0	4.4	4.5	14.4	8.1	6.4	10.2
Guinea*	—	—	—	7.4	5.3	3.2	4.2
Guinea-Bissau*	0.0	43.8	32.1	42.0	19.8	15.3	20.5
Kenya*	3.8	3.8	3.4	6.8	1.7	0.6	0.6
Lesotho	0.0	-8.3	44.5	7.1	3.6	1.9	0.9
Liberia	0.2	6.7	3.1	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	6.8	3.8	6.1	5.5	6.9	3.0	2.4
Malawi*	7.5	7.7	6.0	25.4	15.7	8.7	5.6
Mali*+	8.7	8.6	20.8	15.6	9.1	8.2	7.9
Mauritania*	19.8	30.7	30.1	15.5	17.1	8.6	8.3
Mauritius	—	1.7	2.7	0.8	0.7	0.1	0.1
Mozambique*	—	1.6	10.4	24.2	14.1	14.8	13.0
Namibia	—	6.7	21.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Niger*+	10.4	8.7	4.4	7.9	6.7	4.7	5.0
Nigeria	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1
Rwanda*	13.1	13.4	11.4	27.8	17.3	14.8	13.9
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.0	16.9	16.7	80.7	43.7	32.1	46.0
Senegal*+	6.9	8.8	11.7	11.4	5.1	3.3	3.4
Seychelles	—	14.0	12.9	2.9	2.7	1.5	1.7
Sierra Leone*	1.6	6.4	5.2	12.1	7.0	8.3	9.7
Somalia	8.6	35.9	11.3	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sudan	1.2	3.5	3.6	1.1	0.4	0.2	0.4
Swaziland	5.8	27.0	24.6	1.1	9.6	8.5	7.7
Tanzania*	—	—	4.9	13.8	9.1	5.8	5.7
Togo*+	8.4	11.1	16.0	5.2	4.2	2.7	0.8
Uganda*	0.6	4.1	4.8	9.1	7.5	6.1	8.1
Zambia*	3.3	6.8	9.6	18.1	13.0	5.7	7.0
Zimbabwe	0.4	0.9	2.3	3.7	5.3	1.4	1.1
North Africa	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.1	0.5	0.5
All Africa	1.8	2.0	2.7	2.9	2.1	1.2	1.3

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: Gross concessional aid flows include loans plus official balance of payments transfers. Group totals are weighted averages.

Source: World Bank data.

DEBT SERVICE RATIO		3.2					
	Percentage of exports						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1999	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.6	11.0	25.1	15.7	13.4	10.7	—
Excluding South Africa	9.6	11.0	25.1	19.4	14.1	11.1	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	10.9	17.3	21.3	20.5	15.7	13.6	—
Angola	—	—	6.4	11.7	17.9	14.3	—
Benin*+	1.9	4.9	11.5	11.0	14.4	16.8	13.8
Botswana	1.6	2.1	5.4	3.2	2.1	2.0	1.7
Burkina Faso*+	4.0	5.9	10.5	11.4	16.0	17.4	—
Burundi*	2.9	9.4	20.4	27.6	45.1	38.8	41.6
Cameroon*+	7.6	14.6	23.4	20.9	24.3	20.5	26.0
Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic*+	6.1	4.9	14.2	6.8	15.9	11.1	10.3
Chad*+	3.7	8.4	13.9	4.9	12.4	10.5	—
Comoros*+	—	2.6	8.9	1.6	5.2	4.8	3.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9.1	22.6	24.8	1.4	2.0	2.5	39.5
Congo, Rep. of*+	7.0	10.6	34.4	14.7	1.5	1.6	4.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	7.6	39.1	34.8	20.4	28.3	23.9	12.7
Djibouti	—	—	—	5.1	3.8	5.1	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.0	—	21.7	2.2	0.6	0.4	0.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	0.1	1.6	1.1	—
Ethiopia*	6.4	7.6	28.4	19.1	15.9	13.2	—
Gabon+	14.2	15.0	11.6	15.6	19.3	15.4	—
Gambia, The*	1.4	5.7	10.8	12.7	9.5	9.1	5.9
Ghana*	4.9	13.1	23.7	25.1	20.8	19.0	—
Guinea*	—	19.8	—	23.2	16.8	18.1	—
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	46.8	51.6	16.6	9.2	—
Kenya*	4.1	8.8	18.7	30.3	25.9	17.3	15.4
Lesotho	—	1.5	6.8	6.0	10.5	12.0	—
Liberia	6.1	8.8	8.6	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	34.7	19.3	38.2	7.1	17.1	7.7	—
Malawi*	9.3	27.8	39.0	26.6	13.0	12.1	—
Mali*+	7.4	5.1	19.9	13.9	13.8	13.5	10.7
Mauritania*	9.0	17.3	24.5	20.5	24.1	20.5	—
Mauritius	—	9.1	26.4	10.9	7.2	16.9	7.1
Mozambique*	—	—	34.5	34.8	18.5	16.1	12.4
Namibia	—	0.3	0.3	0.1	1.1	—	—
Niger*+	2.0	21.7	33.8	16.7	9.8	8.0	—
Nigeria	6.1	4.1	33.6	15.3	8.0	4.7	—
Rwanda*	0.2	4.1	10.8	22.8	26.0	21.4	21.9
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	5.1	29.0	20.9	26.1	26.7	—
Senegal*+	11.0	26.7	20.7	16.6	14.2	14.3	—
Seychelles	—	36.2	7.9	8.5	5.9	3.6	—
Sierra Leone*	9.3	28.0	13.0	48.8	23.3	38.0	—
Somalia	3.7	4.9	14.2	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	—	9.5	12.2	10.0	—
Sudan	13.8	25.1	12.8	10.0	6.7	3.2	3.3
Swaziland	—	4.0	9.8	2.0	3.0	3.1	2.9
Tanzania*	4.1	23.5	39.2	21.0	16.0	15.7	—
Togo*+	7.6	9.0	28.4	6.2	8.7	6.5	6.8
Uganda*	8.4	17.3	38.0	20.0	22.1	22.8	18.9
Zambia*	31.9	25.2	14.4	195.3	16.8	20.8	30.6
Zimbabwe	2.1	20.7	32.7	23.4	25.8	21.9	6.8
North Africa	9.9	13.7	25.1	24.0	22.0	17.2	15.1
All Africa	9.7	12.3	25.1	18.5	16.5	13.1	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	—	7.8	8.7	11.7	9.3	7.9
India	19.2	9.8	23.0	27.8	15.3	14.0	11.7
Indonesia	—	—	28.8	29.9	30.1	25.2	24.5
South Asia	17.8	12.0	22.2	24.9	16.0	13.6	12.3
East Asia	—	—	23.8	11.4	15.7	10.8	11.5

— Not available.
 * SPA country.
 + CFA country.
 Source: World Bank data.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

3.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars (net), current prices						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1999	2000	2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	-708	784	687	7,051	5,674	6,618
Excluding South Africa	—	57	1,281	1,943	7,498	5,319	6,118
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	796	936	1,266	6,025	3,945	4,318
Angola	—	—	278	303	2,471	878	1,347
Benin*+	4	4	1	4	77	75	48
Botswana	53	109	52	30	100	30	33
Burkina Faso*+	4	0	0	14	9	24	10
Burundi*	—	1	1	1	0	6	6
Cameroon*+	-1	105	274	-154	7	280	170
Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic*+	0	5	2	4	2	3	9
Chad*+	6	0	53	37	46	72	451
Comoros*+	—	0	0	1	0	0	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0	0	6	0	23	74	83
Congo, Rep. of*+	68	40	13	27	519	478	218
Côte d'Ivoire*+	51	83	29	234	196	103	180
Djibouti	—	—	—	3	4	9	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	0	93	30	113	230
Eritrea*	0	0	0	0	83	28	12
Ethiopia*	31	0	0	0	136	51	52
Gabon+	16	24	144	-109	129	-15	-33
Gambia, The*	—	—	1	7	7	2	6
Ghana*	14	16	8	83	46	110	106
Guinea*	—	34	—	25	34	12	12
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	—	0	0	0	0
Kenya*	0	78	13	33	42	127	50
Lesotho	—	4	0	30	36	32	30
Liberia	49	—	-16	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	11	0	0	10	58	70	93
Malawi*	8	10	1	0	39	27	28
Mali*+	-9	24	3	30	24	18	21
Mauritania*	10	27	4	7	0	1	4
Mauritius	—	0	3	-1	20	19	13
Mozambique*	—	0	0	45	382	139	183
Namibia	—	—	—	157	110	145	167
Niger*+	1	44	-10	0	2	18	33
Nigeria	373	-739	345	677	1,473	1,374	1,800
Rwanda*	2	16	15	2	2	8	5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	0	2	3	4	4
Senegal*+	-9	61	-16	-10	126	36	1
Seychelles	—	6	1	27	46	14	22
Sierra Leone*	7	10	3	-5	2	2	2
Somalia	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	-23	-765	-497	-1,256	-447	355	500
Sudan	—	0	0	0	224	179	98
Swaziland	—	18	9	31	87	6	26
Tanzania*	—	—	—	104	517	463	372
Togo*+	2	42	31	5	—	—	—
Uganda*	5	0	30	2	175	169	144
Zambia*	32	62	0	97	163	122	72
Zimbabwe	—	-26	3	98	50	15	10
North Africa	—	-78	384	1,350	2,284	2,886	5,519
All Africa	—	-786	1,167	2,037	9,335	8,560	12,138
Comparator countries	67	57	1,637	39,736	36,388	35,280	35,309
China	0	57	1,327	33,849	36,978	37,483	37,356
India	67	—	—	2,144	2,155	2,346	3,300
Indonesia	—	—	310	3,743	-2,745	-4,549	-5,347
South Asia	—	—	—	2,645	3,012	3,190	—
East Asia	—	—	—	45,918	48,904	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

