


“Though democracy is still fragile, basic freedoms and civil liberties are expanding throughout the continent.”



AFRICAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

Annual Report 2000/2001
of the Global Coalition for Africa



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FOREWORD

Ahead of our forthcoming plenary, this year's Annual Report reviews broad political and economic trends in the past five years. It also highlights some of the Global Coalition for Africa's (GCA) activities since the last plenary in 1995.

The years since 1995 saw continuing democratization in Africa. In many countries, periodic elections—however imperfect—were becoming routine. There was also a broadening of individual political rights and participation—and of exposure to differing political views. The globalization of news and information—but one manifestation of the technological revolution—increased popular access to alternative sources of information about events. The challenge that most countries now face: to strengthen the institutions that uphold democracy, especially the legislature and the judiciary.

Economic performance in the second half of the 1990s saw a modest upswing in GDP growth, a clear improvement over the stagnation of the decade's first half. But for most countries the resumption of growth was still well below the levels required for reducing poverty. Sub-Saharan Africa thus remains the one region where the ranks of the poor are growing.

Africa's social indicators—in education, health, and nutrition—show the immensity of the tasks for governments and other stakeholders. And the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS—eroding human capacities, imposing unaffordable burdens on national health budgets, straining community coping mechanisms, and leaving many families without breadwinners—will reverse years of hard-won economic and social gains.

Despite the sobering challenges, there is progress. Above all, there is a wide consensus on the developmental problems facing countries and even on the measures needed. We believe that the GCA forum has contributed to this. During the past five years, participants at GCA meetings have debated the lack of supply response to economic reforms, the poor performance in exports and foreign direct investment, the need to enhance agricultural productivity and competitiveness, and the policy and governance implications of Africa's rapid urbanization. Under the auspices of the GCA, there has also been

frank dialogue on curbing corruption, strengthening parliaments, redefining the role of the military, and promoting peaceful political succession.

We believe that the discussion of corruption and orderly political succession again confirms the value added of the GCA as a forum that does not shy away from sensitive but timely topics. We also note the broad satisfaction with holding our last two meetings in symbolically important venues. In Dakar in 1999, just before the historic election and smooth political alternation. And in Abuja in 2000, where a new democratically elected civilian government is rebuilding political and economic order after years of military misrule.

In line with the diversity of the region, some African countries will devise different approaches to formulating development strategies and pursuing cooperative relations with their external partners. They rightly expect those relations to reflect specific national and sub-regional characteristics. Also necessary is addressing the growing skepticism and disillusionment of Africans with the push by external partners of too many development priorities at the same time.

On the whole, however, we welcome the international community's continuing interest and support for African development. One example is the second plenary of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II), held in 1998 with the GCA as a co-organizer. Among other things, the Agenda for Action adopted at the end of the conference reinforces calls for enhanced South-South cooperation between Asian and African countries. Another is the first summit between African and European Union countries in early 2000 and the signing of the Cotonou Agreement by the European Union and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states, thus renewing their long-standing economic relationship. Meanwhile, the United States enacted the Growth and Opportunity Act, a framework for easier market access for African products. All these advances show the commitment of Africa's external partners to better cooperation with the continent.

Last, we note the progress toward debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries, many of them in Africa. As in the past, we urge that funds for this purpose be truly additional—not at the expense of existing or future development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. We also

reemphasize the need to increase resource flows and to reverse the unwelcome decline in allocations of official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, given its important role in financing development.

Co-Chairpersons

*Alpha Oumar Konaré, Meles Zenawi,
Ketumile Masire, Frene Ginwala,
Eveline Herfkens, Maria Minna*

ABOUT THE GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA

The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) is a North-South forum that brings together African leaders and Africa's principal external partners. Launched in 1991, it examines Africa's most critical social and economic development issues, seeks consensus on policies and programs of action, and monitors the results. The GCA is based on the premise that Africa can grow only if there is effort from within, but that to do so it needs sustained and well-coordinated outside support and a stronger working partnership with Northern donors. With sweeping changes around the world, the GCA strives to keep Africa on the global agenda and to mobilize the necessary international support to match Africa's commitments to economic and political change.

The GCA's Co-Chairpersons are President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali; Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia; Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana; Eveline Herfkens, Minister of Development of the Netherlands; Maria Minna, Canada's Minister for International Development and Minister responsible for La Francophonie; and Frene Ginwala, Speaker of the South African Parliament. Mr. Jan P. Pronk, the Netherlands Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment and Mr. Robert S. McNamara, former President of the World Bank, continue to be associated with the GCA as Co-Chairpersons Emeriti. The Secretariat, based in Washington, D.C., is headed by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah.

The GCA's ultimate governing body is a plenary of all its members—involving African governments and their bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental partners—which met for the second time in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in November 1995. In between plenary meetings the GCA's work is guided by a Policy Forum comprising representatives of African and Northern countries, together with representatives of international and regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the European Union, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the Africa Department of the International Monetary Fund, and the Africa Region of the World Bank.

The GCA's agenda is focused on the following themes:

- African capacity development in economic policy formulation and management, including the policy changes and institutional and structural reforms required to elicit supply response.
- Political transition, including governance, democratization, and conflict management, and the related areas of reduced corruption and military spending.
- Population, agriculture, and environment.
- The promotion of regional integration, in particular within the context of improving the international competitiveness of African countries.
- Africa's role in an increasingly global economy, with an emphasis on assuring continuing resource flows from the industrial countries, including private investment, official development assistance, and debt relief.

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OVERVIEW

This year's Annual Report looks again at recent political and economic trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. But it also touches on the progress in the second half of the 1990s. And it briefly describes the work and activities of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA).

The Africa of 2000 is a different region, and in many cases in better shape, than the Africa of 1990. But the positive changes of the 1990s are not yet sufficiently deep or widespread. The political change and transition that started around 1990 in a few countries in West and Central Africa has now spread to all subregions. The widening and deepening of civil liberties and democratic practices and the regular holding of elections deserve greater recognition.

Of the pace-setters, Benin and Mali are poised to hold third rounds of national elections—in a strongly competitive environment, a far cry from their one-party authoritarian systems of preceding decades. Three other landmarks of fundamental political change in the 1990s: South Africa's multiracial and democratic elections, Nigeria's return to civilian rule, and Senegal's orderly and peaceful political transition. And in a growing number of countries, open political dialogue, expanded individual rights, and greater press freedoms have become the norm. These advances, with the easier public access to international media reports, have increased demands for the transparency of government.

Parliaments, civil society organizations, and official watchdog institutions are helping to improve governance, enhance transparency, and combat corruption. In support of this, the GCA devoted one of its high-level annual meetings to discussion and consensus building on combating corruption. It also facilitated the drawing up and adoption of Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa by 11 like-minded countries in the region. The expectation is that these countries will implement the Principles and encourage neighboring countries to do the same, eventually forming the basis for a regional convention to combat corruption.

Undermining these positive developments is the persistence of long-drawn conflict in the Sudan, Angola, and other countries in Central and Western Africa. The regionalization of the internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a major setback—for the

country's people and for Africa's external image. Conflict in parts of West Africa continues to wreak havoc on the affected populations and to put extra burdens on other countries in the subregion. Welcome, then, were the cessation of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the efforts at reestablishing permanent peace between the two countries. So, too, were the encouraging signs for the long-term resolution of the internal conflict in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).

Change and reform were also important on the economic front. Most countries undertook reforms in the 1990s, with varying outcomes. Some went only for basic monetary and fiscal stabilization, while others were inconsistent in their adherence to the reform path. But several proceeded beyond the stabilization phase and undertook wider reforms. Where they also invested to restore and maintain basic infrastructure, there has been significant economic growth.

But this growth was based mostly on fuller use of existing capacities, with investment and diversification into significant long-term production and productivity-enhancing capacities yet to come. In short, the front-runners in reform have to deepen their efforts by undertaking structural and institutional reforms. They also have to invest to improve their prospects for a tangible and durable supply response. Countries on the lower rungs of the reform ladder obviously have to commit themselves to additional policy liberalization and institutional restructuring—to establish the credibility and irreversibility of their change agenda.

Reforms thus need to continue with more determination. Economic growth for Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3% a year in the second half of the 1990s, up from 0.4% in the first half. But except for a handful of countries, economic growth was barely faster than population growth. And in few cases was there a firm basis for growth to continue at adequate rates. Moreover, investment and growth rates in Africa continue to lag behind those in other regions. These, together with the more global and intensely competitive international economic environment, call for further reform and restructuring. Complicating all this is the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS.

As always, African countries have to take the lead in formulating and carrying out their own long-term programs of economic development. At the same time, the international community should pro-

vide timely and adequate support for country-initiated development strategies, including through bilateral or subregional partnership.

The considerable progress in writing off the debt of several African countries needs to be accompanied by adequate development assistance. This is all the more important in view of the significant decline in ODA flows to Africa, from about \$19 billion a year in the early 1990s to less than \$14 billion by decade's end, a significant proportion of which is in humanitarian assistance.

This Annual Report underscores the importance of peace and stability for sustained economic growth and social improvement. Countries in conflict will in many cases need the assistance of others to engage in and seriously pursue reconciliation and peace. But external actors have to take care that their efforts are coherent and bound to helping the early and durable resolution of conflicts. Underlining this sensitive point, Part III of the Report examines the role of external actors in mitigating conflict in Africa.

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah
Executive Secretary

PART I POLITICAL TRENDS

In general, there was significant progress on the political front in the 1990s. Overall, the continent is very different from 10 years ago, when the abuse of human rights and the suppression of political freedoms were commonplace, and competitive politics extremely rare. Basic freedoms and civil liberties are expanding throughout the continent, and most governments are now elected. But democracy is still very fragile, and much remains to be done to institutionalize democratic processes and principles. The change from single-party politics to democracy requires a transformation of political philosophy, outlook, and practice.

Basic freedoms and civil liberties are expanding throughout the continent, but democracy is still very fragile

There are wide variations across countries in political liberalization. Democratic traditions have deepened and consolidated in Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal. Democracy is still fragile in Zambia, Kenya, and Mali. And despite elections, it cannot be said that Togo or Cameroon or Guinea are democratic.

RECENT PROGRESS

One of the most important recent political events was the end of military rule in Nigeria. After the death of military ruler Sani Abacha, President Abdelsalaam Abubakar kept his promise and handed over power to an elected civilian government headed by Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. Although confronting entrenched corruption, institutional decay, deteriorating infrastructure, and religious and ethnic tensions, the return to civilian government gives Nigeria an opportunity to rebuild domestically and play a constructive regional role.

In June 1999 South Africa took another step toward consolidating democracy with its second multiparty elections, which also saw President Mandela step down and hand power to Thabo Mbeki. Also in Southern Africa, multiparty politics seem to have taken root in Mozambique—with the presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1999, the second since the end of civil war. Equally important, peace has continued to hold throughout the country, stimulating economic recovery. In Botswana, President Ketumile Masire provided a rare example of the voluntary retirement of a popular incumbent President, when in early 1998 he handed over power to his Vice President, Fes-

tus Mogae, who assumed his first full term of office following elections in 1999. Mauritius maintained its tradition of competitive democratic politics when an alliance of the main opposition parties won power in the September 2000 elections, defeating the governing majority elected in 1995.

Democratic principles were upheld in Senegal when Abdoulaye Wade was declared winner of presidential elections in February 2000, defeating the long-serving Abdou Diouf. The elections marked the first alternation of power between political parties since Senegal achieved independence in 1960. There were also indications that democratic politics were deepening in some other countries. In both Ghana and Mali incumbent presidents have indicated that they will observe presidential term limits when their constitutionally mandated terms end, in December 2000 and March 2000, respectively.

Setbacks

However, there were setbacks. Burundi, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Comoros have all experienced military coups since 1995. Côte d'Ivoire, long one of the most stable and prosperous countries in West Africa, suffered its first military coup in December 1999. With the presidential candidates of the two largest parties excluded, elections in October 2000 did little to restore democracy. But the elections eventually returned civilian government under the Presidency of Laurent Gbagbo, following the civil unrest accompanying military leader General Robert Guei's attempt to declare himself the victor, despite his defeat. Still, the political exploitation of ethnic and religious divisions by General Guei and his predecessor has serious implications for the future harmony and stability of the country—and for relations with its neighbors.

Threatening stability and security in Zimbabwe in the months preceding the June 2000 elections was the violent occupation of white-owned farms, with the apparent acquiescence of the government. Economic difficulties, partly attributable to Zimbabwe's costly military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, also led to popular discontent. And although the ruling party retained power with a reduced majority, the elections created a multiparty political system, when unprecedented numbers of opposition candidates won office.

Violent conflict

Perhaps the most obvious indicator of the difficulties of political transition: violent conflict. Since 1995, at least 15 countries have experienced some form of civil conflict, although violence rarely affects the whole country and is not usually prolonged. Some conflicts, such as those in Sudan or Angola, are protracted wars that have lasted for some time. Others, as in Uganda and Senegal, have been sporadic and confined to a region. Still others spilled over or ignited instability in neighbors, as in the Great Lakes region, or with Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.

Conflict has become a vehicle for the expression of various types of disaffection and economic ambitions

Rather than being limited to hostilities between clearly defined antagonists with clearly defined aims, conflict has become a vehicle for the expression of various types of disaffection and economic ambitions. The political manipulation of ethnic differences has also provided a basis for violence. The ready availability of arms—often a result of previous wars, the willingness of other African countries to allow transshipments of arms, or exports of arms from outside the continent—has helped to fuel conflicts.

Two other issues have also come to the fore—the use of natural resources to fund the war, as in Sierra Leone and Angola, and the use of private military companies. Some conflicts, such as that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have also seen freelance mercenaries. The regionalization of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo is also worrisome.

Although the civil war in Liberia ended with the 1997 elections that brought Charles Taylor to power, instability there spilled over into Sierra Leone. The civilian government elected in Sierra Leone in 1996 was overturned by a military coup in 1997. Regional intervention under the auspices of The Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) restored civilian rule in 1998, but has yet to halt the violence, undermining the legitimacy of the government. The Lomé peace agreement in 1999 was breached when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) reopened hostilities. Although UN peacekeeping troops are in place, a political settlement has to be reached for stability to be reestablished. The unresolved conflict in Sierra Leone, and the instability in neighboring Guinea and Liberia, threatens regional security.

The Great Lakes region also remains volatile. In Burundi, peace negotiations mediated at first by former President Julius Nyerere and then by former President Mandela have yet to produce a conclusive agreement. Rwanda's borders, still insecure, continue to be threatened by armed groups based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Lusaka Accords agreed to in 1999 show little sign of progress in ending the war, even though an outright military victory by any of the factions seems unlikely. But the cost of intervention, taking its toll on the economies of the countries providing support to the government or rebel factions, may stimulate their withdrawal.

Attempts at mediation

Very few recent conflicts have been well mediated or resolved. Despite intermittent progress, agreement has proved elusive in Sudan. Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo highlight the fragility of brokered agreements, especially when parties to the conflict have no real economic or political interest in peace or see continuing violence as their best option. But there have been some settlements and political accommodations. In the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) the conflicting parties arrived at an agreement without international mediation. And Eritrea and Ethiopia eventually agreed to end hostilities.

In recent years, the international community has been very reluctant to intervene in conflicts in Africa. Meanwhile, there have also been more African conflict management efforts and greater involvement of African security forces in peacekeeping operations. The OAU is seeking to prevent and resolve conflicts, often drawing on the good offices of former heads of state as mediators. Individual political leaders have also tried to mediate disputes, and conflict management is taking on an increased importance within subregional groupings.

Partly as a result of ECOMOG's experience with peacekeeping in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are building regional and collective security mechanisms. But collective security mechanisms depend on the credibility, professionalism, and quality of the military forces of individual countries. Furthermore, the will-

ingness of African countries to undertake peacekeeping should not reduce the international community's responsibility.

GCA'S ACTIVITIES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Since its 1995 plenary the GCA has explored various aspects of political transition, promoting better understanding of the process and identifying policy actions to address problems and consolidate progress. The broad issues of focus are the institutionalization of democracy, corruption and development, and the military and security in democratic transition. Each fundamentally affects political development—for individual countries and for the continent.

Elections, though important, are but one element in functioning democracies

Institutionalizing democracy

In 1996 the Political Committee met in Ouagadougou to consider political transition on the continent. In this and other GCA meetings it was recognized that new elections have been one of the most obvious aspects of democratization, and in the past five years most countries have conducted presidential or parliamentary elections. Even political leaders who originally came to power through extraconstitutional means have sought to legitimize their regimes through the electoral process. But despite the progress in the conduct of elections, the integrity of the electoral process has often been questioned, with some elections widely regarded as fraudulent.

Elections, though important, are but one element in functioning democracies. And while the mechanics of elections can be put in place fairly quickly, developing accountable, credible, and durable institutions to uphold democracy is a longer and harder process. In most countries, a representative legislature, an independent and competent judiciary, and an effective and efficient public service are only now being put in place. And for the most part, civil society organizations and an independent and free press—essential to the proper functioning of democracy and to holding governments accountable—are in their infancy.

Discussions within the GCA have emphasized the respect for constitutional principles and the rule of law as the basis for democratic gov-

ernance. For democracy to work, democratic principles and practices must be embedded in society. And a democratic culture, based on rule of law and political inclusion, must be developed. This takes time. In many countries in transition—including those in Africa—nondemocratic norms and values still condition the political culture.

With parliaments so crucial for institutionalizing representative and democratic governance, the GCA convened parliamentarians in 1998 in Harare. The meeting underscored accountability as a cornerstone of democratic governance—and parliament as a key institution in promoting the accountability of government. Although parliaments are changing rapidly, they still face the constraints of inadequate resources, limited technical expertise, and a weakly developed culture of competitive politics. And the balance of power generally remains weighted in favor of the executive at the expense of the legislature.

Minority parties are now represented in parliaments. But few countries have a capable parliamentary opposition that can act as a countervailing force and hold the executive accountable. The growing effectiveness of parliaments and the extent to which they represent all groups will thus determine the quality of democracy. Political parties need to develop credible policy platforms to contest elections, with opposition parties seen as viable alternatives. Political party funding and campaign finance also require attention in most countries. And ways need to be found to minimize the costs of elections and electoral campaigns without compromising the electoral process.

Democracy implies—indeed requires—political inclusion and a tolerance of opposing views. Inequalities in access to resources and political power—and at the extreme, outright political exclusion—have caused conflict throughout the continent. Yes, there has been progress. But the effective participation of all citizens is still not guaranteed in all countries, especially the participation of women. That is why GCA meetings emphasize calls for women to be full participants in the political process.

The 1999 Policy Forum in Dakar focused on one of the most significant challenges to democratization in Africa—orderly and peaceful political succession. Although more prevalent, peaceful succession is not yet the norm. In many fledgling democracies, the concepts of political competition, alternation of power, and shared responsibility

Few countries have a capable parliamentary opposition that can act as a countervailing force and hold the executive accountable

Creating the conditions for orderly political succession requires responsible leadership

for governance have not been fully assimilated. And the stakes of retaining political power remain extraordinarily high. Creating the conditions for orderly political succession requires responsible leadership, a sound institutional base, and adherence to democratic principles.

So far, elections have changed regimes in only a few instances—such as Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, and obviously in South Africa, when the first universal suffrage election brought apartheid to an end. The advantages of incumbency, together with the relative political and financial weakness of the opposition, have kept long-established ruling parties in power. Presidential political systems, as practiced in most African countries, have also tended to favor the status quo by reinforcing political patronage and the personalization of power.

The 1999 forum recognized that qualified politicians have few professional opportunities once they leave office—and that the substantial benefits of political office create incentives to remain. At the same time, political leaders have to be held accountable for their actions while in office, and violations of human rights cannot be condoned. The role and status of former leaders—and the provisions for their retirement from office—thus require attention if changes in power are to be encouraged. A promising sign: several African countries have adopted constitutional mechanisms to facilitate orderly political succession and accountable governance, including presidential term limits.

Corruption and development

The GCA provided one of the first forums for Africans and their development partners to openly discuss corruption. In 1997 the Policy Forum in Maputo focused on corruption and development. Following GCA meetings in 1998 and 1999 representatives of 11 African countries agreed to adopt Principles to Combat Corruption. These Principles support the efforts of individual countries. If adopted by enough countries, they could form the basis of a subregional or regional anti-corruption convention, similar to those of the OECD and the Organization of American States (OAS).

GCA meetings have emphasized that corruption is not unique to Africa and that African countries are no more corrupt than those in

other regions. But Africa can least afford the costs of corruption, given its stage of development. And there is tremendous variation in corruption across countries. At one extreme, systemic corruption has seriously damaged political and economic institutions and threatened the fabric of society, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Nigeria under Sani Abacha. At the other are countries that are relatively corruption-free, such as Botswana.

GCA meetings have underlined the need for effective coalitions of governments, civil society, and the private sector to make headway against corruption—governmental efforts alone are unlikely to yield durable results. Discussions emphasized that corruption in Africa is essentially a governance issue. Political corruption undermines democracy and political competition. Bureaucratic corruption reduces the quality of public services and makes government less efficient and more costly. Left unchecked, corruption will undermine the real gains from political and economic reforms in recent years. It also limits the prospects of reducing poverty. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that corruption disproportionately affects the poor—they suffer most from the lack of services and efficient government, and they are least able to bear the costs.

Although the primary responsibility for addressing corruption obviously lies with African countries, GCA discussions have also pointed to the international dimension of corruption in Africa—in international business transactions and in the misuse of development assistance funds. And in recent years the linkages between corrupt practices, organized crime, drug trafficking, and money laundering have become more evident in some African countries. This new challenge requires international cooperation, for African governments alone cannot combat increasingly sophisticated international criminal networks.

The military, security, and democratic transition

The lack of stability and security remains a serious impediment to both democracy and development. Security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of states, and one of the most pressing issues now facing most countries. In Addis Ababa in 1998, and again in Abidjan in 1999, military and civilian defense officials met with experts in civil-

Left unchecked, corruption will undermine the real gains from political and economic reforms

military relations and members of civil society under the auspices of the GCA to discuss issues of democracy, security, and the military. Also in 1999, the GCA convened a roundtable to consider the privatization of security and the involvement of private security forces in conflicts in Africa.

The meetings underlined that security in Africa is essentially a political and social issue—and that insecurity comes from poor governance. Armed conflict obviously undermines public security, but so does the legacy of military rule and the militarization of politics. Avoiding military coups requires respect for constitutions and adherence to the rule of law by both politicians and security forces. Even in countries without direct experience of military involvement in politics, democratic oversight of the military is relatively weak, requiring knowledge and information that many legislatures lack in Africa's fledgling democracies.

The consensus in GCA meetings is that democratization and development are the means of obtaining and maintaining security in individual countries and in Africa. But democratization also requires that security forces adapt to changing circumstances. National security is undermined to the extent that military establishments cannot deter or compel—two of their basic functions. At the same time, the nature and source of threats to security have to be reassessed. Throughout the continent security forces face a range of new challenges—yet for the most part they are ill-equipped to cope.

Democratization and economic reform mean that most countries now confront the need to meet perceived security threats and maintain preparedness, while achieving cost-efficiency. Military reform is thus an imperative, but it does not always result in reduced expenditure, at least in the short term. Building military capacity and professionalism can be costly, but a disaffected, underpaid, and marginalized military can be a security threat.

