



2001/2002 Annual Report

Global Coalition for Africa  
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USA


African Social and Economic Trends

2001/2002 Annual Report

Global Coalition for Africa

“The private sector —  
the missing link in  
African development  
strategies?”

African Social and  
Economic Trends  
Global Coalition for Africa



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# AFRICAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

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Annual Report 2001/2002  
of the Global Coalition for Africa



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## FOREWORD

The first Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) Plenary to be held in Africa was convened in Gaborone on October 25, 2001. We felt that Botswana was a fitting location, given its impressive record of economic growth, good governance, and participatory democracy since independence. In established GCA tradition, the Plenary brought together a wide range of participants from African governments, their development partners, civil society, and the private sector. The meeting focused on the private sector in Africa, specifically on what African governments, the private sector itself, and Africa's partners all need to do to promote its role and its development.

We selected this topic because in many ways the private sector has been the missing link in African development. It is apparent that without a broad and diverse private sector, African countries will face further difficulties in meeting their goals of poverty reduction and sustained economic growth. In other regions of the world the private sector has provided the bulk of the investment that has spurred growth, employment, and the means of integrating into the global economy. We believe, given an appropriate environment, that the private sector can do the same in African countries. And we are hopeful that such an environment is now being built domestically and internationally. Because of the importance of the topic, we have included an overview of issues relating to the private sector in this Annual Report.

The Plenary provided an opportunity to review (and evaluate) the work of the GCA and to outline our ideas for future priorities. Participants agreed that the GCA has been useful in bringing together key political, business, and civic actors from African and partner countries to discuss issues of central concern to African development. There was continued appreciation for the informal and yet serious format that has enabled frank dialogue on emerging and sensitive topics—and for the GCA's contribution to building consensus on political and economic actions to address the challenges facing the continent.

The future agenda will cover three main issues: peace and security, governance and the transition to democracy, and sustainable growth and integration into the global economy. Within these we will select each year the areas to which we think the GCA can bring the greatest

added value. We will also seek to build support for various aspects of the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

The Plenary took place only a few weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, attacks categorically condemned in the meeting. But our discussions also underscored the best antidote to terrorism: political progress and economic prosperity. Exclusion and poverty breed the despair that enables terrorists to manipulate people for their own ends. As the September 11 attacks demonstrated, in an era of globalization no country is safe from the threat of terrorism. Though obviously predominantly beneficial, open and easy communications and the free movement of people and money have a dark side. As we have seen, international terrorist organizations are operating throughout the world, and African countries, like others, are vulnerable. It is thus imperative that resources for development be maintained and that the efforts of African countries to reduce poverty and improve the well-being of their people be supported.

It is also necessary for the international community to engage seriously with Africa. The difference in response to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction between Africa and other regions has led many to question international commitment to the continent. While Africa should certainly assume primary responsibility for addressing its problems, "African solutions to African problems" should not become an excuse for disengagement. Furthermore, the same standards should apply to Africa as to the rest of the world. This applies to the pressure to end violence and to the assistance to recover from conflict and maintain peace that is then provided.

This report also focuses on the two main developments in Africa in 2001—the creation of the African Union to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the endorsement of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

There is no question that NEPAD is novel and welcome. It was initiated and promoted by Africa's leaders, and it has been adopted by the full membership of the OAU and endorsed by the international community. Among its most challenging and gratifying features is its call for mutual responsibilities and obligations. Such commitments are expected at various levels—between governments and key national constituencies including the private sector, among African countries

through mechanisms of peer review, and between African countries and their development partners.

It is clear that African countries will move at different speeds in adopting the new development framework. A few will move quickly to formulate and implement their national development strategies. A large group may follow only after laying the groundwork of further reforms. And a third group may take even longer to develop the action plans and implementation procedures to operationalize the initiative. The unequivocal support that the early implementers receive from the international community will greatly enhance the likelihood of success and wider operationalization of NEPAD.

While African countries have the main responsibility and leadership for implementation of NEPAD, the need for international solidarity cannot be overstated. For our part we will continue to urge timely and adequate external action in the form of deeper debt relief and increased development assistance. We will also encourage more foreign direct investment and greater market access, along with a reduction of agricultural subsidies, which continue to disadvantage African producers. The G-8 summit in Canada and the UN Conferences on Financing Development and Sustainable Development will be occasions for concrete and tangible commitments by Africa's development partners.

Co-Chairpersons

*Alpha Oumar Konaré, Meles Zenawi,  
Ketumile Masire, Frene Ginwala,  
Eveline Herfkens, Maria Minna, Clare Short*

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## ABOUT THE GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA

The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) is a North-South forum that brings together African leaders and Africa's principal external partners. It examines Africa's most critical social and economic development issues, seeks consensus on policies and programs of action, and monitors the results. The GCA is based on the premise that Africa can grow only if there is effort from within, but that to do so it needs sustained and well-coordinated outside support and a stronger working partnership with Northern donors. With sweeping changes around the world, the GCA strives to keep Africa on the global agenda and to mobilize the necessary international support to match Africa's commitments to economic and political change.

The GCA's Co-Chairpersons are President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali; Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia; Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana; Frene Ginwala, Speaker of the South African Parliament; Eveline Herfkens, Minister of Development of the Netherlands; Maria Minna, Canada's Minister for International Development; and Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development of the United Kingdom. Mr. Jan P. Pronk, the Netherlands Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment, and Mr. Robert S. McNamara, former President of the World Bank, continue to be associated with the GCA as Co-Chairpersons Emeriti. The Secretariat, based in Washington, D.C., is headed by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah.

The GCA's ultimate governing body is a plenary of all its members—involving African governments and their bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental partners—which met for the third time in Gaborone, Botswana, in October 2001. In between plenary meetings the GCA's work is guided by a Policy Forum comprising representatives of African and Northern countries, together with representatives of international and regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the European Union, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the Africa Department of the International Monetary Fund, and the Africa Region of the World Bank.

The GCA's agenda is focused on the following broad themes:

- Peace and security, including conflict management and security sector reform.
- Governance and transition to democracy, including anticorruption, democratic accountability, and peaceful political succession.
- Sustainable growth and integration into the global economy, including regional integration, the private sector, and agriculture.



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## OVERVIEW

This Annual Report is being issued at the end of a troubled year. There were violent protests against globalization in Gothenborg and Genoa. And there was discord at a UN Conference on Racism in Durban. But these events were eclipsed by the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on civilians in New York and Washington. African populations and leaders, deploring the death of so many innocent people from so many different countries, have pledged their support to the international coalition against terrorism.

All countries must be involved in the fight against terrorism. Indeed the deep-rooted structural problems that can give rise to terrorism must also be addressed if an enduring solution is to be found. Political inclusion and the institutionalization of democracy must be vigorously promoted and supported, with people given a voice in their own development. Human rights and civil liberties, hard won in many African countries, must not be denied now in the name of countering terrorism. Similarly, major democracies should not turn away from the universal moral values that define them, and there can be no return to security as the rationale for international cooperation and development assistance. The international community cannot and should not turn a blind eye to leaders who back away from democracy, simply because they denounce terrorism. If it does, it will be helping to create the conditions that terrorists can exploit.

As is well known, the events of September 11 have far-reaching implications—both political and economic—for all countries. The global economy is projected to grow by only 2.6 percent in 2001. And growth in world trade, averaging more than 5 percent in the second half of the 1990s, slowed to less than 3 percent in 2001. These estimates have not factored in the economic impact of the September 11 events. It is against this deteriorating international economic environment that Africa's recent performance and near-term economic prospects should be assessed. But Africa's overall performance is also influenced by political and economic trends and developments within Africa itself.

Throughout the year conflict remained a major impediment to progress, reinforcing the negative image of Africa as a continent of instability. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continued to be embroiled in

hostilities that undermined security in each country and in the West Africa region. In Angola and Sudan peace proved elusive. Oil revenues bolstered the ability of governments to continue long-standing wars, matched in Angola by UNITA's illicit sale of diamonds. In the Democratic Republic of Congo the number of competing factions and the involvement of other African states—as well as the inability of any one party to gain a decisive military victory—further complicated efforts to reach a peace agreement. But there was some progress in establishing the parameters of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, intended to facilitate peace negotiations.

On democratization, both presidential and legislative elections are now the norm throughout the continent. But in many cases the benefits of incumbency, along with political patronage, still undermine genuine political competition. The conduct of elections varied in Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mauritania, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles, and Uganda, with results far more credible in some than others. The commitment to democracy is now being tested as several serving presidents come to the end of their constitutionally mandated terms of office. Ghana's peaceful exchange of power in January 2001 was an exception in a year that returned most incumbent leaders to office. Suggestions for constitutional amendments to permit serving heads of state to seek reelection—a move defeated in Zambia by popular protest—were a disturbing trend.

The economic upturn in the second half of the 1990s was barely maintained in 1999 and 2000, when Sub-Saharan Africa recorded GDP growth rates of 2.4 percent and 3.2 percent. Accounting for much of the improved results for 2000 are the significantly higher growth rates by Nigeria and South Africa, which together account for 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. Among other important economies, Zimbabwe's economic performance was disappointing, reflecting the country's political instability. Côte d'Ivoire, another country with an unsettled political transition, saw declines in investment and growth. Kenya too experienced poor growth.

Except for the oil-producing states, Sub-Saharan Africa was hurt by lower prices for its principal exports, with coffee prices at their lowest in 40 years. Foreign direct investment to the region remained low, and in the current international climate prospects are not promising. Official development assistance is still the largest form of external resource

transfers to Africa, and it must continue to be available. Indeed, many prominent Western political leaders with responsibility for development cooperation, including the Co-Chairpersons of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), have been vigorously advocating a significant increase in overall development assistance, particularly to low-income Africa. At the same time, removing the remaining barriers to market access will encourage African exports.

Despite the year's difficulties there are positive signs for Africa. One is a deepened commitment to the continent at the highest political level in some G-8 countries. The other is the growing interest of large private corporations, as evidenced at the GCA Plenary and other forums. Matching these developments is the greater openness to change by African populations and their leaders.

*Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah*  
*Executive Secretary*

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## **PART I A NEW AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM IN THE MAKING**

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### *Two landmark initiatives*

Africa entered the new millennium by taking two landmark initiatives—adopting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and endorsing the African Union. After various high-level meetings in 2000 and 2001, leaders gave the final go-ahead for both initiatives at their July 2001 Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Lusaka. The effects of the changed international climate following the events of September 11, 2001, with its increased focus on security and combating terrorism, remain to be seen. But it is clear that the development and democracy emphasized by both initiatives are essential.

#### **THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY BECOMES THE AFRICAN UNION**

At the OAU’s annual summit in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000 and at a subsequent special summit in Sirte, Libya, in March 2001, African heads of state agreed to transform the OAU into the African Union. They adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union to replace the 1963 OAU Charter. At the July 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, the newly elected secretary general was instructed to implement a one-year transition from the OAU to the new African Union. The major challenge of the transition will be to establish the new institutions and mechanisms called for in the constitutive act.

The original OAU Charter reflected the preoccupation of leaders of the newly established African states to consolidate independence, protect territorial integrity, combat neocolonialism, and continue the struggle to free African nations still under colonial or apartheid rule. Beyond such generic concepts as “the total advancement of our peoples” and support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the challenges of economic development and the transition of African societies toward democratic governance were seen as the natural outcomes of independence.

In recent years, in part due to both internal and external pressures, African heads of state have turned their attention to institutionalizing democracy, improving governance, and promoting regional economic integration. The heads of state signaled their commitment to regional

integration by adopting the Abuja Treaty of 1991. And in 1993 they established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution within the OAU, removing the taboo of noninterference in internal affairs with respect to civil wars. In addition, through decisions at the 1997 and 1999 summits, they agreed to refuse to accord legitimacy to any new regimes coming to power through unconstitutional means.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union adopts and endorses most of the original provisions of the 1963 OAU Charter. But the main thrust of the new charter is emphatically economic reform, improved governance and democracy, conflict resolution, and regional integration. The ambition of the African Union is to establish a single African common market, eventually leading to an economic union. The language clearly reflects better understanding of why most of Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world in significantly reducing poverty. These ideas are worth repeating:

- The African heads of state collectively condemn and reject unconstitutional changes in government.
- Conflict resolution is a prerequisite for Africa's developmental and integration agendas.
- African nations must protect human rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and ensure good governance and the rule of law.
- African governments must establish the conditions to enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations.
- The African Union should coordinate and harmonize the policies of regional economic communities.

An important provision of the constitutive act acknowledges, for the first time, that a state's failure or collapse is a collective responsibility. In addition, the act recognizes that failure or collapse is the likely outcome of sustained economic decline caused by the refusal or incapacity of governments to embark on political, economic, and governance reforms. The constitutive act also acknowledges that violent conflict is not just a source of subregional instability, but a major impediment to economic development throughout Africa.

*Violent conflict is a major impediment*

The African heads of state have established a collective peer review mechanism to hold each other accountable for failure to enact basic reforms. As demonstrated in Southern Africa since mid-2000, economic decline and growing instability in one country, Zimbabwe, can hurt the investment climate and growth prospects in neighboring countries.

The signing of this declaration pledging to institute a new African order of reform and change is important and laudable. But will African countries meet the challenges of implementation and coordination? Will the new African Union truly be a value-added catalyst for national and subregional efforts to implement reforms? Will its new leadership and bureaucracy resist the temptation to take a top-down approach to implementation and instead build on the organizational and substantive accomplishments of several states and subregional groupings?

#### **THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINED GROWTH AND POVERTY ERADICATION**

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) lays out a unified vision and development strategy for the continent—to place African countries on the path of accelerated growth and poverty eradication. It is a synthesis of several other plans—including one by the presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa and one by the president of Senegal. It provides a detailed analysis of the impediments to sustainable growth. It lists the prerequisites for development, and identifies priority sectors for resource allocation. Proposing a number of initiatives to which African governments would adhere (thereby accepting applicable rules and disciplines), it outlines the central issues to be addressed on a fast-track basis—including HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, information and communication technologies, debt relief, and market access. It also sets out the principles for a new relationship between Africa and its development partners.

There is no question that NEPAD, in its approach and scope, departs in a big way from previous “plans.” One fundamental difference: it has been conceived, elaborated, and promoted by key African leaders and countries. The full membership of the OAU Summit had several opportunities to consider, comment on, and influence the text before it was adopted.

The document leaves no doubt that African countries have responsibility for their own development, and NEPAD requires that they undertake specific commitments and obligations. Africans are expected to take the lead in identifying, planning, and implementing various initiatives emanating from NEPAD. Furthermore, a system for peer review is suggested to promote accountability and to ensure that commitments are fulfilled and agreed targets achieved. There is clearly a role for Africa's development partners, but again the proposed partnership is based on mutual benefit, commitment, and accountability.

NEPAD is new and refreshing. It contains:

- A frank analysis of the challenges and constraints facing Africa, with the main responsibility assigned to Africa. This is a “no holds barred” discussion about poor leadership, corruption, bad governance, and the inadequacies and shortcomings of many countries’ policies in the post-independence era.
- A strong reaffirmation of the need for African ownership of the development process, a concept on which the views of Africans and their partners have come to converge. The document is a clarion call for Africans to be “the architects of their own sustained development” and to begin thinking seriously about the eventual phasing out of aid “that has already reached its limits.”
- A ringing endorsement of agriculture and the participation of rural communities as key elements of African development. “Improvement of agricultural performance is a prerequisite for economic development on the continent.” Agricultural expansion is not only a mechanism to guarantee food security, but a fundamental basis for development.
- A realistic refusal to reject globalization, guided by the insight that “effectively managed integration presents the best prospects for future economic prospects and poverty reduction.” Despite antiglobalization demonstrations, many Africans see integration into the global economy as the way to reverse their deepening marginalization.
- A redefinition of democracy and state legitimacy that includes accountable government and a culture of human rights and pluralism. Multiparty elections are only the starting point on the road to genuine democratic and legitimate governance.

*Mutual benefit,  
commitment, and  
accountability*



- A firm recognition that African integration begins in the subregions, where some progress has already been made. “Integration is needed to form viable markets and investment targets. Therefore, the five regional economic groupings must be strengthened.”

The document also emphasizes the need to:

- Promote the role of women by giving them access to revenue-generating activities and credit. Without equal status for women, especially in education, Africa will not have the use of half of its brainpower, a fatal development handicap.
- Mobilize resources through increased savings, better management of public revenue, enhanced debt relief, and conditions that encourage citizens to keep their money in their own countries.
- Give the private sector the role and status it deserves through public-private partnerships, and facilitate intra-African trade on the basis of preferential trading arrangements, thus promoting a sector that has been relatively neglected since the end of colonialism.
- Accept collective responsibility for keeping all African governments on the moving train of economic, political, and social reform.

NEPAD recognizes that the objectives for African countries are poverty eradication, sustainable growth and development, and integration into the global economy. To achieve the internationally adopted millennium development goals—especially those for poverty reduction, universal primary education, and significantly improved health indicators—African countries must sustain growth rates of 7 percent or better a year over the next 15 years. Considerably above recent rates for most countries, this will require serious commitment to comprehensive development strategies. NEPAD outlines the elements of such strategies and the imperative for countries to:

- Establish the preconditions for development by maintaining peace, stability, sound governance, rule of law, and democratic practices.
- Focus on such critical human development issues as education and health—including HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.

- Invest in all forms of infrastructure, including transport, energy, water supply, and information and communication technology.
- Increase production, productivity, and diversification in such sectors as mining, agriculture, and manufacturing.
- Develop service industries (particularly tourism), improve export competitiveness, and seek new and improved market access for products.
- Mobilize resources, domestic and foreign, to finance development.

As African countries formulate their comprehensive development strategies, they must focus not only on meeting challenges, but also on fully exploiting opportunities and potential for development. To this end, NEPAD enumerates the principal endowments of the continent—what it offers to the rest of the world and what it can use as the basis for strong and sustainable development. Africa’s tropical rainforests and its contribution to the earth’s biodiversity are vital for the planet’s ecosystems. Africa also offers a substantial reservoir of archeological and cultural heritage. For its own development, the continent has significant mining and agricultural potential that can yield opportunities for processing and export industries in addition to primary products. And tourism operations can be built around its historical and cultural heritage, as well as natural and wildlife reserves.

Overseeing implementation of NEPAD is a select committee of 15 African heads of state, assisted by a steering committee and a small NEPAD secretariat in South Africa. Several partnerships will make NEPAD operational—based on commitments to agreed goals and targets and specifying each party’s tasks and obligations and mechanisms for review and accountability. Beyond national consensus in support of country development strategies, partnerships between government and the private sector will also be necessary. Subregionally, countries may agree to mutual peer review and monitoring. The collaboration of African and other institutions will also be required to elaborate the strategies and programs that NEPAD outlines.

NEPAD has an important message and challenge for Africa’s development partners. It proposes equal responsibility, with reciprocal accountability, for success or failure in fulfilling performance targets. It expects Africa’s external partners to provide assistance and cooperation—by helping mobilize adequate foreign private capital, ensuring

*NEPAD has an important message: equal responsibility, with reciprocal accountability*

continued development assistance, and implementing deeper debt relief measures. It also requires them to facilitate market access for African products by removing tariff and nontariff barriers and phasing out subsidies. In return for donors moving beyond the “debt sustainability” at the core of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries debt relief initiative, Africans pledge to impose their own stringent conditions on good governance and solid poverty reduction strategies. Assessments will ascertain to what extent each party fulfills its obligations.

Just as NEPAD is forthright about Africa’s past shortcomings, it tells industrialized nations that they can ignore Africa’s severe underdevelopment only at their peril. Through modern communications, the virus of instability can spread dangerously beyond the country or continent of origin. People are also more critical of what they consider to be double standards, with democracy preached but repressive regimes supported. In other words, can the industrialized nations sustain their own prosperity without integrating the poorest nations, most of them in Africa? It is becoming increasingly apparent that the drag of underdevelopment is the dark side of globalization. In this time of global economic slowdown the prospect of Africa becoming a significant contributor to the growth of global wealth appears all the more vital.

In adopting NEPAD the African heads of state have given themselves a tall order. Achieving its objectives and addressing its priority requirements will challenge political will and administrative capability, especially in view of the severe erosion of governmental capacity over the years. But does Africa really have a choice except to proceed down the road the African heads of state have projected for their continent? Clearly, there is no alternative.

#### **THE RESPONSE OF THE G-8**

A group of African leaders presented the new development strategy to the annual G-8 summit in Genoa. The G-8 leaders indicated their support by issuing the “Genoa Plan for Africa.”

The G-8 identified peace, stability, and the eradication of poverty in Africa as among the most important global challenges at the start of the new millennium. It thus welcomed NEPAD, especially its “core principles of responsibility and ownership, with an emphasis on

democracy, transparency, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights as fundamental factors of development.”

G-8 leaders, describing the initiative as a good basis for “a new intensive partnership between Africa and the developed world,” pledged support for Africa’s efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and conflict resolution. They also offered to help Africa play a more prominent role in international economic forums, including the World Trade Organization; to improve market access for African products in industrialized countries; and to encourage foreign direct investment. But while welcoming the initiative, they clearly expect the details to be fleshed out. As a demonstration of their commitment, each agreed to “designate a high level personal representative to liaise with committed African leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G-8 summit in Canada in 2002.”

The G-8 response to NEPAD gives every indication that a new and better partnership is being built. Even so, it could be asked whether the development partners will persist in supporting full ownership and greater responsibility of Africans, improving coordination among themselves, and marshalling the increased resources to match their enthusiasm for Africa’s ambitious new plans.

#### **OUTLOOK FOR THE TRANSITIONAL YEAR**

The transitional year 2001–02 can be very productive, but success will depend on follow-up, persistence, and the translation of summit decisions into the day-to-day work of the African countries and their multilateral and bilateral development partners.

Every African government will face the organizational and disciplinary challenge of formulating viable development strategies that reflect the needs and aspirations of their people, based on a national consensus that rises above short-term political considerations. As a collective, the African Union will also need the political will to accept the reality that some African countries can devise and implement development strategies more quickly than others and that their partners will exercise unprecedented selectivity in initiating new cooperation arrangements in some countries earlier than in others. While the most successful economic reformers will move ahead expeditiously, other

nations will first have to deal with conflict resolution and reconstruction, as well as the persistent political obstacles to achieving macroeconomic stability.