INFANT MORTALITY RATE		4.1							
		Deaths per 1,000 live births							
		Estimate						Projection	
		1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997	2000	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa		126	118	114	110	108	108	106	—
Excluding South Africa		129	121	117	114	111	110	108	54
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria		132	122	117	114	111	110	108	57
Angola		167	158	155	166	172	172	172	98
Benin*+		138	127	119	111	104	102	98	54
Botswana		81	62	54	45	50	60	74	49
Burkina Faso*+		152	140	129	118	110	108	105	76
Burundi*		127	116	115	114	114	114	114	80
Cameroon*+		116	105	95	85	92	93	95	54
Cape Verde		73	61	53	45	37	34	30	20
Central African Republic*+		135	121	118	115	115	115	115	77
Chad*+		137	124	121	118	118	118	118	74
Comoros*+		140	120	104	88	74	69	61	31
Congo, Dem. Rep. of		139	130	129	128	128	128	128	63
Congo, Rep. of*+		94	88	86	83	81	81	81	36
Côte d'Ivoire*+		136	114	107	100	101	101	102	77
Djibouti		149	137	128	119	111	107	102	87
Equatorial Guinea*+		154	143	133	122	113	109	103	57
Eritrea*		—	112	102	92	81	78	73	32
Ethiopia*		152	143	136	128	122	120	117	76
Gabon+		92	68	64	60	60	60	60	42
Gambia, The*		165	144	123	103	96	94	92	41
Ghana*		102	92	83	74	65	62	58	42
Guinea*		186	175	160	145	129	122	112	57
Guinea-Bissau*		180	173	163	153	143	139	132	84
Kenya*		85	73	68	63	73	75	77	63
Lesotho		120	115	109	102	97	95	92	70
Liberia		169	157	157	157	157	157	157	68
Madagascar*		108	106	105	103	95	91	86	50
Malawi*		173	157	152	146	133	127	117	82
Mali*+		196	171	162	152	147	145	142	82
Mauritania*		134	118	119	120	120	120	120	60
Mauritius		45	33	26	21	20	20	16	9
Mozambique*		152	140	142	143	133	130	126	103
Namibia		94	84	75	65	61	59	56	50
Niger*+		194	191	191	191	176	169	159	73
Nigeria		119	117	116	114	112	111	110	68
Rwanda*		127	130	119	107	122	113	100	94
São Tomé and Príncipe*		86	83	77	69	63	61	58	21
Senegal*+		146	128	109	90	84	82	80	38
Seychelles		—	—	19	17	18	8	10	6
Sierra Leone*		199	192	189	185	182	181	180	95
Somalia		146	133	133	133	133	133	133	72
South Africa		73	65	55	45	50	52	55	49
Sudan		95	86	81	75	70	69	68	45
Swaziland		116	99	88	77	78	87	101	67
Tanzania*		118	106	100	102	103	103	104	65
Togo*+		117	106	91	88	83	82	80	51
Uganda*		109	108	104	100	90	86	81	65
Zambia*		101	92	100	108	112	112	112	91
Zimbabwe		78	69	61	53	60	65	73	59
North Africa		122	104	84	62	49	44	37	22
All Africa		125	115	109	104	101	100	99	—
Comparator countries		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China		48	42	37	38	36	35	32	16
India		130	115	97	80	74	71	69	41
Indonesia		109	90	75	60	46	44	41	20
South Asia		132	119	103	87	79	76	73	45
East Asia		64	57	48	44	40	39	36	—

— Not available.
 * SPA country.
 + CFA country.
 Source: World Bank data.

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH

4.2

	Actual							Projection
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997	2000	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	46	48	49	50	49	49	47	—
Excluding South Africa	45	47	48	49	49	48	46	60
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	46	47	49	49	48	48	46	59
Angola	39	41	43	45	46	46	47	50
Benin*+	46	48	50	52	53	53	53	58
Botswana	55	58	60	57	50	47	39	45
Burkina Faso*+	42	44	45	45	45	45	44	49
Burundi*	45	47	47	44	42	42	42	48
Cameroon*+	47	50	52	54	54	53	50	55
Cape Verde	59	61	63	65	67	68	69	72
Central African Republic*+	44	46	47	48	46	45	43	48
Chad*+	40	42	44	46	48	49	48	55
Comoros*+	49	50	52	56	59	60	61	68
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	47	49	51	52	49	47	46	54
Congo, Rep. of*+	48	50	51	51	51	51	51	63
Côte d'Ivoire*+	47	49	51	50	48	47	46	51
Djibouti	42	44	46	48	50	50	46	49
Equatorial Guinea*+	41	43	45	47	49	50	51	61
Eritrea*	45	44	46	49	50	51	51	63
Ethiopia*	42	42	44	45	44	43	42	49
Gabon+	46	48	50	52	52	52	53	64
Gambia, The*	38	40	45	49	52	53	53	59
Ghana*	51	53	55	57	59	60	57	62
Guinea*	38	40	42	44	46	46	46	51
Guinea-Bissau*	37	39	41	42	44	44	45	51
Kenya*	52	55	57	57	53	50	47	52
Lesotho	51	53	56	58	52	48	44	51
Liberia	49	51	53	45	44	47	47	57
Madagascar*	48	51	52	53	53	53	55	62
Malawi*	42	44	46	45	42	41	39	45
Mali*+	40	42	45	45	44	44	42	47
Mauritania*	45	47	48	49	50	50	51	59
Mauritius	64	66	68	70	70	70	72	77
Mozambique*	43	44	44	43	45	45	42	47
Namibia	50	53	55	58	57	56	47	49
Niger*+	40	42	44	45	46	46	46	51
Nigeria	44	46	47	49	50	50	47	51
Rwanda*	45	46	48	40	38	40	40	46
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	62	64	64	65	72
Senegal*+	43	45	47	50	52	52	52	58
Seychelles	—	—	69	70	71	71	72	78
Sierra Leone*	35	35	36	35	36	37	37	50
Somalia	42	43	44	42	44	47	47	56
South Africa	55	57	59	62	58	55	48	53
Sudan	45	48	50	52	55	56	57	63
Swaziland	49	52	54	57	58	58	45	51
Tanzania*	48	50	51	50	49	48	44	50
Togo*+	47	49	51	50	49	49	49	57
Uganda*	50	48	48	47	44	42	42	49
Zambia*	49	50	50	49	45	43	38	44
Zimbabwe	53	55	56	56	49	45	40	46
North Africa	55	58	61	65	67	68	69	73
All Africa	48	49	51	53	52	52	50	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	65	67	68	69	69	70	70	74
India	52	54	57	59	61	62	63	67
Indonesia	51	55	59	62	64	65	66	71
South Asia	51	54	56	58	61	62	62	66
East Asia	62	64	66	67	68	68	69	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