The GCA meeting on the privatization of security in Africa recognized that the demand for private security, and the number of groups providing services, have grown since the end of the Cold War. This is a response to the decline of traditional forms of military assistance and to the reluctance of the international community to become involved in conflicts in Africa. Private security companies, offering a range of

services, span a spectrum from the highly professional corporate entities to groups more akin to mercenaries. Although they can at times tilt the military balance in the short term, private security companies are unlikely to be able to either maintain military advantages or ensure stability in the longer term. Durable peace requires addressing the underlying causes of conflict and finding political solutions.

PART II ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS


RECENT PROGRESS

For Sub-Saharan Africa, average annual GDP growth in the 1990s was only marginally higher than in the 1980s. But in the second half of the 1990s (1995–99) that growth was 3% (figure 1), while for Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa and Nigeria it was 4.3%. These rates are much higher than the 0.4% in the first half of the 1990s (1990–94) for the entire region, and the 0.2% without South Africa and Nigeria. This better performance is significant because it also covers the 1997–98 period of international financial crisis, which reduced global import demand and hit exports and production, particularly in oil and minerals.

Partly explaining the upturn in Africa's economic performance since the mid-1990s are higher international prices for some commodities, at least during part of the period, and lower costs of oil for the oil importers. In contrast, oil exporters experienced adverse terms of trade until the middle of 1999. Weather patterns were also generally favorable—although for individual countries the experience may have been sharply different—and as a result there was overall growth in agricultural production.

Restoration of macroeconomic stability led to resumed production

FIGURE 1. PERFORMANCE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DURING THE 1990s



Source: Calculated for GCA from World Bank data.

For several countries the faster growth probably is due in part to the reforms. For reformers, the restoration of macroeconomic stability—with some deregulation and improvements in the efficiency of transport and communication—led to resumed production, higher capacity use, and increased exports, all contributing to GDP growth. Except in Côte d'Ivoire, where GDP declined sharply in 1999, West African franc zone countries maintained growth of 4–6%. Of the Central African franc zone countries, only Cameroon managed such growth.

The upswing in growth, though welcome, remains modest and fragile. Among

countries with low GDP growth in the 1990s were South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, each with a significant weight in the Sub-Saharan average.

- Although South Africa recorded modest growth throughout the decade, it suffered more than other African countries from the contagion of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and from the lower demand for its exports.
- Nigeria’s poor performance reflected depressed oil prices until mid-1999, as well as the more basic constraints of decaying infrastructure and inadequacies and disarray in managing the economy. The resurgence in the price of oil is a welcome relief for the new democratically elected government of Nigeria, but the government will still face many inherited problems.
- Kenya and Zimbabwe also faced accumulated macroeconomic policy distortions and increasingly complex political and governance issues.

Closer examination of GDP performance for 1998 and 1999 shows that economic growth for the region has been below the average for the second half of the 1990s. Countries that grew faster than the region’s average in 1998 and 1999 include Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Cape Verde.

Investment

Rapid growth over the long term can be achieved only by boosting investment to rates much higher than in recent years. In the 1990s investment in Africa grew at 16–18%, essentially the same rate as in the 1980s. The better-performing countries, including Botswana and Mauritius, continued to have higher investment rates than others. In foreign direct investment, the main beneficiaries were such established oil-producing countries as Nigeria and Angola. But Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and lately Mozambique also attracted some foreign direct investment—in part due to investors’ perception of a better business environment. However, the flows to these countries, and the Sub-Saharan share of global FDI flows, were still very modest. It is also necessary to stress that investment rates in Africa have not been raised to levels that will generate growth rates of 7% or

Rapid growth over the long term can be achieved only by boosting investment to rates much higher than in recent years

more—the level at which economic growth can begin to have significant impact on poverty reduction.

Agriculture

One constant challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa is having agricultural production grow faster than population growth and thus enable progress in food security, rural incomes, and agricultural exports. In the 1990s, however, average annual agricultural growth was nearly the same as in the 1980s, although there was a significant upturn in the second half (see figure 1). Annual growth was 3.9% in 1995–99, up from 0.6% in 1990–94. Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, and Mozambique, after severe drought in the early 1990s, had better weather conditions in the later part of the decade. Niger, Cameroon, Ghana, and Guinea also had faster growth in agricultural production in the second half of the 1990s. And in 1998 and 1999 agricultural growth in the region averaged 2.2% and 3.9%. Many countries recording good performance in those years also had faster growth for 1995–99.

*Education and skills
can enable the poor
to qualify for gainful
employment*

Exports

Like GDP and agriculture, Africa's annual export growth in the second half of the 1990s was markedly higher than in the first half, 3.9% as against 2.2% (see figure 1). More than balancing the declines in export values for Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania in 1995–99 were the increases for Cameroon, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The figures for 1998 and 1999 again show significant declines in Nigeria, while Botswana and Zambia suffered from the Asian economic crisis and the moderation in global demand for minerals.

Education

Among the international development goals is the call for appropriate strategies and intensified action to achieve universal primary education by 2015. Beyond its intrinsic value as a foundation for human development, education and skills can enable the poor to qualify for gain-

ful employment. With rapid and sustained growth, the health, education, and skills of citizens are essential for effective poverty reduction.

The trends in health and education have not been satisfactory for most African countries. Most would have to increase their efforts considerably to enroll all primary school-age children in 2015. Countries expected to easily attain this goal—because they already are at or near the target—include Zimbabwe, Mauritius, South Africa, Gabon, Botswana, Malawi, Cape Verde, and Namibia. Among the many farthest from the target are Somalia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Nigeria, Angola, and Liberia.


HIV/AIDS

AIDS does more than impose suffering and burden on households and communities. For too many African countries it is reversing decades of hard-won gains in economic and social development. One dramatic indicator of such reversal, depicted in last year's Annual Report, is the sharp decline in average life expectancy for many countries in Africa. Those most at risk of infection include individuals in the most economically active and productive age groups—skilled and highly trained professionals who are not easily replaced, inflicting losses on production, growth, and capacity. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to account for two-thirds of the known cases of HIV/AIDS. In seven Southern African countries, some 20% or more of the adult population (15–49) is infected. In 15 Sub-Saharan African countries 10% or more of the adult population is infected (figure 2).

Political commitment and leadership are critical in combating HIV/AIDS. And prevention is the key. Political and community leaders as well as health and social workers must promote and advocate safe sex practices, including the widespread use of condoms. Care and treatment are also essential—but costly. Policymakers, com-

Political commitment and leadership are critical in combating HIV/AIDS

FIGURE 2. AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH HIGH ADULT HIV/AIDS INFECTION RATES



Source: Adopted from UNAIDS, *Report of the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic*, June 2000.

munity leaders, and activists have to enhance awareness of the threat of AIDS. They also have to spearhead efforts at effective and sustained action in combating HIV/AIDS. Other tropical diseases, particularly malaria, have to be addressed with equal vigor—with the help of the international community.

EXTERNAL RESOURCE FLOWS

Over the past three or four decades, the main instrument of development cooperation has been aid. But in recent years, there have been calls for a more balanced and mutually rewarding relationship—encompassing aid, debt relief, and trade and investment. What can external partners do to strengthen and advance the key elements of the new and better-balanced relationship? The decline in official development assistance (ODA)—globally and to Sub-Saharan Africa—seen in the 1990s is particularly unfortunate, occurring precisely when reforms in both African and donor countries are expected to improve the transparency and efficiency of ODA’s use and management.

The decline in official development assistance—globally and to Sub-Saharan Africa—seen in the 1990s is particularly unfortunate

Promoting foreign direct investment in Africa

Greater foreign direct investment (FDI) is needed in part because of the low domestic savings in almost all African countries. But it is needed for more than “filling the investment gap,” because of the long-term benefits from foreign investment projects. Compared with other private capital inflows, FDI puts less pressure on a country’s balance of payments because it is fairly stable and is in the form of equity, not debt. Added beneficial features include the transfer of knowhow (both managerial and technological), access to foreign markets directly or through affiliates, and supply linkages that stimulate domestic production and private sector development.

All private capital flows to developing countries, particularly foreign direct investment, grew rapidly in the 1990s. As a result, official flows have declined fairly steeply as a share of total resource transfers to developing countries, while the share of FDI has risen equally dramatically. But a mere 10 countries (including China, Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia) took 75% of the FDI flows to developing regions, with the surge largely

bypassing Sub-Saharan Africa, which received only 3–5% of those flows.

Why? A big reason is the persistent and often generalized projection of a negative image of Africa by external parties, including some sections of the press. Few investors in industrial countries understand the diversity of Africa. Few know that conflicts, though serious, are a problem in a limited number of countries. As a result few are likely to realize that the majority of African countries enjoy relative peace and stability, and that a good number have well-run, growing economies. Nor do investors know that the profitability of foreign investment is higher in Africa than in any other developing region.

That makes it essential to project a true picture of Africa to foreign investors. African countries have more to do in strengthening their investment promotion programs. Both bilateral and multilateral partners can take more supportive action to present Africa to foreign investors as a credible and profitable investment destination—and to project a more positive and factual image of African countries. They can also extend further guarantees and insurance to investors to cover various risks, including political risks—and provide cofinancing for feasibility studies and investment projects.

Tangible action on debt relief will of course reassure potential investors. Industrial countries in Europe, North America, and Asia can encourage collaborative relations between their companies and African companies. And removing all remaining barriers to their markets may be the most important support that bilateral partners can give to promote FDI in Africa. A welcome development is incorporating duty-free and quota-free imports of textiles and apparel from Africa in the new U.S. Growth and Opportunity Act. Other partners can take similar measures to encourage foreign investment in Africa.

Speeding debt relief and reinvigorating aid

By mid-1999 there was an apparent international consensus in support of “broader, faster, and deeper” debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC). For the most part, however, the widely expected implementation of solemn pledges has yet to materialize. It is hoped that all remaining obstacles will soon be removed so that beneficiary

countries can implement new and more vigorous growth and poverty reduction strategies.

It is appropriate to caution that existing ODA allocations not be diverted to meet the additional financing required for this purpose. African countries will continue to need development assistance to realize faster economic growth and poverty reduction. Yet, ODA has been declining since 1992—when it was 0.33% of donor GNP, in actual amounts and in percentages of donor GNP.

In 1998 there was a recovery from the low point of 1997—to \$51.8 billion (0.24% of donor GNP) from \$48.3 billion (0.22% of donor GNP). The recovery was in part due to exceptional and quick-disbursing aid to countries affected by the Asian financial crises. But it was also due to changes in policies of some donor countries in support of increased aid. The overall rise in 1998 was achieved despite significant declines from such traditionally important donors as France, Germany, Canada, and Sweden. The United States has by far the lowest allocation among bilateral donors, allocating only 0.10% of its GDP for ODA.

For Sub-Saharan Africa, too, ODA peaked at \$18–20 billion a year in 1990–92, and then held steady at about \$18 billion a year until 1994. It has since been declining—to \$13.8 billion in 1998. Per capita receipts of ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa declined even more sharply—from \$32 per capita in 1990 to \$19 in 1998. The approach to aid has also been changing—with reassessments of the rationale for aid, the criteria for eligibility, the adoption of selectivity, and the shift to program aid from the traditional project approach, as well as African country ownership and coordination of aid programs.

GCA'S ACTIVITIES IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The GCA is a unique venue for Africa's policymakers—and other key actors in the private sector and civil society—to meet with their external counterparts to review, analyze, and arrive at consensus on important Africa-related development issues. In the economic area, it acts as a catalyst for achieving sustained growth and poverty reduction in as many African countries as possible. In line with this objective, the GCA has focused on initiating, implementing, and consolidating economic reforms. And since its second plenary in Maastricht in 1995, the GCA

has facilitated dialogues on broader macroeconomic issues and key sectoral constraints that bear on the performance of African economies.

Supply response

Economic reforms are expected to trigger an adequate supply response in the form of greater production and exports. To examine reforms and their outcomes from this perspective, the GCA took up supply response to reforms as the main theme of its Policy Forum in Ouagadougou in October 1996. Case studies of selected countries and the overall performance of Sub-Saharan Africa were reviewed and discussed.

Only a small group of countries had started reforming in the 1980s and early 1990s, but most African countries were implementing some type of reform by the mid-1990s. The initial measures were to achieve macroeconomic stability and liberalize prices, trade, and tariffs. In the large group of countries that attempted mainly stabilization and liberalization, Uganda and Mozambique demonstrated seriousness and persistence—and saw higher GDP growth and greater domestic and foreign investment. In the CFA franc zone countries, a 50% devaluation of their common currency in 1994 had for a period restored the international competitiveness of export products, particularly for countries with accompanying reform measures. But the supply response has been weak in most African countries—because reforms did not go beyond macroeconomic stabilization and trade and price liberalization.

As confirmed by the GCA-sponsored analyses and discussions, a significant and lasting supply response can be advanced only when countries take up additional measures, including structural and institutional reforms and investments in essential infrastructure and support services.

A significant and lasting supply response can be advanced only when countries take up additional measures

Investment

Strong and sustained growth requires much higher investment than the 16–18% average seen in most African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. And higher investment implies higher savings. Investment is also influenced by external financial resource inflows, ODA, and particularly foreign direct investment. The constraints on investment—and the measures by different actors to promote and stimulate investment—were dis-

cussed extensively in a high-level GCA meeting in Gaborone in March 1998.

The GCA discussions confirmed that the hurdles for investment are similar to those for supply response. Policies and reform measures have to establish a hospitable environment for the private sector. To be credible, such measures have to be seen as adequate, irreversible, and fully backed by the unwavering commitment of policymakers.

Reform measures have to be seen as adequate, irreversible, and fully backed by the unwavering commitment of policymakers

Trade

The region's loss of market share in world exports and failure to diversify into newer export products were analyzed in the GCA's paper "Africa and International Trade," and discussed at the GCA Economic Committee Meeting in Abidjan in May 1997. The document and discussions examined the factors behind Africa's export performance and considered the measures to improve the prospects for future export growth and diversification. The main constraints include political and economic instability, poor governance, cumbersome regulations, institutional and structural weaknesses, and inadequate infrastructure. When these are removed, the cost of doing business would be lower, the environment for investment much better, and the efficiency of transactions enhanced—all necessary for greater competitiveness and export growth.

Also recognized was that export growth would be helped by well-targeted export promotion measures and more effective government-business collaboration in facilitating trade. In addition, governments could encourage export growth by strengthening regional integration, to give exporters an intermediate stage in regional markets before plunging into more competitive global markets. External partners can support this by continuing and augmenting ODA assistance, providing debt relief, and facilitating foreign direct investment in the region. Most important, developed country partners need to take further action to remove their remaining trade barriers, including non-tariff barriers, to allow unhindered market access for products of Sub-Saharan African countries.

The examination of trade issues also touched on the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, and the implications

for African countries of the new World Trade Organization (WTO)-monitored trade regime. Only a limited number of African countries actively participated in the various phases of the Uruguay Round, and even they had neither the requisite size of delegation to participate in all aspects of the negotiations nor the expertise and bargaining clout to influence the outcome.

The Uruguay Round Agreements proposed that the least developed countries receive special assistance and exemptions. African least developed countries were expected to take advantage of the envisaged benefits and adapt themselves to the new trade disciplines. The envisaged benefits include special and differential treatment, abrogation, and longer implementation periods for some sections of the Agreements. The least developed countries would also get support for trade-related training and capacity development, needed to strengthen the skills and expertise of African countries for trade negotiations and the implementation of agreements.

One serious implication of the new trading system is that the preferential nonreciprocal trading arrangement between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries must be reconciled with the nondiscrimination clause of the WTO. This compatibility was an important and contentious issue in the negotiations leading to the new ACP-EU Agreement. Anticipating this, the GCA prepared two workshops to facilitate dialogue and to assist African participants to prepare their negotiating strategy—one just ahead of the opening of negotiations in September 1998, and the second in July 1999 at a critical juncture in the negotiations.

Agriculture

For most Sub-Saharan countries the agricultural sector continues to be important, forming 35% of GDP, employing 70% of the labor force, and accounting for 40% of exports. But productivity and crop yields have remained low—with yields in Africa averaging 1 ton per hectare, compared with 2.6 tons in Latin America and 3 tons in Asia. Faster growth in agricultural production would thus be an important indicator of strong supply response, and the GCA has made agriculture a high priority. At the Economic Committee Meeting in Nairobi in April

1999, “Promoting Agricultural Productivity and Competitiveness” was the main item on the agenda.

The main factors constraining agricultural production and productivity are poor political and policy environment, institutional deficiencies, poor access to better (research-based) technologies, weak extension support, inadequate infrastructure, and shortcomings in such essential services as marketing, input-supply, and credit. Where these constraints were removed and supportive policies and services were effectively delivered—as with smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe and cotton-growing in Mali—African farmers achieved yields comparable to those of farmers elsewhere in the developing world.

Debt

Looking back, the GCA has played its usual catalytic role in the HIPC debt relief initiative. During the period leading to the initial adoption of the HIPC initiative by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GCA placed the debt issue and the HIPC initiative as a main agenda item in its Economic Committee Meeting in Addis Ababa in August 1996. The GCA Co-Chairpersons wrote to the World Bank and the IMF in support of the initiative at the September 1996 Annual Meetings. In addition, GCA Co-Chairpersons have written regularly to G-8 leaders, urging them to place the economic development of Africa high on the agenda of their annual meetings and to take concrete action on debt relief.

Regional integration

Another major focus for the GCA is regional economic integration. Foreign investors from within the region and outside will be more attracted to the larger markets of an integration group. And African countries will have stronger bargaining power when they are associated with a larger group.

In its meetings and studies, the GCA has assessed the various integration initiatives in Africa, with a view to promoting the rationalization of integration institutions, for they clearly show duplication

and overlap of both mandates and membership. Beyond the need to correct such duplication and overlap, countries also have to demonstrate stronger political commitment and loyalty to the goals of integration. With the support of the European Commission, the GCA is looking into all this—to recommend how to strengthen economic integration in Africa. It intends to promote a mechanism for implementing those recommendations by countries and by regional groups.

PART III THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MEDIATING CIVIL CONFLICTS: LIMITS AND DANGERS

One generally welcome result of the end of the Cold War is the international community's sharp change in attitudes toward armed conflict in Africa. Cold War political allegiances and superpower rivalries had shaped the international response to African conflicts, even when no strategic interest was at stake. Similarly, superpowers and former colonizers had upheld the principle of state sovereignty because it protected their relationships with specific countries. Nonaligned states embraced it to preserve their independence, erect a barrier against external pressure, and in many cases to repress domestic dissent.

All this changed with the end of the Cold War. Although external powers retain residual interests in some conflicts, they are now far more likely to regard them as problems to be resolved in some fairly neutral way. In the process, the United Nations has assumed, at least in part, its intended role as a global body responsible for assuring world peace.

Weaker today is the old emphasis on sovereignty—with the globalization of not just the world economy, but communications and the values and cultures they transmit. And no longer adequate is the distinction between domestic conflicts, which fell within the responsibility of national governments, and international conflicts, which fell within the responsibility of the United Nations. Why? Because of the artificiality of state frontiers in many parts of the world, and the ease for conflicts in one country to flow beyond its borders—through refugees, arms traffic, and the activities of insurgent movements.

These changes have been accompanied by new efforts of international actors to help resolve conflicts. These efforts have ranged from a dramatic increase in UN-authorized peacekeeping missions, to attempts to tackle long-standing conflicts, and to proactive conflict resolution where the potential for violent conflict can clearly be discerned but where timely action may prevent the eruption into widespread bloodshed.

The limits and even the dangers of these efforts are becoming apparent. The number of conflicts resolved in any definitive sense remains disappointingly small. For every relative success, there have been an uncomfortably large number of evident failures, while the recurrence of conflict has under-

scored the fragility of brokered peace agreements. The level of global violence has increased over the last decade. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons has continued to rise. And complete state breakdowns, previously rare, are becoming more common. There are also indications that attempts to resolve conflicts may on occasion worsen or perpetuate them. It is thus time for the international community's attempts at conflict resolution to come under closer scrutiny.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND AFRICA

In the post-Cold War politics of conflict resolution, Africa has emerged as a major arena—in many ways *the* major arena. It provided the location for about half the UN peacekeeping missions worldwide in the 1990s. And in 2000, 11 African states had UN special missions, against only as many as 5 in any other region. Africa is the almost exclusive concern of the European Union's efforts in conflict resolution. The United States, France, and Britain have also focused on conflict in Africa. And many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with mediation, dispute solving, and community relations have concentrated their efforts in Africa.

In part, this prominence results from the appalling conflicts in Africa—and from a sense of opportunity for external attempts at settlement. In part, too, it reflects generally well-intentioned but often misconceived (and even patronizing) efforts by external actors. And recently, there has been a call for “African solutions to African problems,” suggesting that while external actors may involve themselves in conflict management, they may also choose to withdraw if the costs become too great or the desired results are not achieved.

Most conflicts in Africa are not of central importance to any of the major powers. For the most part, the continent is seen as comprising small, weak, and poor states, with little economic or strategic significance, largely dependent on external assistance. Outside states and societies, to a very large extent, view Africa as a source of problems: famine, civil conflict, refugees, poor governance, state breakdown, environmental degradation, AIDS, uncontrolled emigration, and other threats to the rest of the world. The image of Africa projected to the outside world is overwhelmingly one of human suffering.

The resulting desire to help reflects a moral concern and a sense of common humanity. But external attempts at assistance can achieve lasting and beneficial results only if accompanied by a modest and hard-headed appraisal of their impact on the people whose welfare they are intended to improve. Conflicts in Africa or elsewhere can be effectively resolved only by the parties to conflict. External actors can assist the process, but experience proves that enforced peace is rarely durable.

External actors can assist the process, but experience proves that enforced peace is rarely durable

THE RISE OF THE MEDIATOR

External actors can play several roles in conflict management, from long-term prevention to the provision of humanitarian aid and support for postconflict reconstruction. Indeed, their assistance in these areas is often crucial. But one distinctive form of involvement has come to the fore: the emergence of mediators, designated by one body or another in the international community—or even by their own private organizations—to assist in resolving conflicts around the world. Heirs to a long and honorable tradition of peacemaking, running from medieval Europe to precolonial Africa, these mediators bring the parties to conflict together, in pursuit of an agreed and peaceful settlement.

Pride of place among such emissaries belongs to representatives of the United Nations, whose role in conflict resolution, in Africa and elsewhere, dates to long before the end of the Cold War: UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was killed while personally engaged in such a mission in 1961. In recent decades, the UN role has often been assumed by officials accorded the title of Special Representative, Representative, or Special Envoy of the Secretary-General—designated with the approval of the Security Council to represent the UN in conflicts both international and domestic, charged with attempting to mediate solutions on the ground, defuse tensions, and maintain contact with UN headquarters. Although the role of the special representative dates to the Cold War era, the number of such representatives has risen sharply over the past decade, indicating a growing level of UN involvement and concern that would previously have been unthinkable. In June 2000, 16 such officials were accredited to different parts of Africa.

Special representatives on the spot can be far more deeply involved than the Secretary-General and bring a direct UN presence into the con-

flict zone, and some have become significant international actors in their own right. The selection of special representatives, normally experienced diplomats, involves delicate diplomatic considerations. They must be both sufficiently detached from the conflict not to be automatically associated with one side or the other, yet capable of appreciating local sensitivities. Africans are normally chosen for conflicts in Africa (11 of the 16 representatives are African).