For the complex and ambitious task of establishing the new institutions of the African Union, the new secretary general, working under the heads of state, will need to develop an incremental approach, reflecting the continent's financial limitations and the diminished capacities of many governments after years of conflict and economic decline. The future of the African Union will be more secure if it builds on foundations established by the subregional organizations that have already registered significant achievements under the leadership of Africa's most committed states.

Is a new African development paradigm really in the making? Yes. When the industrialized nations' leaders talk of opening markets to African products and promoting foreign direct investment in Africa, there are clear signs that Africa is no longer being relegated to the category of humanitarian victim. When Africans talk of assigning a lead role in the development process to the business community through public-private sector partnerships—and of substantive participation in the World Trade Organization—there are clear signs that they feel they can and should become players in the global economy. Above all, Africans want to escape from the confines of permanent dependence on charity. If this new view of Africa's potential is embraced by governments, businesses, and the many nongovernmental organizations involved in Africa, a new African development paradigm can become a reality.

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## **PART II EMBRACING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE MISSING LINK IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT**

With the collapse of the socialist system in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the move to the market elsewhere, the private sector now accounts for the bulk of economic activity globally. Throughout the world recent economic growth and development have come about predominantly through private endeavor. There is no reason to believe that Africa should be any different. Yet so far the private sector in most African countries remains underdeveloped.

Individually and collectively, African countries are articulating a vision of accelerated growth and poverty reduction. This is also the goal of Africa's development partners. But effective and sustained poverty reduction needs much higher levels of broad-based economic growth than have yet been realized. Although government actions and external support are undoubtedly necessary, the required growth will be attained and maintained only through sustained private sector activity.

The private sector is not a panacea for all of Africa's difficulties. But with the right conditions and support it can, as elsewhere, generate the wealth to stimulate growth, the revenue to improve public services, and the employment to lift people out of poverty. For the poor and unemployed, access to an income-earning job is the surest way out of poverty and deprivation. And the higher revenues from expanded private sector activities would enable governments to invest more in social services.

The private sector also provides the main opportunity to facilitate Africa's integration into the global economy. This has taken on added importance now that official development assistance to the continent has fallen significantly from its peak in the mid-1990s and the state-dominated economic model is no longer seen as viable. A new development paradigm is needed for Africa to avoid further marginalization. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), adopted by African leaders in July 2001, embodies such an approach, envisaging a substantial contribution by the private sector. The G-8 leaders have endorsed its principles.

Perhaps for the first time since independence there is a real opportunity for the private sector to contribute to development in Africa. Both the international context and the policy environment in many

countries are now much more conducive to business. A new generation of private actors who understand the global environment and the need for competitiveness is emerging. And Africa's partners know that a true partnership with the continent involves more trade and investment, not just development assistance. Africa's prosperity and progress, and its place in the world, depend on the extent to which African governments, the private sector, and external partners work together to overcome the constraints that still inhibit the private sector—and to support its growth.

*A new generation of private actors is emerging*

### **GREAT POSSIBILITIES**

In many African countries a variety of constraints limit the prospects for viable business activities and significant economic growth. Yet a closer look indicates considerable possibilities for new investment—and for diversifying and expanding business activities. As underscored in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, the private sector can be the main agent for developing and using Africa's natural and human resources.

#### *Areas of most promise*

With rich mineral deposits still unexploited in many countries, mining offers many prospects for foreign and domestic private investment. But since most domestic private companies lack the technical and financial resources for mining and oil operations, African governments and their private sectors must explore creative ways to attract foreign partners.

In line with their all-round importance to African economies, agriculture and related activities provide easier opportunities. Not only is there domestic and regional demand for modern inputs for the sector, but the scope is considerable for increasing the value of agricultural products through processing. Both traditional and nontraditional agricultural exports can be expanded—if product quality, packaging, and delivery standards can be met.

Whether for the further processing of primary products or not, industrial production for domestic markets is a principal avenue for

growth and diversification. Over time, some of the industries catering to this demand may branch into production for export. Textiles and footwear, the usual entry points for value-added manufactured exports, should become more attractive since some of Africa's external partners have recently taken significant steps to remove all import barriers for Africa-originating textiles and apparel.

Trade is a traditional business with ample prospects for modernization and for greater efficiency and competitiveness. Export-related businesses in particular have considerable scope for expansion in both regional and global markets, with exports to neighboring countries providing opportunities to sharpen and upgrade competitiveness for the wider and more demanding global market.

Africa's natural endowments and its cultural and historical heritage could be the bases for a strong private sector-led tourism industry. The scope for growth is large, and the investments and skills are less demanding, though competitive tourism requires infrastructure, good accommodation and catering, efficient tour operators, and safety and health provisions. An additional benefit of the tourist trade is its linkages to such related activities as handicrafts, financial services, and transport, creating opportunities for small and medium-size enterprises.

The potential of banking and finance for savings mobilization and for financing development can also be profitably tapped. Among other services, new and interesting possibilities are emerging in information technology. Examples include the provision, by Africa-based enterprises, of accounting, data-entry, back-office operations, and even architectural and engineering design for companies based elsewhere. Such contractual services are easily provided over the Internet. The advantage of Africa-based enterprises lies chiefly in lower personnel costs, if the skills base is adequate.

The inadequate provision of infrastructure, a major constraint facing the private sector, is also an opportunity to be exploited. Although traditionally dominated by the public sector, it is now well understood that private participation in infrastructure is a more effective way of financing investment and improving operating efficiency. The telecommunications sector is especially open to private participation and to private ownership and management.



### *Unleashing Africa's private sector*

Growth of private activity in Africa will depend largely on the private sector itself. Africa's modern private sector, with the clear exception of South Africa, is underdeveloped, in large part because of past government policies. In most countries a big share of companies employing more than 100 workers is still either state-owned or multinational, though privatization is gradually changing this. Medium-size firms with 50 to 100 workers are more frequently the product of local private initiative, often beginning as small firms or microenterprises. And except for mining and other extractive industries, larger firms are usually based in the main urban areas, where facilities and services are better.

*Small businesses and microenterprises offer considerable potential*

Outside traditional agriculture the bulk of the domestic private sector in most countries is made up of small firms with up to 50 workers—and microenterprises with fewer than 5. They are usually family-owned or sole proprietorships providing employment to the owners, apprentices, and family members. Engaging in a wide range of activities with low entry and exit barriers, they serve as an important channel for entrepreneurs from all sections of society, especially women, the poor, and minority groups.

Small businesses and microenterprises, often characterized by organizational flexibility and located in urban and rural areas, offer considerable potential for economic development. They serve as a training ground for entrepreneurs to develop management skills. They complement larger firms by catering to niche markets, often functioning as subcontractors. And they act as incubators for the development of new products.

Thought to generate considerable (unrecorded) wealth, the informal sector is expanding much more than the formal sector in many African countries because of the rules and regulations that constrain formal sector growth. The informal economy encompasses small-scale trading, simple processing of raw materials, informal provision of finance, and cross-border trade. It is also a fallback for those who cannot find employment in the formal sector. Although mostly small firms and microenterprises operate in the informal sector, some larger companies are also said to run informal sector operations to avoid taxes and compliance with regulations. Another problem is that in some instances the state, the economy, and society in general have become informal.

Microenterprise development offers an opportunity for transition from the informal to the formal sector. But microenterprises should be encouraged to operate as commercial ventures from the outset. Too often they are seen as quasi-charitable ventures, not actual businesses. Throughout the world, small and medium-size enterprises have created jobs and provided entry points for private sector activity. But in Africa their development has been largely neglected. Although not all small and medium-size enterprises can or should graduate into larger operations, growth should be feasible for some, if accompanied by sound management and marketing strategies and appropriate financial, accounting, and audit practices.

As the private sector develops, it is likely to become more diverse and multifaceted, catering to domestic, regional, and international markets. At all levels the private sector has to focus on enhancing quality, improving productivity, and increasing competitiveness. It also has to be more creative in exploiting new technologies. To facilitate export-led growth, firms need to move up the value-chain in producing for export and ensuring that products meet international standards.

Indeed, the private sector in Africa is changing. Innovative, well-educated, entrepreneurial businesspeople see success in their ability and competitiveness, not their political connections. So, too, a range of foreign companies are willing to discount negative images and to invest in Africa. These are promising beginnings.

#### **WHAT GOVERNMENTS CAN DO**

Few African countries have generated a truly conducive environment for private activity. Many governments espouse the idea of private sector-led development. But do they know the full implications of implementing the profound changes it requires? The responsibility for addressing constraints and creating a stable policy framework lies primarily with governments. Obviously, not all governments face the same challenges, but creating a good business environment requires ongoing effort to ensure stability, improve governance, and maintain a coherent macroeconomic framework. Achieving this will not be easy, in some cases requiring fundamental changes in the way governments see their role. The New Partnership for Africa's Devel-

opment signifies the political willingness of African leaders to address development, but achieving results will require sustained commitments to action.

### *Create the right business environment*

The primary task facing African governments is to ensure stability and security. Much of Africa's recent past has been characterized by political upheaval, inefficient single-party regimes, and military rule. Even today, the ongoing violent conflict in some countries continues to hurt the continent's image. Political and legal uncertainties have inhibited the development of the private sector by increasing risk and deterring long-term productive investment in favor of short-term gains.

Stability and security require government respect for human rights and democratic processes, as enshrined in their laws, and political systems based on inclusion, tolerance, and participation. Most African countries, still in political transition, face challenges of ensuring peaceful political succession and developing the institutions to uphold the rule of law.

Governments need to produce results in the short term, while continuing reforms in the longer term. Predictability, accountability, and transparency—along with impartial enforcement of the rule of law—are essential parts of a good business environment. To attract investment, several governments have established investment promotion offices, enacted investment codes, and created a variety of incentive schemes such as tax breaks. But such measures are unlikely to succeed in a climate of unpredictability. The legal and regulatory framework in particular is important to ensure protection from state coercion, as well as from arbitrary actions and corruption.

Both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs need to be ensured that their assets will be secure and their contractual obligations upheld. Property rights are thus of singular importance. And in many instances specific attention will be required to make sure that women entrepreneurs and investors are afforded the same legal rights and protections as men. Innovative mechanisms to grant land ownership and other property rights on the basis of established use could enable small businesses to meet collateral requirements for loans, opening the way to obtain credit.

Improvements also have to extend to the regulatory environment, which in many instances is too complex, lending itself to confusion, delays, and corruption. Complicated licensing requirements, customs procedures, and tariff and tax structures are commonplace, making business more difficult and adding to transaction costs. Reducing, streamlining, and simplifying regulatory procedures would do much to create a more investor-friendly climate. But this does not mean unfettered private activity, for it is the responsibility of governments to institute a clearly defined and understandable legal and regulatory framework and then to enforce it rigorously and impartially. Experience shows that this is likely to increase efficiency as well as reduce opportunities for corruption.

In several countries weak public institutions have hampered the private sector. Thus far, civil service reform has often focused on reducing the wage bill rather than on improving standards. Strengthening the public sector to enhance service delivery may require increasing pay to attract, retain, and ensure the integrity of highly skilled officials, though budgetary constraints make this difficult. There is also need for transparent, merit-based recruitment and promotion—and in-service training and career development opportunities. While decentralization of government functions makes governance more responsive, attention to capacity building at the local level is essential.

*Weak public institutions have hampered the private sector*

#### *Foster investment*

Just as political instability deters productive private activity, so too does macroeconomic uncertainty. This underscores the need for consistently applying sound economic policies and maintaining a stable and predictable macroeconomic framework. The challenge facing governments is to create an incentive and institutional structure that permits economic agents to channel investment toward productive and competitive enterprises and sectors. Trade and exchange rate policies, as well as tax and tariff structures, can significantly affect the competitiveness and profitability of businesses, while high statutory taxes encourage informal, rather than formal, business activity.

Most countries need to broaden and deepen economic and structural reforms, within a framework of established priorities. Such reforms would considerably improve the business climate. But responding to

*Privatization offers considerable opportunities*

the varied and sometimes competing demands of their international development partners can make it difficult for governments to retain their focus on their own reform agendas.

Although experience is mixed, privatization offers considerable opportunities. In addition to facilitating the withdrawal of government from direct involvement in business, it sends a strong signal to the private sector, especially when accompanied by trade and financial sector reforms. Care is nevertheless needed to adopt the most suitable models. Proper planning and institutional arrangements are also essential to avoid replacing a public monopoly with a private politically connected monopoly, to protect the interests of the labor force, and to provide opportunities for the domestic private sector.

Africa accounts for about 2 percent of world trade, and its share of manufactured exports is even lower. Governments should take advantage of preferential access to the European market and the recent U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act to encourage private sector exports. They also need to be more informed and actively engaged in international trade negotiations, particularly at the World Trade Organization (WTO). And they should consult and involve the private sector in multilateral trade issues and negotiations.

Regional arrangements are also important. Serious commitment to regional integration could lead to enhanced cross-border trade. Although a number of regional integration institutions have been formed, progress has been slow, largely because governments have not acted decisively. Harmonizing laws and regulations, removing barriers to cross-border trade, and standardizing procedures would make exporting to regional markets easier. Larger integrated markets would also be more attractive to foreign investors.

#### *Provide skilled people, infrastructure, and finance*

The cost and availability of trainable labor is a primary determinant of competitiveness and productivity. In several countries labor laws and regulations have deterred both the foreign and domestic private sector. While minimum standards need to be ensured and workers' rights protected, low labor costs are an advantage that African countries need to exploit. Although the private sector should help to develop

skilled labor, the responsibility for basic education lies with governments. Worldwide, no country has sustained economic progress without literacy rates well over 50 percent. In African countries concerted efforts are required to increase enrollment rates and to improve the quality of education. Attention must also go to educating girls.

Current education systems do not necessarily meet the needs of private enterprise. Nor do they promote the innovation and creative thinking that encourage entrepreneurship. African governments face the dilemma of where to target educational resources—to primary or higher education. Improved access to primary education would increase the opportunities available to the poor, while universities provide the skills and expertise that underpin development.

Developing the human resource base requires attention to health as well as education. The already difficult task of ensuring basic health care is worsened by HIV/AIDS, which is overwhelming the capacity of most governments to cope. Governments and the private sector need to take the impact of HIV/AIDS into account, both in labor losses and in the cost of providing treatment for employees. HIV/AIDS will burden already overstretched health care budgets. And it will reduce the economic potential of countries.

Unless infrastructure can be improved, and the costs radically reduced, it will be difficult for the private sector in Africa to become more globally competitive. Africa's transport costs are the highest of any region. Although the situation varies from country to country, the continent is generally poorly served with transport networks, communications, and utilities. Complete reliance on public ownership and provision of infrastructure resulted in inadequate investment, poor management, and high service costs. African countries that have experienced protracted conflict also face the challenges of rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. While improvements in all infrastructure are needed, increased and affordable access to communications technologies is essential if African countries are to benefit from the emerging knowledge and information-based global economy.

The accessibility, quantity, quality, and cost of finance are almost as important as physical infrastructure to the private sector. Yet financial systems are still weak. Capital markets are rudimentary. And heavy government borrowing from the banking system tends to crowd out

*Africa's transport costs are the highest of any region*

the private sector. As a result, credit to the private sector is generally both modest and costly.

Governments face the challenge of restructuring banking systems in ways that minimize the costs to taxpayers, reduce the likelihood of recurring crises, and develop sound and competitive banking and nonbank financial institutions. Liberalization has to be accompanied by measures to improve financial sector governance, including robust systems of prudential supervision and regulation. Specific action may also be necessary to ensure that women entrepreneurs have equitable access to finance. A regional approach to financial sector development that harmonizes monetary and macroeconomic policies and encourages the development of regional capital markets would greatly facilitate regional trade by increasing competition, cutting costs, and lowering risks to the private sector.

#### **WHAT FIRMS CAN DO**

Despite recent progress, economic growth rates in Africa have not been high enough to reduce poverty. Much greater investment is needed to stimulate growth, with the private sector in a leading role. In addition to generating employment, the private sector directly finances training and skills development—and serves as the principal link to the global economy through foreign trade. And in a competitive business environment firms lower the prices for essential consumer goods and services, making them more affordable to the lower income segments of the population.

#### *Take the reins of competitiveness*

Private enterprises should take the reins of their own development, productivity, and competitiveness—and meet appropriate standards of governance and corporate citizenship. They should also take advantage of the opportunities offered by privatization. Government involvement in the economy remains considerable, even with the privatization of more than \$6 billion in assets in Sub-Saharan Africa by the late 1990s. Medium-size and large enterprises have to be more systematic in developing products and services. And those intending to cater to the

export market need to know the competition, meet required quality standards, and ensure reliable and efficient delivery.

To stay competitive, businesses must generate knowledge or have access to knowledge generated elsewhere. Acquiring the right to production and distribution of an international (or national) brand—sometimes through franchise operations or production under license—offers the advantages of association with a tested and recognizable trademark. But such arrangements can also have disadvantages, including restrictions on the market area covered and obligations not to carry competing brands.

Often, innovative business ideas fail to become marketable products and services because of difficulties in securing the financial resources for investment and working capital. In many countries the depth and breadth of the financial infrastructure remain a problem, but one that the private sector can help to overcome. It can establish and run banks and other financial intermediaries, including savings and loans institutions, insurance companies, pension and venture capital funds, and stock exchanges—all mobilizing domestic savings to channel as credit to other businesses.

For most countries the practical and feasible approach is to strengthen privately owned commercial banks. Public ownership of commercial banks continues to be the norm in a number of African countries. And commercial banks, whether private or public, continue to use much of their loanable funds for purchasing treasury bills rather than extending credit to businesses. That has to change. On the equity side, too, the private sector is likely to be the main source of capital. Neither stock exchanges nor venture capital—both common sources of financing elsewhere—are well-developed in Africa.

Private foreign sources of finance can be tapped through foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (channeled through stock exchanges), and loans from foreign credit institutions and suppliers. Of the three, FDI shares in the business risk, is not debt forming, and usually comes with additional positive elements, including access to technology, management know-how, and established markets. But a reasonably well-developed market for portfolio instruments is needed to serve as a credible exit channel for the eventual disposal of FDI holdings.



### *Enhance productivity*

The long-term profitability and viability of business enterprises depends on their ability to keep improving productivity and expanding markets. In manufacturing and other processing operations the choice of equipment and technology is an important determinant of productivity. Equally important, if not more, is labor, particularly the extent to which workers have undergone general and specialized training to upgrade their skills. For profitability and competitiveness it is crucial that wages be closely related to the productivity of labor.

*Survival is  
tied to  
competitiveness*

The feasibility and survival of export-oriented businesses are intimately tied to competitiveness. Innumerable and costly chains of marketing and handling are now hurting the competitiveness of African producers and exporters. As Africa-based enterprises attempt to penetrate export markets and move up the value chain, they are likely to encounter more demanding customers—willing to pay more for a product but with stricter service and quality standards. This is true not only for export production industries but also for tourism. To retain their competitive edge, exporters need to know both their customers and their competitors.

With tariff liberalization even firms that cater mainly to the domestic market will be open to challenges from cheaper imports. Enterprises with ambitions to operate in regional and global markets or expand such activities need to achieve and constantly maintain competitiveness. How? Often through linkages with established foreign enterprises through FDI, contractual arrangements for the acquisition of know-how, or strategic marketing connections. Such arrangements, if correctly negotiated, can ensure access to technology and management and marketing know-how.

Firms, particularly in export businesses, can initially base their operations on low-wage labor and access to domestic raw material. But they cannot sustain such “static competitiveness,” derived from natural endowments. They have to build “dynamic competitiveness” based on training, skills development, and up-to-date technology and know-how. To stay competitive Africa-based exporters have to move up the value chain through further processing of raw exports, gradually shifting to manufactured exports. Strong external linkages may be decisive in upgrading technology and moving to high-value exports.

The private sector itself can be part of the solution to—instead of a helpless victim of—inadequate and inefficient infrastructure. The form of private participation varies from independent ownership and management (predominantly telecommunications and increasingly electric power supply), build-operate-transfer (roads), concessioning (railways), and partial share ownership (airlines) to management contracts (ports). Whatever the form and extent, strong, transparent, and efficient regulatory systems are needed to ensure fair pricing and adequate service delivery.

### *Adopt good business practices*

Good business practices and standards are essential to the integrity and long-term sustainability of private enterprises. Good corporate governance, like good public governance, is based on accountability and transparency. It requires enacting and enforcing comprehensive company laws and regulations, maintaining complete public share registers, conducting independent external audits, and protecting shareholder rights. As businesses grow from sole proprietorship and small businesses toward larger and more structured organizations with more shareholders, proper corporate governance becomes more essential, building public confidence in the private sector.

Good corporate citizenship means refraining from corruption, avoiding anticompetitive practices, and generally conforming to the rule of law. It also means supporting national programs of social and economic development. It is built on responsiveness to those whose interests the enterprise's activities affect. The common interest that both management and labor have in the survival and prosperity of the enterprise can be promoted by consultative mechanisms. Consumers are another important group of stakeholders that firms need to attend to. Whether products meet specified quality and safety standards matters a lot to consumers, as does the pricing of products.

There are ample opportunities for promoting business-to-business linkages, networks, and associations. One such collaborative arrangement is a vertical relationship between suppliers and customers, along major parts of a supply chain. Multinational corporations usually engage in such vertically integrated businesses, and transfer pricing between downstream and upstream components of their vast operations is complex

and controversial. Africa-based enterprises could benefit from vertical relationships with well-established foreign partners. Similarly, linkages for small and medium-size enterprises to supply intermediary inputs to major production enterprises could promote the growth and development of smaller companies.

Horizontal associations can facilitate collaborative research, as well as joint procurement of inputs and marketing of products, particularly by small and medium-size enterprises. Input supply and product marketing can also be managed by a separate and appropriately organized trading company. Particularly where critical inputs are sourced from abroad and production is destined for export, such trading companies can provide vital and specialized services to small and medium-size enterprises and even to large firms.

Traditional forms of business associations, such as chambers of commerce, serve many purposes, including linking business communities with foreign counterparts. They also represent business interests before public bodies. They can be used for training and capacity development—and for organizing trade fairs. Too often, however, the contribution of such associations has been undermined by political patronage and interference.

