2003/2004 Annual Report

Global Coalition for Africa
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 550
Washington, DC 20006
USA

African Social and Economic Trends

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"African countries have to overcome the legacy of past regimes and build the culture and institutions that uphold democracy"

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AFRICAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

Annual Report 2003/2004
of the Global Coalition for Africa

Global Coalition for Africa
1919 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 550
Washington DC, 20006, USA
Tel. (1) (202) 458-4338
Fax. (1) (202) 522-3259
http://www.gca-cma.org

The Global Coalition for Africa
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 550
Washington DC 20006

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to note the considerable progress in 2003 in establishing the structures of the African Union (AU). As Co-Chairpersons of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), we are particularly pleased and proud that our colleague, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former President of Mali, was chosen as the first Chairperson of the African Union Commission by the African Union Heads of State and Government at their Summit in Maputo in July 2003. This was an important step forward, and we offer our congratulations. We have no doubt that his vision and leadership will be an inspiration to the continent and to the organization. We also congratulate the AU Commissioners on their election, and we are pleased to note that—in line with the AU's commitment to gender equality—half of them are women.

We commend the efforts of the AU and regional organizations, as well as African leaders, to bring armed conflicts to an end through dialogue and reconciliation. Those who chose negotiation over conflict also deserve credit. As a result of their actions, there are real prospects for peace and progress on the continent. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where transitional power-sharing arrangements are laying the groundwork for political reconstruction and economic recovery. We encourage all domestic forces and constituencies to work actively to consolidate peace. And we call on the international community to provide the necessary levels of support. The war in the DRC destabilized surrounding countries, but recent favorable developments have also had a positive regional spillover, as events in Burundi attest.

The progress in Sudan toward resolving the longstanding conflict between the north and the south is also noteworthy. Difficult issues—including sharing of power and wealth and the application of Sharia law—have been addressed. We encourage all involved to resolve the remaining issues and to implement the comprehensive peace agreement. We remain concerned about the severe humanitarian consequences of escalating conflict in western Sudan, and urge all parties to commit to negotiations to bring it to an end. In the volatile West African region, we acknowledge the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in promoting and supporting peace, and commend its efforts. While the end of instability and conflict in Liberia offers new hope for regional peace, progress in Côte d'Ivoire is also essential.

The African Union did help to bring conflicts to an end and establish peace and security. In some negotiations, its designated mediators played critical roles. In others, it combined its political and moral authority with that of regional and international actors to bring about positive change. While timely intervention is needed to address conflicts, accountability, equitable representation, and the rule of law will promote good governance and prevent conflict. The Pan-African Parliament is expected to be launched early in 2004 and together with the African Court of Justice will play an important role in this process.

On the economic front, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)—the AU's framework for economic development—has moved into the elaboration of detailed programs and projects in such priority sectors as agriculture and infrastructure. In parallel, NEPAD's country performance evaluation system—the African Peer Review Mechanism—has started operations under the leadership of its Panel of Eminent Persons.

It is clear that Africa is moving on a number of fronts. But to consolidate and build on the progress, it needs the collaboration of its development partners. As NEPAD has indicated, further debt relief, increased official development assistance (ODA), improved market access, and enhanced foreign direct investment are the areas of cooperation sought from external partners. The international community's repeated promises of more effective support need to evolve from declaration to concrete measures. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the third Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development, held in Tokyo on September 29-October 1, 2003, had NEPAD as its principal theme. The GCA was pleased to be one of the co-organizers of the conference, and we thank the Government of Japan for the reaffirmation of its commitment to a strong partnership with Africa.

In the year ahead, the GCA will continue to collaborate closely with the AU in addressing Africa's political, social, and economic challenges. We look forward to active cooperation on several fronts, including the implementation of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism. This Annual Report gives special focus to Africa's participation in global trade. We firmly believe that Africa's integration into a more equitable international trading system is necessary for the continent's long-term development. We encourage the World Trade Organization and all its members to move forward in implementing the Doha Agenda and to ensure that the promise of a development round is fulfilled.

In concluding, we would like to thank former UK Secretary of State Clare Short, who stepped down as a Co-Chairperson, for her contribution to the work of the GCA over the years.

GCA Co-Chairpersons

Festus Mogae, Meles Zenawi,
Alpha Oumar Konaré, Frene Ginwala,
Susan Whelan, and Hilde F. Johnson

ABOUT THE GLOBAL COALITION FOR AFRICA

The Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) is a North-South forum that brings together leaders from Africa and their principal external partners to examine Africa's most critical social and economic development issues. It seeks to promote consensus on policies and programs of action and monitor the results. The GCA is based on the premise that Africa can grow only if there is effort from within, but that it also needs sustained and well-coordinated outside support and strong collaboration with its external partners. With sweeping changes around the world, the GCA strives to keep Africa on the global agenda and to mobilize the necessary international support to mach Africa's commitments to economic and political change.

Policy guidance for the GCA is provided by its co-chairpersons, who also determine the GCA's work program on an annual basis. The GCA Co-Chairpersons are President Festus Mogae of Botswana, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Former President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali, Speaker Frene Ginwala of the South African National Assembly, Minister Susan Whelan of Canada, and Minister Hilde F. Johnson of Norway. Former President Sir Ketumile Masire of Botswana, former Minister Jan Pronk of the Netherlands, and former World Bank President Robert McNamara are Co-Chairpersons Emeritus. The Secretariat, based in Washington D.C., is headed by Mr. Hage G. Geingob, former Prime Minister of Namibia.

The GCA's ultimate governing body is a plenary of all its members—involving African governments and their bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental partners—which met for the third time in Gaborone, Botswana, in October 2001. Between plenary meetings the GCA's work is guided by a Policy Forum comprising representatives of African and Northern countries, together with representatives of international and regional organizations, including the African Union, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the European Union, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the Africa Department of the International Monetary Fund, and the Africa Region of the

World Bank.

The GCA's agenda is focused on the following broad themes:

- Peace and security, including conflict management and security sector reform.
- Governance and transition to democracy, including anti-corruption, democratic accountability, and peaceful political succession.
- Sustainable growth and integration into the global economy, including regional integration, agriculture, and the private sector as the principal agent for enhanced trade, investment, and growth.

LIST OF INITIALS AND ACRONYMS

AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
CNDD-FDD	Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie—forces pour la defense de la democratie
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EBA	Everything but Arms
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDI	Foreign direct investment
G-8	Group of Eight
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCA	Global Coalition for Africa
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITO	International Trade Organization
LDC	Least developed country
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPS	Sanitary and phytosanitary
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TRIPS	Trade-related intellectual property rights
WTO	World Trade Organization

CONTENTS

OVERVIEW

In line with recent practice, this Annual Report is in two parts. Part I of the Report reviews recent trends in Africa on both the political and economic fronts. It is important to note that—in contrast to the persisting distorted image of a continent beset by conflict—the large majority of African countries are either at peace or taking significant steps to restore security and stability. The Report highlights the promising processes of constructive dialogue, reconciliation, and consolidation under way in several countries. Lasting peace can best be built if the legitimate grievances of all parties are addressed and political inclusion is ensured.

Africa's performance—favorable developments as well as clear setbacks—with regard to democratization and governance is also examined in the first part of the Report. Based on the latest available data, the section on economic trends underscores the much higher levels of investment that will be required to achieve and sustain the GDP growth rates (at least 7 percent a year) needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

Part II of the Report is an essay on trade. It focuses on the external market access barriers and the domestic supply-side constraints that African countries face in expanding and diversifying their exports. It is based on extensive discussions in a Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) high-level meeting on trade, held in Nairobi in August 2003. Coming just days before the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Cancun, the Nairobi meeting reviewed the main issues for improving market access for African exports in developed countries.

As the essay indicates, more than $330 billion in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) agricultural subsidies, as well as persisting tariff and nontariff barriers in industrial countries, present formidable obstacles for African exports. West African cotton exporters clearly illustrate the problem. In recent years they have become internationally competitive in production costs. But they face greatly depressed world prices due to U.S. and other OECD export subsidies. So they are unable to enjoy the benefits of expanded trade, despite their best efforts. The essay also shows that while improving access to the markets of developed countries is the principal aim of African countries, attention should also go to expanding South-South and intra-Africa trade.

To encourage and facilitate increased exports, all African countries have to undertake necessary reforms, improve trade-related services and invest in infrastructure. They have to increase their traditional exports and diversify both their markets and products if they are to reverse their shrinking share in world markets. In this regard, they will need effective support from their development partners—to build and strengthen their institutional capacities and to undertake investments in trade-related services and infrastructure. Because these issues are on the Doha Round agenda, it is anticipated that such technical and development assistance will be taken up when the stalled multilateral trade negotiations resume.

Regional economic integration, another priority area of the GCA, is closely related to trade. Under our auspices, two groups of Eminent Persons examined the mandates, regulations, and programs of integration institutions operating in the same geographic subregion—and proposed how they can be better harmonized and coordinated. The preliminary findings and recommendations of the two groups were presented and discussed at the Nairobi meeting on trade. Because the promotion and strengthening of regional integration are primary objectives for the African Union and its member countries, the final report of the GCA Eminent Persons will be forwarded to the AU for its consideration.

In addition to its activities, the GCA also works collaboratively with other Africa-oriented initiatives. A prime example is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). This is an important forum dedicated to the mobilization of support for African development from the international community, including from Japan and the rest of Asia. As a co-organizer—with the Government of Japan, the UN, and the World Bank—the GCA has continued to actively participate in TICAD's programs.

The most recent event was TICAD III, held in Tokyo, September 29-October 1, 2003. The high-level attendance, including 23 African Heads of State and Government, the relevance and focus of the conference themes, and the active engagement of its wide range of participants made this a memorable occasion. In addition to its substantive contribution to the preparatory work, the GCA and particularly its Co-Chairpersons played crucial roles in the TICAD III meeting. African delegations noted that crisis areas like Iraq were commanding considerably more attention and allocation of resources from the international community than their own continent. But they were gratified with Japan's pledge of additional substantial assistance.

It is no exaggeration to state that the GCA helped place the problem of corruption high on the African governance agenda. In 1997 corruption and development was the theme of the GCA Policy Forum in Maputo. This was followed by high-level visits to several African countries and subsequent meetings of Ministers from 11 countries, who adopted a set of Principles to Combat Corruption. The intent of the GCA and the pioneering countries was to promote a continent-wide initiative for combating corruption. It was thus especially satisfying for the GCA to witness the adoption of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption at the African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo in July 2003. We congratulate the AU on its initiative and strongly urge the early ratification of the Convention by all African countries.

The adoption of a UN Convention Against Corruption in December 2003 was also gratifying. As the GCA has always emphasized, corruption is a worldwide problem, and thus concerted and collaborative efforts by all countries are needed to combat it. But the costs and consequences of corruption are greater for the weak economies of Africa. For this reason, decisive action against corruption has become a development imperative for the continent. The AU and the UN conventions, important tools in the fight against corruption, will reinforce the efforts that individual countries are already making.

Hage G. Geingob,
Executive Secretary

PART I: REVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Democratization, governance, and conflict management on the continent remain mixed. The year saw positive developments—but also some setbacks. And as countries move to varying stages of political transition, some are slowly developing the institutions and culture to uphold democracy while others are losing ground. Even as some longstanding major conflicts wind down, continuing instability and armed conflict in several countries perpetuate an image of a continent beset by problems. Countries in the region are also faced with new challenges, not least the social and economic effects of HIV/AIDS.

In keeping with the AU's commitment to gender equality, four of the Commissioners are women

The African Union

A year after the African Union was formed, it took a step toward institutionalization with the election of Alpha Oumar Konaré, former president of Mali, as the first Chairperson of the Commission. Commissioners overseeing the eight principal areas of the AU's work also took office during the year. In keeping with the AU's commitment to gender equality, four of the Commissioners are women. Financing the expanded structure of the AU will be a challenge. Particularly in the early stages, establishing the Commission, its programs, and the specialized organs will require considerable resources. Early attention is also needed to create effective institutional arrangements within the Commission to implement its expanded programs.

Progress was made in setting up the specialized organs when the required number of countries ratified the protocols establishing the Pan African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council, and the African Court of Justice. The parliament, expected to hold its first meeting early in 2004, will assume full legislative powers after functioning in a consultative and advisory capacity for the first five years. The Peace and Security Council is intended to be the AU's main mechanism for addressing conflict, including peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. The African Court will function as the judicial organ of the AU, resolving disputes and legal matters referred to it. Strengthening the Regional Economic Communities, as the building blocks of the Union, will also be a major element of the AU's agenda.

NEPAD, the AU's framework for development, saw good momentum during the year. In addition to preparatory work in several priority areas, the African Peer Review Mechanism—NEPAD's self-monitoring instrument—took shape. A panel of seven eminent persons was appointed to provide oversight and ensure the independence of the process, and by December 2003 16 member states had agreed to peer reviews. The mechanism and step by step process were also agreed to, and guidelines established. Implementation is scheduled to begin in 2004, when the first three countries are expected to be peer reviewed.

Considerable progress was made in reaching political agreements to bring major conflicts to an end

As agreed at the June 2003 G-8 Summit in Evian, the international community supported NEPAD with the formation of the Africa Partnership Forum in November 2003. The Forum comprises the 20 African countries on the NEPAD steering committee and Africa's principal partner countries, as well as multilateral and regional organizations. Its initial priorities will be peace and security, HIV/AIDS, education, and economic growth and wealth creation. The Forum also established a trust fund for voluntary contributions to support the African Peer Review Mechanism.

Conflict management

The major political developments in 2003 related to conflict management. Considerable progress was made in reaching political agreements to bring major conflicts to an end, with African institutions and individual countries both playing a central role. For the first time in 20 years of civil war, real peace between the north and the south seems within grasp in Sudan. In Liberia an increasingly brutal civil war ended when President Taylor succumbed to pressure to leave office and go into exile in Nigeria. In the Democratic Republic of Congo the formation of a transitional government moved the country's peace process to a new stage. Some progress was also made in Burundi when power-sharing arrangements were agreed between the government and the main rebel group toward the end of the year. But continuing instability in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia underline the fragility of peace agreements and the difficulties of implementing them.

All countries coming out of conflict face major challenges of reconstruction, if a recurrence of violence is to be avoided. Political inclusion is a central element in this, but so is economic development. Without other viable means of support, there is a danger that unemployed former combatants will engage in criminal behavior, especially with the many small arms in circulation. Organized criminal networks can also exploit poverty, limited security, and weak government in post-conflict countries. Throughout Africa, high unemployment, particularly of youths, is cause for concern. In countries coming out of conflict, many young people not only lack employment—they have also been denied education because of war. In countries like Liberia, the significant numbers of young people actively engaged in violence as combatants also require special attention.

All countries coming out of conflict face major challenges of reconstruction if a return to violence is to be avoided

Two landmark legal actions during the year suggested a new willingness to confront those responsible for promoting conflict. The UN Special Court for Sierra Leone indicted Liberian President Charles Taylor for war crimes and crimes against humanity on the grounds that he incited and supported the war in Sierra Leone. This was the first time an African head of state had been so indicted. On the other side of the continent, the international tribunal in Arusha convicted three Rwandans on charges of genocide for using the media to foment the violence that led to the massacre of about 800,000 Rwandans in 1994. This was the tribunal's first ruling explicitly linking the use of the media to genocide.