Other international organizations, and even individual states, are adopting the same device. The European Union appears to have been among the first to take it up, enhancing the EU's profile in international affairs and giving a European slant to initiatives that individual member states might otherwise have taken. The Organization of African Unity has also appointed representatives to handle particular African crises. So have individual states, including those belonging to such regional organizations as the European Union, which have simultaneously established mediating missions. All this has been in addition to diplomatic representatives accredited to countries in disputes. Special envoys can add much to the processes of normal diplomacy. But they can also undermine ambassadors, send contrary signals to conflicting parties, or reduce the leverage applied through diplomatic processes.

Non-state actors operating outside the institutional framework of the interstate system, particularly NGOs, are also doing more in conflict mediation. The International Committee of the Red Cross—the oldest such organization, long commanding great respect—has special status as a largely Swiss-run body with responsibilities acknowledged by states signing the Geneva conventions and protocols. Religious organizations, as neutral intermediaries between warring regimes of the same faith, have been especially active in promoting a global civil society commitment to peacemaking. NGOs essentially concerned with the distribution of emergency relief aid have also become engaged in largely local mediation, to remove conflict's obstacles to relief. Such organizations have often secured agreement to transport aid across the lines between opposing forces.

There also are specialist NGOs concerned with conflict mediation. Some, such as the Carter Center established by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, have gained international respect for their mediation

efforts. But many raise issues of their accountability, expertise, and authority to intervene.

In short, there has been no lack of mediators to help in any African conflict. And in several cases—with the Great Lakes region as the most obvious—a host of different international organizations, states, and voluntary bodies have appointed a multiplicity of different mediators to handle the same conflict. The problems lie in working out what such mediators can actually do—and in ensuring that their efforts at best contribute to conflict resolution, and at worst do not obstruct one another.

Mediation typically involves a sustained process of informing, explaining, cajoling, and even threatening

THE POSITIVE ROLE OF MEDIATION

Third-party conflict mediation can yield significant results, for it has several advantageous features. First, parties to conflicts are often so locked into particular mindsets that it is very hard for them to envisage solutions. The mediator can combine knowledge and concern about the conflict with detachment from it, encouraging the parties to take a broader view of their situation and to foster points of contact between them.

Mediation typically involves a sustained process of informing, explaining, cajoling, and even threatening—to help resolve the underlying sources of conflict and to prevent conflicts from degenerating into a further cycle of violence. At times, when the conditions are suitable, it may extend to the negotiation of specific political settlements that call for compromises on both sides. An in-depth understanding of the conflict—and of the social and political realities that inform it—is essential for successful mediation. At the same time, mediators cannot be so closely involved that objectivity and neutrality are sacrificed (box 1).

Second, international mediators can bring the resources of the international community to the process of conflict settlement. Legitimacy is one such resource, but it should not be overrated. Parties to disputes tend to be so obsessed by a sense of the rightness in their own cause that any external involvement that is not unambiguously favorable is readily perceived as interference—or even as a conspiracy with their opponents. Even so, the OAU in African conflicts, or the UN at a global level, carries some authority for a mediator to draw on. Medi-

ation is unlikely to be effective unless the conflicting parties consider that the mediator has the moral authority and legitimacy to intervene.

Through their links back to the organizations that they represent, mediators should be able to manage or manipulate resources emanating from the international system—to ensure that they promote rapprochement rather than conflict.

- The isolation of the conflict from possible sources of encouragement, through diplomatic pressures on external states not to favor internal parties, may be one important element. But it requires discipline by individual states to conform to international agreements.
- Another element is the management of aid flows, and the additional financial resources that may be needed to lessen the suffering of

Non-state actors involved in mediation also have to accept the need for accountability

BOX 1. MEDIATION—SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

Outside mediation can help bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table, or even broker a peace agreement. But there are many issues to consider.

- A deep understanding of the background is essential for effective mediation, especially in complex situations involving a variety of actors. Mediators also need the moral authority to intervene—to be regarded as neutral or impartial by the majority of parties to the conflict.
- Mediators need a clear and realistic mandate, with enough technical and financial resources to pursue it. The timeliness and flexibility of response are crucial to the success of mediation.
- Mediation, only one part of a peace process, needs to be supported by other measures. And reaching a peace agreement is only the first step. Resources have to be provided to ensure that the agreement is effectively implemented—and to avoid a recurrence of conflict. The terms and follow-up actions of peace agreements also need to be realistic. If they are too complex, they are unlikely to be sustainable.
- Mediation is often long and costly, and mediators have to be able and willing to stay the course. Mediation driven by externally defined timetables can result in peace agreements that parties will not honor, that leave too many issues undecided, or that mediators must underwrite at high cost. Mediators and the international community need a clear exit strategy to withdraw if parties to the conflict refuse to negotiate in good faith.
- At times, an array of mediators can help, and two-track efforts or the good offices of eminent persons can support official mediation. But mediators need to agree on norms and principles—a code of conduct—and collaborate to ensure that a coherent message is sent to all parties to the conflict. Non-state actors involved in mediation also have to accept the need for accountability.

the population or simply to provide inducements to faction leaders to opt for peaceful rather than violent means of pursuing their goals. For a major aid donor, the links between mediation and aid are critical.

- Mediators can also threaten targeting international individualized sanctions of one kind or another on recalcitrant local actors, though they generally need to be used very sparingly. Imposed economic sanctions often prove counterproductive, reinforcing preconceptions of external hostility, but on occasion they can be useful.

Third, mediation involves a complex of tasks, and different mediators can pursue multitrack operations. High-level mediation involving contacts between leading actors, with which mediators such as a UN special representative are almost of necessity primarily concerned, often needs to be combined with low-level reconciliation between local communities, perhaps best undertaken by aid agencies or NGOs. While a top-level mediator may need to maintain a scrupulous reputation for impartiality, other actors associated with particular parties may be better placed to exercise appropriate leverage on them. There is even a place for a complementary division of roles, in which one actor is primarily associated with the coercive elements in a settlement, and another can take a more conciliatory approach. A multiplicity of mediators is not necessarily to be avoided, if their activities support an overall agreed strategy of conflict resolution. Neither the weakness of state institutions, nor the ambitions of warlords or conflicting parties, should minimize the need for coherence and harmonization of external mediators' actions.

WHAT CAN GO WRONG?

The record of mediation, everywhere, shows clearly that it does not provide any readily applicable set of solutions to intractable conflicts. Only a small number of African conflicts have been resolved definitively. The usual process is akin to decolonization, involving the acceptance by a minority ruling group of the inevitability of majority rule, and the negotiation of agreed mechanisms for the transition. The chief examples: Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Mozambique stands virtually alone as a bitter domestic conflict that has

been resolved—now for more than six years—apparently through international mediation.

Nor is this surprising. Mediators always need to approach their task with a modest recognition of the limits of external action. The resolution of local conflicts ultimately has to be internal, and mediation strategies that are well conceived, coherently implemented, and pursued over an extended period with appropriate instruments may be doomed to fail.

Would-be mediators also need to recognize that theirs is not a cost-free option. It is all too readily assumed that the attempt to mediate, even if it does not succeed, can at least do no harm. If it works, so much the better. But even if it does not, the situation can be no worse than before. This encourages a try-it-on attitude for external actors. Mediation is a low-cost response to the need to do something about a conflict, bringing with it favorable publicity and opportunities for the expression of concern, while doing no damage—even if the prospects of success must realistically be regarded as nonexistent.

That perception is profoundly mistaken. It leads too easily to a proliferation of mediating agencies, many with little expertise and no serious commitment to the task, and many of whose efforts merely obstruct one another. More important, mediation introduces resources into a conflict that can be appropriated by parties to it, and that can make the conflict worse. The attempted mediation of the Rwandan conflict in 1990–94, despite the sincerity of almost all external actors, shows how badly mediation can go wrong. In other cases would-be mediators have simply provided parties to the conflict with the breathing space to gather their forces and reestablish their connections with external sources of weaponry or finance.

The lesson is clear. Mediation should not be an easy option for organizations and individuals that are not prepared to treat it with the dedication and modesty that it requires. It should be taken up only by those who have a real contribution to the peace process and are prepared to back that up with whatever resources they can bring. Any other approach to mediation is at best obstructive, perhaps even extremely damaging.

Mediators are optimists. They have to be. Any other attitude would make their task too dispiriting to be pursued, denying them the reserves

Would-be mediators also need to recognize that theirs is not a cost-free option

of patience and persistence to overcome the constant setbacks and disappointments. Yet the task requires a realistic appraisal of what mediation can achieve, often very limited objectives. Overambitious attempts at settlement have probably done more damage than all the other dangers of mediation put together. A clear, implementable mandate is therefore a basic requirement of successful mediation, along with the flexibility to respond to changes in a timely fashion.

Rwanda is a tragic example of an overambitious mandate. Those preparing the genocide had no serious intention of participating in the extraordinarily complex negotiated settlement that the international community was seeking to impose. In Angola, a number of factors contributed to the failure of the 1990–92 settlement, including that the international community did not provide the resources to implement it effectively.

More conflicts are resolved by the straightforward victory of one side over the other than by negotiated settlements that seek to deal with complex issues of state formation. And even if victory is not an option, it does not follow that a negotiated settlement must work instead. Much effort has been devoted to trying to work out the point at which a previously intractable conflict becomes ripe for resolution—and to the conditions then required to make that resolution hold. One condition is the recognition by the internal parties that their interests can be more reliably assured by negotiation than by continued conflict. Another is the ability to isolate the conflict by denying external resources to the internal parties.

When these conditions are met, skillful mediation can help lead to a successful resolution. But even these cases need the support of a largely united international community—including the immediate neighbors of the state in conflict—and the provision of enough financial resources to implement the settlement quickly. The chances of successful mediation are lower when parties to the conflict can mobilize financial resources from oil, diamonds, or the diaspora—and external cross-border support from other states. That precludes bringing to bear pressures and inducements on the combatants.

One common feature of successful resolution is leaving in place a structure of authority, capable of maintaining order and assuring basic stability. But authority is difficult to share. Even if some compromise

settlement is arrived at, it must designate a winner, who assumes the position of head of state and controls the major decisions of the government. Other would-be contestants must then either accept a subordinate position within this power structure, or leave the scene, for the peace process to be successful.

Mediated agreements that blur this critical issue, and thus leave the ultimate prize of state control open to further conflict, are unlikely to succeed. Often, the winner is designated through elections, an essential part of the mediation process. But elections can help to end conflict only if the results are accepted by all parties and if they are accompanied by adequate disarmament and demobilization efforts. Failed mediations and dishonored settlements illustrate the futility of any approach to conflict resolution that does not tackle the key question of power.

THE PROLIFERATION OF MEDIATORS

The engagement of different mediators in conflict resolution is not always harmful—and may be essential. Successful settlements involve complex and interlocking processes, which various actors may usefully contribute to at different times. But the sheer proliferation of mediators in many recent African conflicts in particular has at times impeded the peace process, making evident the need for a clear organizational structure for attempts at mediation.

For a start, different mediators may have very different interests in the mediation process, interests that lead them to operate at cross purposes. Visibility is one. Successful mediation enhances the standing of the institution that sponsors it. And international organizations, in their eagerness to establish their credentials, often want to be seen to be promoting settlements in a way that does not always foster cooperative relations with one another. The same can be true in a single organization, where different divisions or individuals fight turf wars for the credit. NGOs may find it even harder to shun publicity resulting from successful mediation. They may even exaggerate or exacerbate conflict—to promote their credentials for resolving it (and increase their chances for future funding).

Mediators linked to national governments can also have more specific interests at stake. Even when negotiations are conducted under

The sheer proliferation of mediators in conflicts has at times impeded the peace process

Mediation can never be value neutral, since any mediator must approach the task with some idea of how the conflict arose and how it might be settled

the auspices of a regional organization, they can be deeply undermined by caving in to the interests of a particular state or group of states. Support to conflicting parties—or the leadership ambitions of a single country in the regional grouping—can also affect the peace process.

At stake, too, are different conceptions of how best to resolve conflicts. Mediation can never be value neutral, since any mediator must approach the task with some idea of how the conflict arose and how it might be settled. And different ideas lead to different solutions, which in turn may empower different internal actors. One immediate question is whether combatants identified as *rebels* within the prevailing values of the international state system should be treated the same as those designated as *governments*. For such international organizations as the OAU or indeed the UN, both founded on the principle of sovereign statehood, this might be very difficult to acknowledge. Governments that represent these states in these organizations have a status that can scarcely be ignored. But NGOs—not sharing the same attitude to sovereignty—are more likely to regard governments as the conflict's source, not as its solution.

There are even more differences over the identity of parties to be included in valid negotiations. Should *extremists* be excluded or incorporated? Should *warlords* be the principal parties in the peace process—enhancing their status and legitimacy? Or should mediators seek *civil society* interlocutors and try to promote a settlement behind the backs of the armed factions—or at least without them? Should negotiations be conducted only with moderates and those likely to accept political compromises? And if so, how can others be prevailed on to accept whatever settlement is agreed? More broadly, should the peace process be conducted essentially through diplomacy between leaders (in the way diplomats working on behalf of the international state system tend to see it)? Or should it involve structural solutions to deep-seated sources of social conflict (in the way NGOs are likely to regard as essential)?

These real problems face any mediation process. And they can be resolved only with difficulty, if at all, in the specific circumstances of particular conflicts and with the financial support of the international community. The danger with a multiplicity of would-be mediators is that each approach to mediation tends to empower one set of local actors. Each set therefore works with mediators who empower them most, leading in turn

to a series of rival peace processes, conducted by rival mediators, each with its clientele of local supporters. What was ostensibly a process of conflict resolution may therefore merely extend the conflict into a wider sphere. The accountability of mediators—both to local actors and to the international community—is thus crucial.

THE DANGERS OF REPLICATION

Each conflict—even ones that are apparently similar—has its own character and needs to be approached on its own terms. At the heart of any mediation must be a deep and dispassionate understanding of the conflict: its historical origins, the language in which the combatants conceptualize it, the mediators’ (often unspoken and even unacknowledged) fears and ambitions, a sense of the openings for mediators to pursue the goal of reconciliation, and an awareness of the words and actions that they must at all costs avoid, if they are not to make matters worse.

At the same time, mediators—understandably, indeed necessarily—approach their task with more general ideas about how conflicts may be resolved. They very often bring powerful legacies from their experience of peace processes that have either succeeded or gone very wrong—experience that can at times deeply condition a response to conflict. Of course, all actors come to conflicts with some preconceptions, without which the same old lessons would need to be learned again and again.

The problem lies in working out which old lessons need to be applied to each new situation—and which are specific to some previous experience, or perhaps irrelevant and even harmful to the new one. In practice, mediators have often been much too ready to assume that any conflict resolution mechanism that has “worked” in some previous setting can be applied elsewhere. In some cases, they approach conflicts with such a powerful intellectual overhang from their previous experience that it is very difficult indeed for them to see any other situation in different terms. But conflicts that appear similar on the surface are rarely so in reality. And the conditions that may facilitate successful mediation in one instance frequently do not exist in another. While some general principles of conflict resolution are broadly relevant, their application to particular circumstances requires deep understanding and sensitive judgement.

The accountability of mediators—both to local actors and to the international community—is thus crucial

The same goes for the choice of mediators. Mediation depends on personality and individual skill, which some would-be mediators possess but others do not. Some mediators appointed by the UN or other bodies have been superb, others disappointing. It obviously is sensible to pick mediators with a successful record. But it is unwise to assume that an individual successful in one context can be transferred to another conflict where the prospects of success are slight and where the skills for success may be very different.

LESSONS

Given the complexities of mediation, any attempt to list what should be done would be presumptuous. Broadly divided into issues of substance and method, some very basic conclusions can nonetheless be drawn from the many failures and the rather smaller number of successes in recent mediation processes in Africa and elsewhere.

ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE

It is critical to identify at an early stage in the mediation process what can plausibly be achieved—given the conflict, the actors, and the resources available to the combatants and mediators—and to work out an overall strategy to achieve the objectives. This is no easy task, especially in fast-moving situations often fueled by bitter enmities, when missions need to frequently rethink their goals in the light of unexpected (and usually unwelcome) developments. Without a single strategic vision, in turn linked to a realistic appraisal of the practical possibilities, the enterprise is doomed. Far too many missions appear to operate from unrealistic assumptions. One is the belief that complex and legalistic constitutional settlements can work, for example, in the conflict zones of central Africa. Another is that combatants can be relied on to negotiate in good faith and to implement on the ground measures harmful to their own interests.

Sometimes, the assessment may have to lead to the conclusion that no mission can (under the current circumstances) achieve any worthwhile result—and that the combatants have to be left to pursue their own violent path, until a point is reached at which the interna-

tional community can usefully take a hand. Often, missions may identify a relatively limited number of useful tasks to undertake—such as discouraging harmful external involvement in conflicts, or helping to develop local skills and grassroots institutions that may come into play only later in the conflict—while merely doing what they can to contain the basic sources of friction.

The assessment of what can be achieved inevitably involves very difficult judgments, open to a high level of risk. Rarely will any plausible prospect of a definitive solution arise, and then it is essential to ensure that every available resource is geared to the attempt to achieving it. There may well be situations that justify an ambitious (if risky) approach. But such judgments have to be in the light of a realistic assessment of the costs of failure, not merely from wishful thinking. At all times, mediation that can fuel or perpetuate the conflict should be avoided.

At all times, mediation that can fuel or perpetuate the conflict should be avoided

ISSUES OF METHOD

Coherence is also critical. The prospects of success are dramatically reduced if different actors, with different judgments, are left to pursue their own individual strategies, without regard to what is happening elsewhere, or even without regard to the consequences of their actions. Effective mediation requires agreement on a single individual or lead mediator to define the terms of the mission and the roles of each of the other actors. Would-be mediators who do not accept the leadership of the designated mediator, or who disagree with the terms on which the strategy is based, need to be excluded as effectively as possible from the process—or treated as part of the problem. The same goes for actors who wish to be seen to be part of the peace process, for publicity or prestige, but are not prepared to devote to it the discipline and resources of a serious player.

In the vast majority of cases, the lead agency will be the United Nations, the sole global organization with an acknowledged responsibility for peacemaking. Where this responsibility is delegated to—or assumed by—a regional organization (OAU), a subregional organization (SADC or ECOWAS), or even a single state or NGO, the terms must be clear. And the principal agency must be able to exercise authority

even over missions from states or other international organizations that lie beyond its membership.

The United Nations is itself a complex body, only gradually coming to terms with its changed role since the end of the Cold War. And it is subject to financial crisis, institutional legalities, and turf wars between agencies and even individuals within the UN system. The greatest weakness lies in the relationship between the UN's headquarters in New York and missions on the ground: the sheer mental distance between life in a great bureaucracy in the United States and life on the streets in a conflict zone where the mediator has to work is often terrifyingly great. And the saddest reflection on the UN's capabilities is when its special representatives feel that their best efforts were hampered by insufficient support from UN headquarters.

If peace is the primary consideration, the principal responsibility must be left to the special representative on the spot, and the UN system must be modified to ensure that the mediator receives every possible assistance. The burden on that individual is then massive. And there may well be times when he or she loses the confidence of the other actors—or can no longer take the burden and has to be replaced. Such a system appears to offer the only prospect of ensuring that the already awesome task of mediating violent and intractable conflicts is pursued with the greatest possible prospect of success.

The change in attitude toward Africa since the end of the Cold War is most welcome, but outsiders should not see African conflicts as free zones for unguided mediation. As with the conflicts, all parties have to take mediation seriously. No doubt external actors can be helpful, and at times even indispensable. But the intent of mediation alone is not sufficient basis for a peace mission. The mediators need mandates and mechanisms of accountability. They also need support to carry out their task to conclusion. Otherwise, having too many mediators can become part of the problem, perpetuating the conflict. That is why, for a lasting solution, coherence and consistency are crucial in both the approaches and the actions of mediators.

SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

The tables use symbols to mark SPA countries (*)—those participating in the Special Program of Assistance for Debt-Distressed Countries in Africa—and CFA countries (+)—those with their exchange rates fixed to the French franc. Technical notes for the tables are given at the end of the tables.