4.3

	Percentage of population with access to health services (last available data between 1985 and 1995)		
	Total	Urban	Rural
Angola	24 (1991)	—	—
Benin*+	42 (1991)	—	—
Botswana	86 (1988)	—	—
Burkina Faso*+	70 (1985)	—	—
Burundi*	80 (1991)	—	—
Cameroon*+	15 (1988)	—	—
Cape Verde	82 (1988)	—	—
Central African Republic*+	12 (1988)	—	—
Chad*+	26 (1991)	—	—
Comoros*+	82 (1985)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	59 (1991)	—	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	60 (1988)	—	—
Djibouti	37 (1983)	100 (1988)	95 (1988)
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	55 (1991)	—	—
Gabon+	87 (1988)	—	—
Gambia, The*	—	—	—
Ghana*	25 (1992)	—	—
Guinea*	45 (1992)	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	64 (1985)	—	—
Kenya*	—	—	—
Lesotho	80 (1988)	—	—
Liberia	34 (1988)	—	—
Madagascar*	65 (1988)	—	—
Malawi*	80 (1988)	—	—
Mali*+	20 (1983)	—	—
Mauritania*	30 (1985)	—	—
Mauritius	99 (1991)	100 (1988)	100 (1988)
Mozambique*	30 (1988)	—	—
Namibia	—	—	—
Niger*+	30 (1991)	—	—
Nigeria	67 (1991)	87 (1993)	—
Rwanda*	—	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe*	88 (1988)	—	—
Senegal*+	40 (1990)	—	—
Seychelles	99 (1991)	—	—
Sierra Leone*	36 (1985)	88 (1993)	—
Somalia	20 (1985)	50 (1985)	15 (1985)
South Africa	—	—	—
Sudan	70 (1991)	—	—
Swaziland	55 (1991)	—	—
Tanzania*	93 (1991)	94 (1993)	—
Togo*+	—	—	—
Uganda*	71 (1988)	—	—
Zambia*	75 (1988)	100 (1988)	50 (1988)
Zimbabwe	71 (1985)	90 (1988)	80 (1988)
Average	57	55	50

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

CHILD IMMUNIZATION AND ORT USE

4.4

	Percentage use among under-five-year-olds		Percentage of one-year-olds immunized			
	ORT		DPT		Measles	
	1989	1992-93 ^a	1989	1999	1989	1999
Angola	12	48 (1992)	18	22	48	46
Benin*+	45	28 (1993)	48	79	48	75
Botswana	66	64 (1993)	90	90	87	90
Burkina Faso*+	15	15 (1993)	44	42	66	46
Burundi*	30	49 (1993)	82	74	73	75
Cameroon*+	84	84 (1993)	56	48	56	62
Cape Verde	5	5 (1992)	—	—	—	61
Central African Republic*+	20	24 (1992)	64	33	69	39
Chad*+	10	15 (1992)	20	21	32	30
Comoros*+	79	70 (1992)	—	—	85	69
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	40	46 (1993)	—	—	41	15
Congo, Rep. of*+	13	67 (1992)	79	29	75	23
Côte d'Ivoire*+	16	16 (1992)	42	62	41	62
Djibouti	51	56 (1992)	77	23	75	23
Equatorial Guinea*+	21	40 (1992)	48	40	18	24
Eritrea*	—	—	—	93	—	88
Ethiopia*	32	68 (1993)	26	21	23	27
Gabon+	10	25 (1992)	78	37	76	55
Gambia, The*	39	51 (1993)	—	—	84	88
Ghana*	21	44 (1992)	51	72	65	73
Guinea*	63	82 (1993)	17	46	27	52
Guinea-Bissau*	5	26 (1993)	54	38	65	70
Kenya*	80	69 (1992)	83	79	75	76
Lesotho	68	78 (1992)	77	85	79	77
Liberia	9	15 (1992)	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	11	26 (1993)	45	55	44	55
Malawi*	14	50 (1993)	87	84	84	83
Mali*+	41	41 (1993)	26	52	40	52
Mauritania*	54	54 (1992)	28	40	42	56
Mauritius	7	—	85	85	80	80
Mozambique*	30	60 (1993)	47	61	48	90
Namibia	—	75 (1993)	58	72	56	65
Niger*+	54	17 (1993)	14	28	14	36
Nigeria	35	80 (1993)	47	26	59	40
Rwanda*	24	36 (1993)	82	85	83	78
São Tomé and Príncipe*	46	50 (1992)	—	—	45	64
Senegal*+	27	27 (1992)	47	60	48	60
Seychelles	88	—	97	99	89	99
Sierra Leone*	55	60 (1992)	—	46	—	62
Somalia	7	78 (1992)	18	18	30	38
South Africa	—	—	71	76	84	82
Sudan	36	47 (1993)	60	50	61	53
Swaziland	85	85 (1992)	89	99	85	72
Tanzania*	37	83 (1992)	—	—	79	72
Togo*+	33	33 (1993)	72	41	78	57
Uganda*	15	45 (1993)	42	55	51	57
Zambia*	87	90 (1993)	83	84	80	85
Zimbabwe	77	—	87	81	87	79
Average	38	49	57	57	61	61
Median	33	49	56	55	65	62

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: ORT is oral rehydration therapy; DPT is diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.

a. Most recent available data.

Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

4.5

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in primary school						Projection
	1975	1985	1990	1995	1998	1999	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	59	76	74	76	79	—	74
Excluding South Africa	56	76	71	72	75	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	57	69	66	66	75	81	74
Angola	—	107	92	72	89	64	101
Benin*+	50	68	58	73	82	86	61
Botswana	71	105	113	108	109	108	117
Burkina Faso*+	14	27	33	40	42	43	37
Burundi*	21	53	73	51	51	62	68
Cameroon*+	95	102	101	87	88	91	101
Cape Verde	127	116	121	140	144	—	109
Central African Republic*+	73	75	65	57	56	—	69
Chad*+	35	44	54	51	67	70	57
Comoros*+	64	82	75	75	75	84	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	93	87	70	67	47	—	76
Congo, Rep. of*+	136	147	133	114	57	84	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	61	72	67	69	74	77	68
Djibouti	30	40	38	38	38	37	45
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	131	125	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	56	56	61	—
Ethiopia*	21	38	33	37	65	71	25
Gabon+	—	—	—	—	154	151	—
Gambia, The*	33	68	64	77	81	75	66
Ghana*	72	75	75	72	78	—	77
Guinea*	30	34	37	48	58	63	37
Guinea-Bissau*	65	64	56	66	—	83	59
Kenya*	104	99	95	85	91	—	95
Lesotho	106	112	112	111	106	104	112
Liberia	40	—	29	25	—	118	—
Madagascar*	92	—	103	92	96	102	93
Malawi*	56	60	68	134	164	158	65
Mali*+	25	25	26	41	55	—	23
Mauritania*	20	48	49	75	85	84	55
Mauritius	105	109	109	107	108	108	104
Mozambique*	—	87	67	60	80	85	66
Namibia	—	—	129	133	118	113	116
Niger*+	19	26	29	29	31	32	29
Nigeria	50	104	91	93	—	—	71
Rwanda*	55	63	70	94	120	122	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal*+	40	56	59	64	70	73	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	38	63	50	53	—	65	48
Somalia	42	14	11	10	—	—	—
South Africa	104	—	122	133	119	119	—
Sudan	47	52	53	50	54	55	49
Swaziland	97	102	111	121	127	125	105
Tanzania*	53	75	70	67	62	63	67
Togo*+	98	93	109	119	133	124	111
Uganda*	44	73	71	74	146	141	80
Zambia*	97	105	99	89	81	79	90
Zimbabwe	70	136	116	114	—	97	118
North Africa	77	88	91	100	102	103	—
All Africa	63	79	78	80	84	89	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	122	123	125	118	107	106	—
India	81	96	97	100	101	101	—
Indonesia	86	117	115	113	—	108	—
South Asia	75	86	90	94	102	101	—
East Asia	114	119	121	116	106	106	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.6