West Africa

In West Africa an arc of instability continues to threaten the region's prospects. Although Sierra Leone made progress in post-conflict reconstruction, ongoing violence in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and the spillovers to Guinea undermined the security of the whole region during the year. These countries became less stable as each supported groups seeking to destabilize the others—and as large quantities of arms circulated freely and groups of mercenaries moved from conflict to conflict. A regional approach to conflict management that involves Côte d'Ivoire and the Mano River countries could strengthen the stability of individual countries.

In January 2003 the Linas Marcoussis peace agreement to end hostilities in Côte d'Ivoire was reached in talks hosted by France. The agreement established a Government of National Reconciliation, a power-sharing arrangement led by a consensus prime minister that was constituted in March. In May the government presented a draft program for implementing the agreement, addressing such central issues as citizenship, national identity, land tenure, and eligibility for election to the presidency. But there has since been little progress in implementing it.

In Liberia violence and lawlessness caused a severe humanitarian crisis

In July, the war was officially declared over, but the country remains divided and unstable even though troops from ECOWAS and France have prevented a large-scale return to conflict. Armed militias and mercenaries supporting both the government and the rebels continue to pose a security challenge, and human rights violations are perpetuated by all sides. The coalition government collapsed in September when opposition forces (the New Forces) withdrew, accusing President Gbagbo of undermining the peace process. The New Forces rejoined the peace process in December, following extensive diplomatic intervention by ECOWAS and the international community, but the peace remains fragile.

In Liberia violence and lawlessness for much of the year caused a severe humanitarian crisis, with an estimated 700,000 internally displaced persons. The departure of President Taylor to exile in Nigeria and the peace agreement reached in August between LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) and MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) rebels and the Government of Liberia offered the prospects of peace in Liberia and greater stability in the region. The rapid intervention of ECOWAS peacekeepers led by Nigeria helped stabilize the situation until a UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIL, charged with overseeing the peace agreement, was deployed toward the end of the year. Eventually the mission, which operates under a Chapter VII mandate, may have as many as 15,000 peacekeepers. Yet security remains fragile in much of the country.

Under the peace agreement a two-year transitional government will prepare the country for elections. It will face formidable challenges.

Not only is it a coalition of previously warring factions, but Liberia's institutions and structures of governance have broken down, while years of mismanagement destroyed physical and social infrastructure. The successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants from both government and rebel forces is a major first step in promoting security in the country—and region. A program to demobilize an estimated 40,000 combatants, to start in December 2003, was delayed pending the arrival of additional peacekeeping troops.

The spillover effects of the conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire were felt in other countries in the region through increased refugee flows and the proliferation of weapons. Guinea, which provided support to Liberia's rebels and was the destination for many refugees, was particularly affected. Despite the end of the war in Liberia, the situation remains unstable. Political uncertainty in Guinea is compounded by the poor health of President Conté, who was returned to power for another seven years in an uncompetitive and questionable presidential election in December.

The spillover effects of the conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire were felt in other countries through increased refugee flows and the proliferation of weapons

Central Africa

In the Democratic Republic of Congo the process of negotiation resulted in agreement to form a transitional government of national unity. Under the power-sharing agreement, President Kabila retained office, while four vice presidential posts were divided among the former armed factions and unarmed opposition. Government ministries and senior military positions were also divided among the previously opposing forces. Although the power-sharing arrangements are intended to promote stability and political inclusion, the unwieldy governing structure has resulted in delays in implementing other provisions of the agreement. The transitional government has between 24 and 30 months to organize national elections, a formidable task given the country's institutional decay and lack of infrastructure.

Although most of the country remained peaceful during 2003, fighting in the east by ethnic militias led to the deployment of a UN force under a Chapter VII mandate. Continuing instability in the eastern part of the country could undermine the fragile peace accord. In turn, stability in the DRC is essential to the promotion of peace in other countries in the Great Lakes and Central Africa. The regionalized conflict in the DRC highlighted how quickly violence and insecurity can spread. As with West Africa, a regional approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes and Central Africa could stabilize the region and promote the economic recovery that would lay the basis for durable peace.

In Burundi there were tentative signs of progress toward peace when an agreement was reached between the government and the main rebel group, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie—forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD). The South Africa-backed agreement provided for the inclusion of CNDD-FDD members in government and for assurances of percentages in the military, the police, and other institutions. Power was also handed over to a Hutu president, Domitien Ndayizeye, in accordance with the terms of a three-year process of transition to multiparty rule. By year end, no agreement had been reached with the remaining rebel faction, the Forces nationals de liberation (FNL), but there was optimism that talks could prove positive.

By the end of 2003 the promise of peace in Sudan finally seemed within grasp

East Africa

By the end of 2003 the promise of peace in Sudan between the northern government and the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) finally seemed within grasp. The civil war in Sudan has been one of the longest and costliest on the continent, with an estimated two million lives lost and four million internally displaced persons or refugees. Negotiations hosted by the Government of Kenya under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development began in 2002 and continued throughout 2003, with the support of international partners. Considerable progress was made on a number of issues, and a final agreement is expected during the first months of 2004.

The planned agreement will provide for a transition period, with a constitution to be drafted in the first six months. Elections will follow after three years, and after six years a referendum will be held in the south to determine whether it will remain part of Sudan. Other key issues that the agreement will cover are the application of Sharia law in the north, a structure for post-war military establishments, transitional power-sharing arrangements, the status of contested areas in central Sudan, and the sharing of wealth. As with all peace agreements, monitoring its implementation will be essential to its success.

The accord is the result of long and complex negotiations by the parties to the conflict. But events elsewhere in Sudan threaten to undermine the positive momentum toward peace between the north and the south. Security is far from assured in the east, where low intensity conflict continued during 2003. Meanwhile, security in the west rapidly deteriorated during the year, as fighting between ethnically based armed militias escalated. The conflict in the west has caused a humanitarian emergency, with an additional 700,000 internally displaced persons and refugees, and efforts at mediation by Chad have so far proved unsuccessful. Addressing the grievances that underlie these other conflicts and facilitating the political inclusion of all groups will be necessary if the peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM is to be implemented effectively.

In contrast to the hopeful signs of reaching an agreement in Sudan, the peace process in Somalia came close to collapse

In contrast to the hopeful signs of reaching an agreement between the north and the south in Sudan, the peace process in Somalia came close to collapse—as attempts to broker reconciliation and power sharing among a variety of clan-based groups proved unsuccessful. The power vacuum in Somalia also underlined the threat that failed states pose to other countries—there were reports that the country was being used as a base for arms trafficking and international terrorism.

In Uganda government forces made little headway in combating the 18-year insurgency in the north by the Lord's Resistance Army. Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, still not normalized after the 1998–2000 war, grew tense following a ruling by the international Border Commission delimiting a key section of the disputed border in Eritrea's favor. Public opinion in both countries, especially in the border region, is belligerent.

The status of democratization

Despite the African Union's refusal to recognize governments that gain power by nonconstitutional means, the year saw several coup attempts. Unpopular leaders in the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau were overthrown by coups, while a coup in São Tomé and Principe was later overturned and the ousted president returned to office. Following his seizure of power in Central African Republic, President Bozize has promised a return to civilian rule in 2005 through democratic elections. In Guinea-Bissau, the army handed over power to a broad-based civilian government headed by President Rosa following pressure from regional leaders. The government has pledged a return to constitutional rule through parliamentary elections in 2004 and presidential elections in 2005.

The willingness of leaders to engage in genuine political competition will be tested in many countries in 2004

Presidential elections in 2003 returned incumbent leaders to power in a number of countries. Both the conduct of the elections and the degree of political contest varied. In Togo, where the main opposition candidate was banned from participating, President Eyadema was returned to power after 36 years in office. In Guinea, flawed elections, boycotted by the main opposition candidates, returned a chronically sick President Conté to power. In Rwanda incumbent President Kagame won by a landslide victory, in part reflecting a popular desire for continued political stability. President Obasanjo won a second and constitutionally final term in Nigeria. Although the results were initially contested on the basis of irregularities in the vote, Nigeria has now seen a civilian president win two consecutive elections since the end of the Abacha regime. Given the country's history of political violence and military rule, this is an achievement for democracy.

The willingness of leaders to engage in genuine political competition will be tested in many countries in 2004, with presidential or general elections scheduled in Namibia, Malawi, Cameroon, South Africa, Mozambique, Niger, Ghana, and Botswana. In Malawi attempts by President Muluzi to change the constitution to allow a third term were unsuccessful. In Uganda campaigns for constitutional change to permit President Museveni to seek a third term in office proved politically divisive.

In Zimbabwe the political situation continued to deteriorate during the year as the principal opposition politician, Morgan Tsvangiri, was arrested on treason charges and restrictions on the media were increased. The government withdrew from the Commonwealth when the organization extended Zimbabwe's suspension. In Kenya the coalition government's first year in office consolidated the peaceful transfer of power with its election in late 2002.

Both presidential and parliamentary elections are now commonplace in Africa. In many countries officials are also elected at the local and municipal level. The conduct of elections has improved. Voter education has increased. And in most countries civil society organizations are involved in election monitoring. These are important developments. The challenge now is for most countries to move beyond elections and deepen democracy. This is a much longer and more complicated process, requiring commitments and concerted efforts by governments and citizens alike. African countries—like those elsewhere—have to overcome the legacy of past authoritarian regimes and build the culture and institutions that uphold democracy and guard against autocratic practices and abuse of power. The continuing recourse to nonconstitutional means of changing government in some countries underlines the difficulties of ensuring the rule of law and effective civilian oversight of military establishments.

Elections are now commonplace in Africa. The challenge for most countries is to move beyond elections and deepen democracy

Governance

The major governance steps of 2003 are related to international efforts to combat corruption. The African Union adopted a Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption at its Maputo Summit, requiring states to undertake a wide range of measures. Some—such as requirements for declaration of assets by public officials and laws governing funding of political parties—promote greater accountability. Others—covering money laundering, mutual legal assistance, and extradition—support and strengthen national measures to counter corruption.

The AU convention focuses on the prevention of corruption, as well as its criminalization, in both the private and the public sectors. It also recognizes the contribution of civil society and the media in fighting corruption. It establishes an 11-member Advisory Board on Corruption within the African Union, for states to report on implementing the convention at national level. The convention demonstrates acceptance by African countries that corruption is undermining development and that concerted effort and cooperation are needed to combat it. The convention will come into force once fifteen member states have ratified it.

There have been other measures—by the GCA as well as by SADC and ECOWAS—to promote cooperation among countries to counter corruption. But the AU convention is a major step forward, in its breadth and in the fact that it is continental. The test will be how effectively it is implemented.

The African Union anti-corruption convention was followed in December by the signing of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 2003. The UN convention had been negotiated in seven sessions of an ad hoc committee between January 2002 and October 2003, with several African countries participating. By the end of December 2003, 20 Sub-Saharan countries had signed the convention. Ratification by 30 states is required for the convention to come into force—Kenya was the first country to ratify it.

International cooperation requires states to collaborate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption

The convention covers the prevention and criminalization of corruption, international cooperation, and asset recovery. Preventive measures address financing of election campaigns and political parties, codes of conduct for public officials, public procurement, the judiciary, the private sector, and money laundering. Criminalization and law enforcement provisions cover a wide range of acts of corruption, including influence peddling, abuse of functions, and bribery and embezzlement. They also protect witnesses and those who report corruption.

International cooperation requires states to collaborate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption, with provisions for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and law enforcement. Asset recovery provisions require states to cooperate to prevent and detect transfers of proceeds of crime, confiscate and recover property, and transfer recovered assets to their legitimate owners.

Highly publicized allegations and investigations of corruption attracted attention in several countries during the year. In Kenya a comprehensive investigation by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority uncovered and reported extensive corruption in the judiciary, leading to the suspension of several senior judges who now face tribunals. In Zambia former President Chiluba stands charged with corruption during his time in office. In South Africa investigations into arms deals dating back to 1999 have implicated some senior ANC figures and increased media and public attention on corruption.

Overall economic trends

Global economic growth remained subdued in 2002. The 4.6 percent GDP growth for developing countries was not particularly impressive, but the main drag on the world economy was the sluggish growth of only 1.8 percent in the industrial countries. This slow growth in industrial countries and the reduced demand for African exports undoubtedly hurt the region's performance. The 2.8 percent growth recorded by Sub-Saharan Africa was broadly in line with performance elsewhere, but barely adequate to cover its population growth of 2.2 percent.

Few countries have managed to reduce their dependence on primary commodities by diversifying into higher value added activities

There is little room for complacency when judging Africa's performance against the 7 percent annual growth required to reduce poverty and reach the Millennium Development Goals. Average annual GDP growth for Sub-Saharan Africa has been stuck in the 3-4 percent range for several years.

Despite partial recovery in some non-oil commodity prices, the overall demand and price trends for Africa's traditional exports remain volatile and mostly unfavorable. The frequent recurrence of drought in some subregions and the conflicts and instability in several countries partly account for the persistence of low GDP growth rates. Nigeria and South Africa together have at least 40 percent of the region's total GDP, and their modest growth has direct bearing on overall performance. And the persistent failure to raise investment rates from their low range of 16-18 percent, in turn explained by low domestic savings and modest foreign investment, translated into low GDP growth. Few countries have managed to reduce their dependence on primary commodities by diversifying into higher value added activities—or to develop the private sector, the primary agent for investment, growth, and employment creation.

Overall, the persistence of low growth rates across countries and regions means that most countries will not be able to make significant reductions in the approximately 50 percent of their populations that fall below the poverty line. Even in Mozambique and Uganda, which have sustained higher growth rates for a while, poverty reduction has been modest, limited to urban centers and a few districts.

African countries will have to address political, policy, institutional, and structural constraints if they are to transform their economies and get onto the high and sustained growth path required by the MDGs and the NEPAD framework. The most important Millennium goal aims to reduce poverty by half. To achieve this, growth rates have to be raised substantially, and the incremental benefits of growth more equitably shared. This will require actively pursuing pro-poor development strategies.

African countries will have to address political, policy, and institutional constraints if they are to transform their economies

Southern Africa

The overall pace was set by South Africa. Its macroeconomic management continued to be exemplary in its prudence and its support of critical social programs. But the 3 percent growth recorded in 2002 was well below that required to address high unemployment. That growth, though an improvement over recent years, still falls short of the economy's potential—and of creating more jobs and redressing the inequities inherited from the apartheid era. The strengthening of the rand against the U.S. dollar and the lower demand in OECD countries were significant constraints to export growth and thus overall growth.

South Africa's neighbors—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia—also had modest growth rates in the range of 2 percent to 4 percent during 2002. A notable recent event was the institutionalization—based on a revised agreement—of the Southern African Customs Union, SACU, a longstanding and well-functioning integration grouping of the five countries. SACU now has a secretariat in Windhoek, and preliminary talks have been started with the United States on a SACU-U.S. free trade area agreement. Within the framework of SADC, investment projects in regional infrastructure are being promoted, including power generation and distribution and road corridors.

Mozambique continued its decade-long trend of high GDP growth by recording a 7.7 percent growth rate in 2002, while Angola's growth rate shot up to 15.3 percent during the year, with significant new offshore oil production. Zimbabwe, because of its political and governance crisis as well as the disruptions from its controversial land reform program, had its GDP continue to decline sharply, at the rates of 8.4 percent in 2001 and 5.6 percent in 2002. Its economic performance is expected to be no better in 2003.

Indian Ocean, Eastern Africa, and Horn of Africa

In 2002 Mauritius grew at a rate of 4.4 percent, at the lower end of its long-maintained range of 4 to 6 percent. Madagascar recorded a 12.7 percent decline in GDP, a result of the social turmoil and economic disruption following disputed national elections. With the settlement of the election dispute, stability has been restored, and there are strong indications of a rebound in 2003.