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	REAL GDP GROWTH						1.1
	Average annual percentage change						
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.2	3.3	1.6	2.3	2.1	2.2	
Excluding South Africa	2.4	4.0	2.4	2.8	3.4	3.2	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.5	3.9	2.8	2.9	3.8	3.6	
Angola	—	—	3.5	0.8	5.0	-0.1	
Benin**	2.8	1.9	2.7	4.7	4.5	5.0	
Botswana	9.2	14.2	10.4	4.3	3.5	4.5	
Burkina Faso**	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	6.2	5.2	
Burundi*	4.5	2.9	4.5	-2.9	4.8	-1.0	
Cameroon**	0.2	7.5	4.5	1.3	5.0	4.4	
Cape Verde	—	3.4	7.9	5.8	8.0	8.0	
Central African Republic**	3.3	2.5	1.6	1.8	4.7	3.4	
Chad**	1.1	0.2	6.7	2.3	8.1	-1.0	
Comoros**	—	—	2.9	-0.5	0.0	1.0	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.2	-0.2	2.1	-5.1	3.0	—	
Congo, Rep. of**	4.7	4.6	3.8	0.9	3.5	-1.1	
Côte d'Ivoire**	9.3	7.5	1.7	3.7	4.5	2.8	
Djibouti	—	—	—	-2.7	0.7	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	19.4	21.9	15.1	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	5.2	3.9	3.0	
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.9	4.8	-1.0	7.0	
Gabon*	4.5	10.9	0.5	3.3	2.0	—	
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.9	3.5	2.7	4.7	4.2	
Ghana*	1.3	-0.2	2.6	4.3	4.7	4.4	
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.2	4.4	3.7	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	3.4	3.8	0.3	-28.1	8.7	
Kenya*	7.9	6.8	4.1	2.2	1.8	1.6	
Lesotho	3.3	8.7	4.2	4.4	-5.0	2.5	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	4.8	0.3	0.8	1.7	3.9	4.7	
Malawi*	5.3	6.2	2.4	4.0	3.1	4.2	
Mali**	2.0	5.1	0.6	3.6	3.3	5.3	
Mauritania*	4.4	1.5	1.9	4.1	3.2	4.3	
Mauritius	-0.6	8.6	6.1	5.1	5.5	4.7	
Mozambique*	—	—	-0.9	6.3	12.0	9.0	
Namibia	—	—	1.1	3.4	2.4	3.1	
Niger**	-1.0	0.9	-0.4	2.4	8.4	2.0	
Nigeria	-2.0	4.3	0.8	2.4	1.8	1.0	
Rwanda*	7.8	4.8	2.5	-1.5	9.5	5.0	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.7	2.5	2.5	
Senegal**	0.7	2.5	3.2	3.2	5.7	5.1	
Seychelles	2.8	7.5	3.5	2.9	2.0	1.5	
Sierra Leone*	2.6	1.7	0.8	-4.8	-0.8	-8.1	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	5.5	2.8	0.9	1.9	0.6	1.2	
Sudan	0.6	5.8	0.4	7.7	5.0	4.0	
Swaziland	—	5.3	6.6	2.9	2.0	2.0	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.1	3.5	4.3	
Togo**	7.2	3.6	1.5	2.5	-1.0	3.0	
Uganda*	—	—	2.3	7.2	5.6	7.8	
Zambia*	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	-2.0	1.3	
Zimbabwe	5.8	1.1	5.9	2.4	2.5	0.0	
North Africa	5.3	6.7	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.1	
All Africa	4.5	4.2	2.4	2.6	3.3	2.9	
Comparator countries	3.8	4.7	7.9	8.4	4.1	5.9	
China	2.0	4.8	10.6	10.7	7.8	7.1	
India	4.6	3.4	5.7	6.1	6.1	6.2	
Indonesia	5.9	7.8	5.8	4.7	-13.2	0.2	
South Asia	4.6	3.4	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.7	
East Asia	5.7	6.9	8.0	7.5	-1.3	6.8	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA		1.2					
	Average annual percentage change						
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.5	0.5	-1.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.2	
Excluding South Africa	-0.3	1.2	-0.5	0.1	0.8	0.7	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.8	1.1	-0.2	0.2	1.1	1.1	
Angola	—	—	0.8	-2.4	2.0	-2.9	
Benin**	0.1	-0.7	-0.5	1.8	1.7	2.1	
Botswana	6.1	10.3	6.6	—	1.6	2.8	
Burkina Faso**	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.4	3.7	2.7	
Burundi*	2.5	1.4	1.6	-5.0	2.7	-2.9	
Cameroon**	-2.1	4.7	1.6	-1.5	2.2	1.6	
Cape Verde	—	2.7	6.1	3.2	4.9	4.8	
Central African Republic**	1.4	0.3	-0.8	-0.3	2.8	1.7	
Chad**	-0.7	-1.7	4.0	-0.7	5.2	-3.7	
Comoros**	—	—	0.3	-3.0	-2.5	-1.5	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.2	-3.0	-1.1	-8.1	-0.2	—	
Congo, Rep. of**	2.0	1.7	0.9	-1.9	0.7	-3.7	
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.1	3.3	-1.9	0.9	2.5	1.1	
Djibouti	—	—	—	-5.1	-1.2	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	16.3	18.8	12.2	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	2.4	1.1	0.1	
Ethiopia*	—	—	-2.1	2.6	-3.5	4.4	
Gabon*	4.4	7.4	-2.8	0.7	-0.4	—	
Gambia, The*	1.6	2.5	0.0	-0.7	1.7	1.3	
Ghana*	—	-2.4	—	1.5	2.0	1.7	
Guinea*	—	—	—	1.6	2.0	1.3	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	-1.0	1.7	-1.9	-29.6	6.6	
Kenya*	4.4	3.0	—	-0.4	-0.6	1.2	
Lesotho	1.2	6.2	1.7	2.1	-7.1	0.2	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	2.4	-2.2	-1.9	-1.2	0.8	1.5	
Malawi*	2.7	3.0	-0.8	1.2	0.6	1.7	
Mali**	-0.4	2.9	-1.8	0.7	0.4	2.3	
Mauritania*	2.1	-0.9	-0.8	1.3	0.4	1.5	
Mauritius	-2.5	6.9	5.1	3.9	4.4	3.8	
Mozambique*	—	—	-2.5	3.9	9.9	7.0	
Namibia	—	—	-1.6	0.8	0.0	0.7	
Niger**	-3.7	-2.0	-3.6	-1.0	4.8	-1.4	
Nigeria	-4.6	1.4	-2.2	-0.5	-0.8	-1.5	
Rwanda*	4.4	1.5	-0.7	-3.0	6.7	2.4	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	-0.9	0.2	0.3	
Senegal**	-2.0	-0.4	0.3	0.5	2.9	2.3	
Seychelles	0.3	5.4	2.6	1.4	0.7	0.3	
Sierra Leone*	0.8	-0.3	-1.3	-7.1	-3.0	-9.9	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	3.3	0.5	-1.6	-0.2	-1.2	-0.5	
Sudan	-1.7	2.7	-2.1	5.5	2.7	1.7	
Swaziland	—	2.2	3.4	-0.2	-1.1	-0.9	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	0.2	0.9	1.8	
Togo**	2.6	1.0	-1.4	-0.4	-3.5	0.5	
Uganda*	—	—	-0.1	4.0	2.7	4.9	
Zambia*	-1.5	-1.7	-2.0	-1.6	-4.3	-0.9	
Zimbabwe	2.4	-1.7	2.4	0.1	0.5	-1.8	
North Africa	2.6	4.1	1.5	1.2	3.8	2.4	
All Africa	1.8	1.4	-0.5	0.1	0.8	0.6	
Comparator countries	2.2	3.5	4.9	5.1	-4.5	2.3	
China	-0.7	2.9	9.0	9.5	6.8	6.1	
India	2.2	1.0	3.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	
Indonesia	3.5	5.2	3.9	3.0	-14.6	-1.4	
South Asia	2.1	1.0	3.3	3.8	3.6	3.8	
East Asia	2.9	4.8	6.3	6.1	-2.4	5.6	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS		1.3					
		Percentage of GDP					
		1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–99	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa		20.4	24.1	19.7	15.7	15.3	14.3
Excluding South Africa		19.5	24.5	17.1	13.8	13.0	10.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria		21.9	24.5	16.0	12.5	14.0	14.9
Angola		—	—	24.0	25.9	30.4	48.0
Benin**		2.2	2.7	1.1	7.4	8.3	7.6
Botswana		2.3	28.5	41.5	33.7	21.8	14.2 Burk-
ina Faso**		1.1	3.0	-1.0	7.6	11.2	10.1
Burundi*		5.0	3.3	3.1	-2.7	-2.5	0.8
Cameroon**		11.3	18.3	24.1	19.0	19.9	19.0
Cape Verde		—	-29.0	-5.8	2.5	7.6	10.4
Central African Republic**		7.2	4.2	-1.1	3.1	4.5	6.5
Chad**		10.3	6.2	-8.1	-2.1	2.6	-0.4
Comoros**		—	—	-4.5	-3.2	-5.4	-5.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of		10.1	12.9	10.9	8.5	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**		5.0	12.0	31.9	28.8	26.4	47.1
Côte d'Ivoire**		29.0	27.4	19.1	17.5	24.8	23.1
Djibouti		—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**		29.4	8.1	-15.0	17.8	19.9	57.9
Eritrea*		—	—	—	-27.0	-24.5	-20.1
Ethiopia*		—	—	6.8	5.6	6.3	4.5
Gabon*		—	54.3	44.3	41.8	43.2	—
Gambia, The*		0.6	2.3	6.5	6.2	7.5	7.4
Ghana*		9.2	10.2	4.8	7.8	12.3	3.9
Guinea*		—	—	16.4	14.3	15.3	17.3
Guinea-Bissau*		—	-6.7	-0.9	0.9	-8.9	-5.4
Kenya*		19.1	19.8	15.9	13.3	6.7	7.1
Lesotho		-24.9	-50.9	-65.2	-39.3	-34.6	-38.2
Liberia		38.5	33.5	16.5	—	—	—
Madagascar*		3.7	4.2	3.3	3.9	4.6	4.6
Malawi*		1.5	14.4	11.8	4.6	0.4	2.4
Mali**		7.9	2.2	-0.4	7.5	10.6	8.2
Mauritania*		32.8	5.7	3.1	8.3	6.3	12.0
Mauritius		12.0	20.1	20.4	24.1	23.3	24.0
Mozambique*		—	—	-10.3	-7.5	1.7	2.5
Namibia		—	—	10.8	9.3	9.9	9.3
Niger**		2.6	6.7	7.3	2.8	3.3	4.8
Nigeria		8.4	22.7	17.5	21.1	11.8	0.0
Rwanda*		2.0	6.0	5.0	-5.1	-1.8	-0.1
São Tomé and Príncipe*		—	10.2	-16.7	-22.5	2.0	-8.4
Senegal**		5.3	7.8	0.1	10.3	14.9	14.2 Sey-
chelles		—	32.0	24.1	22.3	20.3	19.9
Sierra Leone*		—	—	5.2	0.3	-1.9	-7.5
Somalia		5.0	0.3	-6.3	-12.5	—	—
South Africa		21.7	22.4	23.6	17.6	17.4	18.2
Sudan		12.2	9.6	5.0	1.4	—	—
Swaziland		24.6	30.7	12.9	21.7	19.2	21.1
Tanzania*		—	—	-0.2	3.5	11.5	10.9
Togo**		24.2	27.7	12.3	8.3	7.5	5.6
Uganda*		13.6	10.0	2.3	3.8	5.7	5.6
Zambia*		43.2	33.2	14.0	8.1	5.3	5.7
Zimbabwe		20.4	22.3	17.6	16.9	15.4	19.3
North Africa		26.9	32.8	29.9	19.9	19.4	20.0
All Africa		21.3	25.8	23.1	17.1	16.7	16.4
Comparator countries		14.0	24.7	28.3	30.9	29.4	—
China		21.9	30.3	34.7	41.1	43.2	41.8
India		15.2	18.7	19.6	20.9	20.9	20.5
Indonesia		4.8	25.0	30.6	30.7	24.1	—
South Asia		14.1	16.1	17.1	19.0	19.3	18.6
East Asia		17.4	26.3	31.3	36.3	36.9	37.4

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries

Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT		1.4					
	Percentage of GDP						
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.0	20.1	17.2	16.5	17.9	16.6	
Excluding South Africa	14.1	20.0	16.6	17.9	19.2	17.4	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	14.1	18.4	16.4	18.0	18.9	19.6	
Angola	—	—	14.8	19.2	20.2	22.9	
Benin**	10.9	15.5	15.1	16.4	17.1	17.9	
Botswana	24.0	39.7	28.8	26.0	20.6	19.7	
Burkina Faso**	9.6	21.3	19.7	22.9	28.6	27.2	
Burundi*	7.2	8.2	16.6	11.8	9.0	9.2	
Cameroon**	12.7	21.4	23.8	16.5	18.4	19.5	
Cape Verde	—	38.0	43.5	35.9	37.0	37.6	
Central African Republic**	19.4	15.0	10.9	11.3	13.5	14.3	
Chad**	14.3	14.9	6.3	12.9	15.0	17.8	
Comoros**	—	—	28.8	20.3	19.8	19.2	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	12.3	16.4	11.7	7.0	8.1	—	
Congo, Rep. of**	28.1	29.7	32.5	33.1	35.1	31.3	
Côte d'Ivoire**	20.2	24.1	16.0	11.9	18.2	16.3	
Djibouti	—	—	—	12.8	—	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	17.0	17.2	0.0	57.7	91.6	41.4	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	27.4	47.2	44.6	
Ethiopia*	—	—	14.3	15.2	18.2	18.6	
Gabon*	—	46.4	34.6	24.3	32.3	—	
Gambia, The*	9.5	12.0	19.7	20.0	18.3	17.4	
Ghana*	12.8	10.2	7.8	20.1	24.7	21.6	
Guinea*	—	—	16.1	17.2	17.1	18.2	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	21.3	32.0	25.4	11.3	13.7	
Kenya*	18.5	23.2	20.3	16.5	14.4	15.3	
Lesotho	9.5	19.1	40.0	59.4	47.0	78.6	
Liberia	18.4	25.6	14.0	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	9.1	9.8	10.6	11.8	12.5	12.5	
Malawi*	15.9	27.2	18.6	17.4	13.7	15.2	
Mali**	17.3	15.5	17.2	22.4	20.9	20.0	
Mauritania*	14.4	19.8	27.5	19.7	20.2	22.3	
Mauritius	14.0	23.9	23.7	28.2	25.4	26.0	
Mozambique*	—	—	8.1	19.7	20.4	35.5	
Namibia	—	—	18.4	21.7	19.9	20.1	
Niger**	8.1	15.6	15.3	8.7	10.4	9.9	
Nigeria	13.5	22.9	16.5	17.9	20.0	10.6	
Rwanda*	8.3	11.7	15.3	14.6	15.7	15.7	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	20.8	36.1	39.5	44.8	40.0	
Senegal**	8.2	14.6	12.1	16.6	19.6	21.3	
Seychelles	—	38.8	26.4	31.5	37.5	37.5	
Sierra Leone*	—	—	11.9	6.4	5.3	0.2	
Somalia	11.8	20.4	28.8	15.5	—	—	
South Africa	20.5	20.8	18.9	14.8	16.2	15.7	
Sudan	12.7	15.1	14.3	—	—	—	
Swaziland	21.3	27.4	26.5	24.8	12.3	12.9	
Tanzania*	—	—	18.0	22.1	18.0	18.0	
Togo**	15.1	28.1	19.5	15.7	14.2	13.6	
Uganda*	12.7	9.7	8.5	15.4	15.1	17.2	
Zambia*	28.7	30.2	16.1	14.3	14.3	16.6	
Zimbabwe	18.7	21.0	18.3	19.1	17.2	14.5	
North Africa	18.4	27.2	29.0	24.0	24.1	24.3	
All Africa	16.1	21.6	21.0	19.0	20.2	19.6	
Comparator countries	15.7	23.8	28.1	30.2	25.5	—	
China	21.7	30.6	35.4	38.7	38.8	39.9	
India	16.1	19.3	22.2	23.4	23.6	24.0	
Indonesia	9.2	21.6	26.8	28.4	14.0	—	
South Asia	16.3	20.6	22.0	23.0	22.6	—	
East Asia	22.4	29.9	32.5	36.9	35.8	—	

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL AGRICULTURAL GROWTH		1.5					
		Average annual percentage change in value added					
		1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa		—	1.6	2.4	2.6	2.2	3.9
Excluding South Africa		—	1.3	2.3	2.8	3.0	3.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria		—	—	2.6	2.8	3.4	4.1
Angola		—	—	—	-3.1	5.0	-10.1
Benin**		—	1.4	5.2	5.3	6.7	4.7
Botswana		12.0	7.9	2.4	0.3	3.5	4.5
Burkina Faso**		—	1.2	3.6	3.5	5.5	6.2
Burundi*		-1.9	2.4	3.1	-2.0	5.2	-3.0
Cameroon**		5.4	3.5	2.5	5.3	6.8	6.0
Cape Verde		—	15.9	15.3	5.4	2.7	11.7
Central African Republic**		2.5	2.2	1.7	3.7	4.1	4.8
Chad**		2.2	-0.4	3.1	4.9	11.1	-4.6
Comoros**		—	—	4.0	-0.5	0.0	1.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of		—	1.3	2.5	2.9	1.8	—
Congo, Rep. of**		4.2	2.2	3.3	1.7	3.3	1.6
Côte d'Ivoire**		5.2	2.2	-0.4	3.1	4.3	0.7
Djibouti		—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**		—	—	—	7.2	-11.7	9.9
Eritrea*		—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia*		—	—	—	—	—	—
Gabon*		—	—	1.5	-2.3	-5.3	—
Gambia, The*		4.5	5.1	1.2	2.0	3.0	16.5
Ghana*		2.8	-0.8	0.9	3.4	5.1	4.9
Guinea*		—	—	—	4.5	5.2	5.2
Guinea-Bissau*		—	1.1	5.0	3.6	-17.3	10.2
Kenya*		8.1	5.0	3.2	1.4	1.6	1.0
Lesotho		—	2.1	2.1	2.0	3.9	7.6
Liberia		—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*		—	0.2	2.4	1.5	0.2	1.4
Malawi*		-1.2	4.9	2.1	8.7	2.7	2.5
Mali**		-1.5	4.2	2.6	2.8	0.6	8.6
Mauritania*		-1.3	-1.7	2.0	5.2	6.2	9.0
Mauritius		—	-1.7	3.2	1.4	4.0	4.8
Mozambique*		—	—	7.3	5.2	7.0	5.4
Namibia		—	—	1.3	3.8	2.8	9.5
Niger**		0.2	-4.8	1.8	3.3	18.1	-1.2
Nigeria		-4.1	0.0	2.9	2.9	1.5	2.6
Rwanda*		4.7	8.1	0.8	-3.5	8.6	4.0
São Tomé and Príncipe*		—	—	—	3.6	4.4	4.5
Senegal**		0.9	2.3	2.8	1.6	-1.7	6.1
Seychelles		—	—	-2.3	-1.7	2.0	2.0
Sierra Leone*		1.8	5.5	3.5	1.6	-8.8	5.9
Somalia		—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa		5.5	3.0	2.9	1.0	-3.1	4.3
Sudan		—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland		—	-2.1	2.4	-0.1	2.3	2.3
Tanzania*		—	—	—	3.6	2.2	4.2
Togo**		6.2	1.3	5.7	4.5	-2.6	5.3
Uganda*		—	—	1.5	3.7	1.9	8.1
Zambia*		0.9	2.6	4.1	-4.4	-6.1	1.3
Zimbabwe		—	0.6	4.7	4.3	4.9	8.0
North Africa		4.2	2.6	4.4	2.3	9.9	5.1
All Africa		2.4	1.9	3.0	2.5	4.6	4.2
Comparator countries		3.4	2.2	4.5	3.2	4.6	-9.3
China		1.6	2.2	6.1	4.3	3.5	2.8
India		5.2	1.7	2.9	3.8	7.6	3.0
Indonesia		4.2	3.9	3.3	2.6	0.8	—
South Asia		4.9	1.6	3.1	3.7	6.6	2.6
East Asia		2.8	3.2	4.6	3.3	0.7	3.3

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

1.6

	Average annual percentage change in value added					
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.6	3.4	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.8
Excluding South Africa	—	5.0	1.9	2.1	4.6	3.9
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	4.0	2.3	5.4	4.1
Angola	—	—	—	4.2	9.3	1.4
Benin**	—	1.5	3.3	3.8	0.9	3.4
Botswana	12.8	16.7	10.8	2.8	2.5	2.0
Burkina Faso**	—	2.8	4.2	3.5	16.4	—
Burundi*	—	6.4	4.6	-6.7	1.8	7.2
Cameroon**	6.3	8.6	7.6	-2.0	7.7	5.0
Cape Verde	—	3.0	14.6	4.6	9.5	6.3
Central African Republic**	7.9	4.4	1.6	0.4	3.4	6.6
Chad**	1.6	0.5	7.9	2.2	10.4	-2.7
Comoros**	—	—	-2.3	3.2	0.1	2.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	-1.0	2.3	-11.7	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	9.3	9.8	5.5	-0.2	3.3	-2.9
Côte d'Ivoire**	10.4	8.8	5.1	6.4	10.2	5.0
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	47.5	42.8	17.9
Eritrea*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gabon*	—	—	0.4	2.7	1.3	—
Gambia, The*	2.6	5.3	4.3	0.7	5.2	3.6
Ghana*	5.2	-0.4	2.6	4.8	3.2	6.9
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.5	3.6	4.0
Guinea-Bissau*	—	2.1	1.3	-2.3	-40.0	4.8
Kenya*	8.7	9.6	3.7	1.9	1.3	1.4
Lesotho	—	28.5	4.7	5.7	-14.1	6.8
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.3	0.7	1.9	4.8	4.2
Malawi*	5.4	6.8	2.4	1.7	5.3	5.0
Mali**	1.9	2.7	4.7	6.4	6.5	1.2
Mauritania*	7.7	0.5	5.4	2.8	-0.3	-0.7
Mauritius	—	10.9	10.3	5.3	5.6	5.3
Mozambique*	—	—	-4.5	9.9	22.9	12.6
Namibia	—	—	-0.7	2.5	1.0	2.3
Niger**	4.9	10.5	-2.0	2.0	2.5	3.4
Nigeria	0.1	7.7	-2.1	1.7	2.9	3.5
Rwanda*	2.1	3.9	2.8	1.3	9.8	8.8
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	1.4	1.6	2.3
Senegal**	3.3	3.9	4.4	4.6	8.8	7.7
Seychelles	—	—	3.8	10.0	2.0	2.0
Sierra Leone*	-1.0	-3.4	0.2	-7.1	17.2	5.9
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.1	2.4	0.6	0.9	-0.9	-0.2
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	—	7.4	11.5	3.9	2.8	2.8
Tanzania*	—	—	—	2.6	8.5	7.6
Togo**	10.7	7.7	0.7	2.9	2.8	3.3
Uganda*	—	—	4.4	12.7	11.5	9.3
Zambia*	0.3	1.2	0.5	-4.3	-4.3	-1.9
Zimbabwe	—	1.0	6.1	-0.6	-1.7	6.8
North Africa	8.0	6.0	3.5	2.4	6.4	—
All Africa	5.6	4.1	1.9	2.0	3.4	3.1
Comparator countries	4.9	7.3	9.3	10.8	4.3	-5.9
China	2.3	8.0	11.6	14.4	8.9	8.1
India	4.6	4.6	6.8	6.7	4.0	7.5
Indonesia	12.8	10.7	6.5	7.8	-15.1	—
South Asia	4.9	1.6	3.1	3.7	6.6	2.6
East Asia	2.8	3.2	4.6	3.3	0.7	3.3

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

GDP DEFLATOR		1.7					
Average annual percentage change							
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999	
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.4	14.3	9.9	9.8	3.8	6.5	
Excluding South Africa	5.7	15.1	9.3	9.5	3.4	3.3	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.7	16.0	8.6	9.4	3.1	3.2	
Angola	—	—	—	813.8	60.9	412.6	
Benin**	1.9	10.0	1.9	9.4	4.2	3.5	
Botswana	2.7	11.5	13.6	—	7.9	7.5	
Burkina Faso**	0.4	9.2	3.5	6.2	3.1	1.6	
Burundi*	0.9	11.6	4.1	12.2	12.1	10.4	
Cameroon**	9.5	8.8	6.5	5.5	1.1	-1.2	
Cape Verde	—	8.1	13.2	5.1	4.0	4.3	
Central African Republic**	4.5	11.2	8.7	4.9	1.7	1.3	
Chad**	3.2	7.4	1.3	7.6	4.1	-2.1	
Comoros**	—	—	7.3	3.9	3.0	3.0	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37.9	27.8	58.8	1,423.1	15.0	—	
Congo, Rep. of**	3.9	8.5	0.7	7.0	-16.9	22.3	
Côte d'Ivoire**	2.5	13.1	2.8	8.3	2.7	1.3	
Djibouti	—	—	—	4.4	3.0	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	13.1	-24.1	38.4	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.7	2.7	12.6	
Ethiopia*	—	—	5.0	0.0	9.7	1.9	
Gabon*	5.6	17.1	1.3	7.2	-8.6	—	
Gambia, The*	0.9	11.0	18.2	4.4	1.3	5.2	
Ghana*	—	32.9	—	27.2	17.0	11.5	
Guinea*	—	—	—	6.2	5.0	4.0	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	5.7	55.5	37.6	7.6	3.1	
Kenya*	1.5	10.3	—	14.8	10.6	5.0	
Lesotho	3.1	10.7	12.0	9.6	8.4	7.2	
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	2.4	9.7	17.5	20.6	8.4	9.8	
Malawi*	1.8	8.8	14.1	33.5	23.2	45.8	
Mali**	12.0	9.6	5.1	8.5	4.0	0.0	
Mauritania*	1.2	9.8	8.8	6.1	9.9	1.9	
Mauritius	3.6	14.1	9.3	6.2	5.8	6.2	
Mozambique*	—	—	36.2	36.4	3.8	5.2	
Namibia	—	—	13.9	9.8	10.3	8.3	
Niger**	-0.1	9.6	2.5	6.4	3.0	3.0	
Nigeria	2.5	15.7	15.8	34.8	21.6	11.9	
Rwanda*	17.0	15.5	3.7	16.6	2.6	2.0	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	55.3	37.1	16.0	
Senegal**	1.7	8.4	7.3	5.2	2.2	1.6	
Seychelles	2.7	16.6	3.6	1.5	2.0	2.0	
Sierra Leone*	3.4	12.5	60.8	31.2	27.0	25.0	
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
South Africa	4.5	12.7	15.4	10.2	7.6	6.9	
Sudan	5.7	14.5	38.6	74.4	28.9	—	
Swaziland	—	11.9	9.9	12.1	8.5	9.5	
Tanzania*	—	—	—	23.2	19.3	11.6	
Togo**	2.6	9.3	5.2	8.3	2.7	1.1	
Uganda*	—	—	116.0	13.7	10.7	3.0	
Zambia*	13.8	7.0	37.4	56.9	23.2	0.0	
Zimbabwe	1.6	9.3	12.2	23.7	29.8	58.2	
North Africa	2.1	9.1	9.4	6.7	3.6	4.6	
All Africa	3.4	14.3	9.9	9.5	3.3	3.2	
Comparator countries	58.5	18.8	8.4	8.2	—	—	
China	-0.4	1.1	5.6	8.2	-2.4	-2.2	
India	6.6	8.3	7.9	8.6	8.9	5.5	
Indonesia	194.5	20.5	8.4	14.4	73.1	17.2	
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: World Bank data.