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in secondary school							Projection 2010
	1975	1985	1990	1995	1996	1998	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	10	20	23	26	26	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa	10	20	19	21	20	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	10	16	18	18	18	22	—	74
Angola	9	14	12	12	12	16	15	101
Benin*+	8	18	12	16	17	21	22	61
Botswana	15	29	43	63	65	78	82	117
Burkina Faso*+	2	4	7	9	9	9	10	37
Burundi*	2	4	6	7	7	7	—	68
Cameroon*+	13	23	28	26	25	20	—	101
Cape Verde	7	13	21	43	51	69	—	109
Central African Republic*+	8	16	12	10	10	—	—	69
Chad*+	3	6	8	9	9	11	11	57
Comoros*+	13	28	18	21	23	25	21	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	17	23	22	24	22	18	—	76
Congo, Rep. of*+	48	75	53	53	52	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	12	20	22	23	24	22	—	68
Djibouti	7	12	12	13	14	17	15	45
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	—	32	31	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	19	20	25	28	—
Ethiopia*	6	13	14	12	12	—	5	25
Gabon+	—	—	—	—	—	54	—	—
Gambia, The*	9	16	19	25	26	31	27	66
Ghana*	36	40	36	34	32	37	—	77
Guinea*	14	13	10	12	13	14	—	37
Guinea-Bissau*	4	9	9	11	11	—	20	59
Kenya*	13	21	24	24	24	30	—	95
Lesotho	13	23	25	31	31	33	28	112
Liberia	16	—	14	13	12	26	23	—
Madagascar*	13	—	18	16	16	14	—	93
Malawi*	4	6	8	17	17	45	—	65
Mali*+	7	6	7	11	12	15	—	23
Mauritania*	4	15	14	16	16	18	18	55
Mauritius	38	49	53	62	64	—	107	104
Mozambique*	3	7	8	7	7	10	14	66
Namibia	—	—	44	62	61	59	60	116
Niger*+	2	5	7	7	7	7	7	29
Nigeria	8	34	25	32	30	—	—	71
Rwanda*	4	6	8	14	13	9	12	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal*+	11	14	16	16	16	20	—	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	12	18	17	17	17	—	24	48
Somalia	4	8	6	6	6	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	74	95	96	92	90	—
Sudan	14	21	24	21	21	30	29	49
Swaziland	32	39	44	53	54	60	—	105
Tanzania*	3	3	5	5	5	—	5	67
Togo*+	19	21	24	27	27	34	36	111
Uganda*	4	10	13	12	13	—	—	80
Zambia*	15	19	24	27	26	25	—	90
Zimbabwe	8	42	50	47	49	—	45	118
North Africa	30	52	62	65	65	68	69	—
All Africa	14	27	30	33	33	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	46	40	49	66	69	62	63	—
India	26	38	44	49	49	50	50	—
Indonesia	20	41	44	51	56	—	55	—
South Asia	24	34	40	43	44	50	49	—
East Asia	42	40	47	62	65	63	63	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

FEMALE PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

4.7

	Percentage of total primary enrollment						Projection 2000
	1975	1985	1991	1995	1996	1998	
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
Excluding South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
Angola	—	45	46	—	—	46	—
Benin*+	31	34	34	36	37	39	38
Botswana	55	52	51	50	50	50	51
Burkina Faso*+	37	37	39	39	—	40	45
Burundi*	39	42	45	45	46	45	45
Cameroon*+	45	46	48	46	46	45	47
Cape Verde	48	49	—	—	—	49	50
Central African Republic*+	36	39	40	—	—	40	44
Chad*+	26	28	32	33	34	37	36
Comoros*+	—	43	45	—	—	45	48
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	40	39	43	—	—	47	47
Congo, Rep. of*+	47	49	48	48	—	49	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	38	41	42	42	42	43	46
Djibouti	35	41	42	42	42	41	47
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	—	44	50
Eritrea*	—	—	46	45	45	45	—
Ethiopia*	32	39	42	36	36	38	44
Gabon+	49	49	50	50	50	50	—
Gambia, The*	33	39	41	44	—	46	44
Ghana*	43	—	46	—	—	—	45
Guinea*	34	32	32	34	36	38	35
Guinea-Bissau*	35	—	36	—	—	—	41
Kenya*	46	48	49	49	49	49	50
Lesotho	59	56	55	53	52	52	52
Liberia	34	—	—	—	—	42	46
Madagascar*	43	—	48	49	—	49	47
Malawi*	40	43	46	47	—	—	43
Mali*+	36	37	37	39	39	41	42
Mauritania*	36	40	43	46	47	48	47
Mauritius	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Mozambique*	—	44	43	42	—	42	47
Namibia	—	—	51	50	50	50	—
Niger*+	35	36	37	38	38	39	40
Nigeria	40	44	44	45	45	—	46
Rwanda*	46	49	50	—	—	50	50
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	49	—
Senegal*+	42	40	42	44	45	45	43
Seychelles	51	49	49	49	49	49	—
Sierra Leone*	40	—	—	—	—	—	45
Somalia	35	34	—	—	—	—	45
South Africa	—	—	50	49	—	49	—
Sudan	36	40	43	45	45	46	41
Swaziland	49	50	50	49	49	49	50
Tanzania*	42	50	49	49	49	50	51
Togo*+	35	38	40	41	41	43	45
Uganda*	40	—	46	46	46	47	50
Zambia*	45	47	—	48	—	48	48
Zimbabwe	46	48	49	49	49	—	—
North Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
All Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	43	44	46	46	46	46	—
China	45	45	46	47	47	48	47
India	38	40	42	43	43	45	48
Indonesia	45	48	49	48	48	—	49
South Asia	37	40	41	43	43	44	42
East Asia	46	46	47	48	48	48	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

FEMALE SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.8

	Percentage of total secondary enrollment						Projection 2000
	1975	1985	1991	1995	1996	1998	
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	40
Excluding South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	40
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	—	—	—	—	40
Angola	—	—	—	—	—	41	—
Benin*+	—	29	—	—	—	31	31
Botswana	52	53	54	52	—	52	49
Burkina Faso*+	32	34	34	—	—	38	39
Burundi*	31	34	38	—	—	43	47
Cameroon*+	33	38	—	—	—	44	41
Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—	—	45
Central African Republic*+	18	27	29	—	—	—	34
Chad*+	—	—	—	20	20	21	25
Comoros*+	—	39	—	—	—	44	44
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	26	30	32	—	—	34	36
Congo, Rep. of*+	36	44	43	43	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	—	—	—	—	—	35	37
Djibouti	27	39	40	42	41	42	48
Equatorial Guinea*+	17	—	—	—	—	27	36
Eritrea*	—	—	—	42	42	41	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	45	43	—	38	44
Gabon+	35	42	—	47	—	46	—
Gambia, The*	27	30	35	38	—	40	39
Ghana*	38	—	—	—	—	—	40
Guinea*	—	26	—	26	—	26	31
Guinea-Bissau*	31	—	—	—	—	—	38
Kenya*	35	38	—	—	—	47	49
Lesotho	56	60	59	—	59	58	55
Liberia	25	—	—	—	—	39	23
Madagascar*	—	—	—	—	—	49	48
Malawi*	22	23	—	—	—	—	42
Mali*+	26	—	31	34	33	34	39
Mauritania*	—	—	34	34	—	42	41
Mauritius	44	47	—	—	50	50	50
Mozambique*	—	31	37	39	—	40	35
Namibia	—	—	55	54	54	53	—
Niger*+	28	—	30	34	35	38	33
Nigeria	—	41	42	—	—	—	35
Rwanda*	52	42	44	—	—	50	51
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	27	—
Senegal*+	—	33	35	37	37	39	39
Seychelles	56	50	49	49	49	49	—
Sierra Leone*	32	—	—	—	—	—	39
Somalia	24	35	—	—	—	—	38
South Africa	—	—	54	—	—	53	—
Sudan	31	42	44	46	47	48	42
Swaziland	46	—	—	—	—	50	52
Tanzania*	31	—	43	45	46	—	48
Togo*+	24	24	25	26	27	29	29
Uganda*	—	—	—	—	—	39	40
Zambia*	—	—	—	—	—	43	40
Zimbabwe	41	—	44	46	46	—	—
North Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
All Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	36	37	43	43	42	42	—
China	39	40	42	45	45	45	47
India	30	33	—	37	38	38	43
Indonesia	38	—	45	46	—	—	48
South Asia	29	32	—	37	38	40	42
East Asia	40	41	43	45	45	45	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