Tanzania and Uganda continued to maintain adequate GDP growth, with Tanzania growing at 6.3 percent and Uganda at 6.7 percent during 2002. Kenya, by contrast, was virtually stagnant, partly due to poor governance and partly to a political impasse, broken when elections at the end of the year brought a change in government. Kenya also suffered from a large reduction in tourism and related activities due to the threat of international terrorism. The East African Community proceeded rapidly in implementing its agenda of fuller integration among its three members. It aims to establish a customs union in 2004.

Ethiopia and Eritrea felt the adverse effects of severe drought and their border conflict, with growth dropping sharply in both countries. In Sudan the start of oil production and export reinforced its recent record of a steady 5-6 percent annual growth. Serious peace negotiations between the government and the SPLM-led armed opposition in the south and the likely end to its long-running internal conflict should strengthen Sudan’s economic prospects.

Central Africa

In a subregion long beset by conflict and instability, there are hopeful signs of progress. The prospects for a definitive end to a long-drawn out conflict have improved recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But it will take time to establish a stable political environment and considerable investment to bring the economy back to normal operations. Starting from the low point reached after years of civil strife and economic decline, modest growth was recorded in 2002. But the political and economic foundations for recovery remain precarious.

Rwanda continued to perform fairly well, with 9.4 percent GDP growth in 2002. Chad and Equatorial Guinea had high growth rates during the year—9.7 percent and 16.2 percent respectively—thanks to their emergence as oil exporters. Cameroon, with the strongest economy in the subregion, continued its steady growth at around 4 percent to 5 percent, in the face of persistent power shortages. Investment in power and other infrastructure, including cross-border road and railway links, is a key requirement for countries and for economic integration.

West Africa

Nigeria, the anchor economy in the subregion, was hit by a reduction in oil exports, due partly to the disruption of production in the Niger Delta but mostly to OPEC's tightening of quotas. Because of the heavy weight of oil in the Nigerian economy, the reduction in oil production translated into an overall GDP decline of close to 1 percent in 2002. But with the rebound in oil production and exports, Nigeria was expected to grow at 4.5 percent in 2003. In Ghana the estimated growth of 4.5 percent in 2002 was in line with its long-term trend. The government's adherence to its reform agenda and its prudent fiscal and monetary management were significant factors sustaining the steady growth. Results in 2002 were also aided by higher international prices for gold and cocoa, the two major exports.

Nigeria was hit by a reduction in oil exports due mostly to OPEC's tightening of quotas

In Côte d'Ivoire, continued civil strife and political instability hurt the country's economic fortunes. The escalation of political tension into open civil war and the effective division of the country accelerated the downward spiral. While regional and international efforts at policing a ceasefire line and promoting reconciliation held tenuously during 2003, the disruptive impact on the economy has been considerable. The political stalemate and periodic eruptions of violence have resulted in significant cumulative declines in GDP, though high cocoa prices helped limit the drop in GDP to only 1.8 percent in 2002. Because Côte d'Ivoire had long been the economic hub for the subregion, its instability had direct and significant impacts on its neighbors, particularly landlocked countries that traditionally use Ivorian ports as their principal access to international markets. These countries also had other linkages with the Ivorian economy—including vital trade relations and remunerative employment for migrant labor, both disrupted.

Burkina Faso, with 4.6 percent growth in 2002, appears to have minimized the impact of the Ivorian crisis on its economy by rapidly and successfully switching its export and import routes to Ghana, Benin, and Togo. Burkina's economy also benefited from good rains, increasing agricultural production, and exports. Although Mali also profited from good rains and had GDP growth of 9.7 percent during the year, its alternative routes for external trade were physically difficult and financially costly. As a result, Mali lost exports of cattle and meat—and Burkina Faso suffered from the drying up of remittances from migrant workers.

Guinea's economy, despite the spillover effects of regional instability and its internal political and governance shortcomings, grew at 4.2 percent during the year. Senegal, while enjoying continued political stability, grew by only 1.1 percent in 2002—far short of its recent average of around 5 percent. Drought and lower international commodity prices accounted for the shortfall.

Higher agricultural productivity is essential if African countries are to substantially reduce poverty and improve food security

A major focus of regional cooperation in West Africa is an energy project to liquefy Nigerian natural gas and transport it by pipeline to neighboring countries, including Ghana.

Agriculture

For many African countries, agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP. Its contribution to employment and export earnings is usually even more significant. The sector periodically suffers from adverse weather patterns, depressed international prices, and conflict. During 2002, serious drought prevailed in the Horn of Africa, the western Sahel, and parts of Southern Africa, depressing agricultural output for several countries in these three subregions. Added to this were manmade disasters, including civil conflict.

Counterbalancing these negative factors was the higher output in South Africa, Nigeria, and countries in the middle and eastern parts of the Sahel belt. As a result, overall growth for agriculture was 3.6 percent in 2002—far short of the requirements, however. Some 30 million Africans faced food shortages and needed emergency relief assistance during the year. Higher agricultural productivity is essential if African countries are to substantially reduce poverty and improve the food security of their people.

To address the challenges of food security and rekindle agriculture's growth, NEPAD has drawn up the Common African Agricultural Development Program. Endorsed by the AU Summit, the program calls for immediate action on three key pillars of agricultural development:

- Extending the area under sustainable land management and irrigation.
- Investing in rural infrastructure and removing other market-impeding constraints.
- Increasing the supply of food.

If these pillars are to enhance productivity, they need to be accompanied by a fourth and longer term pillar, focusing on research and the dissemination and adoption of new technology.

The higher prices for agricultural exports represented only a partial recovery from the steep declines of prior years

Exports

Exports barely increased in 2002, growing by 1 percent in value terms and even less in volume, despite a relative improvement in international prices for most commodity exports, including oil. The higher prices for agricultural exports represented only a partial recovery from the steep declines of prior years. South Africa and Nigeria, which together account for half of Sub-Saharan Africa's exports, both experienced declines. And some other historically important exporters—including Madagascar, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon—also had lower exports in 2002. By contrast, Angola, Namibia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritius, and Kenya had their exports grow.

While Sub-Saharan Africa's overall share of world exports has been steadily declining, the region has done quite well in some products, particularly oil and cotton.

For cotton, Sub-Saharan Africa's exports rose from 460,000 tons in 1980 to 1,200,000 tons in 2000, with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali accounting for most of the growth. As a result of this near tripling, Sub-Saharan Africa's share of global cotton exports jumped from 6.9 percent to 17.3 percent over the last twenty years. And the global market share for the four West African countries expanded from 2.1 percent to 9.4 percent. This dramatic growth in cotton exports was accompanied—and possibly facilitated by—liberalization measures in these countries. Together with other reforms, the measures significantly raised the international competitiveness of cotton exports. Unfortunately, African producers have in recent years been confronted by depressed international prices, caused by huge OECD—principally U.S.—export subsidies. Export subsidies for cotton have been incorporated as an important item of the African negotiating position in current multilateral trade negotiations (see Part II of this Report).

Another area of potential competitive advantage for Africa is in nontraditional exports, such as horticulture and manufactured products. When combined with preferential market access possibilities, such products can take off. The U.S.'s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has become instrumental in this, particularly for textiles and clothing. Petroleum products (mainly from Nigeria and Gabon) account for the bulk of the value of products imported to the United States under AGOA. Next to oil, imports of motor vehicles and parts from South Africa have grown significantly because of the preferences. Similarly, U.S. imports of textiles and clothing from Africa, starting from a low base, have also increased rapidly. So far, the lead AGOA beneficiaries in textiles and clothing are Lesotho, Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Madagascar. Malawi, Namibia, and Uganda are expected to move in the same direction.

An area of potential comparative advantage for Africa is nontraditional exports

The U.S. has relaxed the "rules of origin" provision for AGOA-eligible countries (excluding South Africa and Mauritius), in effect allowing them to use fabrics from third countries as inputs for making apparel. But this relaxation of the rules of origin may expire in 2004, if new legislation extending the provision is not passed in time. The Multi-Fibre Agreement is also expected to expire at the end of 2004. Because this allowed some protective measures, including quota restrictions, its expiration will undermine the very basis of preferences in this area. If preferential access continues, some of the AGOA beneficiary countries could realize significant breakthroughs in textile and clothing exports. This may lead to additional investment in textile production in these countries, with clear and positive impact on employment and domestic value added.

HIV/AIDS

According to the December 2003 update by UNAIDS, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS globally is estimated at 40 million, with 26.6 million, or two-thirds of the global total, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 3.2 million were newly infected during the year. The economic and social effects of the pandemic are severe in the worst-hit countries, as the loss of breadwinners pushes more households into poverty and results in a burgeoning in the number of AIDS orphans.

The rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence varies across the continent, with the Sahel belt of West Africa having the lowest prevalence rates and Southern Africa by far the highest. In some countries, including those in Southern Africa, it appears that the spread of the epidemic is leveling off. But this is largely because the high incidence of deaths from HIV/AIDS almost matches new infections. The epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be nothing short of a catastrophe. Among the emerging findings is that young women are more likely than men in the same age group to be infected. Only effective measures to address the underlying social and cultural factors will counteract this.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be nothing short of a catastrophe

Considerable analysis and publicity have been devoted to the economic and social impact of HIV/AIDS, underscoring the implications for the survival of societies and countries. There is a consensus about the need to focus on both prevention and treatment. National programs, once launched, must be sustained and deepened. Senegal and Uganda are well-known examples of the effectiveness of strong, politically and socially anchored national action plans to combat the epidemic.

A small number of countries, including Southern African countries, are putting in place nationwide facilities for the treatment of infected citizens. International lobbying and intensive campaigns have contributed to a dramatic reduction in the prices of required drugs. But the overall cost of extending treatment to all who need it is still too high for most countries. And a global agreement to exempt the production of such drugs from the application of intellectual property rights has been held back, partly because of its linkage to the stalled Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

External resource flows

As pledged at the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey 2002) and reaffirmed at other forums including

G-8 Summits, Africa's partners have committed to increase their resource flows to developing countries, particularly African countries. As indicated in the NEPAD framework document, support from development partners is sought in four areas—better market access, larger investments flows, more ODA, and more debt relief.

For debt, there has been some progress in providing relief to low income countries through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Since 1999 the enhanced HIPC initiative has directly linked debt relief to poverty reduction, by requiring that anticipated debt service savings be used to increase social sector expenditures. But some of the key assumptions, including projections of export earnings for many HIPC countries, no longer hold, due to further deteriorations in the terms of trade for these countries. So, the issue needs to be revisited. The debt burden of non-HIPC African countries also needs to be addressed. Debt relief should be additional to other aid flows, and be seen as one component of a broader development assistance framework that also ensures adequate concessional resources and facilitates improved access to OECD markets.

A major promise of partner countries was to reverse the recent marked decline in official development assistance

A major promise of partner countries was to reverse the recent marked decline in official development assistance—both in total and as a percentage of their GNPs. Total commitments of ODA from DAC (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD) countries did rise marginally from $52.3 billion in 2001 to $58.3 billion in 2002. But at 0.23 percent of the GNP of DAC countries, the level is still way below the 0.33 percent in 1991–92, let alone the UN target of 0.7 percent.

Some countries do maintain their development assistance at levels well above the UN target of 0.7 percent—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and more recently Luxemburg. The UK has also managed to raise its level of ODA significantly. In this context, it is noteworthy that development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa from both bilateral and multilateral sources grew by almost $5 billion in 2002—from $14.6 billion in 2001 to $19.4 billion in 2002. Assistance from the United States and France accounted for 40 percent of the increase. Is this a one-year phenomenon or the beginning of a promising upward trend?

In 2002 foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at just over $8 billion, in line with average annual flows to the region in recent years (figure 1). Sub-Saharan Africa's declining share of global FDI now stands at about 1.38 percent, while its share of annual FDI to developing countries since 1997 has fluctuated between 2.5 percent and 5 percent (discounting the 2001 one-time irregular spike). As expected, most of the foreign investment was limited to oil and gas, with such traditional oil-producing countries as Angola and Nigeria receiving the lion's share (figure 2). Although Chad and Sudan have come in as new oil producers and exporters, the main focus for prospecting and new investment in production facilities will continue to be along the Atlantic coast of Africa, particularly deepwater production off Angola and in the Gulf of Guinea. The potential for deepwater production—added to existing production—is likely to make Africa a significant player in oil export markets.

Foreign direct investment skewed toward oil raises several issues. The investment and operations of oil extraction are usually enclave activities, with few links to the rest of the economy. As a result, there are limited—if any—spillovers of technology, employment, subcontracting,

FIGURE 1 TOTAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



Source: UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2003.*

FIGURE 2 MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2001-2002 (BILLIONSOF U.S. DOLLARS)



Source: UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2003.*

or supply. Moreover, oil revenues, if not managed well, can be more of a curse than a blessing. Countries rarely avoid the temptation of expanding expenditures during periods of high oil prices, which are then difficult to reduce once the boom period is over. Beyond the leveling of boom and bust cycles, the more fundamental issues of wisely investing a significant portion of oil income—or making savings for future generations—are challenges that most oil-producing countries, including those in Africa, have been unable to rise to.* And in most cases, there is a glaring lack of transparency for the revenues and expenditures associated with oil income.

South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda were important destinations for foreign investment in non-energy sectors. The dom-

* Eiffert, Ben, Alan Gelb and Nils Borge Tallroth: *The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil Exporting Countries,* World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2899, October 2002, Washington DC.

inant objective of African countries and their development partners should be not only enhancing foreign direct investment flows but channeling them to infrastructure development and productive activities. In this context, both sides should examine where and how ODA can be used to attract and leverage more FDI.

One of the attractions of FDI is its embodiment of market know-how and access. But better market access would also trigger more FDI. For AGOA-eligible countries, duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market—together with the (temporary) relaxation of the rules of origin—has increased investment, particularly in textiles and clothing. That is one more reason for all of Africa's development partners to revisit the merits of greater market access for African exports, an issue taken up in greater detail in Part II of this report.

PART II: AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The World Trade Organization's mandate and activities have drawn international attention, particularly in the debate on the benefits and drawbacks of globalization. As the third pillar of the international financial and trading system—with the IMF and the World Bank—the WTO is of interest to African countries, which recognize that trade and export-led growth must be an integral part of their development strategies. But for African countries to be more fully integrated into the international trading system, fundamental issues must be addressed in the WTO.

African countries recognize that trade and export-led growth must be an integral part of their development strategies

Both the WTO and its member countries are putting the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations back on track, following the collapse of the WTO's Cancun Ministerial Conference in September 2003. The Doha Round marked a change from previous trade rounds: it is intended to be a development round—specifically addressing the concerns of developing countries and facilitating their participation in international trade. The main objective of African countries pursued in this forum is to enhance their development prospects through greater market access for their exports. Because Africa is home to the largest group of least developed countries, cooperation in advancing their development goals, including assistance for improving their supply capacities, is another significant outcome that African countries expect from the current trade negotiations.

THE EARLY ROUNDS OF THE GATT

The International Trade Organization (ITO) was not established because the United States Congress failed to ratify it. But the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), "provisionally" adopted in 1947, continued as the institutional framework for international trade negotiations for nearly 50 years. Before the Uruguay Round was launched in the mid-1980s, there were seven GATT rounds. Their main accomplishment was a series of tariff reductions on industrial products. By the end of the seventh (Tokyo) Round in 1979, industrial tariffs had come down from their pre-GATT high of about 40 percent to an average of 5 percent.