REAL GNP PER CAPITA				1.8	
	Average annual percentage change			Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1997-99
	1970-87	1988-99	1999		
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.4	-0.5	-0.3	639 (1974-76)	535
Excluding South Africa	-0.3	-0.1	0.9	342 (1976-78)	301
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.0	-0.3	0.9	351 (1976-78)	319
Angola	—	-8.8	-37.4	347 (1980-82)	151
Benin**	0.3	1.3	2.2	390 (1997-99)	390
Botswana	9.1	2.2	3.0	3,474 (1997-99)	3,474
Burkina Faso**	1.0	1.0	2.7	257 (1997-99)	257
Burundi*	1.5	-4.2	-2.5	206 (1990-92)	143
Cameroon**	5.2	-3.0	2.2	1,016 (1985-87)	633
Cape Verde	10.1	2.5	5.1	1,375 (1997-99)	1,375
Central African Republic**	-1.1	-1.0	1.9	470 (1976-78)	334
Chad**	-1.7	-1.0	-4.1	261 (1970-72)	220
Comoros**	—	-2.8	-3.8	539 (1983-85)	402
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	-2.7	-9.1	—	408 (1972-74)	114
Congo, Rep. of**	4.2	-1.9	4.8	1,025 (1984-86)	692
Côte d'Ivoire**	-1.2	0.6	1.1	1,136 (1977-79)	758
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	11.0	5.7	861 (1997-99)	861
Eritrea *	—	2.0	0.8	214 (1997-99)	214
Ethiopia*	—	1.4	4.8	117 (1981-83)	111
Gabon*	0.0	0.1	—	7,285 (1975-77)	4,050
Gambia, The*	1.1	-0.5	2.2	376 (1976-78)	351
Ghana*	-2.6	1.5	2.1	467 (1970-72)	392
Guinea*	—	1.9	0.9	592 (1997-99)	592
Guinea-Bissau*	-1.0	-1.0	2.8	224 (1995-97)	186
Kenya*	1.5	-0.2	0.1	337 (1988-90)	329
Lesotho	4.9	-0.2	-3.0	729 (1995-97)	700
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	-2.7	-1.0	2.3	386 (1970-72)	233
Malawi*	0.3	1.0	3.8	179 (1997-99)	178
Mali**	0.1	0.4	2.7	309 (1977-79)	262
Mauritania*	-0.9	1.1	2.0	483 (1970-72)	457
Mauritius	3.4	4.1	4.0	4,000 (1997-99)	3,999
Mozambique*	—	3.2	6.6	177 (1997-99)	177
Namibia	—	1.8	0.6	2,149 (1995-97)	2,137
Niger**	-2.5	-1.6	-1.4	385 (1970-72)	208
Nigeria	-1.7	0.7	0.5	294 (1977-79)	230
Rwanda*	1.8	-3.8	4.0	320 (1981-83)	213
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.4	-1.1	2.9	399 (1978-80)	298
Senegal**	-0.7	0.4	2.3	609 (1970-72)	573
Seychelles	2.7	2.5	-4.1	7,018 (1997-99)	7,018
Sierra Leone*	-0.4	-5.6	-9.8	350 (1980-82)	179
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.1	-0.4	-0.9	4,490 (1980-82)	3,843
Sudan	-0.4	2.9	3.6	276 (1976-78)	259
Swaziland	3.5	0.8	-0.9	1,553 (1990-92)	1,536
Tanzania*	—	0.5	3.1	172 (1997-99)	172
Togo**	-0.5	-1.3	-0.3	422 (1978-80)	329
Uganda*	—	3.9	4.8	335 (1997-99)	335
Zambia*	-2.9	-1.2	-2.1	609 (1970-72)	369
Zimbabwe	0.8	-0.2	-1.7	682 (1989-91)	656
North Africa	2.9	1.1	2.3	1,471 (1997-99)	1,470
All Africa	0.5	-0.1	0.5	723 (1980-82)	699
Comparator countries	4.0	5.2	3.4	2,109 (1997-99)	2,109
China	6.2	8.6	6.3	714 (1997-99)	714
India	1.8	3.5	4.9	426 (1997-99)	426
Indonesia	4.4	3.8	0.3	1,062 (1995-97)	969
South Asia	1.9	3.5	4.2	428 (1997-99)	428
East Asia	5.2	6.1	6.0	1,123 (1997-99)	1,123

— Not available.

* SPA countries.

+ CFA countries.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA		1.9		
		Average annual production of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses (kilograms)		
		1974-79	1980-89	1990-98
Sub-Saharan Africa		353.4	320.6	367.8
Excluding South Africa		358.6	325.1	373.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria		358.6	324.8	374.1
Angola		322.7	240.8	274.2
Benin**		517.8	497.2	630.4
Botswana		120.1	56.9	45.8
Burkina Faso**		199.8	212.5	237.3
Burundi*		384.8	380.1	335.2
Cameroon**		370.7	287.0	270.4
Cape Verde		40.6	85.5	68.3
Central African Republic**		554.4	405.9	328.0
Chad**		240.0	230.3	241.9
Comoros**		—	191.0	186.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of		553.9	556.2	497.6
Congo, Rep. of**		419.1	400.9	318.3
Côte d'Ivoire**		559.9	494.4	454.1
Djibouti		—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**		241.7	225.1	210.7
Eritrea*		—	—	52.9
Ethiopia*		—	—	136.4
Gabon*		501.2	454.3	398.2
Gambia, The*		107.8	136.9	103.3
Ghana*		406.0	401.9	599.7
Guinea*		335.1	263.3	253.5
Guinea-Bissau*		183.9	231.0	243.7
Kenya*		293.3	220.3	187.9
Lesotho		196.1	127.6	122.6
Liberia		338.2	307.5	164.2
Madagascar*		529.0	520.8	460.0
Malawi*		386.1	304.8	249.2
Mali**		202.7	200.0	235.9
Mauritania*		49.0	74.8	86.6
Mauritius		14.9	21.5	18.1
Mozambique*		381.5	340.1	329.2
Namibia		267.3	244.0	210.9
Niger**		363.1	343.9	320.5
Nigeria		413.8	384.3	666.8
Rwanda*		390.6	379.9	261.7
São Tomé and Príncipe*		162.4	123.6	118.5
Senegal**		178.9	156.6	126.8
Seychelles		3.3	2.2	2.0
Sierra Leone*		247.0	199.3	174.9
Somalia		49.5	69.2	39.9
South Africa		510.7	425.1	346.4
Sudan		190.6	157.7	172.5
Swaziland		228.0	196.5	133.4
Tanzania*		501.7	528.6	409.6
Togo**		474.5	414.8	411.8
Uganda*		538.6	449.0	383.5
Zambia*		340.4	244.6	209.1
Zimbabwe		354.0	308.8	216.2
North Africa		226.2	214.9	252.1
All Africa		289.8	267.8	310.0
Comparator countries		356.7	374.5	390.1
China		440.8	462.7	488.6
India		241.8	253.6	270.9
Indonesia		314.7	369.0	399.4
South Asia		—	—	—
East Asia		—	—	—

— Not available

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization data.

	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1997-99
	1970-87	1988-99	1998	1999		
	Sub-Saharan Africa	1.3	4.2	0.1		
Excluding South Africa	2.0	4.0	-1.2	3.0	66,012 (1997-99)	66,012
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.0	4.1	0.8	12.2	54,304 (1997-99)	54,304
Angola	—	6.7	-20.5	62.0	4,193 (1997-99)	4,193
Benin**	3.8	1.8	-1.0	12.2	729 (1979-81)	674
Botswana	—	1.8	-6.3	-6.2	2,743 (1996-98)	2,614
Burkina Faso**	4.0	1.5	10.5	5.6	388 (1997-99)	388
Burundi*	3.2	2.9	-8.6	36.5	140 (1997-99)	140
Cameroon**	10.4	1.5	11.1	12.9	3,018 (1997-99)	3,018
Cape Verde	7.6	11.8	-5.0	9.3	139 (1997-99)	139
Central African Republic**	2.4	4.9	1.8	22.9	320 (1997-99)	320
Chad**	-0.3	3.0	12.2	-13.2	357 (1997-99)	357
Comoros**	—	7.7	0.2	2.0	50 (1997-99)	50
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.9	-7.8	14.3	—	3,855 (1987-89)	1,965
Congo, Rep. of**	7.1	6.4	6.9	88.3	2,154 (1997-99)	2,154
Côte d'Ivoire**	6.4	4.4	-0.7	2.4	5,280 (1997-99)	5,280
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	36.0	23.1	15.8	445 (1997-99)	445
Eritrea *	—	0.5	-45.0	17.5	190 (1995-97)	150
Ethiopia*	—	4.8	-9.4	-1.0	1,162 (1997-99)	1,162
Gabon†	4.3	6.2	-2.7	—	3,208 (1996-98)	3,231
Gambia, The*	4.1	1.1	16.6	7.0	215 (1991-93)	208
Ghana*	-6.4	10.2	9.5	1.3	2,522 (1997-99)	2,522
Guinea*	—	4.1	12.8	8.7	915 (1997-99)	915
Guinea-Bissau*	0.2	12.0	-35.8	61.1	49 (1997-99)	49
Kenya*	1.0	2.7	-5.8	4.5	3,144 (1993-95)	2,618
Lesotho	7.0	9.9	-7.6	13.4	296 (1997-99)	296
Liberia	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Madagascar*	-2.5	4.7	2.1	20.9	925 (1997-99)	925
Malawi*	3.6	4.9	3.8	-0.2	572 (1997-99)	572
Mali**	7.2	9.2	0.8	6.7	799 (1997-99)	798
Mauritania*	4.1	-0.3	4.8	4.8	544 (1985-87)	448
Mauritius	4.2	6.0	5.1	5.2	2,935 (1997-99)	2,935
Mozambique*	—	14.7	6.5	8.3	453 (1997-99)	453
Namibia	—	4.3	-0.9	2.8	1,843 (1997-99)	1,843
Niger**	-1.0	0.8	8.7	-9.4	565 (1976-78)	334
Nigeria	-0.3	3.5	-8.3	-29.4	13,635 (1996-98)	12,034
Rwanda*	7.7	-7.0	-0.6	20.0	248 (1985-87)	131
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	2.8	22.6	77.5	16 (1997-99)	16
Senegal**	1.0	2.3	5.2	3.9	1,679 (1997-99)	1,679
Seychelles	—	3.9	4.9	2.2	383 (1997-99)	383
Sierra Leone*	-7.6	-8.2	5.7	2.1	773 (1970-72)	127
Somalia	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
South Africa	0.5	4.7	2.3	0.0	40,617 (1997-99)	40,617
Sudan	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Swaziland	4.5	2.0	3.0	3.3	1,176 (1997-99)	1,176
Tanzania*	—	9.4	-10.0	7.3	1,174 (1995-97)	1,072
Togo**	4.1	-0.8	-0.3	4.9	566 (1987-89)	508
Uganda*	—	13.6	-14.9	33.0	1,112 (1997-99)	1,112
Zambia*	-1.7	1.8	-7.5	-0.8	2,030 (1976-78)	1,486
Zimbabwe	3.1	10.1	25.2	3.5	3,567 (1997-99)	3,567
North Africa	3.7	3.7	-0.3	7.2	58,222 (1997-99)	58,222
All Africa	1.9	4.1	0.0	3.4	163,318 (1997-99)	163,318
Comparator countries	7.3	11.6	7.6	-13.9	325,196 (1997-99)	325,195
China	13.9	14.0	7.3	7.9	234,473 (1997-99)	234,473
India	5.3	11.3	4.2	4.2	47,037 (1997-99)	47,037
Indonesia	3.1	9.2	11.2	—	62,876 (1996-98)	65,529
South Asia	5.3	10.1	4.4	3.5	69,171 (1997-99)	69,171
East Asia	9.5	12.7	7.4	11.7	769,252 (1997-99)	769,252

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country.

REAL IMPORT GROWTH

2.2

	Average annual percentage change				Highest 3-year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US\$)	Average annual value (millions of 1995 US\$) 1997-99
	1970-87	1988-99	1998	1999		
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.7	4.2	2.6	1.5	113,678 (1997-99)	113,678
Excluding South Africa	3.1	3.2	2.9	6.4	76,149 (1997-99)	76,149
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	2.7	1.7	7.0	61,192 (1997-99)	61,192
Angola	—	7.2	-17.1	41.4	3,764 (1994-96)	3,144
Benin**	2.1	2.6	6.8	3.9	1,097 (1979-81)	842
Botswana	—	0.1	1.4	3.7	2,118 (1989-91)	1,987
Burkina Faso**	5.1	1.7	5.5	4.8	778 (1997-99)	778
Burundi*	6.9	-1.1	32.1	36.9	272 (1984-86)	233
Cameroon**	8.5	2.4	13.2	3.1	2,593 (1985-87)	2,516
Cape Verde	7.3	6.5	1.9	3.9	305 (1997-99)	305
Central African Republic**	1.8	-0.7	2.3	-3.2	307 (1990-92)	293
Chad**	0.8	-1.7	1.2	4.0	674 (1986-88)	584
Comoros**	—	-1.4	1.2	1.5	123 (1983-85)	97
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.2	-14.4	9.4	—	5,012 (1987-89)	1,450
Congo, Rep. of**	3.3	5.4	-9.0	49.1	2,271 (1982-84)	1,899
Côte d'Ivoire**	3.9	3.5	-1.3	3.9	4,210 (1997-99)	4,210
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	27.6	71.5	-43.0	551 (1997-99)	550
Eritrea *	—	14.5	3.6	6.7	675 (1997-99)	675
Ethiopia*	—	2.8	11.7	0.8	1,701 (1997-99)	1,701
Gabon†	8.3	0.8	-7.5	—	3,173 (1983-85)	2,525
Gambia, The*	1.5	1.5	15.8	6.0	329 (1979-81)	254
Ghana*	-5.1	9.6	12.1	13.7	4,229 (1997-99)	4,229
Guinea*	—	0.9	8.6	-0.3	932 (1997-99)	932
Guinea-Bissau*	-1.4	-2.7	-24.6	20.1	160 (1972-74)	92
Kenya*	-2.2	7.7	-4.2	-1.7	3,574 (1995-97)	3,533
Lesotho	9.4	3.7	-7.0	6.7	1,189 (1997-99)	1,189
Liberia	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Madagascar*	-3.9	4.1	1.6	16.5	1,752 (1970-72)	1,187
Malawi*	-1.5	3.3	-8.0	-2.6	828 (1997-99)	828
Mali**	8.0	3.0	5.0	1.3	1,102 (1997-99)	1,102
Mauritania*	7.1	0.7	13.7	-1.1	671 (1985-87)	585
Mauritius	3.7	4.5	3.5	4.5	3,080 (1997-99)	3,080
Mozambique*	—	2.3	24.2	55.3	1,440 (1980-82)	1,366
Namibia	—	2.3	0.2	-1.2	2,059 (1996-98)	2,097
Niger**	3.5	2.5	6.6	3.2	751 (1980-82)	504
Nigeria	5.2	5.1	7.8	4.0	29,965 (1980-82)	14,965
Rwanda*	10.0	7.2	8.2	-7.4	518 (1997-99)	518
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	-1.3	-19.1	32.0	49 (1989-91)	41
Senegal**	2.4	0.6	8.0	6.0	2,073 (1997-99)	2,073
Seychelles	—	11.1	14.2	1.8	494 (1997-99)	494
Sierra Leone*	-6.2	-4.4	40.0	1.5	655 (1970-72)	176
Somalia	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
South Africa	-0.8	6.6	2.1	-7.0	37,862 (1997-99)	37,862
Sudan	—	—	—	—	0 (1997-99)	—
Swaziland	6.3	-1.1	-26.3	-0.1	1,251 (1991-93)	1,006
Tanzania*	—	-0.7	-16.6	2.4	2,090 (1994-96)	1,533
Togo**	6.6	-2.3	2.1	0.9	888 (1986-88)	747
Uganda*	—	7.6	3.1	1.5	1,418 (1997-99)	1,418
Zambia*	-6.8	-0.4	-8.2	3.8	4,272 (1970-72)	1,656
Zimbabwe	1.8	10.9	10.1	-4.3	3,747 (1997-99)	3,747
North Africa	5.9	1.9	6.8	2.0	58,558 (1983-85)	56,781
All Africa	3.1	3.4	3.9	1.7	170,851 (1997-99)	170,851
Comparator countries	11.2	10.6	2.8	-10.3	314,165 (1997-99)	314,165
China	14.6	12.0	3.0	18.0	195,100 (1997-99)	195,100
India	6.8	10.3	12.0	5.5	70,282 (1997-99)	70,282
Indonesia	11.6	12.6	-5.3	—	70,622 (1996-98)	73,173
South Asia	5.4	8.9	7.2	3.7	100,777 (1997-99)	100,777
East Asia	10.3	11.5	-12.7	19.9	665,515 (1997-99)	665,515

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

	Index (1995=100)					
	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1997	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	122	127	102	102	96	97
Excluding South Africa	138	140	103	103	94	96
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	116	99	99	96	94
Angola	—	111	102	100	100	100
Benin**	96	82	88	90	95	82
Botswana	—	109	95	87	78	70
Burkina Faso**	55	67	89	84	91	79
Burundi*	166	126	82	90	76	94
Cameroon**	109	95	91	96	92	78
Cape Verde	63	100	100	100	100	100
Central African Republic**	97	83	82	78	64	55
Chad**	140	119	99	92	91	85
Comoros**	—	186	116	76	78	79
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	85	110	100	82	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	168	179	111	125	82	93
Côte d'Ivoire**	178	118	93	93	93	95
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	113	98	100	100	100
Eritrea*	—	—	103	109	110	110
Ethiopia*	—	90	94	76	89	78
Gabon*	140	206	114	122	97	—
Gambia, The*	160	122	101	101	101	101
Ghana*	162	150	102	97	119	117
Guinea*	—	136	105	97	96	92
Guinea-Bissau*	149	182	111	100	94	91
Kenya*	115	79	92	108	106	98
Lesotho	136	105	99	100	103	108
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	144	111	90	95	95	95
Malawi*	175	128	102	111	97	94
Mali**	105	109	102	97	100	88
Mauritania*	94	83	102	101	101	102
Mauritius	114	100	103	100	101	101
Mozambique*	—	203	121	98	104	138
Namibia	—	121	97	92	97	92
Niger**	62	118	100	100	100	122
Nigeria	152	231	120	119	87	106
Rwanda*	63	59	84	124	105	92
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	152	96	117	105	80
Senegal**	110	108	105	104	108	104
Seychelles	—	82	89	101	107	106
Sierra Leone*	74	83	94	100	100	98
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	98	102	100	100	100	98
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Swaziland	126	113	102	91	82	80
Tanzania*	—	127	100	94	104	114
Togo**	138	125	115	123	125	116
Uganda*	—	120	72	76	78	57
Zambia*	216	120	96	95	84	83
Zimbabwe	115	94	101	100	100	107
North Africa	157	169	105	109	100	99
All Africa	128	139	102	104	97	97
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	104	105	101	103	99	95
India	123	119	111	108	122	116
Indonesia	62	123	110	120	127	—
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, VALUE

2.4

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports (millions of current US\$)					
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997
Sub-Saharan Africa	557.7	2,314.5	2,064.8	3,004.4	3,143.0	3,008.4
Excluding South Africa	525.3	2,242.6	1,930.6	2,595.2	2,717.2	2,696.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	465.2	1,656.3	1,442.6	2,220.6	2,379.7	2,387.0
Angola	13.8	93.7	43.5	77.4	104.6	102.6
Benin**	4.5	17.0	15.5	33.3	34.1	34.1
Botswana	3.7	28.8	22.0	56.9	68.0	68.0
Burkina Faso**	7.4	23.2	36.0	37.5	41.3	41.3
Burundi*	0.9	7.7	7.4	9.1	4.7	5.8
Cameroon**	12.8	34.3	24.2	47.0	11.0	11.0
Cape Verde	4.7	11.3	9.0	11.9	9.9	11.3
Central African Republic**	1.9	3.9	5.7	10.4	4.4	4.4
Chad**	3.2	3.3	20.5	15.1	20.9	20.9
Comoros**	2.8	5.4	3.9	15.6	10.5	10.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	35.5	76.9	65.2	84.0	79.0	57.0
Congo, Rep. of**	4.0	21.4	19.0	30.3	28.2	28.2
Côte d'Ivoire**	52.2	164.3	96.4	199.0	167.3	163.9
Djibouti	2.9	12.9	13.6	12.9	12.6	12.6
Equatorial Guinea**	0.5	0.9	2.9	1.1	1.0	1.0
Eritrea*	—	—	—	17.0	39.3	29.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	—	141.2	85.0	85.0
Gabon†	1.6	9.2	15.3	30.3	33.1	33.1
Gambia, The*	1.7	9.0	12.0	28.8	29.5	29.5
Ghana*	28.7	54.8	29.1	78.9	119.8	164.6
Guinea*	10.6	61.4	28.0	110.8	73.6	81.0
Guinea-Bissau*	7.5	5.6	5.4	18.6	21.9	21.9
Kenya*	10.5	85.8	41.0	66.7	101.3	311.5
Lesotho	7.0	33.9	25.4	70.3	66.0	66.0
Liberia	14.4	38.7	38.6	39.1	45.6	39.1
Madagascar*	17.1	34.5	34.8	36.0	26.5	31.7
Malawi*	3.7	11.2	5.9	63.6	74.4	61.6
Mali**	25.2	42.1	55.5	27.3	21.6	20.1
Mauritania*	10.1	26.0	47.3	46.7	68.2	59.0
Mauritius	20.2	56.1	36.6	51.8	88.3	55.2
Mozambique*	14.6	83.0	111.9	116.0	95.5	47.8
Namibia	3.7	7.6	8.6	11.7	20.5	20.5
Niger**	2.4	24.7	47.2	29.4	29.4	29.4
Nigeria	60.1	586.3	488.1	374.7	337.4	309.4
Rwanda*	1.0	8.5	11.9	26.6	46.2	44.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6
Senegal**	63.0	114.4	92.2	192.1	219.4	152.0
Seychelles	1.6	3.7	2.4	6.6	7.9	7.5
Sierra Leone*	11.9	22.5	30.7	83.9	90.6	87.8
Somalia	8.1	69.5	46.3	24.8	29.2	27.5
South Africa	32.4	71.9	134.2	409.1	425.9	312.0
Sudan	26.2	71.1	202.5	96.6	109.1	146.6
Swaziland	—	—	4.4	16.1	16.1	16.1
Tanzania*	5.8	112.9	53.8	48.0	51.1	42.0
Togo**	3.5	12.1	10.1	15.3	19.8	21.3
Uganda*	3.2	15.2	3.8	9.1	9.7	11.1
Zambia*	7.0	108.6	32.0	30.9	33.5	10.4
Zimbabwe	3.2	26.7	22.6	42.2	107.7	59.0
North Africa	511.1	2,599.7	2,969.3	3,766.3	3,988.3	3,545.2
All Africa	1,068.8	4,914.2	5,034.1	6,770.7	7,131.3	6,553.5
Comparator countries	1,750.6	4,330.5	1,881.3	6,408.7	5,797.8	2,892.4
China	914.6	3,341.7	1,531.2	4,516.3	3,725.5	1,614.3
India	373.1	127.7	56.9	3.9	114.3	215.0
Indonesia	462.9	861.1	293.2	1,888.4	1,958.1	1,063.1
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, SHARE OF EXPORTS