POPULATION

5.1

	Millions									
	Estimate						Standard projection ^a		Rapid projection ^a	
	1970	1980	1990	1999	2000	2001	2025	Stabili- zation	2025	Stabili- zation
Sub-Saharan Africa	289.2	382.0	509.1	644.0	659.5	674.5	1,282.9	2,653.5	932.1	1,450.4
Excluding South Africa	267.1	354.5	473.9	601.9	616.7	631.3	1,214.2	2,557.8	876.7	1,377.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	213.9	283.3	377.7	478.0	489.8	501.4	997.3	2,162.4	703.6	1,109.0
Angola	5.6	7.1	9.6	12.8	13.1	13.5	24.5	61.3	17.2	26.3
Benin*+	2.7	3.5	4.7	6.1	6.3	6.4	10.8	19.1	8.5	13.4
Botswana	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	3.6	2.3	3.3
Burkina Faso*+	5.6	7.0	8.9	11.0	11.3	11.6	18.9	47.9	15.3	23.5
Burundi*	3.5	4.1	5.5	6.7	6.8	6.9	10.3	32.0	9.3	14.7
Cameroon*+	6.6	8.7	11.6	14.6	14.9	15.2	22.3	52.9	21.5	32.4
Cape Verde	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.5	0.6	0.9
Central African Republic*+	1.8	2.3	2.9	3.7	3.7	3.8	5.2	11.4	4.9	7.6
Chad*+	3.7	4.5	5.7	7.5	7.7	7.9	15.0	27.7	9.3	13.9
Comoros*+	—	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.9	2.5	1.0	1.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	20.3	26.9	37.0	49.6	50.9	52.4	95.6	170.9	72.0	116.3
Congo, Rep. of*+	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.9	3.0	3.1	6.0	14.2	4.5	7.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.5	8.2	11.8	15.6	16.0	16.4	22.9	63.4	24.1	38.4
Djibouti	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.9	2.5	1.0	1.6
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.1
Eritrea*	1.8	2.4	3.1	4.0	4.1	4.2	7.3	22.6	6.0	9.6
Ethiopia*	28.9	37.7	51.2	62.8	64.3	65.8	104.6	416.7	98.0	156.7
Gabon+	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.1	6.1	2.0	3.2
Gambia, The*	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.1	4.9	1.4	2.2
Ghana*	8.6	10.7	15.1	18.9	19.3	19.7	28.3	61.5	27.6	42.1
Guinea*	3.9	4.5	5.8	7.3	7.4	7.6	11.1	32.8	9.6	14.8
Guinea-Bissau*	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	2.0	3.8	1.4	2.3
Kenya*	11.5	16.6	23.4	29.4	30.1	30.7	41.4	124.3	50.7	81.4
Lesotho	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.5	6.0	3.1	4.6
Liberia	1.4	1.9	2.4	3.0	3.1	3.2	5.6	10.7	4.8	7.0
Madagascar*	6.9	8.9	11.6	15.1	15.5	16.0	27.0	45.3	20.9	31.7
Malawi*	4.5	6.2	8.5	10.1	10.3	10.5	15.8	62.2	15.9	25.6
Mali*+	5.3	6.6	8.5	10.6	10.8	11.1	18.2	57.5	15.5	24.4
Mauritania*	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.6	2.7	2.7	4.7	13.7	3.3	5.1
Mauritius	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
Mozambique*	9.4	12.1	14.2	17.3	17.7	18.1	25.8	96.4	26.7	41.3
Namibia	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.3	7.1	3.3	5.0
Niger*+	4.2	5.6	7.7	10.5	10.8	11.2	21.6	71.7	14.3	23.1
Nigeria	53.2	71.1	96.2	123.9	126.9	129.9	199.4	395.4	173.1	268.3
Rwanda*	3.7	5.2	7.0	8.3	8.5	8.7	12.8	65.0	15.3	26.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3
Senegal*+	4.2	5.5	7.3	9.3	9.5	9.8	15.3	43.2	12.8	20.4
Seychelles	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sierra Leone*	2.7	3.2	4.0	4.9	5.0	5.1	8.3	23.0	6.6	10.1
Somalia	3.6	6.5	7.2	8.5	8.8	9.1	19.2	46.7	13.8	20.9
South Africa	22.1	27.6	35.2	42.1	42.8	43.2	48.4	95.7	55.4	73.1
Sudan	14.4	19.3	24.8	30.6	31.1	31.7	47.7	101.5	43.9	66.9
Swaziland	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4	4.1	1.7	2.7
Tanzania*	13.7	18.6	25.5	32.9	33.7	34.4	50.2	144.3	42.2	66.9
Togo*+	2.0	2.5	3.5	4.4	4.5	4.7	7.1	17.4	6.9	10.8
Uganda*	9.8	12.8	16.3	21.6	22.2	22.8	38.3	90.7	30.1	49.8
Zambia*	4.2	5.7	7.8	9.9	10.1	10.3	13.4	41.3	15.1	25.6
Zimbabwe	5.2	7.1	10.2	12.4	12.6	12.8	15.3	27.6	16.8	24.6
North Africa	69.2	88.4	114.0	135.6	137.9	140.3	216.0	320.5	185.9	248.6
All Africa	358.4	470.4	623.1	779.6	797.4	814.8	1,498.9	2,974.0	1,118.0	1,699.0
Comparator countries	1,483.4	1,816.9	2,162.9	2,458.1	2,488.8	2,518.9	—	—	—	—
China	818.3	981.2	1,135.2	1,253.6	1,262.5	1,271.9	1,460.8	1,885.7	1,572.5	1,841.0
India	547.6	687.3	849.5	997.5	1,015.9	1,033.4	1,347.2	1,854.8	1,247.5	1,626.2
Indonesia	117.5	148.3	178.2	207.0	210.4	213.6	274.6	353.9	260.5	339.9
South Asia	712.0	901.4	1,121.2	1,329.6	1,355.1	1,379.8	458.8	742.8	422.7	599.7
East Asia	1,118.0	1,359.4	1,596.7	1,791.7	1,808.6	1,825.9	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

POPULATION GROWTH

5.2

	Average annual percentage change						Standard projection ^a	Rapid projection ^a
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2001	2000	2001		
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2	1.2
Angola	1.5	2.2	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.1	1.0
Benin*+	2.1	2.4	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.6	1.6	1.2
Botswana	2.9	3.6	3.5	2.8	1.7	1.2	0.7	1.1
Burkina Faso*+	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	1.8	1.1
Burundi*	1.9	1.4	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.2
Cameroon*+	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.3	1.1
Cape Verde	3.4	0.8	1.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	1.5	1.1
Central African Republic*+	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.4	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.2
Chad*+	1.8	2.0	2.6	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.3	0.9
Comoros*+	—	—	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	1.5	1.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.3	1.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.6	1.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.1	2.7	2.5	1.0	1.2
Djibouti	6.4	7.0	3.9	2.9	2.0	2.0	1.4	1.1
Equatorial Guinea*+	2.2	-1	5.8	2.6	2.7	2.6	1.9	0.8
Eritrea*	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.2
Ethiopia*	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.4	1.6	1.4
Gabon+	0.0	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	1.9	1.0
Gambia, The*	2.8	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.2	2.9	1.4	1.2
Ghana*	1.8	2.3	3.4	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.2	0.9
Guinea*	2.3	1.3	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.2	1.1	1.2
Guinea-Bissau*	0.6	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	1.6	0.9
Kenya*	3.3	3.7	3.5	2.6	2.3	2.1	1.0	1.3
Lesotho	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.3	1.3	0.8	1.1
Liberia	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.1	1.2
Madagascar*	2.4	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.1	2.9	1.6	1.2
Malawi*	2.5	3.1	3.3	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.4
Mali*+	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.7	1.0
Mauritania*	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.4	3.2	1.8	1.2
Mauritius	1.9	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.5
Mozambique*	2.4	2.5	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.2	1.0
Namibia	2.5	2.4	3.1	2.4	2.3	2.0	0.9	1.1
Niger*+	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3	2.4	1.1
Nigeria	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.4	2.3	1.6	1.1
Rwanda*	3.2	3.3	3.2	2.0	2.4	2.1	1.4	1.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.3	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.1	2.1	1.6	1.1
Senegal*+	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5	1.5	1.2
Seychelles	2.5	2.0	0.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	0.9
Sierra Leone*	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.0	2.0	1.6	1.1
Somalia	2.7	5.8	0.1	2.0	3.6	3.5	3.0	1.2
South Africa	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.0	0.6	0.8
Sudan	2.4	2.9	2.7	2.3	1.7	1.9	1.2	1.4
Swaziland	2.5	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.5	2.2	1.0	1.4
Tanzania*	3.1	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.3	2.2	1.3	1.1
Togo*+	4.4	2.2	3.4	2.7	3.2	2.8	1.4	1.1
Uganda*	4.2	2.8	2.2	3.1	2.7	2.6	1.8	1.0
Zambia*	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.6	2.1	1.9	0.9	1.2
Zimbabwe	3.3	3.3	3.8	2.1	1.9	1.5	0.9	1.1
North Africa	2.6	2.4	2.6	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.2	0.9
All Africa	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.0
Comparator countries	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.2	—	—
China	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.6
India	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.7	0.9	0.7
Indonesia	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	0.9	0.7
South Asia	2.4	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.2	1.0
East Asia	2.6	2.0	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.0	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