The creation of enterprise networks has revolutionized the conduct of business in most parts of the world. Networks emanating from private initiative are free of the limitations imposed by formal structures that seek to legislate economic cooperation. This flexibility allows private participants more latitude to mold the business networks to meet their needs. The West African Enterprise Network is one example, and the creation of similar networks in Eastern and Southern Africa has led to the formation of an umbrella-organization, the Africa Enterprise Network. Today, foreign trade and investment do not automatically mean non-African. Whether regional or ad hoc, cooperation among private enterprises in different African countries can be of mutual benefit.

#### **WHAT EXTERNAL PARTNERS CAN DO**

External partners can do much to support the private sector, by providing more official assistance and by opening their markets to African exports. For Africa's development partners the impulse to support the

private sector lies in its potential contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction. But bilateral partners also want to develop new markets and expand opportunities for their own firms—and to minimize economically induced migration.

Early in the 1990s private capital flows to developing countries overtook official development assistance—and now stand at several times the level of official transfers. Yet 95 percent of FDI to developing regions continues to go to just 10 countries, most of them in Asia and Latin America. Africa attracted only a small share, the bulk going to oil-producing countries. Obviously, much greater efforts are needed to attract private capital, particularly with the decline in official development assistance.

*Greater efforts are needed to attract private capital*

#### *Target development assistance on the business climate*

Africa's development partners can help governments improve the overall climate for private sector activity. In many countries, development assistance agencies already fund programs to increase government predictability, improve the rule of law, counter corruption, and strengthen public institutions. If these are implemented with the private sector in mind, they can all help to support it.

Assistance can also remove specific constraints, such as complex regulatory procedures and requirements. Although improvements in governance will eventually help the private sector, protection of property rights, development of contract law, and the implementation of investment codes will yield greater results in the short term. The same is true for external support to tax and tariff reform—and to privatization.

A variety of instruments channel assistance to the private sector, including those of the European Commission (under the Cotonou Agreement), the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank, and the investment agencies of many bilateral partners. Most development assistance agencies already fund programs to support microenterprises and small and medium-size enterprises. To the extent that they promote sound business practices, and allow small-scale entrepreneurs to acquire managerial and technical skills, they can be very useful. But development programs targeted on small firms are often short term and piecemeal. An integrated strategy, and more coordination of efforts, could lead to greater efficiency.

*Target support for specific groups of entrepreneurs, including women entrepreneurs*

Development partners could also target support for specific groups of entrepreneurs, such as women, to facilitate their acquisition of skills and resources. Several development agencies run extensive training programs that could help private operators gain business skills, qualifications, and experience. Some externally financed training programs for microenterprises have enjoyed good success and could be expanded. Because many small businesses and microentrepreneurs operate in the informal sector, such programs could also support their integration into the formal economy. Given the importance of the new information and communication technology to competitiveness and effective integration into the global economy, assistance targeted on increasing access and capacity could raise the competitiveness of African entrepreneurs.

Developing the financial sector and providing finance for specific activities could also be helpful. Externally supported financial institutions that provide startup and working capital to small businesses on commercial terms appear to have made promising starts. Once established, such ventures aim to become self-sustaining, as proper financial institutions catering to a targeted market.

Governments of partner countries and international institutions can also promote foreign investments in African countries by providing investment guarantees against noncommercial risks. Such guarantees can cover the political risk related to specific financial transactions, trade arrangements, and direct investments in African countries that commercial financial institutions are unwilling to take (box 1). These mechanisms are commonly employed for business transactions and investments in other regions of the world—but less so in Africa. More extensive use of private sector firms by development assistance agencies could also expose them to the opportunities that exist in African countries.

Appropriate outside support for regional integration initiatives in general—and for such specific measures as harmonizing legislation, removing tariff barriers, and streamlining customs procedures—could help export-oriented businesses and improve the climate for export-led growth. Similarly, assistance to develop African government and private expertise on WTO rules and requirements could facilitate more effective participation in trade negotiations. Support could also go to

### BOX 1. PROPARCO AND THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY JOINTLY PROMOTE PRIVATE INVESTMENTS

Established in 1977 as a key component of France's overseas development assistance, Société de promotion et de participation pour la coopération économique (PROPARCO) promotes private investment to help strengthen economies and contribute to sustainable development. The company is majority-owned by the French Development Agency, with the remainder held by 41 private shareholders. It provides equity and quasi-equity investments, loan guarantees, and a host of other services.

In July 2001 PROPARCO and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a member of the World Bank Group, signed an agreement to work together to identify possible projects for guarantee coverage, with a special focus on small and medium-size enterprises and large infrastructure, mining, and industrial projects. The agencies will coinsure and reinsure each other's projects, expanding their portfolios, particularly in Africa.

Source: PROPARCO and MIGA.

*Further expand market access for African products*

enhance the capacity of African governments and entrepreneurs to deal with foreign investors, most of whom have greater resources and more specialized knowledge.

Africa's development partners could also further expand market access for African products and help African exporters take advantage of current opportunities. Access can be improved by lowering or eliminating tariffs and nontariff barriers—and eliminating state subsidies to national producers and exporters that work to the detriment of African producers. Better market access would increase the export earnings of countries and strengthen their private sectors.

#### *Support the African private sector*

Foreign investment in most African countries has been primarily supply oriented, guaranteeing the supply of raw materials to developed countries. Such investment provided employment and revenue for African governments, but it generated little domestic manufacturing or ancillary industries and services. Usually managed as enclave activities, such investment created a negative impression of the foreign private sector in African countries.

Properly managed and operated, however, foreign investment can contribute much to national economies by creating employment, stimulating local enterprises, and developing skills. Direct investment, joint ventures, and supply contracts all provide opportunities for local companies, and their managers and professionals, to upgrade skills and experience. Today, foreign collaboration can particularly help to address the “digital divide” that may leave African countries and businesses further disadvantaged. Such collaboration could enable African companies to take advantage of new technologies to reduce production and marketing costs and to link them to customers and markets.

There are also indirect means for foreign investors to support the private sector in Africa. Joint chambers of commerce look after the business interests of individual members, while promoting mutual investment and trade between their countries of origin. SANEC, the South African–Netherlands Chamber of Commerce, is one (box 2). Other organized forums include associations of importers or exporters, private-to-private partnerships oriented to specific industries, and business networks.

Foreign investors, like their domestic counterparts, can help African countries by acting in a socially responsible manner and including social programs in their operations. More foreign companies now demonstrate such behavior, recognizing that acceptance by local communities is important. Foreign companies should obviously meet the standards set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development convention for combating corruption in international business transactions. Although responsibility for enforcing the convention lies with governments, the codes of conduct and anticorruption policies that many companies have voluntarily adopted are setting new standards for international business practices.

For many African countries foreign loans have been both a blessing and a burden. In the short term they have allowed for the importation of much-needed capital and consumption goods. But over the long term they have often led to problems—when projects failed, money was diverted from its objectives or squandered, or exports failed to generate sufficient foreign exchange to finance repayment. Foreign loans from commercial sources (including export credits) are not likely to gain in importance in most African countries as long as their

## BOX 2. BILATERAL PROMOTION OF TRADE INVESTMENT

The South African–Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (SANEC), established in 1992, fosters business relations between South Africa and the Netherlands to achieve closer economic ties and better mutual understanding, to the benefit of both countries. Operating on commercial principles, it promotes exports, imports, business services, tourism, and investment in close cooperation with its members and clients.

It also promotes South Africa as a springboard for Dutch companies into Sub-Saharan Africa—and the Netherlands as a gateway for South African companies wishing to enter the European Community.

Source: SANEC.

*There are enormous benefits to be gained from government-private sector collaboration*

current debt burden persists. The weight of their debt burden has further undermined the creditworthiness of countries, discouraging foreign sources of capital, including private investment and commercial credits.

## BUILDING ON EARLY SUCCESSES

There are good opportunities for the private sector in Africa, and the climate for business is getting better in most countries. But much more needs to be done, with concerted action by all parties. African governments now need to implement pro-business policies, based on facilitation rather than control. The domestic private sector has to take advantage of the openings that political and economic reforms are creating. There are also enormous benefits to be gained from government-private sector collaboration in, for example, providing infrastructure, education, and skills training. Several African countries are establishing formal government-business forums based on the East Asian experience, in some instances including organized labor. If open and accountable such mechanisms, including investor councils, can make a real contribution to creating a pro-business policy environment and improving government-private sector relations.

Africa's official development partners can, through their assistance programs, improve the climate for business and directly support the private sector. They can also provide incentives for their own private



companies to invest in Africa. Foreign firms can have a tremendous impact, through their investments, the skills they bring, and the opportunities they afford. But they will not invest simply because they are asked to. They need to be persuaded that Africa is changing—and that the changes are real.

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# **SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS**

The tables use symbols to mark SPA countries (\*)—those participating in the Special Program of Assistance for Debt-Distressed Countries in Africa—and CFA countries (+)—those with their exchange rates fixed to the French franc. Technical notes for the tables are given at the end of the tables.

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	REAL GDP GROWTH						1.1
	Average annual percentage change						
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000	
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.3	3.8	1.7	2.4	2.4	3.2	
Excluding South Africa	2.3	4.8	2.1	3.0	2.9	3.3	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.6	4.6	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.2	
Angola	—	—	3.5	0.7	3.4	2.1	
Benin**	2.8	1.9	3.1	4.6	5.0	5.0	
Botswana	9.2	15.0	10.4	4.8	5.9	3.4	
Burkina Faso**	4.0	3.6	3.8	3.9	5.8	5.7	
Burundi*	4.5	3.4	4.4	-2.2	-1.0	0.3	
Cameroon**	0.2	7.0	4.8	1.0	4.4	4.2	
Cape Verde	—	3.4	9.9	5.6	8.6	6.8	
Central African Republic**	3.3	2.4	1.3	1.7	3.4	4.1	
Chad**	1.1	0.2	6.0	2.0	1.0	0.6	
Comoros**	—	—	2.9	0.2	1.9	-1.1	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.2	0.2	2.1	-5.6	—	—	
Congo, Rep. of**	4.7	5.0	5.4	-0.3	-3.2	7.6	
Côte d'Ivoire**	9.3	7.6	0.1	3.3	3.1	2.8	
Djibouti	—	—	—	-1.4	2.2	0.7	
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	18.2	15.1	21.3	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	3.8	0.8	9.5	
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.9	4.2	6.2	4.6	
Gabon*	4.5	11.3	0.7	2.9	-6.2	2.0	
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.7	3.6	3.1	6.4	5.6	
Ghana*	1.3	0.4	2.0	4.3	4.4	3.7	
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.2	3.9	1.8	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	3.4	3.2	0.7	7.8	7.5	
Kenya*	7.9	6.8	4.1	2.1	1.3	-0.3	
Lesotho	3.3	8.2	3.7	4.3	-2.2	2.2	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	4.8	0.6	0.3	1.8	4.7	4.8	
Malawi*	5.3	6.2	2.1	3.6	4.0	1.7	
Mali**	2.0	4.9	0.2	3.5	6.1	4.5	
Mauritania*	4.4	1.9	1.9	3.9	4.1	5.2	
Mauritius	-0.6	8.1	5.1	5.3	3.3	8.0	
Mozambique*	—	—	-0.9	5.8	7.5	2.1	
Namibia	—	—	1.1	4.2	4.3	3.9	
Niger**	-1.0	0.6	-0.6	2.2	-0.6	3.0	
Nigeria	-2.0	5.5	0.2	2.7	1.1	3.8	
Rwanda*	7.8	4.5	2.8	-0.9	5.9	5.2	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.7	2.5	2.9	
Senegal**	0.7	2.7	2.9	3.4	5.1	5.5	
Seychelles	2.8	7.7	2.5	3.0	-3.0	1.2	
Sierra Leone*	2.6	2.1	1.0	-4.3	-8.1	3.8	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	5.5	3.1	1.4	1.7	1.9	3.1	
Sudan	0.6	5.5	0.7	7.6	5.2	8.3	
Swaziland	—	5.3	6.4	3.5	3.4	3.1	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.1	4.7	5.1	
Togo**	7.2	3.5	1.7	2.1	2.1	3.9	
Uganda*	—	—	2.3	7.0	7.5	4.4	
Zambia*	1.4	1.8	1.1	0.4	2.0	3.5	
Zimbabwe	5.8	2.7	4.0	2.5	0.1	-5.1	
North Africa	5.2	6.5	4.2	3.2	4.0	3.5	
All Africa	4.5	4.5	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.3	
Comparator countries	3.8	4.7	7.9	8.1	6.1	7.0	
China	2.0	4.8	10.6	10.3	7.1	7.9	
India	4.6	3.4	5.7	6.0	6.5	5.8	
Indonesia	5.9	7.8	5.8	4.2	0.8	4.8	
South Asia	4.6	3.4	5.6	5.6	5.8	5.8	
East Asia	5.7	6.9	8.0	7.2	6.9	7.4	

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA

1.2

	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.7	1.0	-1.2	-0.3	-0.1	0.7
Excluding South Africa	-0.3	1.9	-0.8	0.3	0.3	0.7
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	1.1	1.7	-0.3	0.4	0.7	0.6
Angola	—	—	0.8	-2.5	0.5	-0.8
Benin**	0.1	-0.7	-0.1	1.7	2.1	2.2
Botswana	6.1	11.1	6.7	2.3	4.2	2.5
Burkina Faso**	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.4	3.2	3.1
Burundi*	2.5	2.0	1.6	-4.3	-2.9	-1.6
Cameroon**	-2.1	4.2	1.9	-1.7	1.6	1.5
Cape Verde	—	2.7	8.2	3.0	5.4	3.6
Central African Republic**	1.4	0.2	-1.1	-0.4	1.7	2.4
Chad**	-0.7	-1.7	3.3	-1.0	-1.7	-2.1
Comoros**	—	—	0.3	-2.3	-0.6	-3.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.2	-2.6	-1.2	-8.6	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	2.0	2.1	2.4	-3.0	-5.8	4.8
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.1	3.4	-3.5	0.1	0.4	0.2
Djibouti	—	—	—	-3.9	0.3	-1.2
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	15.3	12.2	18.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	1.0	-2.0	-11.8
Ethiopia*	—	—	-2.1	1.8	3.6	2.2
Gabon*	4.4	7.9	-2.5	0.3	-8.4	-0.4
Gambia, The*	1.6	2.3	0.1	-0.4	3.4	2.7
Ghana*	-0.5	-1.9	-1.3	1.6	2.1	1.5
Guinea*	—	—	—	1.5	1.5	-0.5
Guinea-Bissau*	—	-1.0	1.0	-1.5	5.7	5.5
Kenya*	4.4	3.0	0.4	-0.5	-1.1	-2.5
Lesotho	1.2	5.8	1.1	2.0	-4.4	-0.1
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	-2.0	-2.3	-1.1	1.5	1.6
Malawi*	2.7	3.0	-1.0	0.9	1.5	-0.6
Mali**	-0.4	2.8	-2.2	1.0	3.6	2.1
Mauritania*	2.1	-0.5	-0.8	1.1	1.3	2.4
Mauritius	-2.5	6.4	4.2	4.1	2.0	6.9
Mozambique*	—	—	-2.5	3.5	5.4	0.2
Namibia	—	—	-1.6	1.5	1.9	1.6
Niger**	-3.7	-2.2	-3.8	-1.2	-3.9	-0.3
Nigeria	-4.6	2.6	-2.8	-0.1	-1.4	1.3
Rwanda*	4.4	1.2	-0.3	-2.6	3.3	2.8
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	-0.8	0.3	0.7
Senegal**	-2.0	-0.2	0.1	0.7	2.3	2.8
Seychelles	0.3	5.6	1.7	1.5	-4.4	-0.3
Sierra Leone*	0.8	0.1	-1.0	-6.5	-9.9	2.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	3.3	0.9	-1.1	-0.3	0.2	1.4
Sudan	-1.7	2.4	-1.9	5.4	2.9	5.8
Swaziland	—	2.2	3.1	0.3	0.5	0.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	0.2	2.2	2.7
Togo**	2.6	0.8	-1.3	-0.8	-0.3	1.6
Uganda*	—	—	-0.1	3.7	4.6	1.6
Zambia*	-1.5	-1.3	-2.0	-2.3	-0.2	1.3
Zimbabwe	2.4	-0.2	0.6	-0.2	-1.5	-6.9
North Africa	2.5	3.9	1.5	1.3	2.2	1.7
All Africa	1.9	1.8	-0.4	0.1	0.6	0.9
Comparator countries	2.2	3.5	4.9	4.8	2.6	4.7
China	-0.7	2.9	9.0	9.2	6.1	7.3
India	2.2	1.0	3.4	4.2	4.6	3.9
Indonesia	3.5	5.2	3.9	2.5	-0.8	3.1
South Asia	2.1	1.0	3.3	3.6	3.9	3.8
East Asia	2.9	4.8	6.3	5.9	5.8	6.5

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

	GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS					
	Percentage of GDP					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.1	20.3	15.5	13.9	12.6	16.3
Excluding South Africa	12.5	18.7	9.7	10.5	8.5	14.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	14.6	18.4	7.1	6.8	5.9	8.2
Angola	—	—	24.0	18.5	29.4	—
Benin**	1.2	0.5	-2.4	4.2	6.4	6.3
Botswana	2.3	28.5	41.5	32.1	14.2	15.9
Burkina Faso**	1.1	3.0	-1.0	8.8	9.8	11.7
Burundi*	5.0	3.3	3.1	-3.1	-0.4	-5.6
Cameroon**	11.3	18.3	24.1	19.2	18.9	21.1
Cape Verde	—	-29.0	-5.8	-6.4	-17.5	-14.5
Central African Republic**	7.2	4.2	-1.1	4.2	7.2	14.4
Chad**	10.3	6.2	-8.1	-1.3	-3.0	1.0
Comoros**	—	—	-4.5	-0.9	2.7	7.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	10.1	12.9	10.9	8.5	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	5.0	12.0	31.9	34.2	46.1	60.7
Côte d'Ivoire**	29.0	27.4	19.6	18.7	31.5	22.4
Djibouti	—	—	—	-5.4	-5.5	-5.3
Equatorial Guinea**	29.4	8.1	-33.3	23.1	57.9	75.6
Eritrea*	—	—	—	-27.9	-21.3	-27.2
Ethiopia*	—	—	6.8	4.1	2.7	-3.8
Gabon*	—	54.3	44.3	40.5	34.8	28.3
Gambia, The*	0.6	2.3	6.5	4.9	3.2	4.1
Ghana*	9.2	10.2	4.8	7.9	3.7	3.3
Guinea*	—	—	16.4	14.8	17.5	18.6
Guinea-Bissau*	—	-6.7	-0.9	2.9	-2.2	19.6
Kenya*	19.1	20.2	16.1	12.7	6.8	3.0
Lesotho	-24.9	-50.9	-65.2	-36.5	-28.9	-18.1
Liberia	38.5	33.5	16.5	—	—	—
Madagascar*	3.7	4.2	3.3	4.1	4.6	5.9
Malawi*	1.5	14.4	11.8	3.2	-0.6	5.5
Mali**	7.9	2.2	-0.4	7.6	10.1	6.2
Mauritania*	32.8	5.7	3.1	8.3	7.2	15.0
Mauritius	12.0	20.1	20.4	24.0	22.8	22.2
Mozambique*	—	—	-10.3	-5.7	6.5	3.8
Namibia	—	—	17.6	15.7	16.7	16.6
Niger**	2.6	6.7	7.3	2.6	3.8	1.8
Nigeria	8.4	22.7	17.5	24.9	19.1	34.0
Rwanda*	2.0	6.0	5.0	-4.9	-1.4	-1.1
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	2.7	-16.2	-19.0	-9.3	-10.1
Senegal**	5.3	7.8	0.1	10.3	12.6	12.1
Seychelles	—	32.0	24.1	20.4	23.6	0.0
Sierra Leone*	—	—	5.2	0.3	-5.7	-9.2
Somalia	5.0	0.3	-6.3	-12.5	—	—
South Africa	21.7	22.4	23.6	17.5	17.3	18.0
Sudan	1.2	1.0	0.5	—	—	—
Swaziland	24.6	30.7	12.9	22.0	21.1	25.2
Tanzania*	—	—	8.8	2.0	2.2	4.8
Togo**	24.2	27.7	12.3	7.0	3.6	4.2
Uganda*	13.6	10.0	2.3	3.6	4.7	2.6
Zambia*	43.2	33.2	14.0	6.7	-0.9	3.1
Zimbabwe	16.8	19.2	16.5	15.9	11.0	5.5
North Africa	27.1	32.7	28.4	21.2	21.8	25.1
All Africa	18.7	23.6	20.2	16.5	16.2	19.7
Comparator countries	10.0	24.9	28.8	30.5	26.8	28.8
China	—	30.5	34.7	40.8	40.1	39.9
India	15.2	19.1	20.1	20.8	20.0	20.8
Indonesia	4.8	25.0	31.6	29.8	20.2	25.7
South Asia	14.1	16.3	17.3	18.9	18.3	19.2
East Asia	—	26.3	31.3	36.0	34.7	34.9

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries

Source: World Bank data.

## GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT

1.4

	Percentage of GDP					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	17.0	21.2	18.4	17.5	18.1	18.7
Excluding South Africa	15.1	21.6	18.2	19.9	21.1	21.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	15.2	20.0	18.5	19.8	20.4	21.0
Angola	—	—	14.8	17.3	38.2	—
Benin**	10.9	15.5	15.1	16.6	17.6	19.0
Botswana	24.0	39.7	28.8	25.6	19.7	21.7
Burkina Faso**	9.6	21.3	19.7	24.3	27.8	28.6
Burundi*	7.2	8.2	16.6	11.6	9.1	9.0
Cameroon**	12.7	21.4	23.8	16.5	19.5	16.8
Cape Verde	—	38.0	43.5	28.7	20.9	19.3
Central African Republic**	19.4	15.0	10.9	11.6	14.3	14.4
Chad**	14.3	14.9	6.3	12.5	10.3	14.7
Comoros**	—	—	28.8	18.6	14.8	13.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	12.3	16.4	11.7	7.0	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	28.1	29.7	32.5	28.4	27.6	17.3
Côte d'Ivoire**	20.2	24.1	16.5	12.8	18.6	19.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	10.7	8.9	12.9
Equatorial Guinea**	17.0	17.2	—	52.4	41.4	0.0
Eritrea*	—	—	—	30.4	47.3	51.7
Ethiopia*	—	—	14.3	14.6	18.1	15.0
Gabon+	—	46.4	34.6	25.7	28.0	26.1
Gambia, The*	9.5	12.0	19.7	19.8	17.8	17.3
Ghana*	12.8	10.2	7.8	21.0	21.0	23.7
Guinea*	—	—	16.1	18.2	22.2	22.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	21.3	32.0	24.8	16.3	16.0
Kenya*	18.5	23.7	20.3	16.1	13.5	12.2
Lesotho	9.5	19.1	40.0	52.5	40.9	21.4
Liberia	18.4	25.6	14.0	—	—	—
Madagascar*	9.1	9.8	10.6	12.2	12.9	16.1
Malawi*	15.9	27.2	18.6	17.3	14.8	17.5
Mali**	17.3	15.5	17.2	22.4	21.2	21.2
Mauritania*	14.4	19.8	27.5	20.1	17.8	30.1
Mauritius	14.0	23.9	23.7	28.1	26.4	25.7
Mozambique*	—	—	8.1	20.4	31.8	27.5
Namibia	—	—	19.0	23.2	23.9	23.8
Niger**	8.1	15.6	15.3	9.0	10.2	10.4
Nigeria	13.5	22.9	16.5	20.1	23.4	22.7
Rwanda*	8.3	11.7	15.3	14.6	14.3	15.7
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	10.2	15.8	41.5	40.0	39.3
Senegal**	8.2	14.6	12.1	16.8	19.0	19.8
Seychelles	—	38.8	26.4	28.0	37.1	0.0
Sierra Leone*	—	—	11.9	6.5	0.3	6.8
Somalia	11.8	20.4	28.8	15.5	—	—
South Africa	20.5	20.8	18.9	14.7	14.6	15.0
Sudan	12.7	15.1	14.3	17.2	16.7	17.8
Swaziland	21.3	27.4	26.5	23.7	12.9	12.6
Tanzania*	—	—	16.8	21.0	17.0	17.5
Togo**	15.1	28.1	19.5	15.6	13.4	14.7
Uganda*	12.7	9.7	8.5	15.6	16.4	18.1
Zambia*	28.7	30.2	16.1	14.5	17.9	18.3
Zimbabwe	16.8	18.9	17.3	18.1	11.5	2.0
North Africa	18.4	27.2	29.0	24.5	25.8	24.3
All Africa	16.8	22.6	22.2	20.0	21.3	21.0
Comparator countries	15.7	24.0	28.8	29.5	24.1	26.8
China	21.7	30.6	35.4	38.3	37.2	37.9
India	16.1	19.7	22.8	23.4	22.9	24.6
Indonesia	9.2	21.6	28.3	26.8	12.2	17.9
South Asia	16.0	18.4	21.9	22.5	21.9	23.1
East Asia	20.6	27.8	31.5	34.4	28.4	31.1

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.



REAL AGRICULTURAL GROWTH		1.5				
Average annual percentage change in value added						
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	1.6	1.9	2.5	4.1	4.2
Excluding South Africa	—	1.3	1.8	2.9	4.2	4.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	2.0	2.8	3.9	3.9
Angola	—	—	—	-2.8	1.3	9.3
Benin**	—	1.4	4.6	5.2	4.7	5.0
Botswana	12.0	8.8	1.2	0.8	4.5	5.9
Burkina Faso**	—	1.2	3.6	3.3	3.1	5.0
Burundi*	-1.9	4.1	3.1	-1.3	-3.0	3.8
Cameroon**	5.4	3.5	2.8	4.9	6.0	6.8
Cape Verde	—	15.9	14.2	3.8	11.7	-6.3
Central African Republic**	2.5	2.2	1.5	3.6	4.8	4.7
Chad**	2.2	-0.5	2.7	4.4	-6.5	5.7
Comoros**	—	—	4.0	0.9	4.4	1.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.7	2.5	2.8	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	4.2	2.6	3.5	1.0	-6.5	8.4
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.2	2.4	0.0	1.9	1.8	4.4
Djibouti	—	—	—	0.6	0.2	2.0
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	6.4	9.9	9.4
Eritrea*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	-0.4	2.2	3.8	1.9
Gabon*	—	—	1.5	-1.4	4.6	3.7
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.0	0.8	2.2	16.5	6.2
Ghana*	2.8	-0.1	0.6	3.1	3.9	2.1
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.2	5.5	-2.6
Guinea-Bissau*	—	1.1	3.2	3.3	7.5	4.0
Kenya*	8.1	4.4	3.7	1.2	1.3	-1.9
Lesotho	—	2.1	-0.5	2.0	7.6	8.1
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.2	2.2	1.5	1.4	0.8
Malawi*	-1.2	4.9	1.5	6.8	7.0	6.5
Mali**	-1.5	4.0	2.2	2.8	9.5	5.5
Mauritania*	-1.3	-1.7	2.7	4.6	9.1	2.8
Mauritius	—	-1.7	1.9	-0.4	-28.1	28.5
Mozambique*	—	—	7.3	4.7	6.4	1.5
Namibia	—	—	1.9	4.5	11.6	5.3
Niger**	0.2	-4.6	1.7	3.3	-5.0	2.5
Nigeria	-4.1	0.9	2.2	3.4	5.2	5.2
Rwanda*	4.7	7.3	0.8	-2.6	8.5	8.0
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	3.8	4.5	2.6
Senegal**	0.9	2.1	1.8	1.9	6.0	11.5
Seychelles	—	—	-2.5	-1.1	2.0	2.0
Sierra Leone*	1.8	4.9	3.5	-0.5	-5.7	3.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.5	2.9	2.6	0.0	3.4	3.8
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	—	-2.1	2.2	-0.2	2.3	2.3
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.4	4.7	4.7
Togo**	6.2	0.9	5.7	4.2	6.4	—
Uganda*	—	—	1.5	3.7	6.9	4.1
Zambia*	0.9	2.7	3.6	3.1	6.9	1.8
Zimbabwe	—	1.2	2.8	4.6	6.6	5.0
North Africa	4.2	2.7	4.0	1.9	-2.0	-3.9
All Africa	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.3	2.1	1.6
Comparator countries	3.4	2.2	4.5	3.6	2.3	2.3
China	1.6	2.2	6.1	4.1	2.8	2.4
India	5.2	1.7	2.9	3.3	1.3	2.5
Indonesia	4.2	3.9	3.5	2.1	2.7	1.7
South Asia	4.9	1.6	3.0	3.4	1.7	3.3
East Asia	2.8	3.2	4.6	3.1	3.3	2.4

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

## REAL INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

1.6

	Average annual percentage change in value added					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.7	4.1	1.1	1.6	0.7	3.7
Excluding South Africa	—	7.1	1.2	2.6	1.8	5.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	4.1	3.7	3.1	3.6	4.7
Angola	—	—	—	3.0	6.5	1.9
Benin**	—	1.5	4.2	4.1	3.2	7.4
Botswana	12.8	19.2	11.6	2.8	2.0	3.5
Burkina Faso**	—	2.8	4.1	3.5	10.8	—
Burundi*	—	6.4	5.1	-4.9	7.2	4.1
Cameroon**	6.3	7.7	8.8	-2.9	5.0	—
Cape Verde	—	3.0	13.3	4.8	6.3	12.2
Central African Republic**	7.9	4.6	1.3	0.3	6.6	—
Chad**	1.6	0.9	7.4	0.4	-4.1	—
Comoros**	—	—	-2.3	2.5	2.9	-7.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.3	2.4	131.0	6.0	—
Congo, Rep. of**	9.3	10.0	6.8	2.5	1.3	4.4
Côte d'Ivoire**	10.4	9.8	4.8	5.0	4.1	2.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	-5.3	0.5	1.0
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	44.1	17.9	28.4
Eritrea*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	1.2	4.5	6.9	8.9
Gabon*	—	—	0.4	2.7	1.4	1.7
Gambia, The*	2.6	5.1	4.0	1.2	3.6	4.5
Ghana*	5.2	0.1	1.1	2.6	4.9	3.8
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.4	5.3	4.3
Guinea-Bissau*	—	2.1	0.7	1.0	1.5	133.8
Kenya*	8.7	9.8	3.5	1.8	1.0	-1.2
Lesotho	—	28.5	4.8	6.2	9.3	7.4
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.3	-0.6	2.0	4.2	6.1
Malawi*	5.4	6.7	2.1	1.7	4.0	3.5
Mali**	1.9	2.3	4.6	6.6	1.7	7.5
Mauritania*	7.7	0.9	4.4	2.2	-0.6	6.7
Mauritius	—	10.9	8.9	5.6	3.7	8.2
Mozambique*	—	—	-4.5	11.8	15.7	3.4
Namibia	—	—	-0.3	2.5	1.2	5.9
Niger**	4.9	11.6	-1.6	1.6	2.2	—
Nigeria	0.1	10.4	-2.7	1.4	-2.5	6.7
Rwanda*	2.1	3.8	3.8	1.4	3.3	2.7
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.5	2.3	3.4
Senegal**	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.5	6.3	7.3
Seychelles	—	—	3.3	9.5	2.0	2.5
Sierra Leone*	-1.0	-2.5	0.0	-5.4	-14.0	-9.3
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.1	2.7	1.0	0.7	-0.4	2.3
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	—	7.4	9.7	4.2	2.8	2.8
Tanzania*	—	—	—	2.6	4.8	—
Togo**	10.7	7.1	0.6	1.7	-2.0	—
Uganda*	—	—	4.4	11.9	9.3	6.5
Zambia*	1.8	2.0	0.8	-3.5	-5.1	4.6
Zimbabwe	—	2.0	2.6	1.1	-1.9	7.4
North Africa	8.1	5.7	3.0	3.4	3.9	7.0
All Africa	5.8	4.6	1.7	2.2	1.9	5.1
Comparator countries	4.9	7.3	9.3	11.1	7.4	9.2
China	2.3	8.0	11.6	13.8	8.1	9.9
India	4.6	4.5	6.7	6.8	8.8	9.0
Indonesia	12.8	10.7	6.5	5.8	1.9	5.5
South Asia	4.5	4.6	6.6	6.5	7.7	8.2
East Asia	—	10.5	9.4	9.4	8.6	8.3

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

	GDP DEFLATOR					
	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.4	13.4	10.0	8.8	3.5	3.7
Excluding South Africa	5.7	13.4	9.5	8.8	3.4	3.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.7	13.6	8.5	8.6	3.5	4.0
Angola	—	—	—	699.4	560.2	—
Benin**	1.9	9.4	2.8	8.2	2.1	5.1
Botswana	2.7	11.0	12.7	9.4	5.8	11.6
Burkina Faso**	0.4	8.4	4.3	5.0	-1.4	2.0
Burundi*	0.9	10.7	4.5	11.5	3.4	22.9
Cameroon**	9.5	8.5	7.3	4.8	-1.2	1.2
Cape Verde	—	8.1	12.1	4.8	5.0	0.3
Central African Republic**	4.4	10.3	9.7	4.2	1.2	1.3
Chad**	3.2	7.2	2.2	6.8	-3.9	3.5
Comoros**	—	—	7.3	4.7	5.8	6.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37.9	24.6	57.3	1,382.7	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	3.9	8.2	2.6	9.5	30.2	44.6
Côte d'Ivoire**	2.5	11.9	4.8	6.6	1.4	2.0
Djibouti	—	—	—	3.9	2.0	2.4
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	13.2	38.4	46.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.5	8.2	19.2
Ethiopia*	—	—	5.0	7.3	1.3	1.3
Gabon*	5.6	15.8	3.4	6.0	4.8	28.5
Gambia, The*	0.9	10.4	16.4	4.6	4.3	3.7
Ghana*	6.2	29.4	45.6	26.6	14.0	27.2
Guinea*	—	—	—	6.6	3.3	10.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	5.7	49.1	35.5	2.8	6.2
Kenya*	1.5	9.6	9.4	14.0	6.8	6.2
Lesotho	3.1	9.9	12.3	10.4	14.1	6.1
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	9.3	17.9	18.8	9.8	7.1
Malawi*	1.8	8.7	14.0	32.1	42.2	27.1
Mali**	12.0	9.2	6.1	7.0	-2.7	0.9
Mauritania*	1.2	9.3	8.7	6.0	2.1	5.8
Mauritius	3.6	13.5	10.0	6.2	5.4	0.0
Mozambique*	—	—	36.2	34.3	3.3	13.1
Namibia	—	—	14.0	9.3	7.9	9.5
Niger**	-0.1	9.3	3.9	5.4	2.0	3.5
Nigeria	2.5	16.4	15.1	29.4	12.3	25.4
Rwanda*	17.0	14.4	3.9	14.6	-3.5	1.0
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	49.5	16.0	7.9
Senegal**	1.7	7.9	7.7	4.4	1.1	0.7
Seychelles	2.7	15.6	4.5	3.2	6.3	5.8
Sierra Leone*	3.4	11.1	54.6	32.9	25.0	6.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	4.5	11.9	15.5	10.2	6.2	6.5
Sudan	5.7	13.9	36.8	62.3	16.0	8.0
Swaziland	—	11.9	10.2	11.9	11.2	6.3
Tanzania*	—	—	—	22.2	9.1	8.7
Togo**	2.6	8.8	5.9	6.7	1.5	1.5
Uganda*	—	—	116.0	14.8	4.2	3.0
Zambia*	13.8	5.5	33.5	57.6	20.5	18.1
Zimbabwe	1.6	7.8	11.2	25.2	48.1	56.1
North Africa	2.1	8.7	9.7	6.6	2.8	4.1
All Africa	3.4	13.4	10.0	8.7	3.5	4.0
Comparator countries	58.5	18.8	8.6	15.2	14.7	10.8
China	-0.4	1.1	5.6	7.1	-2.3	1.1
India	6.6	8.3	7.9	8.2	3.3	6.9
Indonesia	194.5	20.5	8.6	15.5	15.2	11.0
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

## REAL GNP PER CAPITA

1.8

	Average annual percentage change			Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1998–2000
	1970–88	1989–2000	2000		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.3	-0.3	0.3	613 (1974–76)	525.8
Excluding South Africa	-0.1	0.3	0.1	312 (1976–78)	292.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.3	0.2	0.1	312 (1976–78)	308.9
Angola	—	-8.7	-17.8	—	—
Benin**	0.3	1.5	2.2	400 (1998–2000)	399.5
Botswana	8.9	2.2	5.0	3,589 (1998–2000)	3,588.5
Burkina Faso**	1.1	1.2	3.2	266 (1998–2000)	265.9
Burundi*	1.5	-4.0	-2.6	206 (1990–92)	141.4
Cameroon**	4.8	-2.5	-1.0	978 (1985–87)	619.3
Cape Verde	10.1	2.6	2.9	1,437 (1998–2000)	1,436.5
Central African Republic**	-1.1	-0.7	2.7	470 (1976–78)	342.0
Chad**	-1.4	-1.1	-3.2	261 (1970–72)	216.1
Comoros**	—	-2.3	-3.5	582 (1983–85)	447.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	-2.7	-9.8	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	3.7	-6.2	-9.3	1,216 (1984–86)	584.6
Côte d'Ivoire**	-1.3	0.4	0.2	1,136 (1977–79)	726.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	10.6	-22.2	870 (1998–2000)	870.2
Eritrea *	—	0.7	-9.2	212 (1997–99)	199.9
Ethiopia*	—	1.4	1.9	117 (1981–83)	110.6
Gabon†	-0.4	0.0	-4.5	7,316 (1975–77)	3,946.8
Gambia, The*	1.0	-0.2	3.0	376 (1976–78)	358.6
Ghana*	-2.4	1.6	0.9	466 (1970–72)	399.8
Guinea*	—	1.8	-0.8	586 (1998–2000)	585.5
Guinea-Bissau*	-0.9	-1.3	6.0	224 (1995–97)	167.7
Kenya*	1.4	-0.1	-1.8	338 (1989–91)	331.4
Lesotho	4.6	-0.4	-2.2	729 (1995–97)	660.0
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-2.7	-0.7	1.6	386 (1970–72)	237.1
Malawi*	0.2	0.5	-0.1	159 (1977–79)	151.9
Mali**	-0.1	0.9	2.2	309 (1977–79)	275.7
Mauritania*	-0.9	1.2	3.3	483 (1970–72)	469.3
Mauritius	3.6	4.2	6.9	4,183 (1998–2000)	4,182.6
Mozambique*	—	3.4	-0.6	185 (1998–2000)	185.0
Namibia	—	2.2	1.8	2,406 (1998–2000)	2,405.9
Niger**	-2.5	-1.5	0.0	385 (1970–72)	209.0
Nigeria	-1.7	0.6	-0.2	294 (1977–79)	228.1
Rwanda*	1.7	-3.0	2.8	330 (1981–83)	233.1
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	-0.8	4.6	342 (1986–88)	302.9
Senegal**	-0.6	0.6	2.8	604 (1970–72)	582.2
Seychelles	2.6	1.9	-2.6	6,956 (1996–98)	6,664.1
Sierra Leone*	-0.4	-5.3	2.0	286 (1980–82)	140.0
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.0	-0.3	1.3	4,490 (1980–82)	3,849.2
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	3.5	0.9	4.5	1,566 (1990–92)	1,557.7
Tanzania*	—	0.6	2.8	188 (1998–2000)	187.8
Togo**	-0.5	-1.2	—	418 (1978–80)	322.0
Uganda*	—	3.8	1.6	343 (1998–2000)	342.8
Zambia*	-2.7	-2.2	1.3	669 (1970–72)	372.3
Zimbabwe	-0.5	-0.5	-6.3	699 (1972–74)	618.3
North Africa	2.8	1.3	1.7	1,511 (1998–2000)	1,511.4
All Africa	0.6	0.1	0.7	708 (1980–82)	696.9
Comparator countries	4.3	6.1	-0.3	633 (1998–2000)	632.5
China	6.4	9.0	—	711 (1997–99)	733.6
India	1.9	4.0	4.2	447 (1998–2000)	446.9
Indonesia	4.4	2.8	2.7	1,062 (1995–97)	916.2
South Asia	1.9	3.6	4.7	447 (1998–2000)	446.7
East Asia	5.3	5.9	8.3	1,165 (1998–2000)	1,164.8

— Not available.

\* SPA countries.

† CFA countries.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

## FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA

1.9

	Average annual production of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses (kilograms)		
	1974–79	1980–89	1990–2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	351.7	322.7	377.4
Excluding South Africa	339.7	314.6	380.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	320.9	296.7	300.6
Angola	322.7	240.8	277.5
Benin**	517.8	497.2	658.7
Botswana	119.5	56.7	46.4
Burkina Faso**	199.9	212.8	253.8
Burundi*	384.8	380.8	328.9
Cameroon**	368.3	295.3	304.7
Cape Verde	40.6	85.5	64.0
Central African Republic**	554.5	404.8	329.0
Chad**	240.4	227.2	241.8
Comoros**	—	191.0	203.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	553.9	556.6	477.3
Congo, Rep. of**	418.9	404.7	317.8
Côte d'Ivoire**	559.8	497.1	462.1
Djibouti	0.0	0.0	0.0
Equatorial Guinea**	241.7	225.1	202.5
Eritrea*	0.0	0.0	73.6
Ethiopia*	0.0	0.0	150.9
Gabon*	501.2	454.3	396.5
Gambia, The*	107.8	136.9	107.3
Ghana*	406.2	401.9	680.8
Guinea*	335.0	263.3	262.5
Guinea-Bissau*	185.0	233.0	238.6
Kenya*	293.3	220.6	180.5
Lesotho	197.0	130.6	125.9
Liberia	338.4	308.1	169.1
Madagascar*	516.1	514.6	448.1
Malawi*	384.5	301.6	326.7
Mali**	202.7	216.7	254.4
Mauritania*	49.0	74.6	90.5
Mauritius	13.8	20.4	15.8
Mozambique*	381.5	339.8	359.5
Namibia	267.3	244.0	212.4
Niger**	358.0	339.9	315.8
Nigeria	414.3	384.5	691.6
Rwanda*	390.6	379.9	243.2
São Tomé and Príncipe*	162.4	123.6	158.2
Senegal**	178.9	156.6	123.3
Seychelles	3.3	2.2	2.0
Sierra Leone*	247.0	199.3	162.2
Somalia	62.3	81.9	40.9
South Africa	501.7	426.8	329.5
Sudan	190.6	157.7	165.8
Swaziland	228.0	196.5	132.9
Tanzania*	501.7	528.4	403.7
Togo**	474.5	415.2	425.6
Uganda*	538.6	449.0	392.6
Zambia*	340.4	244.7	210.2
Zimbabwe	354.0	308.8	215.0
North Africa	226.2	215.0	247.2
All Africa	327.9	302.5	354.2
Comparator countries	356.7	374.5	396.2
China	440.8	462.8	492.4
India	241.8	253.6	272.2
Indonesia	314.7	369.0	394.5
South Asia	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—

— Not available

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization data.