2.5

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services					
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.7	2.8	4.1	3.3	3.1	2.9
Excluding South Africa	3.8	4.2	6.0	4.6	4.1	4.1
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.9	5.0	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.8
Angola	—	—	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.0
Benin**	3.9	5.3	4.3	6.1	6.1	6.4
Botswana	3.9	5.1	3.0	2.3	2.6	3.1
Burkina Faso**	17.3	13.4	23.2	12.3	15.0	15.5
Burundi*	2.6	9.5	5.8	7.1	9.3	6.0
Cameroon**	3.5	1.8	0.9	2.2	0.5	0.5
Cape Verde	31.7	58.9	29.1	12.6	8.9	8.6
Central African Republic**	2.4	1.9	3.2	4.5	2.4	2.2
Chad**	3.1	1.9	16.7	4.7	7.9	7.4
Comoros**	—	50.4	20.0	33.9	24.7	34.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.0	3.1	3.3	4.7	4.8	3.9
Congo, Rep. of**	2.3	2.1	1.5	2.4	1.6	1.6
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.8	4.6	3.0	4.8	3.3	3.4
Djibouti	—	—	—	6.5	6.3	6.1
Equatorial Guinea**	1.5	—	12.0	1.2	0.5	0.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.9	19.6	14.4
Ethiopia*	—	—	—	18.0	10.8	8.4
Gabon†	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
Gambia, The*	6.5	8.7	12.1	16.7	16.1	16.0
Ghana*	5.4	14.6	6.1	5.0	5.4	7.4
Guinea*	—	—	—	14.5	10.0	10.5
Guinea-Bissau*	139.3	39.6	38.8	62.8	77.0	38.8
Kenya*	1.5	4.2	2.6	2.2	3.4	10.5
Lesotho	31.0	37.4	62.3	35.4	28.5	23.4
Liberia	4.4	6.3	8.3	—	—	—
Madagascar*	7.3	6.4	9.9	4.7	3.2	4.1
Malawi*	3.0	3.6	2.2	15.0	14.4	10.1
Mali**	43.9	16.0	25.2	5.2	4.1	3.1
Mauritania*	6.5	10.0	11.5	8.9	13.2	13.7
Mauritius	11.1	9.7	6.4	2.2	3.2	2.1
Mozambique*	—	21.7	87.8	32.0	22.3	10.9
Namibia	—	0.4	1.0	0.7	1.2	1.2
Niger**	1.6	4.0	15.8	9.1	8.7	9.8
Nigeria	2.5	3.1	10.7	3.0	2.0	1.9
Rwanda*	3.0	5.0	6.5	40.0	55.4	30.7
São Tomé and Príncipe*	8.6	14.1	29.8	24.6	24.4	20.9
Senegal**	18.2	14.2	12.5	12.4	13.8	10.2
Seychelles	—	3.7	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.1
Sierra Leone*	6.8	8.2	17.2	80.2	55.2	78.3
Somalia	11.5	34.7	83.5	—	—	—
South Africa	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.9
Sudan	5.8	8.8	28.3	—	—	—
Swaziland	—	—	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.5
Tanzania*	—	—	12.6	4.3	4.0	3.4
Togo**	2.6	2.1	2.7	3.4	4.1	4.1
Uganda*	1.1	6.3	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.3
Zambia*	0.6	6.8	3.9	2.4	3.0	0.8
Zimbabwe	—	1.7	1.8	1.6	3.5	1.8
North Africa	5.8	5.6	8.4	6.8	6.9	5.8
All Africa	3.8	4.0	6.1	4.7	4.5	4.1
Comparator countries	14.6	8.1	3.0	2.5	2.1	0.9
China	18.5	21.9	5.0	2.7	2.2	0.8
India	11.0	1.1	0.4	—	—	0.5
Indonesia	12.8	3.2	1.5	3.6	3.3	1.8
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

CAPITAL FLOWS

GROSS CONCESSIONAL AID FLOWS

3.1

	Percentage of recipient country GDP					
	1973	1980	1985	1996	1997	1998
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	1.2	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.8
Excluding South Africa	—	1.7	2.7	3.6	3.2	3.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	2.8	3.4	4.4	3.9	3.8
Angola	—	—	0.5	2.9	0.9	1.3
Benin**	4.4	4.5	3.0	2.9	4.1	2.8
Botswana	0.4	12.6	7.8	6.1	6.2	6.5
Burkina Faso**	10.6	12.3	8.9	11.2	9.7	10.2
Burundi*	0.0	8.5	7.1	7.8	6.6	6.6
Cameroon**	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.3
Cape Verde	0.0	27.6	35.0	13.3	12.2	11.2
Central African Republic**	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	6.2	10.0
Chad**	8.4	2.7	13.0	11.9	10.5	7.6
Comoros**	—	10.4	32.0	12.5	11.8	11.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.7	1.8	2.8	3.8	1.1	2.4
Congo, Rep. of**	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.3
Côte d'Ivoire**	3.6	0.0	1.8	1.2	1.0	1.0
Djibouti	—	—	0.0	11.7	10.7	0.0
Equatorial Guinea**	0.0	—	10.9	2.6	1.9	1.6
Eritrea*	—	—	—	12.7	7.9	9.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	4.4	6.5	3.5	4.0
Gabon*	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.4
Gambia, The*	1.8	0.0	13.8	6.5	6.8	9.1
Ghana*	0.8	1.9	1.8	3.0	2.3	4.0
Guinea*	—	—	—	3.3	3.2	3.4
Guinea-Bissau*	0.0	0.0	18.1	26.0	20.1	1.3
Kenya*	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.4	0.8	0.7
Lesotho	0.0	-10.1	36.1	28.2	26.2	22.1
Liberia	0.0	3.2	0.0	—	—	—
Madagascar*	3.6	0.0	2.1	3.3	5.4	3.1
Malawi*	2.1	4.1	2.2	4.3	3.3	9.3
Mali**	6.4	4.4	12.8	7.7	6.0	4.8
Mauritania*	14.0	17.2	19.0	10.4	11.2	10.9
Mauritius	0.7	1.0	2.9	0.7	1.3	0.4
Mozambique*	—	1.6	3.1	7.9	9.1	8.0
Namibia	—	7.2	23.1	14.4	14.6	14.2
Niger**	9.2	6.4	0.0	5.9	6.1	5.5
Nigeria	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Rwanda*	12.2	11.1	7.0	18.9	14.2	12.1
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.0	0.0	0.0	48.0	71.2	32.6
Senegal**	6.8	5.0	7.4	6.6	6.2	5.1
Seychelles	3.3	9.8	8.5	8.8	8.0	6.8
Sierra Leone*	0.0	3.2	1.6	2.6	0.8	0.7
Somalia	6.0	23.6	0.0	—	—	—
South Africa	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.0	-0.1	0.0
Sudan	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.7	0.3	0.2
Swaziland	0.0	23.8	22.9	17.0	17.2	6.5
Tanzania*	—	—	2.9	10.0	9.9	8.3
Togo**	7.6	8.1	9.1	2.1	2.3	2.4
Uganda*	0.3	3.1	1.8	4.6	4.9	5.6
Zambia*	0.9	0.6	2.4	9.3	5.0	7.2
Zimbabwe	0.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2
North Africa	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.6
All Africa	0.9	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: Gross concessional aid flows include loans plus official balance of payments transfers. Group totals are weighted averages.

Source: World Bank data.

DEBT SERVICE RATIO		3.2					
	Percentage of exports						
	1973	1980	1985	1996	1997	1998	
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.8	11.4	26.3	14.4	15.3	15.0	
Excluding South Africa	9.8	11.4	26.3	15.9	14.2	16.6	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	11.1	18.2	22.9	16.1	15.9	17.5	
Angola	—	—	6.4	16.2	21.0	33.2	
Benin**	1.9	4.9	11.5	7.3	9.0	10.0	
Botswana	1.6	2.1	5.4	5.2	3.6	3.1	
Burkina Faso**	4.0	5.9	10.5	11.7	13.9	11.2	
Burundi*	2.9	9.4	20.4	53.7	29.1	40.2	
Cameroon**	7.6	14.6	23.4	24.0	21.5	23.0	
Cape Verde	—	—	14.0	3.8	6.6	9.5	
Central African Republic**	6.1	4.9	14.2	6.8	7.9	17.8	
Chad**	3.7	8.4	13.9	11.2	11.9	10.3	
Comoros**	—	2.6	8.9	2.3	8.2	13.4	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9.1	22.6	24.8	2.7	0.9	1.2	
Congo, Rep. of**	7.0	10.6	34.4	19.6	6.3	3.3	
Côte d'Ivoire**	7.6	39.1	34.8	27.2	28.3	28.5	
Djibouti	—	—	—	5.4	3.2	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	0.0	—	42.6	2.3	1.2	1.3	
Eritrea*	—	—	—	0.0	0.1	1.5	
Ethiopia*	6.4	7.6	28.4	42.2	9.6	11.3	
Gabon*	14.2	15.0	11.6	11.0	13.1	12.0	
Gambia, The*	1.4	5.7	10.8	13.5	12.8	10.7	
Ghana*	5.0	13.1	23.7	21.4	24.3	22.5	
Guinea*	—	19.8	—	15.4	20.1	19.3	
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	46.8	39.4	17.5	26.7	
Kenya*	9.2	19.7	39.2	27.8	22.2	18.8	
Lesotho	—	0.9	3.8	5.8	6.4	8.1	
Liberia	6.1	8.8	8.6	—	—	—	
Madagascar*	40.5	20.1	38.2	9.0	23.7	14.0	
Malawi*	9.3	27.8	39.0	16.9	13.6	16.0	
Mali**	7.4	5.1	19.7	18.5	11.5	11.3	
Mauritania*	9.0	17.3	24.5	20.4	22.9	23.9	
Mauritius	1.4	9.0	23.4	7.1	10.4	11.2	
Mozambique*	—	—	34.5	26.0	18.2	18.0	
Namibia	—	—	—	0.7	—	1.8	
Niger**	2.0	21.7	33.7	16.3	19.5	18.1	
Nigeria	6.1	4.1	33.6	15.2	8.9	12.5	
Rwanda*	0.2	4.1	10.8	19.7	14.3	17.4	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	5.1	29.0	28.2	28.9	30.7	
Senegal**	11.0	26.7	20.7	16.6	15.2	19.3	
Seychelles	0.0	36.2	7.9	4.8	4.0	5.5	
Sierra Leone*	9.3	28.0	13.0	36.5	15.7	22.2	
Somalia	3.7	4.9	14.2	—	—	—	
South Africa	—	—	—	11.6	17.3	12.3	
Sudan	13.8	25.1	12.8	7.1	9.0	9.8	
Swaziland	—	4.0	9.9	2.7	2.3	2.0	
Tanzania*	4.1	23.5	39.3	23.2	12.6	20.9	
Togo**	7.6	9.0	28.4	11.5	10.4	7.6	
Uganda*	8.4	17.3	38.0	19.9	18.4	23.6	
Zambia*	31.9	25.2	14.4	22.1	18.8	19.1	
Zimbabwe	2.1	4.0	34.0	21.1	22.0	38.0	
North Africa	9.9	13.7	25.1	21.5	19.3	21.1	
All Africa	9.9	12.5	25.7	16.8	16.7	17.2	
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	
China	—	—	8.3	8.7	8.6	8.6	
India	18.3	9.3	22.7	2.0	21.3	20.6	
Indonesia	—	—	28.8	36.6	30.0	33.0	
South Asia	17.3	11.8	22.2	20.8	21.0	18.9	
East Asia	—	—	23.8	12.1	11.2	13.3	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

CAPITAL FLOWS

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

3.3

	Millions of US dollars (net), current prices					
	1973	1980	1985	1997	1998	1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	726	-728	763	6,109	4,001	6,436
Excluding South Africa	749	37	1,260	4,643	5,172	6,174
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	375	776	915	3,104	3,952	4,705
Angola	—	—	278	492	1,115	1,889
Benin**	4	4	1	19	18	31
Botswana	53	109	52	100	100	100
Burkina Faso**	4	0	0	11	-13	13
Burundi*	—	1	1	0	0	0
Cameroon**	-1	105	274	100	-50	22
Cape Verde	—	—	—	12	6	69
Central African Republic**	0	5	2	-5	7	7
Chad**	6	0	53	39	88	38
Comoros**	—	0	0	0	0	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0	0	6	0	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	68	40	13	224	102	300
Côte d'Ivoire**	51	83	0	314	247	196
Djibouti	—	—	—	2	—	—
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	0	185	366	30
Eritrea*	0	0	0	39	32	36
Ethiopia*	31	0	0	0	0	0
Gabon*	16	24	144	-63	-60	—
Gambia, The*	—	—	1	9	12	13
Ghana*	14	16	8	55	-10	115
Guinea*	—	34	—	45	29	29
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	—	0	0	0
Kenya*	0	78	13	40	40	40
Lesotho	—	4	5	290	193	180
Liberia	49	—	-16	—	—	—
Madagascar*	11	0	0	14	16	58
Malawi*	8	10	1	24	34	25
Mali**	1	2	3	-14	-50	24
Mauritania*	10	27	4	-3	0	0
Mauritius	-3	1	7	26	25	21
Mozambique*	—	0	0	64	213	392
Namibia	—	—	—	90	99	95
Niger**	1	44	-10	0	0	8
Nigeria	373	-739	345	1,539	1,220	1,469
Rwanda*	2	16	15	3	7	5
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	0	0	4	3
Senegal**	5	61	-16	92	7	169
Seychelles	—	6	1	45	28	20
Sierra Leone*	7	10	3	0	4	2
Somalia	1	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	-23	-765	-497	1,466	-1,171	262
Sudan	—	0	0	180	670	130
Swaziland	—	18	9	34	10	30
Tanzania*	—	—	—	150	165	183
Togo**	2	42	31	19	1	0
Uganda*	5	0	30	160	190	230
Zambia*	32	62	0	207	219	150
Zimbabwe	—	-26	3	107	88	50
North Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—
All Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	0	65	1,191	0	0	0
China	0	57	1,031	41,673	41,118	—
India	0	8	160	3,557	2,380	2,500
Indonesia	—	—	—	550	-86	800
South Asia	—	—	—	4,611	3,438	—
East Asia	—	—	—	53,190	53,930	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

INFANT MORTALITY RATE		4.1					
Deaths per 1,000 live births							
	Estimate						Projection
	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992	1998	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	132	120	112	103	99	92	—
Excluding South Africa	136	123	114	105	101	93	54
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	136	127	119	110	106	98	57
Angola	173	161	149	138	125	124	66
Benin**	136	117	115	114	98	87	55
Botswana	88	76	67	57	53	62	15
Burkina Faso**	137	127	117	109	103	104	70
Burundi*	137	127	118	114	122	118	54
Cameroon**	119	102	103	78	83	77	25
Cape Verde	91	86	84	74	64	55	15
Central African Republic**	132	122	114	104	101	98	55
Chad**	166	154	120	118	110	99	69
Comoros**	—	138	106	90	80	63	37
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	127	117	109	100	93	90	42
Congo, Rep. of**	95	91	88	87	89	90	57
Côte d'Ivoire**	129	113	105	98	93	88	42
Djibouti	154	143	132	122	115	106	55
Equatorial Guinea**	158	149	138	127	117	106	59
Eritrea*	—	—	91	96	72	61	—
Ethiopia*	155	149	159	132	119	107	76
Gabon+	132	122	112	101	93	86	40
Gambia, The*	179	167	154	126	97	76	72
Ghana*	108	99	90	82	74	65	42
Guinea*	177	167	177	152	128	118	83
Guinea-Bissau*	183	176	164	151	141	128	94
Kenya*	98	88	66	63	61	76	27
Lesotho	130	121	117	107	98	93	36
Liberia	181	167	144	135	190	114	64
Madagascar*	150	130	112	110	98	92	51
Malawi*	191	177	163	137	134	134	83
Mali**	203	191	180	144	130	117	91
Mauritania*	142	125	117	110	101	90	68
Mauritius	55	38	28	24	18	19	8
Mozambique*	168	164	133	136	160	134	83
Namibia	113	98	84	68	61	67	24
Niger**	166	157	136	143	138	118	73
Nigeria	135	105	96	87	84	76	43
Rwanda*	142	133	124	115	144	123	59
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	80	74	52	49	26
Senegal**	122	130	112	85	75	69	39
Seychelles	—	—	19	18	16	15	7
Sierra Leone*	193	192	189	180	195	169	83
Somalia	155	149	143	132	165	121	78
South Africa	76	72	63	58	53	51	22
Sudan	110	97	92	86	85	69	45
Swaziland	133	108	94	84	75	69	55
Tanzania*	125	113	104	102	93	85	58
Togo**	129	117	97	88	80	78	37
Uganda*	104	116	116	116	97	101	64
Zambia*	100	94	88	113	108	114	58
Zimbabwe	93	86	76	50	53	73	22
North Africa	135	118	97	68	55	44	22
All Africa	133	119	109	98	93	86	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	61	40	39	38	38	31	18
India	132	129	105	95	79	70	39
Indonesia	114	105	80	72	55	43	32
South Asia	72	58	50	45	42	35	45
East Asia	135	130	111	101	85	75	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH

4.2

	Actual						Projection
	1972	1977	1982	1987	1992	1998	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	45	47	48	50	50	50	—
Excluding South Africa	44	46	48	49	49	49	60
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	44	46	48	49	49	48	59
Angola	38	40	42	44	46	47	58
Benin**	45	47	49	51	53	53	58
Botswana	53	56	59	61	54	46	73
Burkina Faso**	41	43	45	46	45	44	58
Burundi*	44	46	47	47	42	42	57
Cameroon**	46	48	51	53	55	54	65
Cape Verde	57	60	62	64	66	68	74
Central African Republic**	43	44	47	48	48	44	55
Chad**	39	41	43	45	47	48	57
Comoros**	47	49	50	54	57	60	67
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	46	48	50	51	52	51	61
Congo, Rep. of**	47	49	50	50	49	48	60
Côte d'Ivoire**	45	48	50	51	49	46	64
Djibouti	41	43	45	47	48	50	60
Equatorial Guinea**	41	42	44	46	48	50	58
Eritrea*	44	45	44	48	50	51	—
Ethiopia*	41	42	42	45	45	43	58
Gabon†	45	47	49	51	52	53	65
Gambia, The*	37	39	41	47	51	53	56
Ghana*	50	52	54	56	58	60	63
Guinea*	37	39	40	43	44	47	53
Guinea-Bissau*	37	38	39	42	43	44	48
Kenya*	51	53	56	58	57	51	66
Lesotho	49	52	54	56	58	55	69
Liberia	47	49	51	53	39	47	65
Madagascar*	46	49	51	53	55	58	60
Malawi*	41	43	45	45	44	42	53
Mali**	39	40	43	47	48	50	60
Mauritania*	43	45	47	49	51	54	57
Mauritius	63	65	67	69	70	71	76
Mozambique*	42	43	44	43	43	45	57
Namibia	49	51	54	56	59	54	66
Niger**	39	41	42	44	45	46	55
Nigeria	43	45	46	48	50	53	64
Rwanda*	45	45	46	48	35	41	54
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	61	63	64	76
Senegal**	42	44	46	48	50	52	58
Seychelles	—	—	69	70	71	72	78
Sierra Leone*	35	35	35	37	34	37	54
Somalia	41	42	43	45	39	48	58
South Africa	54	56	58	60	63	63	72
Sudan	44	47	49	51	51	55	62
Swaziland	47	50	53	55	58	56	66
Tanzania*	46	49	51	51	49	47	59
Togo**	45	48	50	51	50	49	64
Uganda*	51	49	48	48	46	42	53
Zambia*	47	49	51	50	49	43	53
Zimbabwe	52	54	56	57	56	51	64
North Africa	53	56	59	63	66	68	73
All Africa	47	48	50	52	53	54	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	63	—	68	69	69	70	75
India	50	53	55	58	61	63	70
Indonesia	49	53	56	60	63	65	69
South Asia	61	—	66	67	68	69	66
East Asia	50	52	55	57	60	62	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Source: World Bank data.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

4.3

	Percentage of population with access to health services (last available data between 1985 and 1993)		
	Total	Urban	Rural
Angola	24 (1991)	—	—
Benin**	42 (1991)	—	—
Botswana	86 (1988)	—	—
Burkina Faso**	70 (1985)	—	—
Burundi*	80 (1991)	—	—
Cameroon**	15 (1988)	—	—
Cape Verde	82 (1988)	—	—
Central African Republic**	13 (1993)	—	—
Chad**	26 (1991)	—	—
Comoros**	82 (1985)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	64 (1993)	—	—
Congo, Rep. of**	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	60 (1988)	—	—
Djibouti	99 (1993)	100 (1993)	95 (1993)
Equatorial Guinea**	65 (1993)	—	—
Eritrea *	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	55 (1993)	—	—
Gabon*	40 (1993)	—	—
Gambia, The*	100 (1993)	—	—
Ghana*	76 (1991)	—	—
Guinea*	45 (1992)	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	64 (1985)	—	—
Kenya*	80 (1993)	—	—
Lesotho	80 (1988)	—	—
Liberia	34 (1988)	—	—
Madagascar*	65 (1988)	—	—
Malawi*	80 (1993)	—	—
Mali**	40 (1993)	—	—
Mauritania*	35 (1993)	—	—
Mauritius	100 (1988)	100 (1988)	100 (1988)
Mozambique*	45 (1993)	100 (1993)	30 (1993)
Namibia	59 (1993)	87 (1993)	42 (1993)
Niger**	30 (1991)	—	17 (1993)
Nigeria	67 (1992)	87 (1993)	62 (1993)
Rwanda*	—	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe*	88 (1988)	—	—
Senegal**	85 (1993)	—	—
Seychelles	99 (1991)	—	—
Sierra Leone*	36 (1985)	88 (1993)	—
Somalia	20 (1985)	50 (1985)	15 (1985)
South Africa	—	—	—
Sudan	70 (1988)	—	—
Swaziland	55 (1993)	—	—
Tanzania*	93 (1993)	94 (1993)	73 (1993)
Togo**	71 (1988)	60 (1988)	60 (1988)
Uganda*	45 (1993)	—	—
Zambia*	75 (1988)	100 (1988)	50 (1988)
Zimbabwe	71 (1988)	90 (1988)	80 (1988)
Average	62	87	57

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: World Bank and World Health Organization data.