5.3

	Average number of children								Standard projection ^a	Rapid projection ^a
	Actual									
	1975	1985	1990	1992	1995	1997	2000	2020		
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.6	6.4	6.1	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.2			
Excluding South Africa	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.7	5.4	3.6	2.3	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.4	3.8	2.3	
Angola	6.7	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.0	6.8	6.6	4.4	2.3	
Benin*+	7.0	6.9	6.6	6.5	6.2	5.8	5.5	3.0	2.2	
Botswana	6.5	5.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.0	2.8	2.1	
Burkina Faso*+	7.3	7.3	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.5	4.1	2.3	
Burundi*	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.0	3.6	2.3	
Cameroon*+	6.4	6.4	6.0	5.7	5.2	5.1	4.8	2.9	2.1	
Cape Verde	7.0	6.0	5.5	5.2	4.1	4.0	3.7	2.1	—	
Central African Republic*+	5.8	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.7	3.0	2.2	
Chad*+	6.3	7.2	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.4	4.2	2.3	
Comoros*+	—	6.9	5.8	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.3	2.3	—	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	6.4	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.1	4.2	2.2	
Congo, Rep. of*+	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.0	4.2	2.2	
Côte d'Ivoire*+	7.4	7.1	6.2	5.7	5.4	5.2	4.8	2.7	2.8	
Djibouti	6.7	6.4	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.5	5.3	3.4	—	
Equatorial Guinea*+	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.7	3.5	—	
Eritrea*	—	7.3	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.7	5.4	3.3	—	
Ethiopia*	5.9	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.2	5.9	5.7	3.6	2.3	
Gabon+	4.3	4.8	5.1	5.2	4.6	4.3	4.2	3.4	2.2	
Gambia, The*	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	5.5	5.2	5.0	2.8	2.4	
Ghana*	6.6	6.3	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.5	4.2	2.4	2.2	
Guinea*	5.9	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.2	2.7	2.5	
Guinea-Bissau*	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.8	3.6	2.6	
Kenya*	8.1	6.9	5.6	5.2	4.9	4.7	4.4	2.6	2.1	
Lesotho	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.4	2.6	2.5	
Liberia	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.0	3.8	2.1	
Madagascar*	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.4	2.9	2.3	
Malawi*	7.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	6.6	6.4	6.3	4.0	2.4	
Mali*+	7.1	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.3	3.8	2.3	
Mauritania*	6.5	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.3	4.9	4.6	3.4	2.3	
Mauritius	3.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	
Mozambique*	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3	5.6	5.3	5.1	3.3	2.8	
Namibia	6.0	5.7	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.0	2.7	2.1	
Niger*+	8.0	8.0	7.6	7.4	7.5	7.4	7.2	4.7	2.3	
Nigeria	6.9	6.5	6.0	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.3	3.6	2.2	
Rwanda*	8.4	7.7	7.2	7.0	6.5	6.2	5.9	3.5	2.3	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.7	4.5	2.6	—	
Senegal*+	7.0	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.7	5.4	5.1	2.9	2.3	
Seychelles	—	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	—	
Sierra Leone*	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.1	5.8	3.6	2.4	
Somalia	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.1	5.4	2.3	
South Africa	5.3	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.5	2.1	
Sudan	6.4	5.8	5.4	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.6	2.4	2.2	
Swaziland	6.5	5.8	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.4	2.6	—	
Tanzania*	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.3	3.0	2.3	
Togo*+	6.6	6.9	6.6	6.6	5.4	5.2	5.0	2.9	2.2	
Uganda*	7.1	7.2	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.2	3.7	2.3	
Zambia*	7.1	6.7	6.3	6.2	5.9	5.6	5.3	3.0	2.2	
Zimbabwe	6.8	5.8	4.8	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.8	2.8	2.1	
North Africa	6.0	4.9	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.2	2.1	
All Africa	6.5	6.1	5.7	5.5	5.2	5.1	4.8	—	—	
Comparator countries	4.6	3.5	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5	—	—	
China	3.4	2.4	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	
India	5.3	4.4	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.2	2.1	
Indonesia	5.0	3.6	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.1	2.1	
South Asia	5.6	4.7	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.3	2.4	2.2	
East Asia	3.8	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	—	—	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE

5.4

	Latest survey	Percentage of women or their spouses using contraception	
		Target	
		2010	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	13 (2000)	—	—
Excluding South Africa	13 (2000)	38.0	72.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	13 (2000)	38.0	72.0
Angola	1 (1977)	33.0	69.0
Benin*+	16 (1996)	40.0	71.0
Botswana	33 (1988)	65.0	75.0
Burkina Faso*+	12 (1998)	38.0	68.0
Burundi*	9 (1987)	40.0	72.0
Cameroon*+	19 (1998)	29.0	72.0
Cape Verde	53 (1998)	—	—
Central African Republic*+	15 (1994)	38.0	69.0
Chad*+	4 (1996)	43.0	71.0
Comoros*+	21 (1996)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1 (1977)	34.0	73.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	—	30.0	74.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	15 (1998)	30.0	74.0
Djibouti	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—
Eritrea*	8 (1995)	—	—
Ethiopia*	8 (2000)	34.0	73.0
Gabon+	33 (2000)	40.0	76.0
Gambia, The*	1 (1977)	33.0	65.0
Ghana*	22 (1998)	45.0	73.0
Guinea*	6 (1999)	32.0	64.0
Guinea-Bissau*	1 (1977)	36.0	68.0
Kenya*	39 (1998)	57.0	80.0
Lesotho	23 (1991)	48.0	73.0
Liberia	6 (1986)	41.0	72.0
Madagascar*	19 (1997)	37.0	68.0
Malawi*	31 (2000)	35.0	74.0
Mali*+	7 (1996)	35.0	71.0
Mauritania*	8 (2000)	35.0	68.0
Mauritius	75 (1991)	81.0	77.0
Mozambique*	6 (1997)	29.0	67.0
Namibia	29 (1992)	—	—
Niger*+	8 (1998)	30.0	70.0
Nigeria	15 (1999)	38.0	73.0
Rwanda*	13 (2000)	38.0	78.0
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—
Senegal*+	10 (1999)	46.0	73.0
Seychelles	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	4 (1982)	39.0	67.0
Somalia	0 (1983)	35.0	69.0
South Africa	62 (1998)	71.0	79.0
Sudan	10 (1993)	36.0	69.0
Swaziland	20 (1988)	—	—
Tanzania*	25 (1999)	34.0	70.0
Togo*+	24 (1998)	57.0	81.0
Uganda*	15 (1995)	35.0	73.0
Zambia*	26 (1996)	29.0	72.0
Zimbabwe	54 (1999)	71.0	80.0
North Africa	56 (2000)	63.0	74.0
All Africa	22 (2000)	—	—
Comparator countries	—	70.0	75.0
China	83 (1999)	79.0	79.0
India	51.8 (1999)	64.0	73.0
Indonesia	57 (1998)	68.0	71.0
South Asia	52 (1999)	55.0	72.0
East Asia	83 (1999)	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANS (EAP)

5.5

	Completed as of fiscal 1999	Expected completion date after 1999	No action	Remarks
Angola			■	
Benin*+	■			
Botswana	■			NCS in lieu
Burkina Faso*+	■			
Burundi*	■			
Cameroon*+	■			
Cape Verde	■			
Central African Republic*+	■			
Chad*+		■ 2003		
Comoros*+	■			
Congo, Dem. Rep. of			■	
Congo, Rep. of *+	■			
Côte d'Ivoire*+	■			
Djibouti			■	
Equatorial Guinea*+			■	
Eritrea*	■			
Ethiopia*	■			
Gabon+	■			
Gambia, The*	■			
Ghana*	■			
Guinea*	■			
Guinea-Bissau*	■			
Kenya*	■			
Lesotho	■			
Liberia			■	
Madagascar*	■			
Malawi*	■			
Mali*+	■			
Mauritania*		■ 2003		
Mauritius	■			
Mozambique*	■			
Namibia			■	
Niger*+	■			
Nigeria	■			
Rwanda*	■			
São Tomé and Príncipe*	■			
Senegal*+	■			
Seychelles	■			
Sierra Leone*	■			
Somalia			■	
South Africa			■	
Sudan			■	
Swaziland			■	
Tanzania*	■			
Togo*+	■			
Uganda*	■			
Zambia*	■			
Zimbabwe	■			
Total	36	2	10	

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: For the Africa Region, the environmental action plan is considered an in-country, demand-driven process. It is not possible in many cases to identify definitive completion dates even though the process may be in an advanced stage, because completion depends on government approval.

Source: World Bank data.