These sequential rounds of tariff reductions opened the markets of developed countries to industrial goods, facilitating unprecedented growth in world trade. Many of the gains came in the 20 years ending in 1972. From then onwards, several industrial countries resorted to more protectionist measures.

The tariff reductions agreed to in the GATT applied uniformly to all developed countries. But starting in the early 1950s, developing countries insisted that they be given special and favorable treatment in the light of their development challenges. They demanded preferential access to the markets of industrial countries, exemption from tariff reductions (to allow them to protect infant industries), and flexibility in the application of GATT rules and disciplines. A particular result of their successful lobbying was the Generalized System of Preferences: industrial countries could voluntarily grant developing countries preferential access to their markets. The various aspects of special and differential treatment for developing countries were eventually adopted as a unified Enabling Clause in 1979 (see box 1).

BOX 1 SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Special and differential treatment in the multilateral trading system refers to rights and relaxed obligations specifically awarded to developing country members of the GATT and now the WTO. The provisions are meant to grant them more favorable access to the markets of the developed countries and to provide substantial policy discretion in their domestic trade policies and tariff structures.

The provisions reflect the recognition that developing countries face special development challenges and need more favorable treatment. While the principle was adopted starting in the mid-1950s, it was progressively elaborated, expanded, and deepened in the 1960s and 1970s.

In essence, special and differential treatment places fewer (or more relaxed) obligations, provides for action in favor of beneficiary countries and calls for special measures to support least developed countries. Its purpose is to enhance market access conditions for countries while permitting them derogation from certain multilateral trade disciplines. Enhanced market access has been implemented through trade preferences—including the Generalized System of Preferences adopted in

BOX 1 (CONTINUED)

1968 and implemented since 1971. Developed countries offer them individually to specific developing and least developed countries.

Developing countries exercise their right to regulate access to their own markets through trade barriers and exemptions from some disciplines. The derogation from certain rules ensures that beneficiary countries are not deprived of essential tools to strengthen their capacity to export—tools they need to take advantage of their preferential access to developed country markets.

The 1979 Framework Agreement on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries—also known as the Enabling Clause—offers a fairly comprehensive statement on the core special and differential provisions. It provided permanent legal cover for special and differential treatment, including the generalized system of preferences. It identified least developed countries as a separate category of GATT members deserving more favorable treatment than other developing countries. And it codified the "graduation" principle for developing countries to assume more obligations of GATT membership as their economies grew stronger.

Criticisms have been levied at the key features of special and differential treatment. It has been argued that granting greater flexibility to developing countries in their use of trade policy instruments is counterproductive. Why? Because "market distorting" measures impose a self-inflicted cost on their own economies, while nonreciprocity may preclude their use of the GATT/WTO framework as an "agency of restraint."

The "Single Undertaking," as the guiding principle for Uruguay Round Agreements, radically changed the form and content of most of the key elements of the second dimension of special and differential treatment provisions. In the Doha Round, the concept of special and differential treatment, its justification, form, and content need to be carefully rethought. A redefinition requires the identification and negotiation of the multilateral rules for granting full or partial derogation to low income countries, including the form of trade preferences that will stimulate development.

Source: Oyejide and Ademola 2004; Michalopoulos 2000.

THE URUGUAY ROUND

By the 1980s there was a sense that new multilateral negotiations were needed to counter the growing protectionist sentiment and provide new momentum to the decades of progressive trade liberalization. The Uruguay Round, launched in the mid-1980s after years of intensive negotiations, was concluded in 1993. Its agreements, formally adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 1994, are much more comprehensive than those of the previous rounds. In addition to industrial goods, the agreements cover trade in agriculture, textiles, clothing, and services. Their coverage encompasses such new areas as trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and clarifies and strengthens regulations governing some key functions and procedures under the GATT. A central element of the agreements was the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Uruguay Round agreements were expected to facilitate a significant expansion of global trade, but they were driven by industrial countries. Of the 36 African members of the GATT, only 12 were active in the negotiations, and their capacity limitations meant less than full participation. Even so, the Uruguay Round agreements meant much—or little—for African countries:

- Because the agreements are a "single undertaking," all members are equally bound by their provisions, though developing countries are given longer implementation periods, with additional transition periods for the least developed.
- Sub-Saharan Africa was likely to benefit least from the agreements, partly because it relies on unprocessed commodity exports and accounts for a small and declining share of world exports. For African food-importing countries, there was some fear that reductions in OECD export subsidies might lead to price rises on such imports. So a decision was adopted at Marrakesh to assist least developed countries and net food importing developing countries. On balance the overriding concern is that OECD export subsidies are a major constraint on Africa's exports—cotton is a prominent case.
- When the Multi-Fibre Arrangement is fully phased out at the end of 2004, trade in textiles and clothing will have been markedly liberalized, undermining the value of preferential access for these products.
- The administrative and technical burden of implementing tariff structures and trade regulations to conform to WTO requirements have been very demanding of the financial and institutional capacities of African countries, particularly the least developed.

The agreed approach for addressing the severe constraints faced by the least developed countries was for several international agencies to coordinate and channel technical and capacity development assistance.

THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND

Toward the end of the 1990s, trade became a central feature of the debate on globalization. Critics of the global trading system were concerned that the mandate of the WTO was rapidly expanding and that its agenda and activities were oriented toward the priorities of the developed countries, at the expense of developing countries. The antiglobalization movement's scuttling of the Millennium Round in Seattle in 1999 was one manifestation of this concern. So when negotiations were resurrected at Doha, Qatar, in 2001, the assumption was that it would be a truly development round. Indeed, the Doha Agenda marked the first time that a trade round focused on development—and on creating a more equitable international trading environment.

The Doha Agenda marked the first time that a trade round focused on development

Two items of the Doha Agenda—agriculture and services—carried over from the Uruguay Round. They were meant to be part of the menu of ongoing negotiations or the "built-in agenda." Other important issues on the Agenda are market access for nonagricultural products, TRIPS, particularly as it relates to public health (production and import of pharmaceuticals for medical emergencies), and special treatment of LDCs—provision of adequate technical assistance as well as quota-free and duty-free access for their products.

Some issues proposed for the multilateral trade agenda at the WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference of 1996—investment, competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation—also form part of the Doha Agenda. The understanding was that a final decision on these issues would be taken at the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Also included in the Doha Ministerial Declaration are the intention to seek ways of assisting LDCs and small and vulnerable economies to integrate into the global economy, as well as provisions for establishing working groups to consider debt and finance and technology transfer.

African countries fully expected that the Doha Development Round would address their two goals of greater access to the markets of the developed countries and more effective partnership to augment their capacity to export.

But by Cancun, there had been little progress in the negotiations. A major divide between developing and developed countries had arisen over whether immediate negotiations on the Singapore issues was a priority. Cancun failed to narrow the differences between developed and developing countries. African countries—like most developing countries—felt that the emphasis was on orienting the agenda toward issues of interest to developed countries—with little or no progress on the inclusion of items of priority concern for Africa.

To improve their export performance, African countries need to diversify their products and markets

Cancun collapsed, accomplishing nothing. Since then, however, there are signs that member states are serious about reviving the negotiations. The issues of central interest to African countries remain the same as at the start of the round. For these issues the Global Coalition for Africa facilitated an in-depth review and discussion at a meeting of African Ministers of Trade in Nairobi in August 2003. Because they will be relevant when negotiations resume, they are summarized here.

- Market access barriers.
- Enhancing Africa's integration into the global economy.
- The Doha Round after Cancun

MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS AGAINST AFRICAN EXPORTS

Africa's export performance, with average export growth of 3 percent a year in 1990–2000, is substantially below the 9 percent average for developing countries and the world average of 6 percent. Why? In part because Africa's exports lack diversity and are highly concentrated in products and markets. Most African countries depend on exports of raw materials, vulnerable to volatile prices, but their products are declining in global importance.

To improve their export performance, African countries need to diversify their products and markets—expanding into processed raw materials and other manufactures to move up the value chain. But a variety of market access constraints in industrial countries—on agricultural and nonagricultural products, including tariff escalations and such nontariff barriers as technical and sanitary standards—make product diversification difficult.

Tariffs, peaks, and escalations

With repeated cuts in successive GATT rounds, import duties in industrial countries have come down significantly. But tariffs much higher than average generally apply to the products that are the predominant exports from low income countries. Tariff peaks of 15 percent or higher for those exports are not uncommon in Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States. More than 30 percent of least developed country exports and 15 percent of all developing country exports may be affected by such peaks. Why? Because tariffs above 100 percent are concentrated on the labor-intensive agricultural products in which low income countries generally enjoy a comparative advantage. Tariff peaks in Japan and the EU are concentrated on agricultural and food products, especially dairy products, vegetables, processed coffee, tea, cereals, cocoa, and tobacco products—precisely the product groups that African counties could diversify into.

Tariffs much higher than average generally apply to the exports from low income countries

African industrial exports are also subject to tariff peaks in developed countries. As with agricultural products, tariff peaks are widely applied on labor-intensive manufacturing products which are of significant export interest to African countries. Industrial products account for more than 88 percent of all products subject to tariff peaks in Canada, about 85 percent in the United States, 24 percent in Japan, and 9 percent in the EU. In many developed markets, the bulk of textiles and clothing, as well as other labor-intensive industrial products, are subject to tariff peaks, though there is progress in phasing out the peaks on textile and clothing.

The tariff structure of most industrial countries also generally features significant escalation. As a result, raw materials face lower import duties than the processed products that provide greater value added to exporters. Tariff escalation in developed countries is particularly prominent in a variety of semiprocessed and fully processed agricultural products of export interest to African countries: cocoa, coffee, tea, spices, oil seeds, vegetable oil, tobacco, manioc roots and tubers, tropical fruits and nuts, wood, rubber, fisheries, and hides and skins.

In the EU, for example, the import of cocoa beans is duty free. But semiprocessed cocoa paste is subject to an import duty of 9.6 percent, while the fully processed form, chocolate, attracts a tariff or tariff equivalent of about 25 percent. Partly because of this escalation, there is an unusual pattern in the distribution of production and trade across developing and developed countries. Developing countries produce 90 percent of the world's cocoa beans but account for only 44 percent of cocoa liquor, 29 percent of cocoa powder and 4 percent of the chocolate produced.

Technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements are significant nontariff barriers for African exports

At times, the tariff escalation can be significant. In Japan and the EU fully processed food products face an average tariff twice as high as the tariff for corresponding products in the first stage of processing. In Canada the average tariff rate on fully processed food products is 12 times higher than the rate for the corresponding unprocessed products. The average tariff rate for all industrial raw materials in developed countries is 0.8 percent, that of the finished product 6.2 percent. For tropical industrial products, the range of average tariff rates is from zero percent for raw materials to 3.4 percent for the corresponding finished products. And while raw materials attract an average tariff of 2 percent, the finished forms of natural resource-based products are subject to an average tariff of 5.9 percent. Tariff escalation thus constrains African exporters seeking to diversify through processing, entrenching the dependence of African countries on low-value primary commodities.

Product standards

Technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements are significant nontariff barriers for African exports. Although standards are obviously necessary for consumer protection, the measures have become more complex and numerous. For example, the annual notification of new technical standards to the GATT/WTO increased from fewer than 25 in the early 1980s to well over 400 in 1999. For African countries to satisfy the requirements imposed by technical standards and SPS measures in their main export markets, they must make substantial investments in redesigning products, assessing conformity, and monitoring compliance and quality control. Both the costs and technical resources for this are quite high.

More than tariff barriers and other quantitative restrictions, technical standards and SPS requirements significantly constrain the ability of African countries to export their products to developed countries. As tariffs are lowered, it is probable that technical standards will be more rigorously enforced. It is also probable that new standards and requirements for the environment and other issues will be introduced, forming additional barriers to market access.

Some examples. In January 1998 the EU banned the import of fresh fish and fish products from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique because it did not consider that the SPS measures in these countries protected EU consumers from the risk of cholera. For similar reasons, Uganda's exporters of food-related items frequently face difficulties in meeting technical regulations, product standards, and SPS measures in their main export markets. In Ghana, of the 38 fishing and fish processing businesses registered for general export, only 6 were approved for exports to the EU, and some had to upgrade their facilities at a cost of about $5,000 per vessel. It has been estimated that implementing the new EU aflatoxin standards could reduce African exports of cereals, dried nuts, and fruits to Europe by 64 percent, or $670 million a year.

OECD government support for agricultural products of predominant value to African countries is particularly high

Agricultural domestic support and export subsidies

Agriculture was a central issue in the Doha Agenda and the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Why? Because of the extremely deleterious effect on developing countries of the trade-distorting domestic support and export subsidies provided to agriculture by developed countries. The level of support to agriculture in OECD countries rose from an annual average of $302 billion in 1986–88 to an annual average of $330 billion in 1999–01. In recent years, subsidies and other forms of support to farmers in OECD countries accounted for roughly one–third of total farm receipts. Farmers in the United States get about 20 percent of their income from government support, those in Japan, almost 60 percent. OECD government support for those agricultural products of predominant interest to African countries is particularly high as a share of producer receipts. Support to producers as a share of the value of farm output averages 31 percent for agriculture as a whole, but it exceeds 40 percent on such products as cotton, meat, rice, sugar, tobacco, and wheat.

Given the structure of their exports, the actual and potential effect on African countries of domestic support and export subsidies in OECD countries is very high. For Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 50–80 percent of exports are agricultural products subsidized in OECD countries. The support and subsidies encourage overproduction in developed countries, reducing world prices or increasing their volatility. The direct impact: a loss of market share and export earnings, and lower investment in agriculture and local processing. Added to this, dumping surplus products by OECD countries depresses demand for local products, reducing income and employment.

Subsidies have enabled OECD countries to increase their exports of agricultural products to Africa, stifling local production

Cotton, an important crop for several African countries, faces declining export prices partly because of domestic support, but mainly due to export subsidies, particularly in the United States. Cotton subsidies there, $3.9 billion in 2001–02, have been the single most important force driving down world cotton prices. In 2001 the value of U.S. subsidies exceeded the market value of its cotton output by about 30 percent. Production support stimulates overproduction in the United States and the surplus is then sold on the world market with the help of export subsidies. As a result, world cotton prices fall and more efficient producers face lower market shares and significant losses in export earnings.

The cumulative loss of export earnings for African cotton exporters in 1999–2001 was $334 million. Countries suffering major losses included Mali ($43 million), Benin ($33 million), Côte d'Ivoire ($32 million), Burkina Faso ($28 million), Cameroon ($21 million), Chad ($16 million), and Togo ($16 million). The loss of export receipts caused by the fall in world prices: more than 3 percent of GDP in Benin and Mali, and 1–2 percent of GDP in Burkina Faso and Chad. This, despite the fact that these countries produce cotton on highly competitive terms.

Subsidies have also enabled OECD countries to increase their exports of agricultural products to Africa, stifling local production. For example, production support and export subsidies for tomatoes may account for the fact that the EU now covers about 80 percent of the demand for tomato products in West Africa at cheaper prices than local suppliers. Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal have all faced significant increases in imports of EU tomato concentrate in recent years. This caused closure of local tomato processing plants in some cases, as well as increased consumption of imported concentrate at the expense of locally produced fresh tomatoes. In Senegal, imports of tomato paste increased 15-fold, from 400 tons annually in 1990–94 to 6,000 tons in 1995–2000, while average annual tomato production fell by 50 percent, from 43,000 tons to about 20,000. Burkina Faso's domestic tomato production fell by 50 percent, from 22,000 tons to 10,000, and its imports of tomato paste increased four-fold, from 400 tons to 1,400.