CHILD IMMUNIZATION AND ORT USE

4.4

	Percentage use among under-five-year-olds		Percentage of one-year-olds immunized			
	ORT		DPT		Measles	
	1987	1992-93 ^a	1987	1997	1987	1997
Angola	12	48	10	41	55	78
Benin	26	28	25	78	26	82
Botswana	46	64	48	76	48	79
Burkina Faso	15	15	34	70	65	68
Burundi	30	49	70	—	54	—
Cameroon	22	84	—	44	—	43
Cape Verde	9	5	92	78	75	82
Central African Republic	15	24	18	—	14	—
Chad	2	15	14	24	16	30
Comoros	18	70	71	48	71	49
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	10	46	38	18	41	20
Congo, Rep. of	2	67	57	23	66	18
Côte d'Ivoire	4	16	51	70	—	68
Djibouti	22	56	25	62	22	59
Equatorial Guinea	21	40	—	81	—	82
Eritrea	—	—	—	60	—	53
Ethiopia	23	68	16	63	13	52
Gabon	7	25	59	—	67	—
Gambia, The	3	51	85	96	88	91
Ghana	36	44	18	60	28	59
Guinea	1	82	—	53	—	56
Guinea-Bissau	1	26	55	63	60	51
Kenya	26	69	—	36	—	32
Lesotho	68	78	—	57	84	53
Liberia	9	15	19	—	40	—
Madagascar	2	26	—	—	27	—
Malawi	42	50	78	95	81	87
Mali	3	41	6	52	8	56
Mauritania	2	54	10	28	27	20
Mauritius	4	—	—	—	—	—
Mozambique	14	60	39	61	37	70
Namibia	—	75	—	63	—	57
Niger	24	17	—	28	—	42
Nigeria	20	80	21	45	24	69
Rwanda	24	36	79	77	74	66
São Tomé and Príncipe	46	50	72	73	69	60
Senegal	9	27	—	65	—	65
Seychelles	—	—	89	98	100	100
Sierra Leone	31	60	—	26	—	28
Somalia	12	78	25	—	29	—
South Africa	—	—	72	—	75	—
Sudan	25	47	29	79	22	92
Swaziland	—	85	86	67	77	57
Tanzania	14	83	81	74	78	69
Togo	19	33	54	33	57	38
Uganda	5	45	39	58	48	60
Zambia	59	90	65	70	65	69
Zimbabwe	26	—	84	78	80	73
Average	19	49	48	59	52	60
Median	15	49	50	63	55	60

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: ORT is oral rehydration therapy; DPT is diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.

a. Most recent available data.

Source: World Health Organization data.

TOTAL PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

4.5

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in primary school						Projection ^a
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	51	81	76	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa	48	80	72	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	49	72	67	67	—	—	74
Angola	75	175	92	—	—	—	101
Benin**	32	67	58	73	78	—	61
Botswana	63	91	113	108	108	—	117
Burkina Faso**	12	18	33	40	—	—	37
Burundi*	27	26	73	51	—	—	68
Cameroon**	92	98	101	87	85	—	101
Cape Verde	54	114	121	—	—	148	109
Central African Republic**	65	71	65	—	—	—	69
Chad**	35	—	54	51	58	—	57
Comoros**	33	86	75	75	—	—	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	95	92	70	—	—	—	76
Congo, Rep. of**	121	141	133	114	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	59	75	67	69	71	—	68
Djibouti	28	37	38	39	39	—	45
Equatorial Guinea**	90	160	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	56	53	—	—
Ethiopia*	14	37	33	38	43	—	25
Gabon*	165	174	—	162	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	25	53	64	77	—	—	66
Ghana*	62	79	75	—	—	—	77
Guinea*	31	36	37	48	53	54	37
Guinea-Bissau*	40	68	—	—	—	—	59
Kenya*	62	115	95	85	—	—	95
Lesotho	87	104	112	111	108	—	112
Liberia	—	48	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	81	130	103	92	—	—	93
Malawi*	37	60	68	134	—	—	65
Mali**	23	26	27	41	45	49	23
Mauritania*	15	37	49	75	79	—	55
Mauritius	96	93	109	107	107	106	104
Mozambique*	40	99	67	60	—	—	66
Namibia	—	—	129	133	131	131	116
Niger**	13	25	29	29	29	29	29
Nigeria	44	109	91	—	—	—	71
Rwanda*	70	63	70	—	—	—	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	39	46	59	64	68	71	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	35	52	50	—	—	—	48
Somalia	8	22	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	92	90	122	133	—	—	—
Sudan	38	50	53	50	51	—	49
Swaziland	87	103	111	121	118	117	105
Tanzania*	34	93	70	67	66	67	67
Togo**	71	118	109	119	120	—	111
Uganda*	38	50	75	74	—	—	80
Zambia*	90	90	99	89	—	—	90
Zimbabwe	70	85	116	114	113	112	118
North Africa	69	84	91	99	100	—	—
All Africa	55	81	79	80	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	91	113	125	118	120	123	—
India	78	83	97	100	100	—	—
Indonesia	80	107	115	113	113	—	—
South Asia	90	111	120	115	116	119	—
East Asia	71	77	90	99	100	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. As assessed in 1993.

Source: UNESCO data.

TOTAL SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.6

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in secondary school						
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	Projection ^a 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	7	15	23	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa	6	15	19	—	—	—	74
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	7	14	17	17	—	—	74
Angola	8	21	12	—	—	—	101
Benin**	5	16	12	16	17	—	61
Botswana	7	19	43	63	65	—	117
Burkina Faso**	1	3	7	—	—	—	37
Burundi*	2	3	6	—	—	—	68
Cameroon**	7	18	28	—	—	—	101
Cape Verde	—	8	21	—	—	—	109
Central African Republic**	4	14	12	—	—	—	69
Chad**	2	—	8	9	10	—	57
Comoros**	3	22	18	21	—	—	75
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9	24	—	—	—	—	76
Congo, Rep. of**	—	74	53	53	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	9	19	22	23	24	—	68
Djibouti	—	12	12	13	14	—	45
Equatorial Guinea**	16	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	19	20	—	—
Ethiopia*	4	9	14	12	—	—	25
Gabon†	8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	7	11	19	25	—	—	66
Ghana*	14	41	36	—	—	—	77
Guinea*	13	17	10	12	—	—	37
Guinea-Bissau*	8	6	—	—	—	—	59
Kenya*	9	20	24	24	—	—	95
Lesotho	7	18	25	31	31	—	112
Liberia	10	22	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	12	—	18	16	—	—	93
Malawi*	—	5	8	17	—	—	65
Mali**	5	8	7	10	—	—	23
Mauritania*	2	11	14	16	—	—	55
Mauritius	30	50	53	62	65	—	104
Mozambique*	5	5	8	7	—	—	66
Namibia	—	—	44	62	61	—	116
Niger**	1	5	7	7	7	—	29
Nigeria	4	18	25	—	—	—	71
Rwanda*	2	3	8	—	—	—	69
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	10	11	16	16	16	—	58
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	8	14	17	—	—	—	48
Somalia	5	9	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	18	—	74	94	94	—	—
Sudan	7	16	24	21	21	—	49
Swaziland	18	38	44	53	54	—	105
Tanzania*	3	3	5	5	5	—	67
Togo**	7	33	24	27	27	—	111
Uganda*	4	5	13	12	—	—	80
Zambia*	13	16	24	—	—	—	90
Zimbabwe	7	8	50	47	49	—	118
North Africa	24	41	62	64	64	—	—
All Africa	10	20	31	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	24	46	49	66	69	70	—
India	24	30	44	49	49	—	—
Indonesia	16	29	44	52	56	—	—
South Asia	24	44	48	64	67	69	—
East Asia	23	27	40	48	49	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

a. As assessed in 1993.

Source: UNESCO data.

FEMALE PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

4.7

	Percentage of total primary enrollment						Projection 2000
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	
Sub-Saharan Africa	40	42	44	45	45	—	46
Excluding South Africa	40	42	44	45	45	—	46
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	40	42	44	45	45	—	46
Angola	—	—	48	—	—	—	—
Benin**	31	32	33	36	36	—	38
Botswana	53	55	52	50	36	36	51
Burkina Faso**	36	37	38	39	39	—	45
Burundi*	33	39	46	45	45	—	45
Cameroon**	43	45	46	—	—	—	47
Cape Verde	—	49	—	—	—	—	50
Central African Republic**	33	37	39	—	—	—	44
Chad**	—	—	31	33	34	34	36
Comoros**	—	41	—	—	—	—	48
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37	42	43	—	—	—	47
Congo, Rep. of**	—	48	47	48	48	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	36	40	41	42	42	42	46
Djibouti	30	—	41	42	42	42	47
Equatorial Guinea**	—	—	—	—	—	—	50
Eritrea*	—	—	—	45	45	45	—
Ethiopia*	31	35	40	36	36	36	44
Gabon†	48	49	—	50	50	—	—
Gambia, The*	31	35	—	44	44	—	44
Ghana*	43	44	45	—	—	—	45
Guinea*	—	33	32	34	—	37	35
Guinea-Bissau*	—	32	—	—	—	—	41
Kenya*	41	47	49	49	49	—	50
Lesotho	60	59	55	53	52	52	52
Liberia	33	35	—	—	—	—	46
Madagascar*	46	49	49	49	49	—	47
Malawi*	—	41	45	47	47	—	43
Mali**	36	36	37	39	39	—	42
Mauritania*	—	35	42	46	47	47	47
Mauritius	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Mozambique*	—	—	43	42	42	—	47
Namibia	—	—	52	50	50	50	—
Niger**	34	35	36	38	38	38	40
Nigeria	37	—	43	—	—	—	46
Rwanda*	44	48	50	—	—	—	50
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	39	40	—	44	45	45	43
Seychelles	50	51	—	49	49	49	—
Sierra Leone*	40	—	—	—	—	—	45
Somalia	25	36	—	—	—	—	45
South Africa	—	—	50	49	49	—	—
Sudan	38	40	43	45	45	45	41
Swaziland	48	50	50	49	49	49	50
Tanzania*	39	47	50	49	49	50	51
Togo**	31	39	40	41	41	—	45
Uganda*	—	—	44	46	46	—	50
Zambia*	44	47	—	48	48	—	48
Zimbabwe	45	—	50	49	49	—	—
North Africa	36	42	43	45	45	45	46
All Africa	39	42	44	45	45	44	—
Comparator countries	37	42	47	48	48	48	—
China	—	—	46	47	47	48	47
India	37	39	—	—	—	—	48
Indonesia	—	46	49	48	48	48	49
South Asia	36	38	—	—	—	—	42
East Asia	—	—	47	47	48	48	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

† CFA country.

Note: For years for which new data are unavailable, last available data are repeated.

Source: UNESCO data.

FEMALE SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

4.8

	Percentage of total secondary enrollment						Projection 2000
	1970	1980	1990	1995	1996	1997	
Sub-Saharan Africa	30	34	39	42	42	41	40
Excluding South Africa	29	34	38	41	41	41	40
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	29	34	38	41	41	41	40
Angola	44	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benin**	30	26	27	30	30	30	31
Botswana	47	56	53	53	53	53	49
Burkina Faso**	25	33	33	—	—	—	39
Burundi*	14	25	37	—	—	—	47
Cameroon**	26	34	41	—	—	—	41
Cape Verde	—	43	—	—	—	—	45
Central African Republic**	17	25	29	—	—	—	34
Chad**	8	—	16	19	20	20	25
Comoros**	25	34	—	—	—	—	44
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	21	—	—	—	—	—	36
Congo, Rep. of**	30	40	42	42	42	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	21	28	32	33	32	32	37
Djibouti	33	—	35	39	39	39	48
Equatorial Guinea**	29	—	—	—	—	—	36
Eritrea*	—	—	49	43	42	42	—
Ethiopia*	24	36	43	43	42	42	44
Gabon*	30	42	—	49	49	—	—
Gambia, The*	25	30	—	—	—	—	39
Ghana*	26	38	39	—	—	—	40
Guinea*	21	28	23	25	26	26	31
Guinea-Bissau*	38	22	—	—	—	—	38
Kenya*	30	42	43	46	46	—	49
Lesotho	53	60	60	59	59	59	55
Liberia	23	28	—	—	—	—	23
Madagascar*	41	—	50	50	50	—	48
Malawi*	29	22	19	35	35	—	42
Mali**	22	29	35	33	33	33	39
Mauritania*	11	21	33	34	34	—	41
Mauritius	40	48	50	51	51	51	50
Mozambique*	—	29	38	40	40	—	35
Namibia	—	—	56	54	54	53	—
Niger**	26	29	29	35	36	36	33
Nigeria	33	35	—	—	—	—	35
Rwanda*	30	28	36	—	—	—	51
São Tomé and Príncipe*	44	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	28	34	35	38	37	38	39
Seychelles	54	47	—	50	50	50	—
Sierra Leone*	28	30	36	—	—	—	39
Somalia	21	28	—	—	—	—	38
South Africa	49	—	54	54	54	—	—
Sudan	28	37	44	47	47	47	42
Swaziland	43	49	50	51	50	50	52
Tanzania*	28	33	42	44	46	45	48
Togo**	21	24	25	26	27	27	29
Uganda*	24	29	37	38	38	—	40
Zambia*	33	35	—	—	—	—	40
Zimbabwe	39	—	47	46	46	46	—
North Africa	27	38	45	46	46	47	46
All Africa	30	34	40	42	42	42	—
Comparator countries	32	36	41	43	42	45	—
China	—	40	42	45	45	45	47
India	28	32	36	38	38	—	43
Indonesia	37	—	45	46	—	—	48
South Asia	—	41	43	45	45	45	42
East Asia	27	31	35	38	38	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: Data include vocational and technical training. For years for which new data are unavailable, last available data are repeated.

Source: UNESCO data.

POPULATION

5.1

	Millions									
	Estimate						Standard projection ^a		Rapid projection ^a	
	1970	1980	1990	1997	1998	1999	2025	Stabili- zation	2025	Stabili- zation
Sub-Saharan Africa	288.6	380.7	508.3	612.0	627.8	642.9	1,282.9	2,653.5	932.1	1,450.4
Excluding South Africa	266.5	353.2	473.1	571.4	586.4	600.8	1,214.2	2,557.8	876.7	1,377.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	213.3	282.0	376.9	453.7	465.6	476.9	997.3	2,162.4	703.6	1,109.0
Angola	5.6	7.0	9.2	11.7	12.0	12.4	26.1	61.3	17.2	26.3
Benin**	2.7	3.5	4.7	5.8	5.9	6.1	10.9	19.1	8.5	13.4
Botswana	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.7	3.6	2.3	3.3
Burkina Faso**	5.6	7.0	8.9	10.5	10.7	11.0	22.7	47.9	15.3	23.5
Burundi*	3.5	4.1	5.5	6.4	6.5	6.7	14.0	32.0	9.3	14.7
Cameroon**	6.6	8.7	11.5	13.9	14.3	14.7	28.7	52.9	21.5	32.4
Cape Verde	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.5	0.6	0.9
Central African Republic**	1.8	2.3	2.9	3.4	3.5	3.5	7.3	11.4	4.9	7.6
Chad**	3.7	4.5	5.7	7.1	7.3	7.5	13.6	27.7	9.3	13.9
Comoros**	—	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.4	2.5	1.0	1.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	20.3	27.0	37.4	46.7	48.2	49.8	100.3	170.9	72.0	116.3
Congo, Rep. of**	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.7	2.8	2.9	6.5	14.2	4.5	7.0
Côte d'Ivoire**	5.5	8.2	11.6	14.2	14.5	14.7	33.1	63.4	24.1	38.4
Djibouti	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.4	2.5	1.0	1.6
Equatorial Guinea**	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.1
Eritrea*	1.8	2.4	3.1	3.8	3.9	4.0	7.8	22.6	6.0	9.6
Ethiopia*	28.9	37.7	51.2	59.8	61.3	62.8	143.9	416.7	98.0	156.7
Gabon*	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	3.0	6.1	2.0	3.2
Gambia, The*	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.2	4.9	1.4	2.2
Ghana*	8.6	10.7	14.9	18.0	18.5	18.9	36.2	61.5	27.6	42.1
Guinea*	3.9	4.5	5.8	6.9	7.1	7.2	14.5	32.8	9.6	14.8
Guinea-Bissau*	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.9	3.8	1.4	2.3
Kenya*	11.5	16.6	23.6	28.2	28.8	29.4	72.9	124.3	50.7	81.4
Lesotho	1.1	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.1	3.6	6.0	3.1	4.6
Liberia	1.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.0	3.0	6.2	10.7	4.8	7.0
Madagascar*	6.9	8.9	11.6	14.1	14.6	15.1	25.9	45.3	20.9	31.7
Malawi*	4.5	6.2	8.5	10.3	10.5	10.8	24.4	62.2	15.9	25.6
Mali**	5.3	6.6	8.5	10.3	10.6	10.9	23.8	57.5	15.5	24.4
Mauritania*	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.6	5.4	13.7	3.3	5.1
Mauritius	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
Mozambique*	9.4	12.1	14.2	16.6	16.9	17.3	43.1	96.4	26.7	41.3
Namibia	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7	3.3	7.1	3.3	5.0
Niger**	4.2	5.6	7.7	9.8	10.1	10.5	24.3	71.7	14.3	23.1
Nigeria	53.2	71.1	96.2	117.7	120.8	123.9	216.9	395.4	173.1	268.3
Rwanda*	3.7	5.2	7.0	7.9	8.1	8.3	16.7	65.0	15.3	26.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3
Senegal**	4.2	5.5	7.3	8.8	9.0	9.3	17.9	43.2	12.8	20.4
Seychelles	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sierra Leone*	2.7	3.2	4.0	4.7	4.9	4.9	10.1	23.0	6.6	10.1
Somalia	3.6	5.9	7.8	8.8	9.1	9.4	21.0	46.7	13.8	20.9
South Africa	22.1	27.6	35.2	40.7	41.4	42.1	68.7	95.7	55.4	73.1
Sudan	13.9	18.7	24.1	27.7	28.3	29.0	60.3	101.5	43.9	66.9
Swaziland	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.2	4.1	1.7	2.7
Tanzania*	13.7	18.6	25.5	31.3	32.1	32.9	58.9	144.3	42.2	66.9
Togo**	2.0	2.6	3.5	4.3	4.5	4.6	9.3	17.4	6.9	10.8
Uganda*	9.8	12.8	16.3	20.3	20.9	21.5	48.2	90.7	30.1	49.8
Zambia*	4.2	5.7	7.8	9.4	9.7	9.9	20.7	41.3	15.1	25.6
Zimbabwe	5.3	7.0	9.7	11.5	11.7	11.9	17.6	27.6	16.8	24.6
North Africa	69.2	88.4	114.1	131.1	133.3	135.5	216.0	320.5	185.9	248.6
All Africa	357.8	469.1	622.4	743.1	761.1	778.4	1,498.9	2,974.0	1,118.0	1,699.0
Comparator countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	—	—	—	—
China	818.3	981.2	1,135.2	1,227.2	1,238.6	1,249.7	1,569.5	1,885.7	1,572.5	1,841.0
India	547.6	687.3	849.5	962.4	979.7	997.5	1,365.0	1,854.8	1,247.5	1,626.2
Indonesia	117.5	148.3	178.2	200.4	203.7	207.0	264.8	353.9	260.5	339.9
South Asia	711.7	902.6	1,122.1	1,280.5	1,304.6	1,329.3	458.8	74.2.8	422.7	599.7
East Asia	1,150.4	1,397.8	1,640.8	1,796.7	1,817.1	1,836.9	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

POPULATION GROWTH

5.2

	Average annual percentage change						Standard projection ^a	Rapid projection ^a
	1965-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	1998	1999		
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.2	1.2
Angola	1.5	2.3	2.7	3.3	2.9	2.9	2.5	1.0
Benin**	2.6	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	1.6	1.2
Botswana	2.9	3.6	3.5	2.5	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.1
Burkina Faso**	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.1
Burundi*	1.9	1.5	2.8	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	1.2
Cameroon**	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.8	1.1
Cape Verde	3.4	0.7	1.7	2.6	3.0	3.0	1.4	1.1
Central African Republic**	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.7	2.2	1.2
Chad**	1.8	2.0	2.6	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.0	0.9
Comoros**	—	—	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.1	1.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	2.1	1.2
Congo, Rep. of**	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.4	1.3
Côte d'Ivoire**	4.0	4.1	3.6	2.7	2.0	1.6	2.0	1.2
Djibouti	6.5	6.6	6.5	2.6	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.1
Equatorial Guinea**	2.2	-4.2	5.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	1.4	0.8
Eritrea*	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.1	1.2
Ethiopia*	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.6	1.4
Gabon*	0.0	3.3	3.4	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3	1.0
Gambia, The*	2.8	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.0	2.9	2.2	1.2
Ghana*	1.8	2.2	3.4	2.7	2.6	2.6	1.7	0.9
Guinea*	2.3	1.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.2
Guinea-Bissau*	-0.3	4.5	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.6	0.9
Kenya*	3.3	3.7	3.6	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.6	1.3
Lesotho	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.3	1.1
Liberia	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.8	1.7	1.2
Madagascar*	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.1	1.5	1.2
Malawi*	2.5	3.2	3.2	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.7	1.4
Mali**	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.5	1.0
Mauritania*	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.5	1.2
Mauritius	1.9	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.5	0.5
Mozambique*	2.4	2.5	1.7	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.5	1.0
Namibia	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4	1.5	1.1
Niger**	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.4	2.9	1.1
Nigeria	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.5	1.6	1.1
Rwanda*	3.2	3.3	3.1	1.5	2.7	2.5	2.0	1.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	1.3	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.2	1.3	1.1
Senegal**	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	1.8	1.2
Seychelles	2.5	1.9	0.8	1.5	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9
Sierra Leone*	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.1	1.1
Somalia	2.7	5.2	2.1	1.6	3.4	3.4	2.2	1.2
South Africa	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.1	0.8
Sudan	2.3	3.1	2.6	2.1	2.2	2.3	1.7	1.4
Swaziland	2.5	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.0	1.4
Tanzania*	3.1	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.5	1.7	1.1
Togo**	4.4	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.6	2.4	1.9	1.1
Uganda*	4.2	2.7	2.3	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.7	1.0
Zambia*	3.0	3.2	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.2
Zimbabwe	3.3	2.8	3.4	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.1	1.1
North Africa	2.6	2.4	2.6	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9
All Africa	2.6	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.0
Comparator countries	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.3	—	—
China	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6
India	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	0.9	0.7
Indonesia	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	0.7	0.7
South Asia	2.4	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.2	1.0
East Asia	2.7	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.1	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

5.3

	Average number of children						Standard projection ^a	Rapid projection ^a
	Actual							
	1970	1980	1990	1992	1997	1998		
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.6	6.6	6.0	5.9	5.5	5.4	—	—
Excluding South Africa	6.7	6.8	6.2	6.1	5.7	5.6	3.6	2.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.6	6.8	6.3	6.2	5.8	5.7	3.8	2.3
Angola	6.5	6.9	7.2	7.2	6.8	6.7	4.5	2.3
Benin**	6.9	7.0	6.6	6.5	5.8	5.7	2.9	2.2
Botswana	6.7	6.1	5.1	4.8	4.3	4.2	2.1	2.1
Burkina Faso**	7.0	7.5	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.7	3.5	2.3
Burundi*	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.2	3.8	2.3
Cameroon**	6.2	6.4	6.0	5.7	5.1	5.0	2.8	2.1
Cape Verde	7.0	6.5	5.7	5.3	4.0	3.9	2.1	—
Central African Republic**	5.7	5.8	5.5	5.3	4.9	4.8	4.0	2.2
Chad**	6.0	6.9	7.1	6.9	6.5	6.4	3.7	2.3
Comoros**	—	7.2	5.8	5.2	4.6	4.5	3.2	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	6.2	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.3	3.5	2.2
Congo, Rep. of**	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.1	6.0	3.8	2.2
Côte d'Ivoire**	7.4	7.4	6.2	5.7	5.1	5.0	3.3	2.8
Djibouti	6.7	6.6	6.0	5.8	5.3	5.2	3.6	—
Equatorial Guinea**	5.7	5.7	5.9	5.9	5.5	5.4	2.8	—
Eritrea*	—	—	6.7	6.5	5.8	5.7	—	—
Ethiopia*	5.8	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.4	4.5	2.3
Gabon*	4.2	4.5	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.1	3.7	2.2
Gambia, The*	6.5	6.5	5.9	6.0	5.7	5.6	4.1	2.4
Ghana*	6.7	6.5	5.8	5.5	4.9	4.8	2.8	2.2
Guinea*	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.5	5.4	4.1	2.5
Guinea-Bissau*	5.3	5.8	6.0	6.0	5.8	5.6	3.7	2.6
Kenya*	8.1	7.8	5.6	5.2	4.7	4.6	4.0	2.1
Lesotho	5.7	5.5	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.6	2.2	2.5
Liberia	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.2	2.9	2.1
Madagascar*	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.8	5.7	2.8	2.3
Malawi*	7.3	7.6	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.4	5.2	2.4
Mali**	7.1	7.1	—	—	6.6	6.5	4.2	2.3
Mauritania*	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.9	5.5	5.4	4.4	2.3
Mauritius	3.6	2.7	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Mozambique*	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.3	5.3	5.2	4.6	2.8
Namibia	6.0	5.9	5.4	5.3	4.9	4.8	2.5	2.1
Niger**	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.3	5.2	2.3
Nigeria	6.9	6.9	6.0	5.9	5.3	5.3	2.8	2.2
Rwanda*	8.2	8.3	6.7	6.6	6.2	6.1	3.8	2.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.6	2.2	—
Senegal**	7.0	6.8	6.2	6.0	5.6	5.5	3.2	2.3
Seychelles	—	—	2.8	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	—
Sierra Leone*	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.1	6.0	4.1	2.4
Somalia	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.2	3.8	2.3
South Africa	5.7	4.6	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.1	2.1
Sudan	6.7	6.5	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.6	3.0	2.2
Swaziland	6.5	6.2	5.3	5.1	4.7	4.6	3.1	—
Tanzania*	6.8	6.7	6.3	6.0	5.5	5.4	3.0	2.3
Togo**	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.6	5.2	5.1	3.0	2.2
Uganda*	7.1	7.2	7.0	6.9	6.6	6.5	4.9	2.3
Zambia*	6.8	7.0	6.3	6.2	5.6	5.5	3.9	2.2
Zimbabwe	7.3	6.4	4.8	4.3	3.8	3.7	2.2	2.1
North Africa	6.5	5.6	4.1	3.8	3.2	3.2	2.2	2.1
All Africa	6.6	6.4	5.6	5.5	5.0	5.0	—	—
Comparator countries	5.7	3.9	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.6	—	—
China	5.8	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.1
India	5.8	5.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.2	2.2	2.1
Indonesia	5.5	4.3	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.2	2.1
South Asia	6.0	5.3	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	2.4	2.2
East Asia	5.7	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	—	—

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

a. See technical notes for definition.