REAL EXPORT GROWTH		2.1				
	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1998–2000
	1970–88	1989–2000	1999	2000		
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.1	4.9	4.4	2.9	106,502 (1998–2000)	106,502.2
Excluding South Africa	1.6	4.9	6.6	-0.5	64,160 (1998–2000)	64,160.1
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	2.4	4.9	12.8	-0.3	50,708 (1998–2000)	50,708.2
Angola	—	3.5	1.7	-6.9	—	—
Benin**	2.4	4.7	24.7	-2.4	543 (1998–2000)	542.9
Botswana	—	1.5	-6.2	-0.1	2,743 (1996–98)	2,501.2
Burkina Faso**	3.8	1.5	-11.1	0.8	412 (1998–2000)	412.1
Burundi*	3.2	7.6	35.9	31.7	211 (1998–2000)	211.4
Cameroon**	10.0	2.0	12.9	-5.4	3,067 (1998–2000)	3,066.9
Cape Verde	7.1	10.9	4.0	29.2	132 (1998–2000)	131.5
Central African Republic**	2.1	11.6	22.9	—	320 (1997–99)	332.7
Chad**	0.3	3.3	-13.2	14.3	370 (1998–2000)	369.9
Comoros**	—	8.6	0.7	11.6	63 (1998–2000)	62.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.2	-7.8	—	—	1,714 (1998–2000)	—
Congo, Rep. of**	7.0	4.4	0.7	4.0	1,945 (1998–2000)	1,945.2
Côte d'Ivoire**	6.0	4.9	23.0	-17.4	5,747 (1998–2000)	5,746.7
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	36.3	15.8	23.3	537 (1998–2000)	536.9
Eritrea *	—	-7.0	-35.8	13.5	190 (1995–97)	86.6
Ethiopia*	—	5.0	-2.6	23.6	1,119 (1998–2000)	1,118.6
Gabon†	3.8	3.6	-6.6	-3.6	2,973 (1996–98)	2,729.5
Gambia, The*	3.7	1.1	-4.2	9.9	225 (1991–93)	220.2
Ghana*	-5.7	10.4	12.1	-2.3	2,784 (1998–2000)	2,783.5
Guinea*	—	4.1	6.0	0.0	960 (1998–2000)	960.1
Guinea-Bissau*	0.3	11.5	33.5	18.9	46 (1998–2000)	46.3
Kenya*	1.2	2.0	2.5	-2.2	3,124 (1993–95)	2,534.9
Lesotho	7.2	10.0	13.4	12.1	314 (1998–2000)	313.5
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-2.6	4.9	19.2	6.9	1,005 (1998–2000)	1,005.0
Malawi*	3.6	4.3	-18.6	-2.3	570 (1997–99)	564.9
Mali**	6.9	9.0	14.3	-3.6	820 (1998–2000)	819.7
Mauritania*	4.0	-0.1	4.8	2.5	544 (1985–87)	465.8
Mauritius	4.8	6.1	4.2	5.5	3,147 (1998–2000)	3,147.3
Mozambique*	—	15.0	16.4	28.6	676 (1998–2000)	676.1
Namibia	—	5.1	14.1	10.3	1,958 (1998–2000)	1,958.3
Niger**	-1.2	2.3	-10.4	1.1	577 (1976–78)	410.3
Nigeria	-0.4	4.7	-12.4	-1.6	14,280 (1996–98)	13,549.9
Rwanda*	7.2	-5.6	14.4	-2.9	248 (1985–87)	136.5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	3.0	37.0	8.3	15 (1998–2000)	15.0
Senegal**	1.1	2.5	6.0	10.5	1,810 (1998–2000)	1,810.2
Seychelles	—	5.5	46.6	11.3	471 (1998–2000)	471.1
Sierra Leone*	-7.7	-7.6	-6.6	21.5	949 (1970–72)	161.0
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.6	4.8	1.3	8.2	42,358 (1998–2000)	42,357.9
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	5.1	2.3	3.3	5.9	1,241 (1998–2000)	1,240.9
Tanzania*	—	8.4	4.7	5.2	1,163 (1995–97)	1,100.4
Togo**	4.1	-1.9	-1.9	2.2	571 (1987–89)	443.9
Uganda*	—	13.1	33.0	-7.9	1,127 (1998–2000)	1,127.4
Zambia*	-1.9	2.8	4.9	4.9	2,181 (1976–78)	1,755.4
Zimbabwe	5.3	9.1	5.3	-16.1	3,518 (1998–2000)	3,518.1
North Africa	4.1	4.3	6.4	7.4	67,799 (1998–2000)	67,798.5
All Africa	2.0	4.7	5.1	4.3	170,988 (1998–2000)	170,988.0
Comparator countries	6.9	12.4	-0.5	20.6	375,996 (1998–2000)	375,995.5
China	10.5	14.8	8.3	24.2	266,026 (1998–2000)	266,026.0
India	5.3	11.3	1.7	7.0	52,510 (1998–2000)	52,510.1
Indonesia	3.0	5.9	-31.6	16.1	63,400 (1996–98)	57,459.3
South Asia	5.3	9.7	1.8	8.4	75,135 (1998–2000)	75,135.3
East Asia	9.1	12.9	7.6	20.6	845,295 (1998–2000)	845,294.9

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

## REAL IMPORT GROWTH

2.2

	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1998–2000
	1970–88	1989–2000	1999	2000		
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.3	4.9	2.2	5.8	111,811 (1998–2000)	111,810.7
Excluding South Africa	2.4	4.2	7.7	5.0	74,401 (1998–2000)	74,401.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.6	3.9	5.9	1.9	58,583 (1998–2000)	58,583.1
Angola	—	6.9	68.3	17.5	—	—
Benin**	1.5	3.1	8.3	3.0	947 (1979–81)	752.6
Botswana	—	0.5	3.7	8.1	2,118 (1989–91)	2,074.5
Burkina Faso**	4.9	2.3	-5.7	-6.8	873 (1998–2000)	872.5
Burundi*	6.4	1.5	13.0	40.3	341 (1998–2000)	340.9
Cameroon**	8.0	3.2	3.1	10.6	2,636 (1998–2000)	2,635.8
Cape Verde	6.4	7.4	13.5	5.6	355 (1998–2000)	354.8
Central African Republic**	1.8	-0.7	-3.2	—	307 (1990–92)	293.6
Chad**	1.3	-0.5	4.0	22.6	674 (1986–88)	639.2
Comoros**	—	-0.6	3.6	-1.4	123 (1983–85)	103.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.9	-14.4	—	—	1,339 (1998–2000)	—
Congo, Rep. of**	2.6	4.7	-16.0	3.0	1,711 (1982–84)	1,472.4
Côte d'Ivoire**	3.5	4.6	12.8	2.5	4,791 (1998–2000)	4,791.4
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	24.3	-43.0	-27.6	551 (1997–99)	506.8
Eritrea *	—	10.7	-12.3	10.7	641 (1996–98)	636.0
Ethiopia*	—	4.1	18.4	6.3	1,984 (1998–2000)	1,983.8
Gabon†	7.2	0.3	-16.4	2.3	2,884 (1983–85)	2,060.1
Gambia, The*	0.9	2.3	-3.2	6.3	335 (1979–81)	286.0
Ghana*	-4.6	10.3	10.9	-17.3	4,180 (1997–99)	4,168.7
Guinea*	—	1.3	-0.5	9.0	984 (1998–2000)	983.8
Guinea-Bissau*	-1.4	-2.7	57.0	27.5	160 (1972–74)	119.8
Kenya*	-1.8	6.4	-8.6	-2.5	3,586 (1995–97)	3,278.2
Lesotho	9.0	3.7	6.7	5.9	1,209 (1998–2000)	1,209.3
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-4.1	5.3	15.4	31.0	1,752 (1970–72)	1,396.2
Malawi*	-1.4	0.5	8.1	-12.9	842 (1991–93)	780.6
Mali**	7.8	2.9	-0.8	11.9	1,105 (1998–2000)	1,105.4
Mauritania*	6.4	1.2	-1.1	12.7	671 (1985–87)	632.7
Mauritius	4.4	4.8	3.1	0.7	3,303 (1998–2000)	3,303.0
Mozambique*	—	4.1	43.3	-1.0	1,394 (1998–2000)	1,394.0
Namibia	—	4.8	0.1	5.0	2,558 (1998–2000)	2,557.6
Niger**	2.9	-2.9	-19.2	19.6	1,163 (1980–82)	489.6
Nigeria	3.4	5.1	14.9	16.0	29,965 (1980–82)	15,757.2
Rwanda*	9.4	6.2	-10.7	-6.8	511 (1997–99)	493.8
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	-1.2	25.7	-1.1	49 (1989–91)	40.8
Senegal**	2.3	1.4	4.4	5.4	2,196 (1998–2000)	2,196.4
Seychelles	—	12.2	10.3	0.2	613 (1998–2000)	613.2
Sierra Leone*	-6.2	-3.2	-5.0	54.4	575 (1970–72)	193.6
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	-0.6	6.2	-7.4	7.4	37,745 (1996–98)	37,653.8
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	6.2	-1.5	-0.1	0.9	1,268 (1991–93)	913.5
Tanzania*	—	-1.5	4.7	5.2	2,129 (1993–95)	1,506.3
Togo**	6.4	-1.7	-2.9	5.1	887 (1986–88)	736.8
Uganda*	—	7.6	1.5	7.3	1,474 (1998–2000)	1,474.0
Zambia*	-6.3	0.5	1.6	7.2	3,933 (1970–72)	1,500.1
Zimbabwe	3.1	9.6	2.3	-20.5	3,706 (1997–99)	3,542.8
North Africa	5.1	2.6	2.3	6.2	64,119 (1998–2000)	64,118.6
All Africa	2.7	4.0	2.2	5.9	175,807 (1998–2000)	175,806.6
Comparator countries	9.7	11.2	1.3	23.7	344,367 (1998–2000)	344,366.6
China	11.0	13.6	19.2	29.1	228,446 (1998–2000)	228,446.2
India	6.9	8.3	-3.6	7.7	61,480 (1998–2000)	61,479.7
Indonesia	10.4	6.8	-40.7	18.2	70,622 (1996–98)	54,440.8
South Asia	5.5	7.4	-2.5	6.6	92,402 (1998–2000)	92,401.7
East Asia	9.5	10.6	10.7	22.8	685,108 (1998–2000)	685,107.6

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

	Index (1995=100)				
	1970-79	1980-89	1990-2000	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	121.4	127.2	102.9	104.3	117.9
Excluding South Africa	137.3	140.7	106.9	114.8	142.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	135.1	114.4	101.3	113.0	125.1
Angola	—	149.4	110.8	126.8	214.2
Benin**	96.3	82.1	86.1	77.9	76.2
Botswana	—	109.3	93.5	69.5	74.7
Burkina Faso**	55.1	66.5	91.1	85.2	—
Burundi*	175.5	132.9	76.9	71.6	61.1
Cameroon**	108.7	94.6	90.6	77.5	—
Cape Verde	62.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Central African Republic**	158.4	136.1	103.9	55.4	—
Chad**	140.0	119.1	103.5	100.0	—
Comoros**	—	183.1	124.0	113.5	122.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	85.4	109.6	95.4	77.9	—
Congo, Rep. of**	116.3	123.3	94.5	95.7	147.3
Côte d'Ivoire**	177.8	117.9	94.1	98.9	100.4
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	113.0	98.4	100.1	100.5
Eritrea*	—	—	102.4	107.7	—
Ethiopia*	—	90.4	95.9	94.5	85.9
Gabon*	129.8	191.6	102.7	83.7	80.2
Gambia, The*	145.4	111.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ghana*	147.1	135.5	96.7	102.1	94.2
Guinea*	—	135.7	102.5	80.1	93.6
Guinea-Bissau*	148.6	181.7	134.8	151.5	312.8
Kenya*	115.6	80.5	93.1	97.7	91.7
Lesotho	136.5	104.9	98.5	96.4	107.1
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	144.2	110.6	93.7	96.4	123.4
Malawi*	213.8	156.2	110.9	100.9	98.2
Mali**	104.9	108.5	100.1	84.7	88.2
Mauritania*	94.4	83.2	101.5	101.1	103.9
Mauritius	113.8	99.9	102.5	100.8	96.1
Mozambique*	—	145.1	90.9	75.0	71.7
Namibia	—	130.9	107.6	111.2	105.9
Niger**	93.7	178.2	102.6	77.5	—
Nigeria	151.7	230.9	124.4	107.6	180.3
Rwanda*	62.8	58.7	84.2	89.0	88.7
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	200.3	110.6	113.9	100.6
Senegal**	103.2	101.9	101.7	102.6	96.1
Seychelles	—	81.7	92.5	105.9	102.2
Sierra Leone*	53.0	59.1	71.3	77.3	74.9
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	98.2	102.4	98.9	96.8	95.6
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	126.2	112.6	100.2	80.2	79.4
Tanzania*	—	129.3	91.7	64.8	—
Togo**	136.7	123.6	114.7	123.8	—
Uganda*	—	119.9	70.1	56.1	52.5
Zambia*	185.0	102.5	74.1	45.7	57.3
Zimbabwe	118.5	92.0	101.3	100.3	108.1
North Africa	157.6	158.1	103.7	97.3	115.5
All Africa	128.3	135.9	104.4	107.9	124.5
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—
China	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.0	98.2
India	129.2	124.4	107.5	92.2	88.5
Indonesia	61.8	120.8	109.5	114.9	113.5
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.  
 \* SPA country.  
 + CFA country.  
 Source: World Bank data.



## STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, VALUE

2.4

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports (millions of current US\$)						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sub-Saharan Africa	557.7	2,314.5	2,064.8	2,893.6	3,035.1	3,129.8	3,469.1
Excluding South Africa	525.3	2,242.6	1,930.6	2,484.5	2,609.3	2,841.1	3,218.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	465.2	1,656.3	1,442.6	2,277.8	2,325.3	2,384.1	2,748.2
Angola	13.8	93.7	43.5	77.4	104.6	82.2	85.0
Benin**	4.5	17.0	15.5	70.0	51.5	44.8	25.6
Botswana	3.7	28.8	22.0	56.9	68.0	62.5	50.8
Burkina Faso**	7.4	23.2	36.0	38.7	40.8	52.3	70.0
Burundi*	0.9	7.7	7.4	9.1	2.7	3.5	6.0
Cameroon**	12.8	34.3	24.2	47.0	11.0	42.2	51.1
Cape Verde	4.7	11.3	9.0	15.6	12.7	22.9	11.5
Central African Republic**	1.9	3.9	5.7	10.4	4.2	9.2	8.7
Chad**	3.2	3.3	20.5	14.9	20.8	16.0	9.0
Comoros**	2.8	5.4	3.9	15.7	10.5	10.6	8.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	35.5	76.9	65.2	101.0	89.0	93.8	75.0
Congo, Rep. of**	4.0	21.4	19.0	30.3	27.9	39.7	40.9
Côte d'Ivoire**	52.2	164.3	96.4	199.0	167.3	176.5	183.0
Djibouti	2.9	12.9	13.6	18.4	15.0	15.0	17.0
Equatorial Guinea**	0.5	0.9	2.9	1.1	1.0	2.3	4.0
Eritrea*	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	39.3	38.5	33.6
Ethiopia*	0.0	0.0	0.0	136.7	86.1	43.0	92.4
Gabon*	1.6	9.2	15.3	30.3	33.1	24.5	18.7
Gambia, The*	1.7	9.0	12.0	28.8	28.8	24.7	25.6
Ghana*	28.7	54.8	29.1	55.9	66.7	54.7	81.6
Guinea*	10.6	61.4	28.0	110.8	73.6	81.0	72.9
Guinea-Bissau*	7.5	5.6	5.4	18.6	21.9	11.6	13.0
Kenya*	10.5	85.8	41.0	66.7	101.3	311.5	204.3
Lesotho	7.0	33.9	25.4	70.3	66.9	51.1	57.7
Liberia	14.4	38.7	38.6	35.1	44.6	24.8	25.7
Madagascar*	17.1	34.5	34.8	36.0	26.5	31.7	35.0
Malawi*	3.7	11.2	5.9	63.6	43.4	33.7	86.1
Mali**	25.2	42.1	55.5	25.4	21.1	32.0	29.6
Mauritania*	10.1	26.0	47.3	52.2	68.2	77.2	163.6
Mauritius	20.2	56.1	36.6	51.8	88.3	55.2	51.0
Mozambique*	14.6	83.0	111.9	116.0	85.5	60.5	85.1
Namibia	3.7	7.6	8.6	45.4	42.9	29.8	21.2
Niger**	2.4	24.7	47.2	21.9	20.3	21.1	57.5
Nigeria	60.1	586.3	488.1	206.6	283.9	457.0	470.1
Rwanda*	1.0	8.5	11.9	26.6	49.7	29.8	38.1
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.8	1.4	2.6
Senegal**	63.0	114.4	92.2	192.1	219.4	152.6	208.1
Seychelles	1.6	3.7	2.4	6.6	7.9	9.6	8.0
Sierra Leone*	11.9	22.5	30.7	83.9	90.6	87.8	89.9
Somalia	8.1	69.5	46.3	28.1	37.4	33.7	51.0
South Africa	32.4	71.9	134.2	409.1	425.9	288.7	250.8
Sudan	26.2	71.1	202.5	96.6	109.1	146.6	153.8
Swaziland	0.0	0.0	4.4	10.6	8.9	21.9	16.8
Tanzania*	5.8	112.9	53.8	50.0	38.1	67.2	80.6
Togo**	3.5	12.1	10.1	15.3	19.8	21.3	52.4
Uganda*	3.2	15.2	3.8	4.2	6.0	37.5	53.0
Zambia*	7.0	108.6	32.0	30.9	41.7	35.5	125.0
Zimbabwe	3.2	26.7	22.6	42.2	107.7	59.0	68.3
North Africa	511.1	2,599.7	2,969.3	3,766.3	3,983.8	3,652.2	3,003.2
All Africa	1,068.8	4,914.2	5,034.1	6,659.9	7,018.9	6,781.9	6,472.3
Comparator countries	1,944.8	4,586.8	2,079.2	6,675.4	6,090.8	3,267.8	3,397.7
China	1,108.7	3,598.0	1,729.2	4,783.1	4,018.5	1,936.4	1,557.3
India	373.1	127.7	56.9	3.9	114.3	268.2	294.9
Indonesia	462.9	861.1	293.2	1,888.4	1,958.1	1,063.1	1,545.5
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

## STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, SHARE OF EXPORTS

2.5

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	2.8	4.1	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.8
Excluding South Africa	3.7	4.2	5.9	4.4	3.9	4.3	5.7
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	4.6	4.8	6.0
Angola	—	—	1.8	2.1	1.7	1.6	2.3
Benin**	5.7	7.7	6.2	17.3	14.8	12.9	6.4
Botswana	3.9	5.1	3.0	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.0
Burkina Faso**	17.3	13.4	23.2	12.7	14.8	19.6	19.4
Burundi*	2.6	9.5	5.8	7.1	5.4	3.7	8.4
Cameroon**	3.5	1.8	0.9	2.3	0.5	1.8	2.2
Cape Verde	31.7	58.9	29.1	16.6	11.4	17.3	9.3
Central African Republic**	2.4	1.9	3.2	4.5	2.3	4.7	5.1
Chad**	3.1	1.9	16.7	4.6	7.4	5.6	2.9
Comoros**	—	50.4	20.0	34.2	24.7	28.1	17.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.3	3.2	3.3	6.3	5.4	6.7	4.5
Congo, Rep. of**	2.3	2.1	1.5	2.2	1.6	2.3	2.8
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.8	4.6	3.0	4.8	3.3	3.7	3.7
Djibouti	—	—	—	9.2	7.5	7.2	—
Equatorial Guinea**	1.5	—	12.0	1.2	0.5	0.4	0.9
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.9	19.6	18.9	31.0
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.0	17.4	11.0	4.3	8.9
Gabon*	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9
Gambia, The*	6.5	8.7	12.1	16.7	15.7	13.4	12.1
Ghana*	5.4	14.6	6.1	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.2
Guinea*	—	—	—	14.5	10.0	10.5	8.8
Guinea-Bissau*	139.3	39.6	38.8	62.8	77.0	20.6	43.6
Kenya*	1.5	4.2	2.6	2.3	3.4	10.5	7.2
Lesotho	31.0	37.4	62.3	35.4	28.5	23.4	—
Liberia	4.4	6.3	8.3	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	7.3	6.4	9.9	4.7	3.2	4.1	4.4
Malawi*	3.0	3.6	2.2	15.0	8.4	5.7	14.9
Mali**	43.9	16.0	25.2	4.9	4.0	5.0	4.7
Mauritania*	6.5	10.0	11.5	9.9	13.5	17.9	41.1
Mauritius	11.1	9.7	6.4	2.2	3.2	2.1	1.9
Mozambique*	—	21.7	87.8	32.0	24.8	15.8	20.7
Namibia	—	0.5	1.0	2.6	2.4	1.7	1.4
Niger**	1.6	4.0	15.8	6.8	6.0	7.0	15.6
Nigeria	2.5	3.1	10.7	1.7	1.7	2.8	4.4
Rwanda*	3.0	5.0	6.5	40.0	59.7	20.7	34.6
São Tomé and Príncipe*	16.1	26.4	30.9	28.8	35.7	11.5	21.5
Senegal**	18.2	14.2	12.5	12.4	13.8	10.3	13.5
Seychelles	—	3.7	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.1
Sierra Leone*	6.8	8.2	17.2	51.3	55.2	78.3	95.1
Somalia	11.5	34.7	83.5	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.7
Sudan	5.8	8.8	28.3	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.0	0.9	2.0	1.4
Tanzania*	—	—	12.3	4.0	2.9	5.5	7.3
Togo**	2.6	2.1	2.7	3.6	4.4	4.3	11.6
Uganda*	1.1	6.3	0.8	0.6	0.8	4.5	7.6
Zambia*	0.6	6.8	3.9	2.5	4.1	3.0	14.5
Zimbabwe	—	1.7	1.8	1.6	3.5	1.8	2.3
North Africa	5.8	5.6	8.4	7.1	6.9	6.0	5.6
All Africa	3.7	4.0	6.0	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.5
Comparator countries	16.1	8.6	3.3	2.6	2.2	1.0	1.1
China	21.8	23.4	5.7	2.8	2.3	0.9	0.8
India	11.0	1.1	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.6
Indonesia	12.8	3.2	1.4	3.6	3.3	1.8	3.1
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

## CAPITAL FLOWS

## GROSS CONCESSIONAL AID FLOWS

3.1

	Percentage of recipient country GDP					
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.1	2.3	4.1	4.0	2.1	1.9
Excluding South Africa	3.3	3.3	6.0	8.0	3.9	3.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	4.9	5.9	7.9	9.8	4.9	4.4
Angola	—	—	0.5	3.9	1.3	1.6
Benin**	6.3	7.0	6.1	8.7	5.1	5.8
Botswana	11.2	13.4	8.9	4.1	6.4	5.2
Burkina Faso**	12.0	14.7	12.3	14.9	10.2	11.0
Burundi*	0.3	12.6	12.3	18.2	5.7	6.5
Cameroon**	3.3	3.3	2.2	1.9	0.3	0.2
Cape Verde	0.0	30.7	52.2	18.1	21.1	13.4
Central African Republic**	1.0	2.4	5.0	10.8	10.0	9.4
Chad**	9.0	3.2	13.8	13.4	7.3	4.6
Comoros**	—	20.6	49.9	14.5	7.8	7.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.7	1.8	2.8	5.6	2.4	—
Congo, Rep. of**	1.6	2.9	3.9	1.4	0.3	0.4
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.0	0.4	2.4	6.6	1.0	1.0
Djibouti	—	—	8.9	15.8	14.4	13.0
Equatorial Guinea**	6.2	—	20.7	7.8	1.6	0.7
Eritrea*	—	—	—	13.6	9.2	12.0
Ethiopia*	—	—	12.4	10.8	4.0	3.3
Gabon*	1.9	0.4	2.0	1.3	0.4	0.4
Gambia, The*	4.2	11.4	18.2	19.4	17.1	14.5
Ghana*	2.0	4.4	4.5	14.1	7.8	3.9
Guinea*	—	—	—	7.4	3.8	3.1
Guinea-Bissau*	0.0	43.9	32.0	42.0	4.0	19.4
Kenya*	3.8	3.8	3.4	6.8	0.7	0.6
Lesotho	0.0	-8.3	44.5	33.3	20.5	16.4
Liberia	0.2	6.7	3.1	—	—	—
Madagascar*	7.1	3.8	6.1	6.0	3.1	3.8
Malawi*	7.5	7.7	6.0	25.4	9.0	8.7
Mali**	8.7	8.6	20.7	15.6	4.7	4.6
Mauritania*	19.8	30.7	30.1	15.5	11.3	13.7
Mauritius	1.7	2.4	4.8	1.4	0.8	0.5
Mozambique*	—	1.6	10.4	23.3	7.9	10.6
Namibia	—	6.7	21.2	9.7	10.3	11.2
Niger**	10.4	8.7	4.4	7.9	6.1	5.2
Nigeria	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	-0.1	0.1
Rwanda*	13.1	13.4	11.4	27.9	12.1	12.5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.0	16.9	16.7	81.6	32.6	32.2
Senegal**	7.8	8.8	11.7	11.4	5.2	3.9
Seychelles	3.3	14.0	12.9	2.8	3.0	1.8
Sierra Leone*	1.8	6.0	3.7	10.8	0.7	2.2
Somalia	8.6	35.9	11.3	—	—	—
South Africa	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0
Sudan	12.5	35.4	35.9	11.3	1.7	3.8
Swaziland	5.8	25.2	24.6	16.9	6.1	17.3
Tanzania*	—	—	4.9	13.8	8.1	8.4
Togo**	8.4	11.1	16.0	4.6	2.6	1.7
Uganda*	0.6	4.1	4.8	9.1	5.6	4.3
Zambia*	3.3	6.9	9.6	17.7	6.8	6.9
Zimbabwe	0.4	0.9	2.3	3.5	1.1	1.8
North Africa	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.8	—	0.6
All Africa	2.0	2.1	3.0	3.3	1.7	1.4

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: Gross concessional aid flows include loans plus official balance of payments transfers. Group totals are weighted averages.