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, SHARE OF GDP 6.1

	Percentage of GDP									
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	
Australia	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Austria	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	
Belgium	0.27	0.23	0.22	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.09	
Canada	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.03	
Denmark	0.11	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	
Finland	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.05	
France	0.18	0.15	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.15	0.13	0.13	
Germany	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	
Ireland	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.11	
Italy	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	
Japan	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.24	
Netherlands	0.06	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.11	0.16	
New Zealand	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Norway	0.10	0.20	0.28	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.21	0.19	
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.24	
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	
Sweden	0.14	0.22	0.25	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.16	
Switzerland	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	
United Kingdom	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.08	
United States	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Average	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	

— Not available.

Note: ODA is official development assistance.

Source: OECD for ODA; World Bank for GDP.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSES

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, VALUE
6.2

	Millions of U.S. dollars									
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	
Bilateral										
Australia	2.0	21.1	33.3	60.5	60.6	49.3	36.3	33.3	34.1	
Austria	0.7	9.6	15.5	76.1	94.5	66.5	78.1	105.5	72.9	
Belgium	122.0	284.5	185.0	202.3	205.2	215.1	268.9	167.5	198.0	
Canada	91.2	198.7	337.3	275.1	271.5	231.4	286.7	225.2	179.7	
Denmark	32.8	127.5	128.3	463.1	463.9	403.1	442.7	444.9	399.7	
Finland	6.0	36.1	69.9	81.7	82.7	68.9	72.3	92.8	64.1	
France	472.6	1,002.9	1,157.6	3,323.6	3,180.6	2,895.6	2,109.8	1,919.9	1,642.5	
Germany	163.2	1,020.1	761.5	1,315.6	1,277.6	970.3	1,077.6	968.0	783.1	
Ireland	0.0	6.5	11.0	61.6	75.6	89.2	90.4	90.3	103.4	
Italy	33.4	60.3	458.5	585.3	333.3	290.7	461.0	268.8	285.8	
Japan	18.7	243.4	296.2	1,431.5	1,144.3	864.8	1,031.4	1,085.3	1,076.5	
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.9	30.2	30.4	34.3	32.5	44.9	
Netherlands	39.5	382.2	271.0	769.4	705.4	580.7	651.1	452.4	575.0	
New Zealand	0.2	1.3	0.6	3.6	3.8	5.7	4.0	5.2	5.1	
Norway	22.8	126.7	179.9	380.0	395.0	390.2	365.6	322.6	299.4	
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	161.4	151.9	161.8	164.1	206.9	255.9	
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	90.1	228.4	213.0	178.9	170.8	122.7	
Sweden	74.7	288.0	259.4	387.6	464.6	392.5	357.1	336.1	368.9	
Switzerland	11.3	52.2	95.3	218.7	192.9	182.0	163.6	163.5	149.2	
United Kingdom	156.2	515.3	336.0	642.1	666.6	645.9	911.6	789.2	1,150.3	
United States	142.0	616.0	1,345.0	1,059.0	642.0	831.0	722.3	958.5	1,146.1	
Total bilateral ODA	1,389.3	4,992.5	5,941.2	11,614.0	10,670.5	9,578.0	9,507.8	8,839.1	8,957.0	
Multilateral										
International Development Association	108.7	436.5	886.3	2,395.7	2,585.0	2,403.0	2,283.5	2,655.5	2,446.6	
European Development Fund	215.2	633.4	711.1	1,848.1	2,128.9	1,917.6	1,814.5	1,707.8	1,253.3	
Africa Development Fund	0.0	96.5	209.5	595.3	605.7	609.6	594.2	478.7	343.7	
International Fund for Agricultural Development	0.0	4.0	80.0	83.1	99.5	63.6	75.3	64.2	91.1	
United Nations Children's Fund	8.7	56.7	100.9	310.4	284.3	164.0	151.0	153.6	166.4	
United Nations Development Program	87.1	194.3	225.0	174.1	228.3	294.3	248.4	210.6	145.7	
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	16.3	159.4	208.7	427.3	155.8	151.0	132.3	148.0	190.2	
United Nations Population Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
World Food Program	40.2	175.0	352.7	616.8	214.8	87.5	117.5	177.6	191.4	
Other UN	12.9	66.2	79.1	84.1	73.0	6.2	4.9	4.4	61.2	
Total multilateral ODA	489.1	1,821.9	2,853.2	6,534.8	6,375.3	5,696.8	5,421.5	5,600.6	4,889.7	

— Not available.

Note: Disbursements of grants and loans and other long-term capital. ODA is official development assistance.

Source: OECD data ; ODA/OA , disbursements of grants and loans and other long term capitals, amount extended.

**LENDING BY THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE IMF
TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

6.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars							
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
World Bank Group								
Commitments	133	68	7	10	108	0	5	93
Disbursements	392	274	229	263	159	89	75	56
Amortization	1,063	1,056	950	834	743	687	552	456
Net flows	-670	-782	-721	-572	-584	-598	-476	-400
Interest payments	695	630	527	407	332	294	213	180
Net resource transfers	-1,366	-1,412	-1,248	-978	-915	-892	-689	-580
International Development Association								
Commitments	2,858	2,403	2,596	1,718	2,947	1,875	3,012	3,654
Disbursements	2,887	2,392	2,585	2,397	2,099	1,968	2,193	2,443
Amortization	101	120	140	154	187	236	277	343
Net flows	2,785	2,273	2,446	2,243	1,912	1,732	1,916	2,100
Interest payments	149	178	185	192	204	223	218	230
Net resource transfers	2,636	2,094	2,260	2,051	1,709	1,509	1,698	1,870
Total IBRD and IDA								
Commitments	2,991	2,471	2,604	1,728	3,056	1,875	3,017	3,746
Disbursements	3,279	2,666	2,814	2,660	2,258	2,058	2,268	2,499
Amortization	1,164	1,175	1,089	988	930	923	829	799
Net flows	2,115	1,491	1,725	1,672	1,329	1,135	1,440	1,700
Interest payments	844	808	713	599	535	517	431	410
Net resource transfers	1271	682	1012	1073	793	617	1009	1290
International Monetary Fund								
Total purchases	917	2994	648	523	801	512	525	582
Repurchases	467	2372	597	1065	1112	589	548	760
Net flows	451	622	51	-543	-311	-77	-24	-178
Charges	170	559	124	101	65	55	43	34
Net resource transfers	281	63	-72	-644	-375	-132	-66	-212

Source: World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

7.1

	Percentage of GDP					
	1992	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Angola ^a	12.0	19.5	(22.3)	11.4	21.2	—
Benin*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	4.3	2.9	3.1	3.9	3.7	3.7
Burkina Faso*+	2.3	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6
Burundi*	3.6	5.8	6.0	6.5	6.2	5.4
Cameroon*+	[1.5]	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.3
Cape Verde	—	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.3
Central African Rep. *°	1.6	1.2	—	—	—	—
Chad*+	—	1.5	1.1	1.0	—	—
Comoros*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. *+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cote d'Ivoire*+	1.4	0.9	0.9	—	—	—
Djibouti	6.1	4.2	4.5	4.4	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea* ^b	—	22.8	13.5	29.0	22.9	—
Ethiopia* ^c	[2.7]	1.9	3.2	5.1	9.4	—
Gabon+	—	—	—	0.3	—	—
Gambia, The*°	1.0	1.0	1.9	0.9	0.8	(1.1)
Ghana*	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0
Guinea*	1.9	—	1.2	1.5	—	(1.5)
Guinea Bissau* ^d	—	0.6	0.7	1.3	—	—
Kenya*	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.6	(1.8)
Lesotho	2.6	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.1	—
Liberia ^e	10.6	—	—	—	1.8	—
Madagascar* ^f	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.4	[1.4]	1.2
Malawi*	1.4	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8
Mali*+	—	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2	[2.5]
Mauritania*°	3.5	2.5	2.3	—	—	—
Mauritius	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Mozambique* ^g	5.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5
Namibia ^h	4.3	1.9	2.3	2.3	3.1	3.3
Niger*+	—	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.4	—
Nigeria ⁱ	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.3	0.9
Rwanda* ^j	4.4	5.3	4.1	4.4	4.6	[3.0]
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal* ^{+k}	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4
Seychelles	4.7	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8
Sierra Leone*	2.5	2.0	1.0	0.8	1.6	1.4
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	2.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.5
Sudan	2.5	0.9	1.0	2.2	2.6	3.0
Swaziland	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.6
Tanzania*	1.9	1.4	1.3	(1.3)	(1.3)	—
Togo*+	2.9	—	—	—	—	—
Uganda*°	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.8
Zambia*	(3.0)	(1.4)	(1.8)	(1.9)	(1.0)	[0.6]
Zimbabwe ^l	3.7	3.2	3.4	2.6	3.4	4.8