In Kenya the volume of milk processed rose from 179,000 tons to 392,000 (or by more than 100 percent) during 1980–90. But after 1990, the volume of milk processed fell drastically, to 126,000 tons in 1998. At the same time, imports of milk powder soared from 48 tons to 2,500. The imports of subsidized milk products at cheap prices undermined Kenya's local production, reducing the country's ability to diversify into agricultural processing. In Benin domestic production of chicken meat increased only marginally during 1985/95–1995/2000, from 25,000 tons to 27,000. In contrast, chicken meat imports increased 17-fold from the 1985–95 annual average of 1,000 tons. In 2001–02, it is estimated that EU sugar subsidies pushed down the world price of sugar by 17 percent. This led to the contraction of the sugar industry and significant job losses in Mozambique, where the sugar industry is a major provider of employment.

Market entry restrictions

For African countries the market power of large multinational firms has significant implications for their market access and export earnings. The marketing chains for many high-value agricultural crops and processed products are dominated by a few multinational firms, as for world trade in coffee, cocoa, oil seeds, grains, and vegetable oils.

The market concentration in major agricultural commodity chains seems linked to the declining share of value that exporting countries receive. Producer prices represent a very low share of the final product price, from 4 percent to 8 percent for raw cotton and tobacco, 11 percent to 24 percent for jute and coffee, and 23 percent to 27 percent for fruits and vegetables. The bulk of the value thus goes to the firms that dominate the market in a product, not to African producers. And their market dominance restricts the expansion of African exporters into trade in higher value processed products.

ENHANCING AFRICA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

To promote Africa's participation in the global economy, market access restrictions in OECD countries must be reduced

To promote Africa's participation in the global trading system, the market access restrictions it faces in OECD countries must be reduced. A variety of preferential access schemes have been offered to facilitate more favorable access to the markets of developed countries for products from African and other developing countries. But the firmer binding of such preferences and, more important, the creation of a more equitable international trading regime through multilateral trade negotiations would serve African and other developing countries better. Agreements in the WTO would apply to all WTO members and be less subject to change than discretionary preferential access schemes.

Removing market access barriers

Market access can be increased through multilateral or bilateral negotiations for mutually binding agreements. Developed countries have also granted market access to developing countries through unilateral preferential schemes. In practice, multilaterally negotiated access arrangements may be complemented by such preferential schemes as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Currently, there are about 15 GSP programs in the context of which various developed countries apply, on a voluntary, unilateral, and time-limited basis, preferential tariff rates to imports from selected developing countries. Most African countries are covered by these preferences. In addition, many African countries benefit from the Lome/Cotonou non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangement with the EU. The latest in the series of preferential trade initiatives of relevance to Africa are the EU's Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme for all least developed countries (most are in Africa) and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the United States.

The EBA and AGOA represent a new generation of preferential trade arrangements. They both provide more favorable market access than the GSP and other preferences. Although other schemes allow low income countries to bypass some of the restrictions imposed by tariff barriers in developed country markets, they generally do not provide full quota–free and duty–free access. Their impact is also limited by eligibility, conditionality, and other procedural constraints. And the preference margins are quite small for the products most heavily protected in the preference-granting countries. In addition, they generally contain restrictive rules of origin for processed agricultural products and simple manufactured products such as textiles and clothing. Yet these are exactly the products into which export diversification and expansion would be most feasible for African countries. These restrictions aside, African countries have generally not taken full advantage of the preferences afforded by such schemes largely because of supply-side constraints. And the liberalization under the Uruguay Round agreements has undermined their value.

EBA and AGOA represent a new generation of preferential trade arrangements

The EU's EBA is an important step forward in the design of trade preference schemes. It provides that virtually *all* products from *all* least developed countries will be eligible for quota-free and duty-free access to the EU market. It also provides that such access will be maintained indefinitely. EBA is thus a significant advance over GSPs in product coverage and duration. There is, however, a delay in the application of EBA to bananas, rice, and sugar. The phase-in period for full market access for bananas runs from January 2002 to January 2006, while that for rice and sugar is delayed until September 2009.

AGOA, the only Africa-specific trade preference scheme, has expanded the range of products eligible for preferential access to the United States and extended the duration of such access. Under AGOA, petroleum products and apparel, as well as a number of agricultural and industrial products, are eligible. Whereas the previous GSP covered only 17 percent of the region's total exports to the United States in 2000, AGOA increases this to 72 percent, though much of this reflects the inclusion of petroleum products. Compared with the GSP, AGOA covers an additional 1,800 tariff line items, including footwear, handbags, and luggage. In addition, a special Apparel Provision relaxes the rules of origin for lesser developed countries (with a GNP of less than $1,500 in 1998) and allows duty-free access for apparel manufactured using fabric from anywhere in the world until September 2004. There remain, however, 1,067 tariff lines for which preference has not been granted, including many products that face import tariffs in excess of 10 percent.

The expected impact of EBA is limited for several eligible African countries (such as Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Liberia) whose current export bundles are dominated by products where the most-favored-nation duties are already zero. Conversely, the potential value of EBA is high in countries whose export bundles consist of products with relatively high most-favored-nation tariff rates. Examples include Malawi (tobacco), Madagascar (fish and clothing), Mozambique (aluminium), Uganda (fish and tobacco), and Lesotho (clothing). To date, the largest share of African exports under AGOA is oil, mainly from Nigeria and Gabon. But textile and apparel exports are now showing considerable growth, with 2003 aggregate exports more than triple the 2001 levels.

Expanding preferential access schemes could yield significant results for African countries

The results suggest that expanding these types of preferential access schemes within the multilateral framework of the WTO could yield significant results for African countries. Their impact would be increased if they did not contain restrictive rules of origin or provisions that allow importing countries to withdraw preferences on an emergency basis or as a safeguard measure.

Other market access constraints imposed by contingent measures, technical barriers to trade, and SPS measures in OECD countries also need to be addressed. Most trade preference arrangements do not oblige preference-granting countries to forgo the use of contingency policies, such as antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures. And their impact is limited by overly strict product standards and SPS conditions. These standards are often imposed in response to lobbying by consumer groups in developed countries and so are unlikely to be scaled back. Reaching agreement on standards within the WTO, followed by application of such standards by developed countries and assistance to help African countries meet them, could help address the problem.

Obviously, from the perspective of developed countries, there are political considerations for maintaining domestic support and export subsidies for agriculture. Governments may not readily agree to eliminate or significantly reduce such support because of the pressure from domestic interest groups and constituencies that now benefit from them. These political realities imply that African countries should be prepared to negotiate skillfully and persistently, if they are to improve their access to developed country markets. Facilitating market access for African exports would lead to an Africa that is more prosperous and more valuable as a trading partner. To be ensured is that reductions in subsidies are not replaced by income support measures that continue to leave African producers at a disadvantage.

Facilitating market access for African exports would lead to an Africa that is more prosperous and more valuable as a trading partner

African countries may also be affected differently by the elimination of domestic support and export subsidies in industrial countries. OECD subsidies can benefit net agricultural importers by lowering world prices, particularly food. Some African exporters also derive significant benefits from OECD policies. For example, countries that have preferential quota arrangements for specific export products, such as sugar, would be hurt by their removal.

Opening the markets of industrial countries would create substantial opportunities for trade expansion for products from African and other developing countries. But attention must also go to reducing the market access barriers in Africa and the developing world. The more advanced developing countries in Asia, and possibly in Latin America, could become significant markets for African products. But many of the same constraints and protectionist measures in OECD countries are found in these countries too. The significant barriers to expanded trade among African countries also need to be addressed. Average tariffs in African countries are currently much higher than those in OECD countries, while inadequate transport, cumbersome transit requirements, and other nontariff barriers impede the expansion of intra-African trade.

Developing export supply capacity

The market access constraints in OECD countries obviously need to be eliminated for a more equitable international trading environment. But removing such barriers may not automatically spur the growth of African exports. African countries need to undertake policy reforms and other key measures to enable them to take full advantage of the opportunities. They cannot continue to rely on the same small group of low-value commodity exports if they want to become more integrated with the global economy. They must improve their international competitiveness and diversify their products and markets. Despite the difficulties, some countries have managed to diversify their exports and meet stringent product standards in OECD countries. Kenya, for example, has achieved substantial growth in the supply of fruit, vegetables, and flowers to the EU.

Continuing reform of macroeconomic policy will be necessary to strengthen the prospects for exports

Developing export supply response capacity will require that most countries take action to address macroeconomic weaknesses, deficiencies in trade-related infrastructure, inefficiencies of key trade-related inputs and services, and inadequate investment. They also need to make trade policy an integral component of their development strategies. In most instances greater government understanding of the constraints faced by private sector producers and exporters—including small businesses—could help to inform policy decisions.

Macroeconomic environment

Most African countries have seen considerable improvements in their macroeconomic environment in recent years, though significant inter-country differences remain. Africa's macroeconomic environment is still less stable and sound than that of the leading exporters in the developing world. Continuing reform of macroeconomic policy will therefore be necessary to strengthen the prospects for exports. Maintaining viable and stable real exchange rates, liberalizing policies toward foreign direct investment—particularly in key production and services sectors—and establishing a fair, open, and transparent regulatory framework are all necessary. Policies, once introduced, must be updated and consistently and effectively implemented.

Trade–related infrastructure

Throughout much of the continent, inefficiencies and inadequacies in communications, transport, and energy push up the costs of trade and act as a tax on it. In Africa, high transport costs, especially for processed products, often place the region's exporters at a serious competitive disadvantage. In addition, in most countries trade costs are increased by the high cost and inadequacy of telecommunications and the lack of reasonably priced and reliable energy. Inadequate port management and poorly managed railways and road systems impose additional costs. Research suggests that every day saved in shipping time could be equal to a cost saving of 0.8 percent.

Net freight and insurance payments as a proportion of export value, while falling in other developing countries, are rising in Africa. Reforms that stimulate competition in infrastructure services are likely to improve their provision and lower the cost. Obviously, landlocked countries and countries located farther from their export outlets experience additional transport costs. With close to 30 percent of African countries landlocked, regional cooperation to create efficient and secure transport corridors will be necessary to reduce their trade costs.

Trade–related inputs and services

The availability, relative cost, and quality of trade-related inputs and services—such as skilled human resources, finance, insurance, technology, public administration, and market institutions—also bear on the ability of African countries to engage in international trade. An efficient, diversified, innovative, and well–regulated financial system is necessary to finance the investment and operating capital needs of exporters and to allocate resources to export activities with the highest returns. But in many African countries the financial sector is limited and not appropriately regulated, and financing for production and export is scarce and expensive. Inefficiencies in public administration, lack of governmental transparency, and the absence of a supportive legal and regulatory environment impose additional costs on producers.

The policy reforms undertaken in many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s have begun to address some of these long-standing problems. But the reforms need to be pursued more vigorously, and additional measures initiated, if the required range and level of services are to be created. In many instances the factors of production may be cheaper and better in industrial countries because of the trade support provided to producers and exporters—and because of higher productivity.

Investment

It is possible that agricultural, mineral, and industrial processing activities based on African raw materials will shift from OECD to African countries as tariffs are further reduced and tariff escalation is eliminated in developed countries. This could facilitate the diversification and expansion of exports, if African countries are globally competitive. Increasing their competitiveness will require improvements in productivity and in the quality of export products, and those improvements will require additional investment. Finding the resources for such investment could prove difficult. Domestic savings and investment rates in Africa have been lower than in the fast-growing developing countries in other regions.

Domestic savings and investment rates in Africa have been lower than in the fast-growing developing countries in other regions

Foreign direct investment (FDI) to most African countries has also been limited. African countries need to do more to encourage FDI, but partner countries and agencies could also offer more support. Increased flows of FDI would not only help meet the financing gap—they would also help African firms acquire technologies and management knowhow. FDI in African countries by OECD firms engaged in processing agricultural, mining, and industrial raw materials could be the quickest and most efficient way of relocating processing activities to Africa, while maintaining the product standards required in OECD markets. Policies that encourage partnerships between local and foreign firms in joint ventures, licensing, management contracts, subcontracting, and franchising arrangements could promote this.

Priorities, consistency, and coherence

Although the contribution of trade to development is now better recognized, it frequently is still not afforded the priority it deserves by either African countries or their development partners. African countries need to clearly identify their comparative advantage in trade and develop a strategic framework that includes South-South and intra-African trade as well as trade with OECD countries. They also have to recognize that much of their global competition is coming from other developing countries. They should focus on both international and regional trade, but each provides different opportunities and requires different strategies. Expanding and facilitating regional trade and developing products for trade within Africa could be a first step toward enhancing capacity for increased trade in a more competitive global market.

Addressing the trade barriers within Africa is within the capacity of African governments. Needed are regional trade agreements, greater harmonization of trade and macroeconomic policies within regions and more equitable relations within regional groupings. Regional cooperation and integration institutions have to focus more specifically on trade and develop technical capacity in this area, as well as moderate and channel the competition that exists among them. NEPAD, given its emphasis on trade and development of the private sector, provides a useful vehicle for addressing trade issues and developing the infrastructure for trade.

The implementation of appropriate policies, institutional measures, and investment programs to enhance exports is the responsibility of each African country. Obviously, external assistance and the conditions attached to it, as well as the provisions of multilateral trade agreements, have a bearing on export growth and Africa's smooth integration into the global economy. In particular, many of the trade-related reforms may figure in both IMF/World Bank assistance programs and on the agenda of the WTO negotiations. It is crucial that African countries ensure consistency and coherence among all such actual or potential commitments and their own development strategies.

African countries need to improve their ability to engage in trade negotiations

Capacity for trade negotiations

The outcomes of previous multilateral trade negotiations and the participation of African countries highlight deficiencies in their capacity for trade policy analysis and trade negotiations. For the current Doha Round, African countries are much better organized, particularly at the political level, and they have carefully prepared their joint position. But multilateral trade negotiations are continuous, and permanent activities are complicated. African countries need to improve their capacity to prepare and participate if they are to obtain the best outcomes. Within the WTO, it is incumbent on countries to have the diversity and depth of expertise to negotiate the most advantageous terms under each agreement. Participating countries have to identify and articulate their negotiating objectives in the light of national and regional priorities and ensure that agreed obligations will help to achieve these objectives.

African countries need to improve their ability to engage in trade negotiations, and external assistance will be important for this. But given the conflicting objectives implicit in trade negotiations, national and regional African initiatives will also be needed. At the country level, technical experts from outside government could be drawn on for the policy research and analysis to underpin trade policymaking. Regional integration institutions and related mechanisms could usefully assist by pooling national capacity and developing specialist knowledge at the regional level. At the WTO, groups of countries could collaborate to build and share technical expertise, and the AU could expand its capacity to provide technical advice to member states.

The WTO offers the prospect of creating a multilateral trading system that takes into account the concerns of developing countries

Despite its shortcomings so far, the WTO offers the prospect of creating a multilateral trading system that takes into account the concerns of developing countries. It affords African countries an equal opportunity to engage in setting the terms of global trade, if they strengthen their capacity for negotiation. The Doha Agenda encompasses issues of particular importance to African countries: increasing real market access for African agricultural and nonagricultural products by:

- Reducing tariff and nontariff barriers and the negative distorting effects of subsidies in developed countries.
- Reaching agreement on TRIPS and public health.
- Reaffirming special and differential treatment for developing countries and ensuring that the assistance promised to LDCs is forthcoming.