Source: World Bank data.

DEBT SERVICE RATIO		3.2				
	Percentage of exports					
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.7	11.7	26.2	15.9	14.7	19.1
Excluding South Africa	9.7	11.7	26.2	20.0	16.2	22.1
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	11.0	19.0	22.9	21.2	17.3	19.6
Angola	—	—	6.4	11.8	29.3	18.0
Benin**	1.9	4.9	11.5	11.0	12.7	14.6
Botswana	1.6	2.1	5.4	3.2	3.0	—
Burkina Faso**	4.0	5.9	10.5	11.4	11.2	16.2
Burundi*	2.9	9.4	20.4	27.6	40.2	88.9
Cameroon**	7.6	14.6	23.4	20.6	23.0	41.3
Cape Verde	—	—	14.0	5.0	10.2	18.5
Central African Republic**	6.1	4.9	14.2	6.8	16.9	17.5
Chad**	3.7	8.4	13.9	4.9	10.5	16.1
Comoros**	—	2.6	8.9	1.6	12.2	5.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9.1	22.6	24.8	1.4	1.2	30.4
Congo, Rep. of**	7.0	10.6	34.4	14.7	3.3	23.4
Côte d'Ivoire**	7.6	39.1	34.8	22.6	28.0	23.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	5.1	2.0	1.8
Equatorial Guinea**	0.0	—	42.6	2.3	1.3	6.5
Eritrea*	—	—	—	0.1	1.6	0.7
Ethiopia*	6.4	7.6	28.4	19.1	11.2	16.9
Gabon*	14.2	15.0	11.6	15.6	12.5	21.4
Gambia, The*	1.4	5.7	10.8	13.6	10.9	6.4
Ghana*	4.9	13.1	23.7	25.1	22.2	20.7
Guinea*	—	19.8	—	23.2	19.1	17.7
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	46.8	51.6	27.4	15.7
Kenya*	9.2	19.7	39.2	30.3	21.2	27.7
Lesotho	—	0.9	3.8	6.4	8.1	13.5
Liberia	6.1	8.8	8.6	—	—	—
Madagascar*	34.7	19.3	38.2	6.9	14.0	11.9
Malawi*	9.3	27.8	39.0	27.7	14.2	20.4
Mali**	7.4	5.1	19.9	13.9	11.1	11.0
Mauritania*	9.0	17.3	24.5	20.5	23.9	31.7
Mauritius	1.4	9.0	23.4	9.0	11.1	9.3
Mozambique*	—	—	34.5	34.8	18.0	33.6
Namibia	—	—	—	—	3.9	1.8
Niger**	2.0	21.7	33.8	16.7	17.9	38.6
Nigeria	6.1	4.1	33.6	15.3	11.7	31.5
Rwanda*	0.2	4.1	10.8	22.8	17.1	41.5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	5.1	29.0	20.9	31.6	48.5
Senegal**	11.0	26.7	20.7	16.6	19.1	13.4
Seychelles	0.0	36.2	7.9	8.5	5.2	3.8
Sierra Leone*	9.3	28.0	13.0	49.6	22.2	58.7
Somalia	3.7	4.9	14.2	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	—	9.5	12.3	13.7
Sudan	13.8	25.1	12.8	10.0	9.8	6.7
Swaziland	—	4.0	9.9	1.7	2.0	2.8
Tanzania*	4.1	23.5	39.2	21.0	21.5	16.2
Togo**	7.6	9.0	28.4	5.8	7.3	0.0
Uganda*	8.4	17.3	38.0	20.0	24.3	23.1
Zambia*	31.9	25.2	14.4	196.1	21.1	37.4
Zimbabwe	2.1	20.7	32.7	23.4	37.9	24.0
North Africa	16.0	22.5	31.2	23.5	21.0	20.6
All Africa	11.6	15.6	28.4	18.6	17.0	19.6
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	—	7.8	8.7	8.7	9.0
India	19.1	9.4	22.7	28.1	20.6	15.0
Indonesia	—	—	28.8	29.9	31.7	25.4
South Asia	17.8	11.8	22.1	25.0	18.4	15.5
East Asia	—	—	23.8	11.4	12.9	15.8

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

3.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars (net), current prices						
	1973	1980	1985	1997	1998	1999	2000
Sub-Saharan Africa	726	—	763	989	4,768	6,619	4,161
Excluding South Africa	749	—	1,260	2,245	5,987	7,066	3,806
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	375	—	915	1,568	4,767	5,593	2,432
Angola	—	—	278	303	1,114	2,471	1,495
Benin**	4	4	1	4	18	31	24
Botswana	53	109	52	30	100	100	100
Burkina Faso**	4	0	—	20	-13	13	0
Burundi*	—	1	1	1	—	—	0
Cameroon**	-1	105	274	-154	-50	25	—
Cape Verde	—	—	—	26	9	67	0
Central African Republic**	0	5	2	4	7	2	—
Chad**	6	0	53	37	46	45	—
Comoros**	—	—	—	1	0	0	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	—	6	—	20	100	0
Congo, Rep. of**	68	40	13	27	299	85	0
Côte d'Ivoire**	51	83	29	234	247	196	256
Djibouti	—	—	—	3	3	4	9
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	93	366	30	0
Eritrea*	—	—	—	—	52	83	0
Ethiopia*	31	—	—	—	7	136	0
Gabon*	16	24	144	-109	-62	129	-15
Gambia, The*	—	—	1	6	12	7	3
Ghana*	14	16	8	83	45	46	100
Guinea*	—	34	—	25	49	34	0
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	—	—	—	—	0
Kenya*	—	78	13	33	40	42	0
Lesotho	—	4	5	295	193	180	0
Liberia	49	—	-16	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	11	—	—	10	16	58	0
Malawi*	8	10	1	—	34	39	0
Mali**	1	2	3	30	16	16	45
Mauritania*	10	27	4	7	0	—	0
Mauritius	-3	1	7	27	38	21	133
Mozambique*	—	—	—	45	213	382	0
Namibia	—	—	—	157	98	109	114
Niger**	1	44	-10	—	—	2	0
Nigeria	373	-739	345	677	1,220	1,473	1,374
Rwanda*	2	16	15	2	7	2	0
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	2	4	3	0
Senegal**	5	61	-16	-10	86	201	104
Seychelles	—	6	1	27	42	52	30
Sierra Leone*	7	10	3	-5	4	2	0
Somalia	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	-23	-765	-497	-1,256	-1,219	-447	355
Sudan	—	—	—	—	700	224	0
Swaziland	—	18	9	10	10	30	34
Tanzania*	—	—	—	104	172	183	0
Togo**	2	42	31	5	1	—	—
Uganda*	5	—	30	2	190	230	0
Zambia*	32	62	—	97	198	163	0
Zimbabwe	—	-26	3	98	436	50	0
North Africa	—	-78	384	—	2,477	2,284	2,486
All Africa	—	—	—	2,339	7,244	8,902	6,648
Comparator countries	0	8	1,500	39,736	43,979	41,950	—
China	—	—	1,030	33,849	41,117	36,978	—
India	0	8	160	2,144	2,462	2,155	—
Indonesia	—	—	310	3,743	400	2,817	—
South Asia	—	119	264	2,652	3,529	2,853	—
East Asia	—	—	1,948	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## INFANT MORTALITY RATE

4.1

	Deaths per 1,000 live births							Projection 2025
	Estimate							
	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	132	120	111	103	100	93	92	—
Excluding South Africa	136	123	114	105	103	95	94	54
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	136	127	119	110	107	98	97	57
Angola	173	161	149	138	125	125	127	66
Benin**	136	117	115	114	98	88	87	55
Botswana	88	76	67	57	53	58	58	15
Burkina Faso**	137	141	129	109	112	105	105	70
Burundi*	137	127	118	114	122	110	105	54
Cameroon**	119	102	103	78	83	80	77	25
Cape Verde	91	86	84	74	58	42	39	15
Central African Republic**	132	122	114	104	101	95	96	55
Chad**	166	154	120	118	110	100	101	69
Comoros**	—	138	106	90	80	65	61	37
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	127	117	109	100	93	92	85	42
Congo, Rep. of**	95	91	88	87	89	90	89	57
Côte d'Ivoire**	129	113	105	98	93	112	111	42
Djibouti	154	143	132	122	115	106	109	55
Equatorial Guinea**	158	149	138	127	117	108	104	59
Eritrea*	—	—	91	96	72	62	60	—
Ethiopia*	155	149	159	132	119	107	104	76
Gabon+	132	122	112	101	93	87	84	40
Gambia, The*	179	167	154	126	97	78	75	72
Ghana*	108	99	90	82	62	55	57	42
Guinea*	177	155	148	129	115	98	96	83
Guinea-Bissau*	183	176	164	151	141	130	127	94
Kenya*	98	88	66	63	61	74	76	27
Lesotho	130	121	117	107	98	93	92	36
Liberia	181	167	144	135	190	116	113	64
Madagascar*	150	130	112	110	98	94	90	51
Malawi*	191	177	163	137	134	104	132	83
Mali**	203	191	180	144	130	118	120	91
Mauritania*	142	125	117	110	101	92	88	68
Mauritius	55	38	28	24	18	20	19	8
Mozambique*	168	164	133	136	160	135	131	83
Namibia	113	98	84	68	61	65	63	24
Niger**	166	157	136	143	138	120	116	73
Nigeria	135	105	96	87	86	81	83	43
Rwanda*	142	133	124	115	144	124	123	59
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	80	74	52	50	47	26
Senegal**	122	130	112	85	75	70	67	39
Seychelles	—	—	19	18	16	8	9	7
Sierra Leone*	193	192	189	180	195	170	168	83
Somalia	155	149	143	132	165	122	121	78
South Africa	76	72	63	58	53	59	62	22
Sudan	110	97	92	86	85	71	67	45
Swaziland	133	108	94	84	75	65	64	55
Tanzania*	125	113	104	110	118	99	95	58
Togo**	129	117	97	88	80	79	77	37
Uganda*	104	116	116	116	97	99	88	64
Zambia*	100	94	88	113	108	113	114	58
Zimbabwe	93	86	76	50	53	65	70	22
North Africa	135	118	97	68	54	45	42	22
All Africa	133	119	109	98	95	88	87	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	61	40	39	38	38	32	30	18
India	132	129	105	95	79	71	70	39
Indonesia	114	105	80	72	55	44	42	32
South Asia	135	130	111	101	85	76	74	45
East Asia	72	58	50	45	42	37	35	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH

4.2

	Actual							Projection
	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	45	47	48	50	50	49	47	—
Excluding South Africa	44	46	48	49	49	48	47	60
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	44	46	48	49	49	48	46	59
Angola	38	40	42	44	46	46	47	58
Benin**	45	47	49	51	53	53	53	58
Botswana	53	56	59	61	54	47	39	73
Burkina Faso**	41	43	45	46	45	45	45	58
Burundi*	44	46	47	47	42	42	42	57
Cameroon**	46	48	51	53	55	53	51	65
Cape Verde	57	60	62	64	66	68	69	74
Central African Republic**	43	44	47	48	48	45	44	55
Chad**	39	41	43	45	47	49	49	57
Comoros**	47	49	50	54	57	60	61	67
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	46	48	50	51	52	47	46	61
Congo, Rep. of**	47	49	50	50	49	48	48	60
Côte d'Ivoire**	45	48	50	51	49	47	46	64
Djibouti	41	43	45	47	48	50	47	60
Equatorial Guinea**	41	42	44	46	48	50	51	58
Eritrea*	44	45	44	48	50	51	50	—
Ethiopia*	41	42	42	45	45	43	42	58
Gabon†	45	47	49	51	52	52	53	65
Gambia, The*	37	39	41	47	51	53	53	56
Ghana*	50	52	54	56	58	60	58	63
Guinea*	37	39	40	43	44	46	46	53
Guinea-Bissau*	37	38	39	42	43	44	44	48
Kenya*	51	53	56	58	57	50	48	66
Lesotho	49	52	54	56	58	48	45	69
Liberia	47	49	51	53	39	47	47	65
Madagascar*	46	49	51	52	53	53	54	60
Malawi*	41	43	45	45	44	43	39	53
Mali**	39	40	43	47	44	44	43	60
Mauritania*	43	45	47	49	51	53	54	57
Mauritius	63	65	67	69	70	70	71	76
Mozambique*	42	43	44	43	43	45	43	57
Namibia	49	51	54	56	59	56	50	66
Niger**	39	41	42	44	45	46	46	55
Nigeria	43	45	46	48	50	50	47	64
Rwanda*	45	45	46	48	35	40	40	54
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	61	63	64	65	76
Senegal**	42	44	46	48	50	52	52	58
Seychelles	—	—	69	70	71	71	72	78
Sierra Leone*	35	35	35	37	34	37	37	54
Somalia	41	42	43	45	39	47	48	58
South Africa	54	56	58	60	63	55	48	72
Sudan	44	47	49	51	51	55	56	62
Swaziland	47	50	53	55	58	58	46	66
Tanzania*	46	49	51	51	49	48	45	59
Togo**	45	48	50	51	50	49	49	64
Uganda*	51	49	48	48	46	42	42	53
Zambia*	47	49	51	50	49	43	38	53
Zimbabwe	52	54	56	57	56	45	40	64
North Africa	53	56	59	63	66	68	68	73
All Africa	47	48	50	52	53	52	51	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	63	65	68	69	69	70	70	75
India	50	53	55	58	61	63	63	70
Indonesia	49	53	56	60	63	65	66	69
South Asia	50	52	55	57	60	62	63	66
East Asia	61	63	66	67	68	69	69	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

4.3

	Percentage of population with access to health services (last available data between 1985 and 1993)		
	Total	Urban	Rural
Angola	24 (1991)	—	—
Benin**	42 (1991)	—	—
Botswana	86 (1988)	—	—
Burkina Faso**	70 (1985)	—	—
Burundi*	80 (1991)	—	—
Cameroon**	15 (1988)	—	—
Cape Verde	82 (1988)	—	—
Central African Republic**	12 (1988)	—	—
Chad**	26 (1991)	—	—
Comoros**	82 (1985)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	51 (1991)	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	60 (1988)	—	—
Djibouti	37 (1983)	100 (1988)	95 (1988)
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—
Eritrea *	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	55 (1991)	—	—
Gabon*	87 (1988)	—	—
Gambia, The*	—	—	—
Ghana*	25 (1992)	—	—
Guinea*	45 (1992)	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	64 (1985)	—	—
Kenya*	—	—	—
Lesotho	80 (1988)	—	—
Liberia	34 (1988)	—	—
Madagascar*	65 (1988)	—	—
Malawi*	80 (1988)	—	—
Mali**	20 (1983)	—	—
Mauritania*	30 (1985)	—	—
Mauritius	90 (1991)	100 (1988)	100 (1988)
Mozambique*	30 (1988)	—	—
Namibia	—	—	—
Niger**	30 (1991)	—	17 (1993)
Nigeria	67 (1992)	87 (1993)	—
Rwanda*	—	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe*	88 (1988)	—	—
Senegal**	40 (1990)	—	—
Seychelles	99 (1991)	—	—
Sierra Leone*	36 (1985)	88 (1993)	—
Somalia	20 (1985)	50 (1985)	15 (1985)
South Africa	—	—	—
Sudan	70 (1991)	—	—
Swaziland	55 (1991)	—	—
Tanzania*	93 (1991)	94 (1993)	—
Togo**	—	—	—
Uganda*	71 (1988)	—	—
Zambia*	75 (1988)	100 (1988)	50 (1988)
Zimbabwe	71 (1985)	90 (1988)	80 (1988)
Average	57	55	50

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank and World Health Organization data.



## CHILD IMMUNIZATION AND ORT USE

4.4

	Percentage use among under-five-year-olds		Percentage of one-year-olds immunized			
	ORT		DPT		Measles	
	1987	1992–93 <sup>a</sup>	1987	1999	1987	1999
Angola	12	48 (1992)	10	22	55	57
Benin**	26	28 (1993)	25	90	26	92
Botswana	46	64 (1993)	48	85	48	74
Burkina Faso**	15	15 (1993)	34	34	65	29
Burundi*	30	49 (1993)	70	63	54	47
Cameroon**	22	84 (1993)	—	48	—	46
Cape Verde	9	5 (1992)	92	69	75	61
Central African Republic**	15	24 (1992)	18	—	14	—
Chad**	2	15 (1992)	14	33	16	49
Comoros**	18	70 (1992)	71	—	71	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	10	46 (1993)	38	25	41	15
Congo, Rep. of**	2	67 (1992)	57	29	66	23
Côte d'Ivoire**	4	16 (1992)	51	60	—	59
Djibouti	22	56 (1992)	25	23	22	23
Equatorial Guinea**	21	40 (1992)	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	56	—	55
Ethiopia*	23	68 (1993)	16	64	13	53
Gabon <sup>+</sup>	7	25 (1992)	59	31	67	30
Gambia, The*	3	51 (1993)	85	90	88	87
Ghana*	36	44 (1992)	18	72	28	73
Guinea*	1	82 (1993)	—	57	—	61
Guinea-Bissau*	1	26 (1993)	55	6	60	19
Kenya*	26	69 (1992)	—	79	—	79
Lesotho	68	78 (1992)	—	64	84	58
Liberia	9	15 (1992)	19	23	40	35
Madagascar*	2	26 (1993)	—	48	27	46
Malawi*	42	50 (1993)	78	81	81	79
Mali**	3	41 (1993)	6	52	8	57
Mauritania*	2	54 (1992)	10	19	27	56
Mauritius	4	—	—	85	—	79
Mozambique*	14	60 (1993)	39	81	37	90
Namibia	—	75 (1993)	—	72	—	65
Niger**	24	17 (1993)	—	21	—	25
Nigeria	20	80 (1993)	21	—	24	—
Rwanda*	24	36 (1993)	79	85	74	78
São Tomé and Príncipe*	46	50 (1992)	72	—	69	—
Senegal**	9	27 (1992)	—	52	—	48
Seychelles	—	—	89	99	100	99
Sierra Leone*	31	60 (1992)	—	—	—	—
Somalia	12	78 (1992)	25	18	29	26
South Africa	—	—	72	76	75	82
Sudan	25	47 (1993)	29	87	22	88
Swaziland	—	85 (1992)	86	96	77	72
Tanzania*	14	83 (1992)	81	82	78	78
Togo**	19	33 (1993)	54	48	57	47
Uganda*	5	45 (1993)	39	51	48	53
Zambia*	59	90 (1993)	65	92	65	72
Zimbabwe	26	—	84	81	80	79
Average	19	49	48	58	52	58
Median	15	49	50	62	55	58

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

<sup>+</sup> CFA country.

Note: ORT is oral rehydration therapy; DPT is diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.

a. Most recent available data.

Source: World Health Organization data.