Source: World Bank data.

CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE

5.4

	Percentage of women or their spouses using contraception			
	Latest survey	Target		
		2000	2025	
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.5 1996	—	—	
Excluding South Africa	19.5 1996	38.0	72.0	
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	19.5 1996	38.0	72.0	
Angola	1.0 1977	33.0	69.0	
Benin**	16.8 1996	40.0	71.0	
Botswana	33.0 1988	65.0	75.0	
Burkina Faso**	7.7 1993	38.0	68.0	
Burundi*	9.0 1989	40.0	72.0	
Cameroon**	19.4 1998	29.0	72.0	
Cape Verde	52.9 1998	—	—	
Central African Republic**	14.8 1994	38.0	69.0	
Chad**	4.2 1996	43.0	71.0	
Comoros**	21.0 1996	—	—	
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	8.0 1997	34.0	73.0	
Congo, Rep. of**	— —	30.0	74.0	
Côte d'Ivoire**	11.4 1994	30.0	74.0	
Djibouti	— —	—	—	
Equatorial Guinea**	15.0 1993	—	—	
Eritrea*	19.8 1995	—	—	
Ethiopia*	4.0 1993	34.0	73.0	
Gabon*	— —	40.0	76.0	
Gambia, The*	11.8 1990	33.0	65.0	
Ghana*	20.3 1993	45.0	73.0	
Guinea*	2.0 1992	32.0	64.0	
Guinea-Bissau*	1.0 1977	36.0	68.0	
Kenya*	39.0 1998	57.0	80.0	
Lesotho	23.2 1991	48.0	73.0	
Liberia	6.4 1986	41.0	72.0	
Madagascar*	19.3 1997	37.0	68.0	
Malawi*	22.0 1996	35.0	74.0	
Mali**	7.0 1996	35.0	71.0	
Mauritania*	4.1 1990	35.0	68.0	
Mauritius	75.0 1991	81.0	77.0	
Mozambique*	5.5 1997	29.0	67.0	
Namibia	28.9 1992	—	—	
Niger**	8.2 1997	30.0	70.0	
Nigeria	10.0 1993	38.0	73.0	
Rwanda*	21.0 1992	38.0	78.0	
São Tomé and Príncipe*	10.0 1989	—	—	
Senegal**	13.0 1997	46.0	73.0	
Seychelles	58.0 1993	—	—	
Sierra Leone*	4.0 1989	39.0	67.0	
Somalia	— —	35.0	69.0	
South Africa	69.0 1994	71.0	79.0	
Sudan	10.0 1993	36.0	69.0	
Swaziland	21.0 1989	—	—	
Tanzania*	18.0 1996	34.0	70.0	
Togo**	23.6 1998	57.0	81.0	
Uganda*	15.0 1997	35.0	73.0	
Zambia*	25.9 1996	29.0	72.0	
Zimbabwe	58.0 1994	71.0	80.0	
North Africa	49.0 1995	63.0	74.0	
All Africa	19.5 1996	—	—	
Comparator countries	— —	70.0	75.0	
China	83.4 1992	79.0	79.0	
India	43.0 1993	64.0	73.0	
Indonesia	57.4 1997	68.0	71.0	
South Asia	49.0 1997	55.0	72.0	
East Asia	57.0 1997	—	—	

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Source: Data on contraceptive use from the African Population Advisory Committee, a Population Council data bank.

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANS (EAP)

5.5

	Completed as of fiscal 1999	Expected completion date after 1999	No action
Angola			■
Benin* ⁺	■		
Botswana ^a	■		
Burkina Faso**	■		
Burundi*	■		
Cameroon**	■		
Cape Verde	■		
Central African Republic**	■		
Chad**		■ 2002	
Comoros**	■		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of			■
Congo, Rep. of**	■		
Côte d'Ivoire**	■		
Djibouti			■
Equatorial Guinea**			■
Eritrea*	■		
Ethiopia*	■		
Gabon*	■		
Gambia, The*	■		
Ghana*	■		
Guinea*	■		
Guinea-Bissau*	■		
Kenya*	■		
Lesotho	■		
Liberia			■
Madagascar*	■		
Malawi*	■		
Mali**	■		
Mauritania*		■	
Mauritius	■		
Mozambique*	■		
Namibia			■
Niger**	■		
Nigeria	■		
Rwanda*	■		
São Tomé and Príncipe*	■		
Senegal**	■		
Seychelles	■		
Sierra Leone*	■		
Somalia			■
South Africa			■
Sudan			■
Swaziland			■
Tanzania*	■		
Togo**	■		
Uganda*	■		
Zambia*	■		
Zimbabwe	■		
Total	36	2	10

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

Note: For the Africa Region, the environmental action plan is considered an in-country, demand-driven process. It is not possible in many cases to identify definitive completion dates even though the process may be in an advanced stage, because completion depends on government approval.

a. National Conservation Strategy in lieu of Environmental Action Plan.

Source: World Bank data.

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, SHARE OF GDP 6.1

	Percentage of GDP							
	1973	1980	1985	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Australia	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Austria	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
Belgium	0.27	0.24	0.23	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11
Canada	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05
Denmark	0.11	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.25
Finland	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06
France	0.19	0.15	0.22	0.28	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.15
Germany	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Ireland	—	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.11
Italy	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04
Japan	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
Luxembourg	—	—	—	0.11	0.15	0.17	0.19	0.20
Netherlands	0.06	0.22	0.21	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.17
New Zealand	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Norway	0.10	0.20	0.28	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25
Portugal	—	—	—	0.24	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.15
Spain	—	—	—	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03
Sweden	0.14	0.23	0.26	0.22	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.16
Switzerland	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06
United Kingdom	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.07
United States	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Average	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10

— Not available.

Note: ODA is official development assistance.

Source: OECD for ODA; World Bank for GDP.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RESPONSES

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, VALUE

6.2

	Millions of U.S. dollars							
	1973	1980	1985	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Bilateral								
Australia	2.0	21.1	33.3	66.6	60.5	60.6	49.3	36.3
Austria	0.7	9.6	15.5	70.0	76.1	94.5	66.5	78.1
Belgium	122.0	284.5	185.0	210.1	202.3	205.2	215.1	268.9
Canada	91.2	198.7	337.3	260.0	275.1	271.5	231.4	286.7
Denmark	32.8	127.5	128.3	361.6	463.1	463.9	403.1	442.7
Finland	6.0	36.1	69.9	85.3	81.7	82.7	68.9	72.3
France	472.6	1,002.9	1,157.6	3,777.7	3,323.6	3,180.6	2,895.6	2,109.8
Germany	163.2	1,020.1	761.5	1,240.7	1,315.6	1,277.6	970.3	1,077.6
Ireland	—	6.5	11.0	38.7	61.6	75.6	89.2	90.4
Italy	33.4	60.3	458.5	417.9	585.3	333.3	290.7	461.0
Japan	18.7	243.4	296.2	1,224.7	1,431.5	1,144.3	864.8	1,031.4
Luxembourg	—	—	—	17.1	25.9	30.2	30.4	34.3
Netherlands	39.5	382.2	271.0	556.2	769.4	705.4	580.7	651.1
New Zealand	0.2	1.3	0.6	4.1	3.6	3.8	5.7	4.0
Norway	22.8	126.7	179.9	359.2	380.0	395.0	390.2	365.6
Portugal	—	—	—	210.3	161.4	151.9	161.8	164.1
Spain	—	—	—	110.4	90.1	228.4	213.0	178.9
Sweden	74.7	288.0	259.4	436.0	387.6	464.6	392.5	357.1
Switzerland	11.3	52.2	95.3	193.3	218.7	192.9	182.0	163.6
United Kingdom	156.2	515.3	336.0	660.5	642.1	666.6	645.9	911.6
United States	142.0	616.0	1,345.0	1,524.0	1,059.0	642.0	831.0	722.3
Total bilateral ODA	1,389.3	4,992.5	5,941.2	11,824.2	11,614.0	10,670.5	9,578.0	9,507.8
Multilateral								
International Development Association	108.7	436.5	886.3	2,889.6	2,395.7	2,585.0	2,403.0	2,107.5
European Development Fund	215.2	633.4	711.1	2,146.9	1,848.1	2,128.9	1,917.6	1,814.5
Africa Development Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	594.2
International Fund for Agricultural Development	—	—	—	—	—	—	63.6	—
United Nations Children's Fund	8.7	56.7	100.9	329.1	310.4	284.3	164.0	151.0
United Nations Development Programme	87.1	194.3	225.0	187.8	174.1	228.3	294.3	248.4
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	16.3	159.4	208.7	518.2	427.3	155.8	151.0	132.3
United Nations Population Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
World Food Programme	40.2	175.0	352.7	760.9	616.8	214.8	87.5	117.5
Other UN	12.9	66.2	79.1	74.7	84.1	73.0	6.2	4.9
Total multilateral ODA	489.1	1,721.3	2,563.8	6,907.2	5,856.5	5,670.1	5,087.3	5,170.2

— Not available.

Note: Disbursements of grants and loans and other long-term capital.

Source: OECD data.

**LENDING BY THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE IMF
TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

6.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars				
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
World Bank Group					
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development					
Commitments	133	68	7	10	108
Disbursements	392	274	229	263	159
Amortization	1062	1056	950	834	743
Net flows	-670	-782	-720	-572	-
Interest payments	695	630	527	407	332
Net resource transfers	-1,366	-1,412	-1,248	-978	-916
International Development Association					
Commitments	2858	2403	2596	1703	3119
Disbursements	2889	2395	2587	2400	2101
Amortization	102	120	140	154	188
Net flows	2788	2275	2446	2246	1914
Interest payments	149	179	186	192	204
Net resource transfers	2,639	2,096	2,261	2,054	1,710
Total IBRD and IDA					
Commitments	2,991	2,471	2,603	1,713	3,227
Disbursements	3,281	2,669	2,815	2,662	2,261
Amortization	1,164	1,175	1,090	988	931
Net flows	2,117	1,493	1,726	1,675	1,330
Interest payments	844	809	713	599	536
Net resource transfers	1273	684	1013	1076	794
International Monetary Fund					
Total purchases	918	2994	652	524	804
Repurchases	467	2372	596	1066	1112
Net flows	451	622	55	-541	-307
Charges	170	559	123	101	65
Net resource transfers	282	63	-68	-643	-372

Source: World Bank and IMF.

	Percentage of GDP					
	1990	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Angola	5.8	19.8	17	19.2	{23.9}	14.9
Benin**	1.8	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	3.9	3.6	3.1	2.6	2.9	3.5
Burkina Faso**	3	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.5
Burundi*	3.4	4	3.6	5.5	5.8	—
Cameroon**	[1.7]	1.3	1.3	1.1	—	—
Cape Verde	—	0.8	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.9
Central African Rep. **	—	1.3	1.2	1.2	—	—
Chad**	—	2.7	2	2.2	1.6	1.4
Comoros**	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of **	—	—	—	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire**	1.5	1.1	—	0.9	0.9	—
Djibouti	—	5.4	5.1	4.2	4.5	4.4
Equatorial Guinea**	—	2.3	2.2	—	—	—
Eritrea** ^a	—	13	19.9	22.8	13.5	—
Ethiopia*	9.1	2.1	2	1.9	3.2	3.5
Gabon*	—	—	—	—	—	0.3
Gambia, The*	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.1
Ghana*	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8
Guinea*	—	1.3	—	—	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	—	0.3	0.5	0.6	—	—
Kenya*	3.3	1.6	1.8	[2.2]	[2.1]	[2.3]
Lesotho	4.1	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.9	3.2
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.4
Malawi*	1.3	1.5	1	0.9	0.8	—
Mali**	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9
Mauritania*	3.8	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.3	—
Mauritius	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	—
Mozambique** ^b	10.1	8.8	3.9	3.6	3.7	{4.2}
Namibia ^c	—	1.8	2	2.1	2.5	2.6
Niger**	1.9	—	—	—	—	—
Nigeria	0.7	{0.6}	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7
Rwanda*	3.7	3.5	4.2	5.3	4.1	4.3
São Tomé and Príncipe*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal**	2	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4
Seychelles	4	2.5	2.3	2.1	2	2
Sierra Leone*	0.7	2.2	2.2	1.8	0.8	—
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	4	2.9	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.6
Sudan	[3.5]	2.5	1.7	0.9	1	—
Swaziland	1.6	2	2.2	2.2	2.4	—
Tanzania*	—	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.3	[1.4]
Togo*	3.2	2.6	2.4	—	—	—
Uganda*	2.5	[1.6]	[1.5]	1.8	1.8	2.2
Zambia*	3.7	1.7	2.2	1.4	1.8	1.8
Zimbabwe	4.5	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.4	2.6

— Not available.

* SPA country.

+ CFA country.

{ } Provisional figure.

[] SIPRI estimate.

a. Became independent in 1993. Figures for 1995 include demobilization expenditures.

b. Figures from 1994 include expenditures for demobilization and formation of national army.

c. Became independent in 1990.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2000.

TECHNICAL NOTES

Most macroeconomic data (in particular, national accounts, balance of payments, government finance statistics, and trade) reflect data maintained by World Bank country desks, often referred to as operational data.

Annual data shown for country groups are totals, averages, or medians for the countries included in the group, as indicated on the relevant table. These group aggregates can be either simple (arithmetic)—where missing data are not imputed—or gap-filled—where weights are used to adjust group totals for missing countries.

Most group averages are weighted according to the relative importance of the countries in the group total for that indicator, based on simple addition across countries when the indicator is expressed in reasonable comparable units. Group averages for analytical ratios (for example, imports to GDP) can be either weighted or simple.

Period averages are calculated from time series (levels, ratios, growth rates, or medians) for both countries and country groups. They are either simple averages or average annual percentage growth rates, which are computed using the least-squares method and are usually based on real-term series. The least-squares growth rate is estimated by fitting a least-squares linear regression trend line to the logarithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant period. It takes into account all observations in a period and reflects general trends that are not influenced by exceptional values, particularly at the end points.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

The time series for national accounts are based mainly on national sources as collected by World Bank country economists. They are generally in accord with the UN System of National Accounts. A conversion factor is used to convert national currencies to U.S. dollars, both in this section and in the trade section.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth—provides average annual growth rates calculated from GDP at market prices (also known as purchaser values), expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars.

Gross domestic savings (GDS)—calculated by deducting total consumption from GDP in local currency at current prices, expressed as percentage of GDP.

Gross domestic investment (GDI)—gross domestic fixed capital formation plus net changes in the level of inventories, expressed as percentage of GDP. GDI comprises outlays by the public sector and the private sector. The ratio is calculated in local currency at current prices.

Real agricultural growth—calculated from the value added of agriculture at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of forestry, hunting, fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock production, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

Real industrial growth—calculated from the value added of industry at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity water, and gas, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

GDP deflator—the implicit GDP deflator for national currency is obtained by dividing, for each year of the time series, the value of the GDP at current prices by the value of the GDP at constant 1995 prices, both in national currency.

Real gross national product (GNP) per capita—calculated by the World Bank Atlas method, which uses three-year averages of exchange rates that smooth out sharp fluctuations from year to year, expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GNP measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents. It comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labor and capital), less similar payments made to nonresidents who contributed to the domestic economy.

Food production per capita—annual per capita production in kilo-grams of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses, from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)–Agricultural Production database.

TRADE

Real export growth and real import growth (goods and nonfactor services)—data for exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services refer to all goods and nonfactor series provided to, or by, the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfac-

tor services. The values of factor services, such as investment income, interest, and labor income, are not included. Calculations use 1995 U.S. dollar series, which are generally estimated on the basis of foreign trade statistics from customs declarations.

Terms of trade—measure the relative movement of export and import prices. This series is calculated as the ratio of a country's export unit values or prices to its import unit values or prices. It shows changes over a base year (1995) in the level of export unit values as a percentage of import unit values.

Staple food imports, value—calculated by adding the import value (from FAO-TRADE databases) of wheat, wheat flour, wheat germ, paddy rice, husked rice, millhusk rice, broken rice, milled paddy rice, rice starch, rice bran, rice flour, maize, maize germ, maize flour, maize bran, and white rice, all expressed in current U.S. dollars.

Staple food imports, share of exports—as above, but as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services in current U.S. dollars.

CAPITAL FLOWS

The principal sources for information on debt are reports to the World Bank, through the Debtor Reporting System, from its member countries that have received either International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans or International Development Association credits. Additional information on debt has been drawn from the files of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Gross concessional aid flows—all concessional credits plus official transfers as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars. This does not include technical assistance.

Debt service ratio—service on long- and short-term debt, including IMF credit, as a percentage of exports of goods and services plus workers' remittances in current U.S. dollars. All figures reflect actual cash payments.

Foreign direct investment—the net amount invested or reinvested by nonresidents to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises in which they exercise significant managerial control. Investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital. The net figures

subtract the value of direct investment abroad by residents of the reporting country.

HUMAN CONDITION

Infant mortality rate—the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. The estimates are based on an analysis of all available information: survey- and census-based indirect and direct estimates, census age structures, health information (especially immunization completeness), and vital registration adjusted for incompleteness. The outcome is a figure that cannot be linked with a single empirical source but that is usually consistent with the demographic situation. Projections for 2000 and 2025 are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Life expectancy at birth—the number of years newborn infants would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of their birth were to stay the same throughout their life. Data are World Bank estimates based on data from the UN Population Division, the UN Statistical Office, and national statistical offices. Projections for 2000 are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Access to health services—refers to the percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services by local means of transport in no more than one hour. Data are presented separately for total, urban, and rural population (WHO data).

Child immunization and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) use—child immunization measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A child is considered adequately immunized against DPT (diphtheria, pertussis or whooping cough, and tetanus) after receiving two or three doses of vaccine, depending on the immunization scheme. Oral rehydration therapy use is the percentage of all cases of diarrhea in children under five years of age treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution (WHO data).

Total primary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the primary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for primary edu-

cation in a given country. Figures shown may be more than 100 percent since the total enrollment includes pupils above and pupils below the primary school age, as well as repeaters.

Total secondary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for secondary education in a given country. Secondary level (general) refers to education in secondary schools that provides general or specialized instruction based on at least four years of previous instruction at the first or primary level and that does not specifically aim at preparing the pupils directly for a given trade or occupation.

Female primary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at the primary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools but may exclude certain specialized schools and training programs.

Female secondary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at secondary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools.

POPULATION

Population—usually projections from the most recent population censuses or surveys. Projected figures were prepared by the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department. These projections assume average, or standard, fertility decline. The rapid projection figures are World Bank projections assuming rapid fertility decline, defined as twice the rate of standard fertility decline experienced by developing countries during recent decades. Both standard and rapid fertility decline variants assume that the use of contraception will increase in all countries. But to achieve the rapid projections, contraceptive use has to increase at a much more rapid pace. Mortality levels are assumed to be identical in both variants and incorporate mortality from AIDS.

Population figures under the heading stabilization are World Bank projections of the size of the stationary population. Stationary populations are those in which age-specific and sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a long period, and in which fertility rates have

remained at replacement level—meaning that women bear, on average, only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population.

Population growth—derived from the population figures in table 5.1.

Total fertility rate—average number of live children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. These estimates are derived from the UN World Population Prospects (1990), demographic and health surveys, censuses, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, official estimates, World Bank estimates, and Eurostat data.

Contraceptive prevalence rate—percentage of married women of child-bearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception (modern or traditional). Childbearing age is generally defined as 15 to 49, although for some countries contraceptive use is measured for other age groups.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure project. SIPRI calculates the ratio of military spending to GDP in domestic currency using current prices. Although common guidelines are used, it is not possible to adhere to a common definition of military spending in all countries, and there are considerable variations between countries in what is included in official defense spending data.

SIPRI collects data from a variety of sources, including an annual questionnaire that is submitted to each country's ministries of finance and defense, national statistical office, and central bank. Data also come from a wide range of national and international publications, including government budgets and statistics. IMF data are used for GDP. Other IMF, UN, and Economist Intelligence Unit data are used as well.