But to obtain a favorable outcome on these and other issues, trade negotiations must be underpinned by considerable technical expertise.

The terms of trade for African countries could be considerably improved by negotiating tariff reductions within the WTO. But tariff reductions also stand to reduce the preferences that African countries now enjoy, and some countries may suffer as a result. Formulas for determining the level of tariffs, the differences between bound and applied tariff rates, and the timetable for tariff reduction all need close attention. With countries at different starting points, it is important that less than fully reciprocal implementation periods and tariff structures be negotiated—and quota and duty free access for African exports sought.

Given the growing importance of standards in global trade, African countries need to be more active in setting standards within the WTO.

Much could be done in properly documenting nontariff barriers in formulas for negotiation, and in simplifying the procedures and steps for enforcing standards. African countries should take advantage of exemptions for specific products where possible, and seek to have exemptions applied to products of importance to them. They could also work to limit the imposition of new standards.

Attention also needs to be devoted to the terms of special and differential treatment afforded to developing countries within multilateral trade agreements, to ensure that they continue to provide meaningful advantage. The Uruguay Round Agreements severely undermined special and differential treatment by merely extending the period for developing countries to liberalize, while requiring that the extent of liberalization be the same as for developed countries. In the current round of negotiations it will be critical for African countries to ensure that existing special and differential treatment provisions are strengthened and maintained in the WTO framework, and that new special and differential arrangements are worked into agreements.

Much could be done in properly documenting nontariff barriers in formulas for negotiation and in simplifying the procedures and steps for enforcing standards

It is important that African countries determine a strategic framework for WTO-sponsored and other multilateral trade negotiations. There was progress before Cancun, when the Mauritius Declaration of African Trade Ministers of June 2003 reflected an agreed strategy and common position for African countries, endorsed by the African Union Summit. The African Union also endorsed the formation of a negotiating team for the multilateral trade talks. And there was considerable progress in involving a range of actors in discussions of trade, so that the Mauritius Declaration represented the views of trade ministers, officials, experts, and representatives of civil society. The GCA meeting reaffirmed many of these perspectives.

THE DOHA ROUND AFTER CANCUN

The Cancun Ministerial conference, intended as a mid-term review of progress in the Doha Round, was expected to re-energize the stalled negotiations and provide clear guidance on pending issues. For African countries, progress on agriculture and the related cotton initiative were priority considerations. And, the joint African position was against crowding the agenda by including such new items as the Singapore issues. The lack of adequate consultation by the chair—together with the wide gaps between the positions of the developed and developing countries—contributed to the failure of Cancun.

Even before the conference collapsed, it was evident that very little progress had been made, particularly on issues of importance to African countries. Serious efforts will now be needed if Doha is to fulfill its promise as a development round. Lack of progress on the Doha Agenda would damage the credibility of the WTO. Already, regional trade agreements entered into by member states outside the WTO threaten to undermine the multilateral trading system. It would appear, however, that member states are committed to moving forward, and it is in the interest of African countries that the talks restart.

Serious efforts will be needed if Doha is to fulfill its promise as a development round

The negotiations, once resumed, must keep to the spirit and letter of the Doha Agenda and safeguard the credibility of the international trading system. Limiting the talks to a key set of issues—including market access in agriculture, industrial tariffs, trade in services, and implementation related issues—would facilitate progress. For African countries, agriculture should be a key area of focus, with the aim of reaching agreement on significant reductions of export subsidies and domestic support by a stipulated date.

Progress on agriculture should facilitate smoother negotiations in other areas, including nonagricultural products and trade in services. Flexibility on the part of all members will be necessary, and African countries need to determine what tradeoffs will be in their interests. Since Cancun, there has been a degree of consensus that African countries could accept the inclusion of negotiations on trade facilitation.

Cancun showed that the international trading system has changed fundamentally, particularly in the post-Uruguay Round era. Developing countries now have an important voice in determining the rules that will govern global trade. But for African countries to fully take advantage of this, their negotiating proposals need to be informed by proper economic, legal, and technical assessments of the options, including the views of their trading partners. To build the support of stakeholders, countries need to design appropriate mechanisms for fostering a participatory trade policy process and mainstreaming it in national development and poverty reduction strategies.

BOX 2 THE COTTON INITIATIVE

The effect of domestic support measures and subsidies on the world market for cotton was a particular issue for African countries at the WTO conference in Cancun. In May 2003 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali submitted a joint proposal to the special session of the WTO committee on agriculture. As a result of liberalization measures, these countries are internationally competitive in the cost of cotton production. Yet subsidies in OECD countries, particularly the United States, distort global market prices. The cotton initiative proposed by these countries requested:

- The establishment at Cancun of a mechanism to eventually eliminate domestic support and export subsidy for cotton by a specific date.
- The introduction of financial compensation for LDCs until support measures for cotton are completely eliminated, as an integral element of the rights and obligations resulting from the Doha Round.

The proposed compensation would be equivalent to the loss in export revenue suffered by LDCs affected by these subsidies.

At Cancun many WTO members were sympathetic to the proposal. But the United States found it unacceptable, suggesting that comprehensive reforms to address problems at each layer of the value chain were necessary. To overcome the stalemate and facilitate compromises, it is now proposed that the initiative be included in the general negotiations on agriculture.

For the initiative to succeed, African countries and their supporters need to:

- Determine a cause for action, such as the evidence of a breach of an agricultural obligation.
- Establish a causal link between the subsidies and the injury, to quantify the extent of damages.
- Confirm the legitimacy of monetary compensation. Usual trade remedies approved by the WTO enable the injured party to retaliate, but given their market size, this is not a viable option for LDC cotton producers.

The initiative also needs to be grounded in analysis that addresses economic and legal issues and recognizes the business and political dimensions. A lobbying effort to bring moral and political pressure to bear would then be needed.

Trade should be integrated into the development strategies of African countries

For Africa, trade and development are inextricably linked, so trade should be integrated into the development strategies of African countries. And trade policy should take into account the needs of entrepreneurs. But Africa's partners also need to adopt a more coherent approach to supporting the development of the continent. A real partnership between African countries and the international community cannot be dependent on aid alone—trade must be an integral part. Indeed, aid will maintain dependence, but trade will facilitate sustainable development. An Africa more fully integrated into the global economy—able to benefit from expanded international trade—will be in the interests of all.

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SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

The tables use symbols to mark SPA countries (*)—those participating in the Strategic Partnership with Africa—and CFA countries (+)—those with their exchange rates fixed to the French franc. Technical notes for the tables are given at the end of the tables.

SUB-SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

REAL GDP GROWTH 1.1

	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.3	3.7	1.8	2.4	3.2	2.8
Excluding South Africa	2.5	4.4	2.1	2.8	3.5	2.6
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.6	4.1	2.6	2.8	3.6	3.3
Angola	—	—	3.5	2.0	3.2	15.3
Benin*+	2.8	1.9	3.1	4.8	5.0	6.0
Botswana	9.2	15.1	10.9	5.1	5.3	3.1
Burkina Faso*+	4.0	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.6	4.6
Burundi*	4.5	3.4	4.4	–1.6	3.2	3.6
Cameroon*+	0.2	7.0	4.8	1.8	5.3	4.2
Cape Verde	—	3.4	9.9	5.7	3.8	4.6
Central African Republic*+	3.3	2.4	1.3	1.8	1.5	–0.8
Chad*+	1.1	0.2	6.0	2.4	9.5	9.9
Comoros*+	—	—	2.9	1.2	1.9	2.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	4.2	0.2	2.1	–4.8	–2.0	3.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.7	5.0	5.4	1.6	3.6	3.5
Côte d'Ivoire*+	9.3	7.6	0.1	2.5	0.3	–1.8
Djibouti	—	—	—	–1.4	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	19.5	1.3	0.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	4.3	10.2	1.8
Ethiopia*	—	—	2.2	4.2	8.9	2.7
Gabon+	4.5	11.3	0.7	2.6	2.5	3.0
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.7	3.6	3.3	5.8	–3.1
Ghana*	1.3	0.4	2.0	4.2	4.2	4.5
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.2	3.8	4.2
Guinea-Bissau*	—	3.4	3.2	1.0	0.2	–7.2
Kenya*	7.9	6.9	4.0	1.9	1.1	1.0
Lesotho	3.3	9.8	4.0	3.6	3.2	3.8
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	4.8	0.6	0.3	1.9	6.0	–12.7
Malawi*	5.3	6.2	2.1	3.2	–4.2	1.8
Mali*+	2.0	4.9	0.0	4.2	3.5	9.7
Mauritania*	4.4	1.9	1.9	3.9	4.0	3.3
Mauritius	—	—	5.9	5.3	6.7	4.4
Mozambique*	—	—	–0.9	6.4	13.0	7.7
Namibia	—	—	1.1	3.8	2.4	2.7
Niger*+	–1.0	0.6	–0.6	2.3	7.1	3.0
Nigeria	–2.0	5.5	0.2	2.6	2.9	–0.9
Rwanda*	7.8	4.5	2.8	0.9	6.7	9.4
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	2.0	4.0	4.1
Senegal*+	0.7	2.7	2.9	3.7	5.6	1.1
Seychelles	2.8	7.7	2.2	4.2	–2.2	0.3
Sierra Leone*	2.6	2.1	0.8	–3.7	5.4	6.3
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.5	3.1	1.4	2.0	2.8	3.0
Sudan	0.6	5.5	2.5	5.2	6.1	5.5
Swaziland	—	5.3	5.9	3.3	1.7	3.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.4	6.1	6.3
Togo*+	7.2	3.5	1.7	1.7	–0.2	4.6
Uganda*	—	—	2.3	6.8	5.1	6.7
Zambia*	1.4	1.8	1.1	0.9	4.9	3.3
Zimbabwe	5.8	2.7	4.0	1.4	–8.4	–5.6
North Africa	5.2	6.5	4.2	3.4	4.3	3.8
All Africa	4.5	4.4	2.5	2.8	3.6	3.1
Comparator countries	3.9	5.0	8.0	7.6	6.3	6.5
China	2.2	5.6	10.8	9.7	7.3	8.0
India	4.6	3.4	5.6	5.8	5.5	4.4
Indonesia	5.9	7.8	5.8	3.6	3.4	3.7
South Asia	4.6	3.4	5.5	5.5	4.9	4.3
East Asia	4.5	6.4	7.6	7.3	5.5	6.7

— Not available.
* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA 1.2

	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.6	0.9	–1.1	–0.2	0.9	0.6
Excluding South Africa	–0.2	1.5	–0.8	0.2	1.1	0.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	0.9	1.2	–0.3	0.2	1.2	1.0
Angola	—	—	0.2	–1.1	0.3	12.1
Benin*+	0.6	–0.5	0.0	1.9	2.3	3.3
Botswana	6.1	11.1	7.1	2.4	4.0	2.1
Burkina Faso*+	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.4	2.1	2.1
Burundi*	2.5	2.0	1.6	–3.7	1.3	1.7
Cameroon*+	–2.1	4.2	1.9	–0.6	3.1	2.0
Cape Verde	—	2.7	8.2	3.2	1.1	1.9
Central African Republic*+	1.4	0.2	–1.3	–0.5	0.1	–2.3
Chad*+	–0.7	–1.7	3.3	–0.6	6.4	6.8
Comoros*+	—	—	0.3	–1.3	–0.5	0.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.0	–2.5	–1.1	–7.7	–4.6	0.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.0	2.1	2.4	–1.5	0.8	0.7
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.1	3.4	–3.5	–0.5	–2.1	–4.0
Djibouti	—	—	—	–4.4	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	16.5	–1.3	–2.4
Eritrea*	—	—	—	1.5	7.4	–0.7
Ethiopia*	—	—	–0.8	1.8	6.4	0.4
Gabon+	4.4	7.8	–2.2	–0.1	0.0	0.6
Gambia, The*	1.6	2.3	0.0	–0.1	2.8	–5.6
Ghana*	–0.5	–1.9	–1.4	1.8	2.1	2.6
Guinea*	—	—	—	1.6	1.5	2.0
Guinea-Bissau*	—	0.7	0.9	–1.3	–2.0	–9.2
Kenya*	4.4	3.1	0.4	–0.6	–1.0	–0.9
Lesotho	1.2	7.5	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.6
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	–2.0	–2.3	–1.1	3.0	–15.2
Malawi*	2.7	3.0	–1.1	1.2	–6.2	–0.2
Mali*+	–0.4	2.8	–2.4	1.7	1.1	7.2
Mauritania*	2.1	–0.5	–0.7	1.0	0.8	0.4
Mauritius	—	—	4.9	4.1	5.5	3.3
Mozambique*	—	—	–2.5	4.1	10.6	5.6
Namibia	—	—	–2.0	1.4	0.4	1.0
Niger*+	–3.7	–2.3	–3.7	–1.1	3.7	–0.2
Nigeria	–4.6	2.6	–2.8	–0.2	0.6	–3.1
Rwanda*	4.4	1.2	–0.3	–0.3	3.7	6.3
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	–0.5	1.9	2.0
Senegal*+	–2.0	–0.2	0.1	1.0	3.0	–1.3
Seychelles	0.3	5.6	1.3	2.6	–3.6	–1.1
Sierra Leone*	0.8	0.1	–1.2	–5.9	3.3	4.2
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	3.3	0.9	–1.1	0.1	1.8	2.2
Sudan	–1.8	2.5	–0.2	2.8	4.1	3.3
Swaziland	—	2.2	2.7	0.2	–0.5	1.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	0.6	3.8	4.1
Togo*+	2.6	1.3	–1.6	–1.0	–2.9	2.1
Uganda*	—	—	–0.1	3.6	2.4	3.9
Zambia*	–1.5	–1.3	–2.0	–1.6	2.9	1.5
Zimbabwe	2.4	–0.6	0.2	–0.7	–9.8	–6.6
North Africa	2.5	3.9	1.5	1.5	2.6	2.0
All Africa	1.8	1.7	–0.4	0.3	1.3	1.0
Comparator countries	2.4	3.7	4.9	4.5	4.0	4.2
China	–0.5	3.7	9.2	8.6	6.5	7.2
India	2.2	1.0	3.4	4.0	3.8	2.8
Indonesia	3.5	5.2	3.9	2.1	2.1	2.3
South Asia	2.1	1.0	3.2	3.5	3.1	2.6
East Asia	1.8	4.4	5.9	6.0	4.5	5.8