## TOTAL PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

4.5

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in primary school						Projection <sup>a</sup>
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	51	81	76	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa	48	80	72	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	49	72	67	67	—	—	74
Angola	75	175	92	—	—	—	101
Benin**	32	67	58	73	78	—	61
Botswana	63	91	113	108	108	—	117
Burkina Faso**	12	18	33	40	—	—	37
Burundi*	27	26	73	51	—	—	68
Cameroon**	92	98	101	87	85	—	101
Cape Verde	54	114	121	—	—	148	109
Central African Republic**	65	71	65	—	—	—	69
Chad**	35	—	54	51	58	—	57
Comoros**	33	86	75	75	—	—	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	95	92	70	—	—	—	76
Congo, Rep. of**	121	141	133	114	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	59	75	67	69	71	—	68
Djibouti	28	37	38	39	39	—	45
Equatorial Guinea**	90	160	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	56	53	—	—
Ethiopia*	14	37	33	38	43	—	25
Gabon†	165	174	—	162	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	25	53	64	77	—	—	66
Ghana*	62	79	75	—	—	—	77
Guinea*	31	36	37	48	53	54	37
Guinea-Bissau*	40	68	—	—	—	—	59
Kenya*	62	115	95	85	—	—	95
Lesotho	87	104	112	111	108	—	112
Liberia	—	48	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	81	130	103	92	—	—	93
Malawi*	37	60	68	134	—	—	65
Mali**	23	26	27	41	45	49	23
Mauritania*	15	37	49	75	79	—	55
Mauritius	96	93	109	107	107	106	104
Mozambique*	40	99	67	60	—	—	66
Namibia	—	—	129	133	131	131	116
Niger**	13	25	29	29	29	29	29
Nigeria	44	109	91	—	—	—	71
Rwanda*	70	63	70	—	—	—	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	39	46	59	64	68	71	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	35	52	50	—	—	—	48
Somalia	8	22	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	92	90	122	133	—	—	—
Sudan	38	50	53	50	51	—	49
Swaziland	87	103	111	121	118	117	105
Tanzania*	34	93	70	67	66	67	67
Togo**	71	118	109	119	120	—	111
Uganda*	38	50	75	74	—	—	80
Zambia*	90	90	99	89	—	—	90
Zimbabwe	70	85	116	114	113	112	118
North Africa	69	84	91	99	100	—	—
All Africa	55	81	79	80	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	91	113	125	118	120	123	—
India	78	83	97	100	100	—	—
Indonesia	80	107	115	113	113	—	—
South Asia	71	77	90	99	100	—	—
East Asia	90	111	120	115	116	119	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

a. As assessed in 1993.

Source: UNESCO data.

## TOTAL SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.6

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in secondary school						Projection <sup>a</sup>
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	7	15	23	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa	6	15	19	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	7	14	17	17	—	—	74
Angola	8	21	12	—	—	—	101
Benin**	5	16	12	16	17	—	61
Botswana	7	19	43	63	65	—	117
Burkina Faso**	1	3	7	—	—	—	37
Burundi*	2	3	6	—	—	—	68
Cameroon**	7	18	28	—	—	—	101
Cape Verde	—	8	21	—	—	—	109
Central African Republic**	4	14	12	—	—	—	69
Chad**	2	—	8	9	10	—	57
Comoros**	3	22	18	21	—	—	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9	24	—	—	—	—	76
Congo, Rep. of**	—	74	53	53	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	9	19	22	23	24	—	68
Djibouti	—	12	12	13	14	—	45
Equatorial Guinea**	16	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	19	20	—	—
Ethiopia*	4	9	14	12	—	—	25
Gabon†	8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	7	11	19	25	—	—	66
Ghana*	14	41	36	—	—	—	77
Guinea*	13	17	10	12	—	—	37
Guinea-Bissau*	8	6	—	—	—	—	59
Kenya*	9	20	24	24	—	—	95
Lesotho	7	18	25	31	31	—	112
Liberia	10	22	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	12	—	18	16	—	—	93
Malawi*	—	5	8	17	—	—	65
Mali**	5	8	7	10	—	—	23
Mauritania*	2	11	14	16	—	—	55
Mauritius	30	50	53	62	65	—	104
Mozambique*	5	5	8	7	—	—	66
Namibia	—	—	44	62	61	—	116
Niger**	1	5	7	7	7	—	29
Nigeria	4	18	25	—	—	—	71
Rwanda*	2	3	8	—	—	—	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	10	11	16	16	16	—	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	8	14	17	—	—	—	48
Somalia	5	9	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	18	—	74	94	94	—	—
Sudan	7	16	24	21	21	—	49
Swaziland	18	38	44	53	54	—	105
Tanzania*	3	3	5	5	5	—	67
Togo**	7	33	24	27	27	—	111
Uganda*	4	5	13	12	—	—	80
Zambia*	13	16	24	—	—	—	90
Zimbabwe	7	8	50	47	49	—	118
North Africa	24	41	62	64	64	—	—
All Africa	10	20	31	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	24	46	49	66	69	70	—
India	24	30	44	49	49	—	—
Indonesia	16	29	44	52	56	—	—
South Asia	23	27	40	48	49	—	—
East Asia	24	44	48	64	67	69	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

a. As assessed in 1993.

Source: UNESCO data.

	Percentage of total primary enrollment						
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sub-Saharan Africa	39	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa	39	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	40	43	—	—	—	—	—
Angola	—	—	—	—	—	—	47
Benin**	31	32	—	36	36	37	38
Botswana	53	55	52	50	50	50	—
Burkina Faso**	36	37	—	39	39	—	40
Burundi*	33	39	—	44	45	46	45
Cameroon**	43	45	—	47	—	46	45
Cape Verde	—	49	—	—	—	—	49
Central African Republic**	33	37	—	—	—	—	—
Chad**	—	—	—	32	33	34	35
Comoros**	—	41	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37	42	—	41	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	—	48	—	46	48	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	36	40	—	42	42	42	43
Djibouti	30	—	—	43	42	42	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	44	45	45	—
Ethiopia*	31	35	—	37	36	36	37
Gabon*	48	49	—	50	50	50	—
Gambia, The*	31	35	—	43	44	—	—
Ghana*	43	44	—	46	—	—	—
Guinea*	—	33	—	34	34	36	37
Guinea-Bissau*	—	32	—	37	—	—	—
Kenya*	41	47	49	49	—	49	49
Lesotho	60	59	55	53	52	52	—
Liberia	33	35	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	46	49	—	51	49	—	49
Malawi*	—	41	—	47	47	—	—
Mali**	36	36	—	40	39	39	41
Mauritania*	—	35	—	45	46	47	48
Mauritius	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Mozambique*	—	—	43	42	—	—	—
Namibia	—	—	52	50	50	50	50
Niger**	34	35	—	37	38	38	39
Nigeria	37	—	43	45	45	—	—
Rwanda*	44	48	—	—	—	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	39	40	—	43	44	45	45
Seychelles	50	51	—	49	49	—	—
Sierra Leone*	40	—	—	—	—	—	—
Somalia	25	36	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	50	49	—	49	—
Sudan	38	40	—	44	45	45	—
Swaziland	48	50	50	49	49	49	49
Tanzania*	39	47	50	49	49	50	—
Togo**	31	39	—	40	41	41	42
Uganda*	—	—	44	46	46	47	—
Zambia*	44	47	—	48	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	45	—	50	49	49	—	—
North Africa	37	41	—	—	46	—	—
All Africa	39	43	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	42	—	46	46	46	46
China	—	—	—	47	47	47	48
India	37	39	—	43	43	43	44
Indonesia	—	46	—	48	48	48	—
South Asia	36	38	—	42	43	43	43
East Asia	—	—	—	47	48	48	48

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: For years for which new data are unavailable, last available data are repeated.

Source: UNESCO data.

## FEMALE SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.8

	Percentage of total secondary enrollment						
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Angola	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benin**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	—	55	53	52	—	52	—
Burkina Faso**	28	—	34	—	—	—	—
Burundi*	—	—	37	—	—	—	—
Cameroon**	29	35	41	—	—	—	—
Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic**	19	—	29	—	—	—	—
Chad**	—	—	—	20	20	21	—
Comoros**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	—	—	—	43	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	22	—	—	—	—	—	—
Djibouti	—	—	—	42	41	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	42	42	—	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	43	43	—	41	—
Gabon*	—	—	—	47	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	24	—	33	38	—	—	—
Ghana*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea*	—	—	24	26	—	26	—
Guinea-Bissau*	—	20	—	—	—	—	—
Kenya*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lesotho	54	60	60	—	59	59	—
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	—	—	—	—	49	—
Malawi*	—	—	19	—	—	—	—
Mali**	22	—	33	34	33	—	—
Mauritania*	—	—	32	34	—	—	—
Mauritius	—	—	50	—	50	—	50
Mozambique*	—	—	36	39	—	—	—
Namibia	—	—	56	54	54	53	—
Niger**	—	29	29	34	35	37	—
Nigeria	—	—	43	—	—	—	—
Rwanda*	—	—	43	—	—	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	—	—	—	37	37	38	—
Seychelles	—	—	—	49	49	—	—
Sierra Leone*	—	—	37	—	—	—	—
Somalia	—	27	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	54	—	—	—	—
Sudan	—	—	43	46	47	—	—
Swaziland	44	—	—	—	—	—	50
Tanzania*	—	—	42	45	46	—	—
Togo**	22	—	25	26	27	—	—
Uganda*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Zambia*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	—	—	47	46	46	—	—
North Africa	31	—	—	—	46	—	—
All Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	43	43	42	44	—
China	—	—	41	45	45	50	—
India	28	—	—	37	38	39	—
Indonesia	—	—	45	46	—	—	—
South Asia	28	—	—	37	38	39	—
East Asia	—	—	43	45	46	50	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: Data include vocational and technical training. For years for which new data are unavailable, last available data are repeated.

Source: UNESCO data.

## POPULATION

5.1

	Millions									
	Estimate						Standard projection <sup>a</sup>		Rapid projection <sup>a</sup>	
	1970	1980	1990	1998	1999	2000	2025	Stabili- zation	2025	Stabili- zation
Sub-Saharan Africa	288.6	380.7	508.3	628.2	644.0	659.8	1,282.9	2,653.5	932.1	1,450.4
Excluding South Africa	266.5	353.2	473.1	586.8	601.8	617.0	1,214.2	2,557.8	876.7	1,377.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	213.3	282.0	376.9	465.9	477.9	490.1	997.3	2,162.4	703.6	1,109.0
Angola	5.6	7.0	9.2	12.0	12.4	12.7	26.1	61.3	17.2	26.3
Benin**	2.7	3.5	4.7	5.9	6.1	6.3	10.9	19.1	8.5	13.4
Botswana	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.7	3.6	2.3	3.3
Burkina Faso**	5.6	7.0	8.9	10.7	11.0	11.3	22.7	47.9	15.3	23.5
Burundi*	3.5	4.1	5.5	6.5	6.7	6.8	14.0	32.0	9.3	14.7
Cameroon**	6.6	8.7	11.5	14.3	14.7	15.1	28.7	52.9	21.5	32.4
Cape Verde	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.5	0.6	0.9
Central African Republic**	1.8	2.3	2.9	3.5	3.5	3.6	7.3	11.4	4.9	7.6
Chad**	3.7	4.5	5.7	7.3	7.5	7.7	13.6	27.7	9.3	13.9
Comoros**	—	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.4	2.5	1.0	1.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	20.3	27.0	37.4	48.2	49.8	51.4	100.3	170.9	72.0	116.3
Congo, Rep. of**	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.8	2.9	2.9	6.5	14.2	4.5	7.0
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.5	8.2	11.8	15.1	15.5	16.0	33.1	63.4	24.1	38.4
Djibouti	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.4	2.5	1.0	1.6
Equatorial Guinea**	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.1
Eritrea*	1.8	2.4	3.1	3.9	4.0	4.1	7.8	22.6	6.0	9.6
Ethiopia*	28.9	37.7	51.2	61.3	62.8	64.3	143.9	416.7	98.0	156.7
Gabon*	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	3.0	6.1	2.0	3.2
Gambia, The*	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	2.2	4.9	1.4	2.2
Ghana*	8.6	10.7	14.9	18.4	18.8	19.2	36.2	61.5	27.6	42.1
Guinea*	3.9	4.5	5.8	7.1	7.3	7.4	14.5	32.8	9.6	14.8
Guinea-Bissau*	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.9	3.8	1.4	2.3
Kenya*	11.5	16.6	23.4	28.7	29.4	30.1	72.9	124.3	50.7	81.4
Lesotho	1.1	1.3	1.7	2.1	2.1	2.2	3.6	6.0	3.1	4.6
Liberia	1.4	1.9	2.4	3.0	3.0	3.1	6.2	10.7	4.8	7.0
Madagascar*	6.9	8.9	11.6	14.6	15.1	15.5	25.9	45.3	20.9	31.7
Malawi*	4.5	6.2	8.5	10.5	10.8	11.0	24.4	62.2	15.9	25.6
Mali**	5.3	6.6	8.5	10.3	10.6	10.8	23.8	57.5	15.5	24.4
Mauritania*	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.5	2.6	2.7	5.4	13.7	3.3	5.1
Mauritius	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
Mozambique*	9.4	12.1	14.2	17.0	17.3	17.6	43.1	96.4	26.7	41.3
Namibia	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.3	7.1	3.3	5.0
Niger**	4.2	5.6	7.7	10.1	10.5	10.8	24.3	71.7	14.3	23.1
Nigeria	53.2	71.1	96.2	120.8	123.9	126.9	216.9	395.4	173.1	268.3
Rwanda*	3.7	5.2	7.0	8.1	8.3	8.5	16.7	65.0	15.3	26.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3
Senegal**	4.2	5.5	7.3	9.0	9.3	9.5	17.9	43.2	12.8	20.4
Seychelles	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sierra Leone*	2.7	3.2	4.0	4.9	4.9	5.0	10.1	23.0	6.6	10.1
Somalia	3.6	5.9	7.8	9.1	9.4	9.7	21.0	46.7	13.8	20.9
South Africa	22.1	27.6	35.2	41.4	42.1	42.8	68.7	95.7	55.4	73.1
Sudan	13.9	18.7	24.1	28.3	29.0	29.7	60.3	101.5	43.9	66.9
Swaziland	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.2	4.1	1.7	2.7
Tanzania*	13.7	18.6	25.5	32.1	32.9	33.7	58.9	144.3	42.2	66.9
Togo**	2.0	2.6	3.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	9.3	17.4	6.9	10.8
Uganda*	9.8	12.8	16.3	21.0	21.6	22.2	48.2	90.7	30.1	49.8
Zambia*	4.2	5.7	7.8	9.7	9.9	10.1	20.7	41.3	15.1	25.6
Zimbabwe	5.3	7.0	9.7	12.2	12.4	12.6	17.6	27.6	16.8	24.6
North Africa	69.2	88.4	114.1	133.4	135.7	138.0	216.0	320.5	185.9	248.6
All Africa	357.8	469.1	622.4	761.6	779.7	797.8	1,498.9	2,974.0	1,118.0	1,699.0
Comparator countries	1,483.4	1,816.9	2,162.9	2,425.5	2,458.1	2,487.4	—	—	—	—
China	818.3	981.2	1,135.2	1,242.2	1,253.6	1,261.1	1,569.5	1,885.7	1,572.5	1,841.0
India	547.6	687.3	849.5	979.7	997.5	1,015.9	1,365.0	1,854.8	1,247.5	1,626.2
Indonesia	117.5	148.3	178.2	203.7	207.0	210.4	264.8	353.9	260.5	339.9
South Asia	711.7	902.6	1,122.1	1,304.6	1,329.3	1,354.7	458.8	742.8	422.7	599.7
East Asia	1,150.4	1,397.8	1,638.7	1,816.6	1,836.6	1,852.6	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

## POPULATION GROWTH

5.2

	Average annual percentage change						Standard projection <sup>a</sup>	Rapid projection <sup>a</sup>
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2000	1999	2000		
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.2	1.2
Angola	1.5	2.3	2.7	3.3	2.9	2.9	2.5	1.0
Benin*+	2.6	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	1.6	1.2
Botswana	2.9	3.6	3.5	2.4	1.7	0.9	1.3	1.1
Burkina Faso*+	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.1
Burundi*	1.9	1.4	2.8	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.2
Cameroon*+	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.8	1.1
Cape Verde	3.4	0.8	1.6	2.6	3.0	3.1	1.4	1.1
Central African Republic*+	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.1	1.7	1.6	2.2	1.2
Chad*+	1.8	2.0	2.6	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.0	0.9
Comoros*+	—	—	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.1	1.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	2.1	1.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.4	1.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.2
Djibouti	6.5	6.6	6.5	2.6	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.1
Equatorial Guinea*+	2.2	-4.1	5.8	2.5	2.6	2.6	1.4	0.8
Eritrea*	—	2.7	—	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.1	1.2
Ethiopia*	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.6	1.4
Gabon+	0.0	3.2	3.4	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3	1.0
Gambia, The*	2.8	3.3	3.4	3.5	2.9	2.8	2.2	1.2
Ghana*	1.8	2.3	3.3	2.6	2.3	2.2	1.7	0.9
Guinea*	2.3	1.3	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.1	1.2
Guinea-Bissau*	-0.3	4.2	2.2	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.6	0.9
Kenya*	3.3	3.7	3.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.6	1.3
Lesotho	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.3	1.1
Liberia	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.8	1.7	1.2
Madagascar*	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.1	1.5	1.2
Malawi*	2.5	3.2	3.2	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.7	1.4
Mali*+	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	1.0
Mauritania*	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.5	1.2
Mauritius	1.9	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.0	0.5	0.5
Mozambique*	2.4	2.5	1.8	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.5	1.0
Namibia	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.3	1.5	1.1
Niger*+	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.4	2.9	1.1
Nigeria	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.5	2.4	1.6	1.1
Rwanda*	3.2	3.3	3.2	1.8	2.5	2.4	2.0	1.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.3	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.2	2.2	1.3	1.1
Senegal*+	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	1.8	1.2
Seychelles	2.5	2.0	0.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.9	0.9
Sierra Leone*	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	1.9	1.6	2.1	1.1
Somalia	2.7	4.7	2.3	2.1	3.4	3.4	2.2	1.2
South Africa	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.1	0.8
Sudan	2.3	3.0	2.6	2.1	2.3	2.4	1.7	1.4
Swaziland	2.5	3.0	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.0	1.4
Tanzania*	3.1	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.3	1.7	1.1
Togo*+	4.4	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.1
Uganda*	4.2	2.8	2.2	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.0
Zambia*	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.2	2.1	2.1	1.2
Zimbabwe	3.3	2.9	3.4	2.8	1.6	1.9	1.1	1.1
North Africa	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.2	0.9
All Africa	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.0
Comparator countries	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	—	—
China	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6
India	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.7
Indonesia	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	0.7	0.7
South Asia	2.4	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.2	1.0
East Asia	2.7	2.0	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.9	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

## TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

5.3

	Average number of children							Standard projection <sup>a</sup>	Rapid projection <sup>a</sup>
	Actual								
	1970	1980	1990	1992	1997	1999			
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.6	6.6	6.0	5.9	5.5	—	—	—	
Excluding South Africa	6.7	6.8	6.2	6.1	5.7	—	3.6	2.3	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.6	6.8	6.3	6.1	5.8	—	3.8	2.3	
Angola	6.5	6.9	7.2	7.2	6.8	6.7	4.5	2.3	
Benin**	6.9	7.0	6.6	6.5	5.8	5.6	2.9	2.2	
Botswana	6.7	6.1	5.1	4.8	4.3	4.1	2.1	2.1	
Burkina Faso**	7.0	7.5	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.6	3.5	2.3	
Burundi*	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.1	3.8	2.3	
Cameroon**	6.2	6.4	6.0	5.7	5.1	4.9	2.8	2.1	
Cape Verde	7.0	6.5	5.5	5.2	4.0	3.8	2.1	—	
Central African Republic**	5.7	5.8	5.5	5.3	4.9	4.7	4.0	2.2	
Chad**	6.0	6.9	7.1	6.9	6.5	6.3	3.7	2.3	
Comoros**	—	7.2	5.8	5.2	4.6	4.4	3.2	—	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	6.2	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.2	3.5	2.2	
Congo, Rep. of**	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.1	5.9	3.8	2.2	
Côte d'Ivoire**	7.4	7.4	6.2	5.7	5.2	4.9	3.3	2.8	
Djibouti	6.7	6.6	6.0	5.8	5.3	5.2	3.6	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	5.7	5.7	5.9	5.9	5.5	5.3	2.8	—	
Eritrea*	—	—	6.7	6.5	5.8	5.6	—	—	
Ethiopia*	5.8	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.3	4.5	2.3	
Gabon*	4.2	4.5	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.1	3.7	2.2	
Gambia, The*	6.5	6.5	5.9	6.0	5.7	5.5	4.1	2.4	
Ghana*	6.7	6.5	5.5	5.3	4.5	4.3	2.8	2.2	
Guinea*	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.5	5.3	4.1	2.5	
Guinea-Bissau*	5.3	5.8	6.0	6.0	5.8	5.5	3.7	2.6	
Kenya*	8.1	7.8	5.6	5.2	4.7	4.5	4.0	2.1	
Lesotho	5.7	5.5	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.5	2.2	2.5	
Liberia	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.1	2.9	2.1	
Madagascar*	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.8	5.6	2.8	2.3	
Malawi*	7.3	7.6	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.3	5.2	2.4	
Mali**	7.1	7.1	—	—	6.6	6.4	4.2	2.3	
Mauritania*	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.9	5.5	5.3	4.4	2.3	
Mauritius	3.6	2.7	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	
Mozambique*	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.3	5.3	5.2	4.6	2.8	
Namibia	6.0	5.9	5.4	5.3	4.9	4.7	2.5	2.1	
Niger**	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.3	5.2	2.3	
Nigeria	6.9	6.9	6.0	5.9	5.3	5.2	2.8	2.2	
Rwanda*	8.2	8.3	6.7	6.6	6.2	6.0	3.8	2.3	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.5	2.2	—	
Senegal**	7.0	6.8	6.2	6.0	5.6	5.4	3.2	2.3	
Seychelles	—	—	2.8	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	—	
Sierra Leone*	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.1	5.9	4.1	2.4	
Somalia	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.1	3.8	2.3	
South Africa	5.7	4.6	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.1	2.1	
Sudan	6.7	6.5	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.5	3.0	2.2	
Swaziland	6.5	6.2	5.3	5.1	4.7	4.5	3.1	—	
Tanzania*	6.8	6.7	6.3	6.1	5.6	5.4	3.0	2.3	
Togo**	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.6	5.2	5.1	3.0	2.2	
Uganda*	7.1	7.2	7.0	6.9	6.6	6.4	4.9	2.3	
Zambia*	6.8	7.0	6.3	6.2	5.6	5.4	3.9	2.2	
Zimbabwe	7.3	6.4	4.8	4.3	3.8	3.6	2.2	2.1	
North Africa	6.5	5.6	4.1	3.8	3.3	—	2.2	2.1	
All Africa	6.6	6.4	5.6	5.5	5.1	—	—	—	
Comparator countries	5.7	3.9	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	—	—	
China	5.8	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.1	
India	5.8	5.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.2	2.1	
Indonesia	5.5	4.3	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.1	
South Asia	6.0	5.3	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	2.4	2.2	
East Asia	5.7	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	—	—	

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.



## CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE

5.4

	Percentage of women or their spouses using contraception		
	Latest survey	Target	
		2000	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	25.4(1999)	—	—
Excluding South Africa	20.2(1999)	38.0	72.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	25.4(1999)	38.0	72.0
Angola	1.0(1977)	33.0	69.0
Benin**	16.4(1996)	40.0	71.0
Botswana	33(1988)	65.0	75.0
Burkina Faso**	11.9(1998)	38.0	68.0
Burundi*	8.7(1987)	40.0	72.0
Cameroon**	19.3(1998)	29.0	72.0
Cape Verde	52.9(1998)	—	—
Central African Republic**	14.8(1994)	38.0	69.0
Chad**	4.1(1996)	43.0	71.0
Comoros**	21(1996)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	8(1997)	34.0	73.0
Congo, Rep. of**	—	30.0	74.0
Côte d'Ivoire**	15(1998)	30.0	74.0
Djibouti	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	15(1993)	—	—
Eritrea*	8(1995)	—	—
Ethiopia*	4.3(1990)	34.0	73.0
Gabon†	—	40.0	76.0
Gambia, The*	11(1990)	33.0	65.0
Ghana*	22(1998)	45.0	73.0
Guinea*	6.2(1999)	32.0	64.0
Guinea-Bissau*	1(1977)	36.0	68.0
Kenya*	39(1998)	57.0	80.0
Lesotho	23.2(1991)	48.0	73.0
Liberia	6.4(1986)	41.0	72.0
Madagascar*	19.4(1997)	37.0	68.0
Malawi*	31(2000)	35.0	74.0
Mali**	7(1996)	35.0	71.0
Mauritania*	4.1(1990)	35.0	68.0
Mauritius	75(1991)	81.0	77.0
Mozambique*	5.6(1997)	29.0	67.0
Namibia	29(1992)	—	—
Niger**	8.2(1998)	30.0	70.0
Nigeria	15(1999)	38.0	73.0
Rwanda*	21(1992)	38.0	78.0
São Tomé and Príncipe*	10(1989)	—	—
Senegal**	12.9(1997)	46.0	73.0
Seychelles	58(1993)	—	—
Sierra Leone*	4(1982)	39.0	67.0
Somalia	—	35.0	69.0
South Africa	62(1999)	71.0	79.0
Sudan	10(1993)	36.0	69.0
Swaziland	19.9(1988)	—	—
Tanzania*	25.4(1999)	34.0	70.0
Togo**	23.5(1998)	57.0	81.0
Uganda*	14.8(1995)	35.0	73.0
Zambia*	25.9(1996)	29.0	72.0
Zimbabwe	54(1999)	71.0	80.0
North Africa	51.7(1998)	63.0	74.0
All Africa	25.4(1999)	—	—
Comparator countries	—	70.0	75.0
China	84.6(1992)	79.0	79.0
India	51.8(1999)	64.0	73.0
Indonesia	57(1998)	68.0	71.0
South Asia	52.8(1999)	55.0	72.0
East Asia	57(1998)	—	—

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

## ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANS (EAP)

5.5

	Completed as of fiscal 1999	Expected completion date after 1999	No action
Angola			■
Benin**	■		
Botswana <sup>a</sup>	■		
Burkina Faso**	■		
Burundi*	■		
Cameroon**	■		
Cape Verde	■		
Central African Republic**	■		
Chad**		■ 2003	
Comoros**	■		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of			■
Congo, Rep. of**	■		
Côte d'Ivoire**	■		
Djibouti			■
Equatorial Guinea**			■
Eritrea*	■		
Ethiopia*	■		
Gabon*	■		
Gambia, The*	■		
Ghana*	■		
Guinea*	■		
Guinea-Bissau*	■		
Kenya*	■		
Lesotho	■		
Liberia			■
Madagascar*	■		
Malawi*	■		
Mali**	■		
Mauritania*		■	
Mauritius	■		
Mozambique*	■		
Namibia			■
Niger**	■		
Nigeria	■		
Rwanda*	■		
São Tomé and Príncipe*	■		
Senegal**	■		
Seychelles	■		
Sierra Leone*	■		
Somalia			■
South Africa			■
Sudan			■
Swaziland			■
Tanzania*	■		
Togo**	■		
Uganda*	■		
Zambia*	■		
Zimbabwe	■		
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: For the Africa Region, the environmental action plan is considered an in-country, demand-driven process. It is not possible in many cases to identify definitive completion dates even though the process may be in an advanced stage, because completion depends on government approval.

a. National Conservation Strategy in lieu of Environmental Action Plan.

Source: World Bank data.

**GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, SHARE OF GDP 6.1**

	Percentage of GDP									
	1973	1980	1985	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	
Australia	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Austria	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	
Belgium	0.27	0.23	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.06	
Canada	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	
Denmark	0.11	0.18	0.21	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	
Finland	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.07	
France	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.25	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.13	0.12	
Germany	—	—	—	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	
Ireland	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10	
Italy	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	
Japan	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.16	
Netherlands	0.06	0.21	0.20	0.15	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.11	
New Zealand	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Norway	0.10	0.20	0.27	0.29	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.20	
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.17	
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	
Sweden	0.12	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.13	
Switzerland	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	
United Kingdom	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	
United States	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Average	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08	

— Not available.

Note: ODA is official development assistance.

Source: OECD for ODA; World Bank for GDP.

## GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, VALUE

6.2

	Millions of U.S. dollars							
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>Bilateral</b>								
Australia	1.9	20.9	33.1	55.6	53.4	43.9	32.4	30.6
Austria	0.7	9.5	15.5	75.7	92.9	62.7	76.8	103.5
Belgium	121.7	284.5	180.3	183.0	183.2	204.4	260.4	158.7
Canada	88.3	175.8	332.2	256.9	255.4	203.2	259.7	216.7
Denmark	31.8	126.5	122.8	455.1	455.2	399.2	439.6	437.9
Finland	6.0	34.7	69.5	78.2	76.0	61.3	67.3	87.5
France	343.9	979.6	966.5	2,971.2	2,698.0	2,424.4	1,869.2	1,763.7
Germany	163.2	1,019.4	744.2	1,305.8	1,259.0	956.9	1,066.9	950.9
Ireland	0.0	6.1	11.0	60.5	75.2	89.2	90.4	90.0
Italy	32.8	48.3	454.3	584.1	333.2	290.5	460.4	266.8
Japan	17.6	241.4	295.6	1,403.5	1,129.8	860.6	1,030.9	1,084.2
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.9	26.1	30.4	34.0	31.8
Netherlands	38.8	378.2	261.4	759.8	701.3	580.7	647.9	435.8
New Zealand	0.2	1.3	0.1	3.3	3.6	5.0	3.7	4.8
Norway	22.5	126.7	171.2	376.3	385.9	375.2	354.8	310.1
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	161.4	150.1	161.1	131.7	196.9
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	89.9	228.1	201.0	178.5	144.4
Sweden	65.0	286.1	227.6	381.3	461.1	387.9	342.7	314.7
Switzerland	11.2	48.6	92.1	218.7	192.9	167.8	151.9	144.7
United Kingdom	146.2	501.5	312.1	624.9	651.9	628.0	894.1	766.6
United States	142.0	616.0	1,345.0	1,059.0	642.0	831.0	722.3	958.5
<b>Total bilateral ODA</b>	<b>1,233.9</b>	<b>4,905.0</b>	<b>5,634.4</b>	<b>11,129.9</b>	<b>10,054.3</b>	<b>8,964.2</b>	<b>9,115.3</b>	<b>8,498.8</b>
<b>Multilateral</b>								
International Development Association	108.7	436.5	886.3	2,395.7	2,585.0	2,403.0	2,283.5	2,655.5
European Development Fund	209.3	595.6	626.2	1,812.9	1,710.7	1,546.8	1,687.3	1,574.8
Africa Development Fund	0.0	96.5	209.5	595.3	593.0	609.6	587.8	478.7
International Fund for Agricultural Development	0.0	4.0	80.0	83.1	99.5	63.6	75.3	64.2
United Nations Children's Fund	8.7	56.7	100.9	310.4	284.3	154.5	145.0	153.0
United Nations Development Programme	76.0	192.7	225.0	173.9	228.1	294.1	248.1	210.5
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	16.3	159.4	208.5	406.8	155.8	151.0	132.3	148.0
United Nations Population Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
World Food Programme	40.2	175.0	352.7	616.8	214.8	87.5	117.5	177.6
Other UN	9.1	63.6	79.1	84.1	73.0	6.2	4.9	4.4
<b>Total multilateral ODA</b>	<b>468.4</b>	<b>1,779.9</b>	<b>2,768.1</b>	<b>6,479.1</b>	<b>5,944.2</b>	<b>5,316.3</b>	<b>5,281.7</b>	<b>5,466.8</b>

— Not available.

Note: Disbursements of grants and loans and other long-term capital. ODA is official development assistance.

Source: OECD data.

**LENDING BY THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE IMF  
TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

6.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars					
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>World Bank Group</b>						
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development						
Commitments	133	68	7	10	108	0
Disbursements	394	274	235	263	159	145
Amortization	1,062	1,056	950	835	743	743
Net flows	-669	-781	-715	-572	-584	-606
Interest payments	695	630	527	407	332	277
Net resource transfers	-1,364	-1,411	-1,242	-978	-916	-883
International Development Association						
Commitments	2,858	2,403	2,596	1,703	3,119	1,503
Disbursements	2,891	2,396	2,593	2,403	2,107	2,585
Amortization	101	120	140	154	190	270
Net flows	2,789	2,276	2,453	2,249	1,918	2,278
Interest payments	149	179	186	192	204	245
Net resource transfers	2,640	2,098	2,267	2,057	1,714	2,033
Total IBRD and IDA						
Commitments	2,991	2,471	2,603	1,713	3,227	1,503
Disbursements	3,284	2,671	2,828	2,666	2,267	2,730
Amortization	1,164	1,175	1,090	988	933	1,013
Net flows	2,120	1,495	1,738	1,678	1,334	1,671
Interest payments	844	809	713	599	536	522
Net resource transfers	1,276	687	1,025	1,078	798	1,149
<b>International Monetary Fund</b>						
Total purchases	918	2,994	652	524	804	481
Repurchases	466	2,372	597	1,066	1,112	604
Net flows	451	622	56	-541	-307	-124
Charges	170	559	123	101	65	62
Net resource transfers	282	63	-68	-643	-372	-186

Source: World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

## MILITARY EXPENDITURES

7.1

	Percentage of GDP					
	1991	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Angola	6.8	17	19.2	(23.9)	14.9	23.5
Benin**	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	4.4	3.1	2.6	2.9	3.5	3.4
Burkina Faso**	2.4	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.6
Burundi*	3.8	3.6	5.5	5.8	—	6.1
Cameroon**	[1.6]	1.3	1.1	—	—	1.5
Cape Verde	—	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9
Central African Rep. **	1.6	1.2	1.2	—	—	—
Chad**	—	2.0	2.2	1.6	1.4	—
Comoros**	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of **	—	—	—	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	1.4	—	0.9	0.9	—	—
Djibouti	5.9	5.1	4.2	4.5	4.4	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	2.2	—	—	—	—
Eritrea* <sup>b</sup>	—	19.9	22.8	13.5	—	22.9
Ethiopia*	[2.0]	2.0	1.9	3.2	3.5	9.0
Gabon <sup>+</sup>	—	—	—	—	0.3	—
Gambia, The*	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.8
Ghana*	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Guinea*	2.4	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	—	0.3	0.5	0.6	—	—
Kenya*	2.4	1.8	[2.2]	[2.1]	[2.3]	[1.9]
Lesotho	3.4	2.8	2.6	2.9	3.2	—
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	1.8 <sup>c</sup>
Madagascar* <sup>d</sup>	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.4	[1.4]
Malawi*	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	—	—
Mali**	—	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.2
Mauritania*	3.6	2.7	2.5	2.3	—	—
Mauritius	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	—	0.2
Mozambique** <sup>e</sup>	4.5	3.9	3.6	3.7	(4.2)	2.4
Namibia <sup>f</sup>	5.7	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.6	36
Niger**	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nigeria <sup>g</sup>	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.4
Rwanda* <sup>h</sup>	5.5	4.2	5.3	4.1	4.3	[4.2]
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal** <sup>i</sup>	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.5
Seychelles	4.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0
Sierra Leone*	1.8	2.2	1.8	0.8	—	1.6
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	3.2	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.3
Sudan	[2.8]	1.7	0.9	1.0	—	2.6
Swaziland	1.6	2.2	2.2	2.4	—	1.7
Tanzania*	—	1.5	1.4	1.3	[1.4]	—
Togo*	(3.1)	2.4	—	—	—	—
Uganda*	2.2	[1.5]	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.1
Zambia* <sup>j</sup>	2.6	2.2	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.0
Zimbabwe	3.8	3.6	3.2	3.4	2.6	3.4 <sup>k</sup>

— Not available.

\* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

( ) Uncertain figure; [ ] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate.

a. These data should be seen in the context of highly uncertain economic statistics because of the impact of war on the Angolan economy.

b. Became independent in May 1993. Data for 1995 include expenditure for demobilization.

c. Data are for security, which represents 13 percent of total expenditure of 2.6 billion Liberian dollars

d. Data include expenditures for the gendarmerie and the National Police.

e. From 1994 onwards data include expenditures for demobilization of government and RENAMO soldiers and the formation of a new unified army.

f. Became independent on 21 March 1990. Data for 1999 refer to the budget of the Ministry of Defense only and do not include the contingency provision of 104 million Namibian rand in the 1999 budget of the Ministry of Finance for the Namibian military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

g. Data before 1999 are understated because of the use by the military of a favorable specific dollar exchange rate.

h. Data for 1997 do not include demobilization allowance of 1.0 billion francs. The 1998 figure is from the official defense budget. According to the International Monetary Fund, there are additional sources of budgetary and extrabudgetary funding for military activities. Alternative estimates put military expenditure at twice the official figure.

i. Data do not include expenditure for paramilitary forces, which in 1998 amounted to 21,100 million francs.

j. Data are uncertain, especially in constant dollars and GDP shares, because of very rapid inflation and several changes in the currency.

k. Includes a supplementary allocation of 1,800 million Zimbabwe dollars.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2000.

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## TECHNICAL NOTES

Most macroeconomic data (in particular, national accounts, balance of payments, government finance statistics, and trade) reflect data maintained by World Bank country desks, often referred to as operational data.

Annual data shown for country groups are totals, averages, or medians for the countries included in the group, as indicated on the relevant table. These group aggregates can be either simple (arithmetic)—where missing data are not imputed—or gap-filled—where weights are used to adjust group totals for missing countries.

Most group averages are weighted according to the relative importance of the countries in the group total for that indicator, based on simple addition across countries when the indicator is expressed in reasonable comparable units. Group averages for analytical ratios (for example, imports to GDP) can be either weighted or simple.

Period averages are calculated from time series (levels, ratios, growth rates, or medians) for both countries and country groups. They are either simple averages or average annual percentage growth rates, which are computed using the least-squares method and are usually based on real-term series. The least-squares growth rate is estimated by fitting a least-squares linear regression trend line to the logarithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant period. It takes into account all observations in a period and reflects general trends that are not influenced by exceptional values, particularly at the end points.

### ECONOMIC GROWTH

The time series for national accounts are based mainly on national sources as collected by World Bank country economists. They are generally in accord with the UN System of National Accounts. A conversion factor is used to convert national currencies to U.S. dollars, both in this section and in the trade section.

*Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth*—provides average annual growth rates calculated from GDP at market prices (also known as purchaser values), expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars.

*Gross domestic savings (GDS)*—calculated by deducting total consumption from GDP in local currency at current prices, expressed as percentage of GDP.

*Gross domestic investment (GDI)*—gross domestic fixed capital formation plus net changes in the level of inventories, expressed as percentage of GDP. GDI comprises outlays by the public sector and the private sector. The ratio is calculated in local currency at current prices.

*Real agricultural growth*—calculated from the value added of agriculture at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of forestry, hunting, fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock production, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

*Real industrial growth*—calculated from the value added of industry at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity water, and gas, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

*GDP deflator*—the implicit GDP deflator for national currency is obtained by dividing, for each year of the time series, the value of the GDP at current prices by the value of the GDP at constant 1995 prices, both in national currency.

*Real gross national product (GNP) per capita*—calculated by the World Bank Atlas method, which uses three-year averages of exchange rates that smooth out sharp fluctuations from year to year, expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GNP measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents. It comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labor and capital), less similar payments made to nonresidents who contributed to the domestic economy.

*Food production per capita*—annual per capita production in kilo-grams of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses, from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)–Agricultural Production database.

## TRADE

*Real export growth and real import growth (goods and nonfactor services)*—data for exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services refer to all goods and nonfactor series provided to, or by, the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfac-



tor services. The values of factor services, such as investment income, interest, and labor income, are not included. Calculations use 1995 U.S. dollar series, which are generally estimated on the basis of foreign trade statistics from customs declarations.

*Terms of trade*—measure the relative movement of export and import prices. This series is calculated as the ratio of a country's export unit values or prices to its import unit values or prices. It shows changes over a base year (1995) in the level of export unit values as a percentage of import unit values.

*Staple food imports, value*—calculated by adding the import value (from FAO–TRADE databases) of wheat, wheat flour, wheat germ, paddy rice, husked rice, broken rice, milled paddy rice, rice bran, rice flour, maize, maize germ, maize flour, and maize bran, all expressed in current U.S. dollars.

*Staple food imports, share of exports*—as above, but as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services in current U.S. dollars.

## CAPITAL FLOWS

The principal sources for information on debt are reports to the World Bank, through the Debtor Reporting System, from its member countries that have received either International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans or International Development Association credits. Additional information on debt has been drawn from the files of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

*Gross concessional aid flows*—all concessional credits plus official transfers as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars. This does not include technical assistance.

*Debt service ratio*—service on long- and short-term debt, including IMF credit, as a percentage of exports of goods and services plus workers' remittances in current U.S. dollars. All figures reflect actual cash payments.

*Foreign direct investment*—the net amount invested or reinvested by nonresidents to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises in which they exercise significant managerial control. Investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital. The net figures

subtract the value of direct investment abroad by residents of the reporting country.

## HUMAN CONDITION

*Infant mortality rate*—the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. The estimates are based on an analysis of all available information: survey- and census-based indirect and direct estimates, census age structures, health information (especially immunization completeness), and vital registration adjusted for incompleteness. The outcome is a figure that cannot be linked with a single empirical source but that is usually consistent with the demographic situation. Projections for 2000 and 2025 are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

*Life expectancy at birth*—the number of years newborn infants would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of their birth were to stay the same throughout their life. Data are World Bank estimates based on data from the UN Population Division, the UN Statistical Office, and national statistical offices. Projections for 2000 are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

*Access to health services*—refers to the percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services by local means of transport in no more than one hour. Data are presented separately for total, urban, and rural population (WHO data).

*Child immunization and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) use*—child immunization measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A child is considered adequately immunized against DPT (diphtheria, pertussis or whooping cough, and tetanus) after receiving two or three doses of vaccine, depending on the immunization scheme. Oral rehydration therapy use is the percentage of all cases of diarrhea in children under five years of age treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution (WHO data).

*Total primary enrollment*—total number of pupils enrolled at the primary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for primary edu-

cation in a given country. Figures shown may be more than 100 percent since the total enrollment includes pupils above and pupils below the primary school age, as well as repeaters.

*Total secondary enrollment*—total number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for secondary education in a given country. Secondary level (general) refers to education in secondary schools that provides general or specialized instruction based on at least four years of previous instruction at the first or primary level and that does not specifically aim at preparing the pupils directly for a given trade or occupation.

*Female primary enrollment*—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at the primary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools but may exclude certain specialized schools and training programs.

*Female secondary enrollment*—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at secondary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools.

## **POPULATION**

*Population*—usually projections from the most recent population censuses or surveys. Projected figures were prepared by the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department. These projections assume average, or standard, fertility decline. The rapid projection figures are World Bank projections assuming rapid fertility decline, defined as twice the rate of standard fertility decline experienced by developing countries during recent decades. Both standard and rapid fertility decline variants assume that the use of contraception will increase in all countries. But to achieve the rapid projections, contraceptive use has to increase at a much more rapid pace. Mortality levels are assumed to be identical in both variants and incorporate mortality from AIDS.

Population figures under the heading stabilization are World Bank projections of the size of the stationary population. Stationary populations are those in which age-specific and sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a long period, and in which fertility rates have

remained at replacement level—meaning that women bear, on average, only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population.

*Population growth*—derived from the population figures in table 5.1.

*Total fertility rate*—average number of live children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. These estimates are derived from the UN World Population Prospects (1990), demographic and health surveys, censuses, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, official estimates, World Bank estimates, and Eurostat data.

*Contraceptive prevalence rate*—percentage of married women of childbearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception (modern or traditional). Childbearing age is generally defined as 15 to 49, although for some countries contraceptive use is measured for other age groups.

## **MILITARY EXPENDITURES**

Data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure project. SIPRI calculates the ratio of military spending to GDP in domestic currency using current prices. Although common guidelines are used, it is not possible to adhere to a common definition of military spending in all countries, and there are considerable variations between countries in what is included in official defense spending data.

SIPRI collects data from a variety of sources, including an annual questionnaire that is submitted to each country's ministries of finance and defense, national statistical office, and central bank. Data also come from a wide range of national and international publications, including government budgets and statistics. IMF data are used for GDP. Other IMF, UN, and Economist Intelligence Unit data are used as well.