— Not available

* SPA country

+ CFA country

° current/operating expenditures only

() Uncertain figure

[] SIPRI estimates

a. Data should be seen in the context of highly uncertain economic statistics because of the impact of war on Angolan economy.

b. Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in May 1993.

c. The figure for Ethiopia in 1999 includes an allocation of 1 billion birr in addition to the original defense budget.

d. This country has changed currency during the period. All figures have been converted to the most recent currency.

e. The figure for Liberia in 1999 is for security, which represents 13 percent of total expenditure of \$64 million.

f. Figures include expenditure for the gendarmerie and the National Police.

g. Figures for Mozambique include expenditure for the demobilization of government and RENAMO soldiers and the formation of a new unified army 1994 onwards. The figures are for defense and security.

h. During the period 1992/93 military construction accounted for more than half of Namibian military expenditure.

i. Data for 1999 do not include contingency provision for the Namibian military presence in the DRC.

j. Data before 1999 are understated because of the use by the military of a favorable specific dollar exchange rate.

k. Data for 1997 do not include demobilization allowance of 1.0 billion francs. The figure for 1998 is the official defense budget. Other estimates indicate substantially higher defense expenditures.

l. Data do not include expenditure for paramilitary forces, which in 1998 amounted to 21,100 million francs.

m. The figure for Zimbabwe in 1999 includes a supplementary allocation of 1,800 million ZD.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2001

TECHNICAL NOTES

Most macroeconomic data (in particular, national accounts, balance of payments, government finance statistics, and trade) reflect data maintained by World Bank country desks, often referred to as operational data.

Annual data shown for country groups are totals, averages, or medians for the countries included in the group, as indicated on the relevant table. These group aggregates can be either simple (arithmetic)—where missing data are not imputed -or gap-filled - where weights are used to adjust group totals for missing countries.

Most group averages are weighted according to the relative importance of the countries in the group total for that indicator, based on simple addition across countries when the indicator is expressed in reasonable comparable units. Group averages for analytical ratios (for example, imports to GDP) can be either weighted or simple.

Period averages are calculated from time series (levels, ratios, growth rates, or medians) for both countries and country groups. They are either simple averages or average annual percentage growth rates, which are computed using the least-squares method and are usually based on real-term series. The least-squares growth rate is estimated by fitting a least-squares linear regression trend line to the logarithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant period. It takes into account all observations in a period and reflects general trends that are not influenced by exceptional values, particularly at the end points.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

The time series for national accounts are based mainly on national sources as collected by World Bank country economists. They are generally in accord with the UN System of National Accounts. A conversion factor is used to convert national currencies to U.S. dollars, both in this section and in the trade section.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth—provides average annual growth rates calculated from GDP at market prices (also known as purchaser values), expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars.

Gross domestic savings (GDS)—calculated by deducting total consumption from GDP in local currency at current prices, expressed as percentage of GDP.

Gross domestic investment (GDI)—gross domestic fixed capital formation plus net changes in the level of inventories, expressed as percentage of GDP. GDI comprises outlays by the public sector and the private sector. The ratio is calculated in local currency at current prices.

Real agricultural growth—calculated from the value added of agriculture at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of forestry, hunting, fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock production, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

Real industrial growth—calculated from the value added of industry at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity water, and gas, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

GDP deflator—the implicit GDP deflator for national currency is obtained by dividing, for each year of the time series, the value of the GDP at current prices by the value of the GDP at constant 1995 prices, both in national currency.

Real gross national product (GNP) per capita—calculated by the World Bank Atlas method, which uses three-year averages of exchange rates that smooth out sharp fluctuations from year to year, expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GNP measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents. It comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labor and capital), less similar payments made to nonresidents who contributed to the domestic economy.

Food production per capita—annual per capita production in kilograms of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses, from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)–Agricultural Production database.

TRADE

Real export growth and real import growth (goods and nonfactor services)—data for exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services refer to all goods and nonfactor series provided to, or by, the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfac-

tor services. The values of factor services, such as investment income, interest, and labor income, are not included. Calculations use 1995 U.S. dollar series, which are generally estimated on the basis of foreign trade statistics from customs declarations.

Terms of trade—measure the relative movement of export and import prices. This series is calculated as the ratio of a country's export unit values or prices to its import unit values or prices. It shows changes over a base year (1995) in the level of export unit values as a percentage of import unit values.

Staple food imports, value—calculated by adding the import value (from FAO-TRADE databases) of wheat, wheat flour, wheat germ, paddy rice, husked rice, broken rice, milled paddy rice, rice bran, rice flour, maize, maize germ, maize flour, and maize bran, all expressed in current U.S. dollars.

Staple food imports, share of exports—as above, but as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services in current U.S. dollars.

CAPITAL FLOWS

The principal sources for information on debt are reports to the World Bank, through the Debtor Reporting System, from its member countries that have received either International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans or International Development Association credits. Additional information on debt has been drawn from the files of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Gross concessional aid flows—all concessional credits plus official transfers as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars. This does not include technical assistance.

Debt service ratio—service on long- and short-term debt, including IMF credit, as a percentage of exports of goods and services plus workers' remittances in current U.S. dollars. All figures reflect actual cash payments.

Foreign direct investment—the net amount invested or reinvested by non-residents to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises in which they exercise significant managerial control. Investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital. The net figures subtract the value of direct investment abroad by residents of the reporting country.

HUMAN CONDITION

Infant mortality rate—the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. The estimates are based on an analysis of all available information: survey- and census-based indirect and direct estimates, census age structures, health information (especially immunization completeness), and vital registration adjusted for incompleteness. The outcome is a figure that cannot be linked with a single empirical source but that is usually consistent with the demographic situation. Projections are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Life expectancy at birth—the number of years newborn infants would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of their birth were to stay the same throughout their life. Data are World Bank estimates based on data from the UN Population Division, the UN Statistical Office, and national statistical offices. Projections are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Access to health services—refers to the percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services by local means of transport in no more than one hour. Data are presented separately for total, urban, and rural population (WHO data).

Child immunization and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) use—child immunization measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A child is considered adequately immunized against DPT (diphtheria, pertussis or whooping cough, and tetanus) after receiving two or three doses of vaccine, depending on the immunization scheme. Oral rehydration therapy use is the percentage of all cases of diarrhea in children under five years of age treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution (WHO data).

Total primary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the primary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for primary education in a given country. Figures shown may be more than 100 percent since the total enrollment includes pupils above and pupils below the primary school age, as well as repeaters.

Total secondary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for secondary education in a given country. Secondary level (general) refers to education in secondary schools that provides general or specialized instruction based on at least four years of previous instruction at the first or primary level and that does not specifically aim at preparing the pupils directly for a given trade or occupation.

Female primary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at the primary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools but may exclude certain specialized schools and training programs.

Female secondary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at secondary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools.

POPULATION

Population—usually projections from the most recent population censuses or surveys. Projected figures were prepared by the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department. These projections assume average, or standard, fertility decline. The rapid projection figures are World Bank projections assuming rapid fertility decline, defined as twice the rate of standard fertility decline experienced by developing countries during recent decades. Both standard and rapid fertility decline variants assume that the use of contraception will increase in all countries. But to achieve the rapid projections, contraceptive use has to increase at a much more rapid pace. Mortality levels are assumed to be identical in both variants and incorporate mortality from AIDS. Population figures under the heading stabilization are World Bank projections of the size of the stationary population. Stationary populations are those in which age-specific and sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a long period, and in which fertility rates have remained at replacement level—meaning that women bear, on average, only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population.

Population growth—derived from the population figures in table 5.1.

Total fertility rate—average number of live children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. These estimates are derived from the UN World Population Prospects (1990), demographic and health surveys, censuses, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, official estimates, World Bank estimates, and Eurostat data.

Contraceptive prevalence rate—percentage of married women of childbearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception (modern or traditional). Childbearing age is generally defined as 15 to 49, although for some countries contraceptive use is measured for other age groups.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure project. SIPRI calculates the ratio of military spending to GDP in domestic currency using current prices. Although common guidelines are used, it is not possible to adhere to a common definition of military spending in all countries, and there are considerable variations between countries in what is included in official defense spending data.

SIPRI collects data from a variety of sources, including an annual questionnaire that is submitted to each country's ministries of finance and defense, national statistical office, and central bank. Data also come from a wide range of national and international publications, including government budgets and statistics. IMF data are used for GDP. Other IMF, UN, and Economist Intelligence Unit data are used as well.