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS 1.3

	Percentage of GDP					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	18.9	22.6	19.7	17.2	17.8	18.0
Excluding South Africa	15.8	20.3	15.4	15.7	17.3	17.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	17.6	19.0	14.1	13.8	15.4	17.5
Angola	—	—	24.0	27.3	35.0	39.2
Benin*+	1.2	0.5	–2.4	4.4	6.5	6.0
Botswana	–1.2	21.0	35.3	39.3	39.7	38.5
Burkina Faso*+	0.1	1.1	–2.7	7.1	5.1	4.8
Burundi*	5.0	3.3	3.1	–3.4	–4.8	–4.5
Cameroon*+	11.3	18.3	24.1	18.9	20.4	16.8
Cape Verde	—	–29.0	–5.8	–7.8	–15.1	–15.7
Central African Republic*+	7.2	4.2	–1.1	5.1	11.1	10.3
Chad*+	10.3	6.2	–8.1	0.2	5.1	6.4
Comoros*+	—	—	–4.5	–3.5	0.0	0.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	10.1	12.9	10.9	7.8	6.2	4.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	5.0	12.0	31.9	34.6	53.1	50.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	29.0	27.4	19.6	18.7	19.6	28.3
Djibouti	—	—	—	–5.4	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	29.4	8.1	–33.3	33.5	82.6	90.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	–32.4	–31.6	–30.1
Ethiopia*	—	—	6.9	4.5	2.6	2.2
Gabon+	—	54.3	44.3	41.9	50.3	48.4
Gambia, The*	0.6	2.3	6.5	4.1	–2.4	3.7
Ghana*	9.2	10.2	4.8	7.6	7.0	10.3
Guinea*	—	—	16.4	15.8	20.0	11.3
Guinea-Bissau*	—	–7.3	–0.9	–2.2	–13.2	–17.4
Kenya*	19.1	20.2	16.1	12.4	3.4	9.5
Lesotho	–30.4	–57.8	–65.6	–29.3	–9.7	–15.1
Liberia	38.5	33.5	16.5	—	—	—
Madagascar*	3.7	4.2	2.9	5.6	15.3	7.7
Malawi*	1.5	14.4	12.7	1.1	–10.3	–5.7
Mali*+	7.9	2.2	–0.4	7.6	4.1	10.2
Mauritania*	32.8	5.7	3.1	8.9	14.0	9.0
Mauritius	—	19.6	20.0	24.4	26.0	25.7
Mozambique*	—	—	–10.3	0.3	27.8	30.0
Namibia	—	—	10.8	13.7	13.8	23.5
Niger*+	2.6	6.7	7.3	3.0	4.1	4.2
Nigeria	8.4	22.7	17.5	24.2	24.5	17.4
Rwanda*	2.0	6.0	5.0	–3.8	2.6	1.4
São Tomé and Principe*	—	2.7	–16.2	–19.8	–27.1	–24.3
Senegal*+	5.3	7.8	0.1	10.3	8.6	9.9
Seychelles	0.0	12.8	24.1	22.5	23.1	27.8
Sierra Leone*	—	—	13.6	0.1	–12.1	–13.6
Somalia	5.0	0.3	–6.3	–12.5	—	—
South Africa	26.9	29.2	28.4	19.2	18.7	19.2
Sudan	12.2	9.6	5.7	10.9	11.7	21.3
Swaziland	24.6	30.7	9.8	4.5	5.7	9.0
Tanzania*	—	—	8.8	3.2	8.4	9.7
Togo*+	24.2	27.7	12.3	6.6	3.6	4.7
Uganda*	13.6	10.0	2.3	4.9	7.7	6.3
Zambia*	43.2	33.2	14.0	7.1	9.8	4.1
Zimbabwe	16.8	19.2	16.5	15.5	9.8	11.4
North Africa	27.1	32.7	28.4	21.7	24.9	24.4
All Africa	20.4	25.0	22.6	18.8	20.6	20.6
Comparator countries	9.4	24.3	28.8	30.7	30.4	29.3
China	—	30.5	34.7	40.6	40.3	39.7
India	13.9	17.3	20.0	21.9	21.7	21.1
Indonesia	4.8	25.0	31.6	29.5	29.2	27.1
South Asia	12.8	14.7	17.3	20.2	20.2	19.8
East Asia	—	27.8	31.6	36.2	36.1	35.5

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries
Source: World Bank data.

GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 1.4

	Percentage of GDP					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	18.3	23.1	19.4	17.5	18.1	18.9
Excluding South Africa	14.9	21.4	17.2	18.4	19.9	20.4
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	15.0	19.9	17.1	18.1	19.8	19.6
Angola	—	—	14.8	23.2	34.6	32.2
Benin*+	10.9	15.5	15.1	16.9	19.2	17.8
Botswana	24.0	41.4	30.0	27.7	21.7	24.8
Burkina Faso*+	8.5	18.9	17.4	21.3	19.1	18.3
Burundi*	7.2	8.2	16.6	10.9	6.9	7.9
Cameroon*+	12.7	21.4	23.8	16.6	17.7	18.3
Cape Verde	—	38.0	43.5	27.3	18.3	20.9
Central African Republic*+	19.4	15.0	10.9	11.8	14.0	14.8
Chad*+	14.3	17.2	6.3	19.2	41.3	58.9
Comoros*+	—	—	28.8	16.7	13.2	12.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	12.3	16.4	11.7	7.0	5.1	7.1
Congo, Rep. of*+	28.1	29.7	32.5	25.4	26.4	23.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	20.2	24.1	16.5	11.2	11.0	10.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	10.7	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	17.0	17.2	0.0	54.8	52.6	28.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	24.1	28.1	26.5
Ethiopia*	—	—	14.3	15.3	17.8	20.5
Gabon+	—	46.4	34.6	26.3	30.5	28.4
Gambia, The*	9.5	12.0	19.7	19.8	17.7	21.5
Ghana*	12.8	10.2	7.8	21.0	26.6	22.3
Guinea*	—	—	16.1	19.5	21.9	16.8
Guinea-Bissau*	—	21.3	32.0	23.7	19.7	14.7
Kenya*	18.5	23.7	20.3	16.5	14.7	13.6
Lesotho	11.4	21.9	39.9	51.8	44.9	40.0
Liberia	18.4	25.6	14.0	—	—	—
Madagascar*	9.1	9.8	10.6	13.2	18.5	14.3
Malawi*	15.9	27.2	19.4	15.3	1.0	12.4
Mali*+	17.3	15.5	17.2	22.0	21.0	18.9
Mauritania*	14.4	19.8	27.5	21.0	26.7	24.7
Mauritius	—	30.3	23.5	27.4	23.3	21.9
Mozambique*	—	—	8.1	25.3	41.5	44.7
Namibia	—	—	18.4	22.6	23.7	24.1
Niger*+	8.1	15.6	15.3	9.5	11.5	12.8
Nigeria	13.5	22.9	16.5	19.9	20.1	23.3
Rwanda*	8.3	11.7	15.3	15.3	18.4	18.8
São Tomé and Principe*	—	10.2	15.8	39.7	29.9	26.6
Senegal*+	8.2	14.6	12.1	17.1	18.1	19.7
Seychelles	0.0	15.5	26.4	30.9	41.3	30.5
Sierra Leone*	—	—	12.2	7.3	6.1	8.8
Somalia	11.8	20.4	28.8	15.5	—	—
South Africa	25.7	27.6	23.7	16.3	15.1	15.8
Sudan	12.7	15.1	13.8	16.3	18.7	19.5
Swaziland	21.3	27.4	26.7	21.2	17.1	17.9
Tanzania*	—	—	16.8	20.1	17.0	16.7
Togo*+	15.1	28.1	19.5	18.2	20.7	21.7
Uganda*	12.7	9.7	8.5	16.9	20.1	21.7
Zambia*	28.7	30.2	16.1	15.1	20.0	17.4
Zimbabwe	16.8	18.9	17.3	17.0	7.8	8.3
North Africa	18.4	27.2	29.0	24.5	24.4	25.4
All Africa	17.6	23.6	22.5	19.9	20.6	21.5
Comparator countries	15.5	23.5	28.7	28.9	27.4	26.8
China	21.7	30.6	35.4	38.2	37.9	38.2
India	15.6	18.3	22.0	22.9	22.4	22.1
Indonesia	9.2	21.6	28.6	25.7	21.8	20.2
South Asia	15.3	17.2	21.3	22.1	21.6	21.1
East Asia	19.6	27.7	32.0	33.9	31.3	31.5

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: World Bank data.

REAL AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 1.5

	Average annual percentage change in value added					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.9	3.6
Excluding South Africa	—	1.9	1.9	3.3	3.4	3.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	2.1	2.0	3.2	3.3	3.1
Angola	—	—	—	0.0	18.0	10.0
Benin*+	—	1.4	4.6	5.5	3.1	7.3
Botswana	12.0	8.9	0.6	–1.0	2.2	0.6
Burkina Faso*+	—	1.2	3.6	3.8	–3.7	8.3
Burundi*	–1.9	4.1	3.1	–0.6	3.8	3.9
Cameroon*+	5.4	3.5	2.8	5.1	5.5	6.3
Cape Verde	—	15.9	14.2	4.4	1.5	1.5
Central African Republic*+	2.5	2.2	1.5	3.7	4.0	4.0
Chad*+	2.2	–0.5	2.7	3.8	4.6	4.6
Comoros*+	—	—	4.0	3.6	9.5	4.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.7	2.5	0.6	–5.4	3.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.2	2.6	3.5	1.1	5.4	4.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.2	2.4	0.0	3.4	0.5	–0.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	0.6	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	6.5	5.9	4.8
Eritrea*	—	—	—	–1.4	29.1	–35.5
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.1	2.2	11.5	–3.1
Gabon+	—	—	1.5	–0.6	4.3	4.9
Gambia, The*	4.5	5.0	0.8	3.8	8.9	–28.2
Ghana*	2.8	–0.1	0.6	3.3	3.7	4.1
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.5	6.3	5.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	1.1	3.2	3.3	1.2	–4.1
Kenya*	8.1	4.8	3.2	1.1	1.3	0.8
Lesotho	—	2.1	1.1	1.6	0.1	–2.5
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.2	2.2	1.8	4.0	–1.6
Malawi*	–1.2	4.9	1.5	6.4	–6.3	2.7
Mali*+	–1.5	4.0	2.2	2.9	–12.9	16.2
Mauritania*	–1.3	–1.7	2.7	4.1	–0.2	–3.6
Mauritius	—	—	3.1	0.5	31.6	6.6
Mozambique*	—	—	7.3	4.5	12.6	7.1
Namibia	—	—	1.3	3.2	–10.5	–3.7
Niger*+	0.2	–4.6	1.7	3.0	14.7	1.5
Nigeria	–4.1	0.9	2.2	3.5	3.8	5.3
Rwanda*	4.7	7.3	0.8	3.6	8.3	14.5
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	3.7	2.7	3.1
Senegal*+	0.9	2.1	1.8	1.8	7.6	–19.9
Seychelles	—	—	–2.0	0.6	–5.0	–0.4
Sierra Leone*	1.8	4.9	3.5	–4.7	3.8	7.2
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.5	2.9	2.6	0.7	–1.7	4.0
Sudan	–4.2	4.3	2.4	7.8	5.6	7.0
Swaziland	—	–2.1	2.1	1.4	–8.8	1.6
Tanzania*	—	—	—	3.5	5.4	5.0
Togo*+	6.2	0.9	5.7	3.3	–2.3	7.7
Uganda*	—	—	1.5	3.9	4.6	4.9
Zambia*	0.9	2.7	3.6	2.9	–2.6	–1.7
Zimbabwe	—	1.2	2.8	3.0	–12.0	–7.0
North Africa	4.2	2.7	4.0	1.9	—	—
All Africa	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.7	4.5	4.0
Comparator countries	3.4	2.2	4.5	3.2	3.5	0.7
China	1.6	2.2	6.1	3.9	2.8	2.8
India	5.2	1.7	3.0	2.7	5.7	–3.1
Indonesia	4.2	3.9	3.5	1.9	1.0	1.7
South Asia	4.9	1.6	3.0	2.9	4.1	–2.1
East Asia	2.7	3.1	4.8	3.1	1.6	2.6

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: World Bank data.

REAL INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 1.6

	Average annual percentage change in value added					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.7	3.9	1.3	1.7	3.2	3.3
Excluding South Africa	—	6.2	1.6	2.4	3.8	3.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	4.0	2.9	4.6	6.8
Angola	—	—	—	4.3	4.1	16.8
Benin*+	—	1.5	4.2	4.7	9.1	6.2
Botswana	16.8	22.2	14.0	4.0	7.1	2.2
Burkina Faso*+	—	2.8	4.1	2.5	8.3	0.7
Burundi*	—	6.4	5.1	–2.4	16.1	25.3
Cameroon*+	6.3	7.7	8.8	–0.1	6.5	6.8
Cape Verde	—	3.0	13.3	5.1	4.5	4.5
Central African Republic*+	7.9	4.6	1.3	1.2	4.0	4.0
Chad*+	1.6	0.9	7.4	3.8	25.4	25.4
Comoros*+	—	—	–2.3	7.2	9.5	4.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	0.3	2.4	–8.1	3.8	3.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	9.3	10.0	6.8	2.9	–3.0	3.7
Côte d'Ivoire*+	10.4	9.8	4.8	3.8	–3.3	–4.6
Djibouti	—	—	—	–5.3	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	45.7	–1.4	81.4
Eritrea*	—	—	—	11.5	6.3	9.2
Ethiopia*	—	—	3.9	2.9	5.0	5.8
Gabon+	—	—	0.4	2.5	2.0	2.7
Gambia, The*	2.6	5.1	4.0	2.7	6.1	9.8
Ghana*	5.2	0.1	1.1	3.1	4.8	6.3
Guinea*	—	—	—	4.6	5.3	4.8
Guinea-Bissau*	—	2.1	0.7	–1.9	6.5	14.2
Kenya*	8.7	9.6	3.7	1.6	0.7	1.1
Lesotho	—	28.5	4.5	5.3	5.0	5.9
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	—	0.3	–0.6	1.9	7.6	–20.8
Malawi*	5.4	6.7	2.1	1.0	–10.8	–7.4
Mali*+	1.9	2.3	4.6	8.0	31.0	11.5
Mauritania*	7.7	0.9	4.4	2.1	1.4	4.2
Mauritius	—	—	9.0	5.5	7.0	2.9
Mozambique*	—	—	–4.5	12.4	20.1	12.5
Namibia	—	—	–0.3	2.7	6.1	5.5
Niger*+	4.9	11.6	–1.6	2.0	2.4	2.4
Nigeria	0.1	10.4	–2.7	1.2	1.5	–4.8
Rwanda*	2.1	3.8	3.8	–2.1	7.6	7.9
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	1.8	4.2	4.3
Senegal*+	3.3	4.0	4.2	5.0	6.1	9.5
Seychelles	—	—	3.3	10.3	–0.8	2.7
Sierra Leone*	–1.0	–2.5	0.0	–3.5	5.6	6.6
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	5.1	2.7	1.0	1.0	2.6	2.7
Sudan	2.5	3.4	7.1	6.0	15.1	7.0
Swaziland	—	7.4	8.6	3.6	3.1	4.3
Tanzania*	—	—	—	4.0	6.9	9.3
Togo*+	10.7	7.1	0.6	2.3	0.2	5.1
Uganda*	—	—	4.4	11.0	4.5	7.3
Zambia*	1.8	2.0	0.8	–2.6	9.2	9.7
Zimbabwe	—	2.0	2.6	–0.8	–9.8	–8.2
North Africa	8.1	5.7	3.0	3.4	—	—
All Africa	5.8	4.5	1.8	2.4	2.9	3.4
Comparator countries	4.9	7.3	9.4	10.1	7.2	7.2
China	2.3	8.0	11.6	12.6	8.7	7.9
India	4.6	4.5	6.7	6.0	3.3	6.1
Indonesia	12.8	10.7	6.8	4.5	3.3	3.7
South Asia	4.6	4.6	6.7	5.9	3.6	5.7
East Asia	6.0	8.8	8.4	9.7	6.7	7.3

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: World Bank data.

GDP DEFLATOR 1.7

	Average annual percentage change					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.7	13.4	9.8	9.3	10.2	2.3
Excluding South Africa	6.7	13.6	9.2	9.4	7.1	2.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	6.0	13.3	8.5	9.1	14.6	1.3
Angola	—	—	—	552.1	127.7	103.3
Benin*+	1.9	9.4	2.8	7.3	3.1	1.9
Botswana	2.7	10.0	12.6	8.9	6.5	5.5
Burkina Faso*+	0.4	8.4	4.3	4.5	5.3	2.1
Burundi*	0.9	10.7	4.5	12.1	13.4	12.9
Cameroon*+	9.5	8.5	7.3	4.5	3.0	4.3
Cape Verde	—	8.1	12.1	4.3	2.7	1.8
Central African Republic*+	4.4	10.3	9.7	3.9	3.0	3.6
Chad*+	3.2	7.2	2.2	6.8	12.6	3.7
Comoros*+	—	—	7.3	3.8	8.5	4.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	37.9	24.6	57.3	780.3	374.1	23.3
Congo, Rep. of*+	3.9	8.2	2.6	7.9	–14.0	–0.6
Côte d'Ivoire*+	2.5	11.9	4.8	7.5	4.2	5.3
Djibouti	—	—	—	3.9	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	16.3	39.8	11.8
Eritrea*	—	—	—	9.6	13.8	14.5
Ethiopia*	—	—	3.6	6.1	–6.4	–7.0
Gabon+	5.6	15.8	3.4	5.3	–11.7	5.9
Gambia, The*	0.9	10.4	16.4	4.9	7.6	19.7
Ghana*	6.2	29.4	45.6	26.4	34.6	22.8
Guinea*	—	—	—	6.1	5.0	2.9
Guinea-Bissau*	—	5.7	49.1	27.8	–5.1	4.8
Kenya*	1.5	9.5	9.5	12.9	9.6	8.7
Lesotho	1.3	8.8	12.6	9.8	7.4	9.8
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	2.4	9.3	17.9	17.0	7.3	15.4
Malawi*	1.8	8.7	14.5	30.9	25.2	17.5
Mali*+	12.0	9.2	6.2	6.2	7.1	1.9
Mauritania*	1.2	9.3	8.7	6.0	10.7	0.5
Mauritius	—	—	9.2	6.2	3.7	5.1
Mozambique*	—	—	36.2	28.6	10.6	11.2
Namibia	—	—	13.9	10.1	10.8	9.4
Niger*+	–0.1	9.3	3.9	5.1	4.0	3.0
Nigeria	2.5	16.4	15.1	25.8	7.8	11.6
Rwanda*	17.0	14.4	3.9	12.2	0.2	0.0
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	43.0	7.6	5.7
Senegal*+	1.7	7.9	7.7	3.9	2.8	2.7
Seychelles	2.7	15.6	4.9	1.8	4.8	5.5
Sierra Leone*	3.4	11.4	49.9	30.6	6.1	3.9
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	4.5	11.9	15.5	9.6	7.6	8.5
Sudan	5.7	13.9	34.5	55.0	2.0	7.8
Swaziland	—	11.9	10.8	12.2	10.7	10.8
Tanzania*	—	—	—	19.4	6.2	4.2
Togo*+	2.6	8.8	5.9	6.1	6.4	–0.1
Uganda*	—	—	116.0	11.6	6.3	–4.0
Zambia*	13.8	5.5	33.5	49.9	24.3	19.9
Zimbabwe	1.6	7.8	11.2	31.0	70.1	107.5
North Africa	2.1	8.7	9.7	6.0	2.8	4.4
All Africa	5.7	13.4	9.8	8.8	12.1	7.5
Comparator countries	58.9	18.8	8.4	15.3	10.5	7.0
China	–0.5	0.3	5.4	5.4	0.0	–1.2
India	6.6	8.3	8.0	7.2	3.5	4.0
Indonesia	194.5	20.5	8.4	15.6	10.8	7.2
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: World Bank data.

REAL GNP PER CAPITA 1.8

	Average annual percentage change 1970–88	1989–2002	2002	Highest 3–year average value since1970 (millions of 1995 US$)	Average GNP per capita (millions of 1995 US$) 2000–02
Sub-Saharan Africa	–0.5	–0.3	1.9	651 (1974–76)	544.3
Excluding South Africa	–0.5	0.0	2.2	356 (1976–78)	308.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	–0.2	0.0	3.2	368 (1976–78)	328.8
Angola	—	–6.0	24.9	823 (1985–87)	380.8
Benin*+	0.4	1.7	3.1	423 (2000–02)	423.0
Botswana	7.0	2.0	1.4	3,756 (2000–02)	3,755.5
Burkina Faso*+	1.4	1.3	2.1	275 (2000–02)	274.6
Burundi*	1.5	–3.6	2.0	206 (1990–92)	138.9
Cameroon*+	4.7	–1.5	4.1	979 (1985–87)	642.4
Cape Verde	—	2.8	1.4	1,534 (2000–02)	1,533.8
Central African Republic*+	–1.1	–0.7	–2.6	470 (1976–78)	333.9
Chad*+	–1.4	–0.7	6.5	279 (1970–72)	232.9
Comoros*+	—	–1.4	–0.7	540 (1983–85)	436.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	–2.6	–7.9	3.0	364 (1972–74)	81.8
Congo, Rep. of*+	3.7	–3.1	4.8	1,014 (1984–86)	584.1
Côte d'Ivoire*+	–1.4	0.0	–2.3	1,287 (1977–79)	744.2
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	7.7	—	700 (1997–99)	—
Eritrea*	—	0.7	2.5	217 (1996–98)	179.7
Ethiopia*	—	0.7	–0.2	121 (1981–83)	120.7
Gabon+	–0.2	–0.4	1.0	7,309 (1975–77)	3,748.6
Gambia, The*	1.0	0.0	–5.3	377 (1976–78)	363.9
Ghana*	–2.5	1.8	2.5	466 (1970–72)	414.7
Guinea*	—	1.9	2.3	608 (2000–02)	607.5
Guinea-Bissau*	–0.2	–1.3	4.2	226 (1995–97)	185.7
Kenya*	1.4	–0.1	–0.6	338 (1996–98)	323.6
Lesotho	4.3	–1.2	0.7	727 (1995–97)	605.8
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	–2.6	–0.7	–14.5	386 (1970–72)	233.9
Malawi*	0.2	0.9	–0.2	164 (1998–2000)	157.4
Mali*+	–0.2	1.3	5.2	309 (1977–79)	291.3
Mauritania*	–0.8	1.6	3.2	511 (2000–02)	511.0
Mauritius	—	4.1	2.9	4,397 (2000–02)	4,396.6
Mozambique*	—	3.9	9.7	194 (2000–02)	194.4
Namibia	—	2.9	–0.8	2,719 (2000–02)	2,719.1
Niger*+	–2.4	–1.2	–0.2	385 (1970–72)	202.8
Nigeria	–1.7	0.5	–3.1	294 (1977–79)	229.6
Rwanda*	1.7	–1.7	7.0	330 (1981–83)	251.8
São Tomé and Principe*	—	–0.4	2.6	342 (1986–88)	318.1
Senegal*+	–0.6	0.9	–2.0	605 (2000–02)	605.0
Seychelles	2.6	2.4	–9.1	7,908 (1998–2000)	7,651.4
Sierra Leone*	–1.9	–5.2	3.3	409 (1973–75)	153.7
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.0	0.0	2.8	4,490 (1980–82)	3,985.6
Sudan	–0.5	3.9	6.5	266 (2000–02)	266.0
Swaziland	2.9	0.4	1.4	1,644 (1995–97)	1,596.9
Tanzania*	—	1.0	9.6	201 (2000–02)	200.8
Togo*+	–0.3	–1.0	2.0	433 (1978–80)	312.5
Uganda*	—	3.3	3.2	347 (2000–02)	346.5
Zambia*	–2.8	–1.1	2.2	653 (1970–72)	391.5
Zimbabwe	–0.5	–1.5	—	693 (1972–74)	469.5
North Africa	2.8	1.5	2.3	1,580 (2000–02)	1,580.4
All Africa	0.4	0.2	1.9	731 (1980–82)	722.4
Comparator countries	5.7	6.9	5.5	452 (1999–2001)	451.9
China	6.4	8.5	6.3	733 (1999–2001)	732.9
India	—	—	—	—	—
Indonesia	4.4	2.5	4.1	1,070 (1995–97)	949.6
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	5.2	5.7	4.8	1,231 (1999–2001)	1,230.5

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: National sources, as collected by World Bank regional country economists.

FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA 1.9

	Average annual production of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses (kilograms)		
	1974–79	1980–89	1990–2001
Sub-Saharan Africa	350.9	320.7	381.9
Excluding South Africa	338.8	312.6	385.6
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	319.8	294.3	306.5
Angola	320.3	232.3	307.2
Benin*+	516.1	499.9	693.4
Botswana	119.5	56.7	44.0
Burkina Faso*+	199.9	212.8	268.4
Burundi*	384.8	380.8	326.7
Cameroon*+	366.9	292.8	318.4
Cape Verde	40.6	85.5	68.0
Central African Republic*+	555.0	400.9	326.7
Chad*+	240.4	226.9	242.8
Comoros*+	—	191.0	194.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	555.9	561.4	451.1
Congo, Rep. of*+	419.0	403.2	303.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	559.8	497.1	455.1
Djibouti	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	241.7	225.1	250.2
Eritrea*	—	—	71.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	163.1
Gabon+	500.5	459.6	397.2
Gambia, The*	107.9	136.0	112.1
Ghana*	406.2	404.4	700.3
Guinea*	335.0	263.3	273.9
Guinea-Bissau*	186.3	241.6	230.5
Kenya*	293.3	220.9	183.2
Lesotho	192.5	130.9	136.3
Liberia	338.4	308.1	178.6
Madagascar*	516.1	514.6	443.7
Malawi*	384.7	300.1	399.2
Mali*+	202.7	216.7	255.4
Mauritania*	49.0	74.9	85.6
Mauritius	13.8	20.4	15.4
Mozambique*	381.5	339.8	370.8
Namibia	270.2	254.9	207.7
Niger*+	355.0	340.4	312.4
Nigeria	414.3	384.5	692.0
Rwanda*	390.6	379.9	306.5
São Tomé and Principe*	162.4	123.6	179.6
Senegal*+	178.9	156.6	124.8
Seychelles	3.3	2.2	2.0
Sierra Leone*	247.0	199.4	155.4
Somalia	59.9	81.5	47.2
South Africa	501.7	426.8	329.9
Sudan	183.8	152.1	157.1
Swaziland	228.0	196.5	123.7
Tanzania*	501.7	530.1	410.3
Togo*+	482.7	424.3	448.1
Uganda*	538.6	449.0	420.2
Zambia*	345.8	252.1	212.8
Zimbabwe	351.2	298.9	197.3
North Africa	226.3	215.0	246.9
All Africa	327.2	301.0	358.0
Comparator countries	356.7	374.5	392.8
China	440.8	462.8	488.2
India	241.8	253.6	270.1
Indonesia	314.7	369.0	395.2
South Asia	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—

— Not available
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization data.

REAL EXPORT GROWTH 2.1

	Average annual percentage change 1970–88	1989–2002	2000	2002	Highest 3–year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US$)		Average annual value (millions of 1995 US$) 2000–02
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.4	4.4	3.2	1.0	119,731	(2000–02)	119,731.4
Excluding South Africa	2.1	4.2	3.6	2.5	74,153	(2000–02)	74,152.5
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.1	4.3	4.8	6.9	61,795	(2000–02)	61,795.3
Angola	—	6.0	–3.7	22.7	5,414	(2000–02)	5,414.4
Benin*+	2.4	2.6	5.0	–0.2	501	(1979–81)	454.5
Botswana	14.0	3.6	–4.7	–4.8	3,343	(2000–02)	3,342.8
Burkina Faso*+	3.8	1.2	3.0	11.7	393	(1998–00)	371.7
Burundi*	3.2	9.8	19.9	6.4	317	(2000–02)	316.9
Cameroon*+	10.0	2.4	1.9	–1.0	3,160	(1999–2001)	3,115.3
Cape Verde	7.1	12.5	14.4	8.5	208	(2000–02)	207.6
Central African Republic*+	2.1	8.4	–6.8	–4.7	292	(2000–02)	291.5
Chad*+	0.3	–0.4	–11.3	–2.2	289	(1995–97)	245.9
Comoros*+	—	–0.1	–10.1	8.8	55	(1992–94)	40.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.2	–1.2	2.0	8.0	3,433	(1987–89)	2,688.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	7.0	4.0	1.9	10.7	1,739	(1998–2000)	1,732.1
Côte d'Ivoire*+	6.0	2.2	4.4	21.7	5,656	(2000–02)	5,655.7
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—		—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	41.1	12.8	5.4	709	(2000–02)	709.0
Eritrea*	—	2.0	54.1	24.8	186	(1995–97)	172.2
Ethiopia*	—	5.8	5.4	13.2	1,668	(2000–02)	1,668.0
Gabon+	3.8	2.6	1.7	3.1	2,973	(1996–98)	2,659.1
Gambia, The*	3.7	2.2	20.0	–3.9	259	(2000–02)	258.7
Ghana*	–5.7	8.8	0.0	–1.7	2,718	(1999–2001)	2,711.0
Guinea*	—	4.9	19.2	–6.5	1,121	(2000–02)	1,120.9
Guinea-Bissau*	0.3	13.9	3.8	–4.6	78	(2000–02)	78.1
Kenya*	1.2	2.6	5.0	5.0	3,124	(1993–95)	3,084.0
Lesotho	6.7	11.3	44.0	25.0	465	(2000–02)	465.0
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—		—
Madagascar*	–2.5	2.9	6.0	–43.7	951	(1999–2001)	863.5
Malawi*	3.6	3.7	11.1	–3.8	562	(1997–99)	531.0
Mali*+	6.9	10.5	24.8	29.2	1,146	(2000–02)	1,145.7
Mauritania*	4.0	1.5	8.0	14.2	580	(2000–02)	579.7
Mauritius	—	5.6	10.7	9.4	3,106	(2000–02)	3,105.7
Mozambique*	—	15.4	58.6	14.1	986	(2000–02)	986.1
Namibia	—	3.2	–4.5	7.1	1,770	(2000–02)	1,769.9
Niger*+	–1.2	2.4	—	—	577	(1976–78)	—
Nigeria	–0.4	3.4	–1.8	–17.6	14,280	(1996–98)	12,445.6
Rwanda*	7.2	–1.6	39.9	–4.1	262	(1985–87)	203.8
São Tomé and Principe*	—	4.5	3.8	7.0	18	(2000–02)	18.2
Senegal*+	1.1	5.6	6.7	1.7	2,402	(2000–02)	2,401.7
Seychelles	—	6.8	13.1	2.7	558	(2000–02)	558.2
Sierra Leone*	–7.7	–25.2	13.2	1.1	941	(1970–72)	13.3
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—		—
South Africa	0.6	4.7	2.5	–1.4	45,600	(2000–02)	45,599.7
Sudan	–1.3	12.1	–8.2	2.6	1,965	(2000–02)	1,964.6
Swaziland	4.8	4.2	16.3	2.1	1,444	(2000–02)	1,444.1
Tanzania*	—	9.2	3.7	4.6	1,319	(2000–02)	1,319.2
Togo*+	4.1	0.1	–1.3	7.0	499	(1987–89)	456.2
Uganda*	—	14.0	14.2	11.4	1,574	(2000–02)	1,573.8
Zambia*	–1.9	3.1	29.0	11.4	2,181	(1976–78)	1,865.3
Zimbabwe	5.3	7.2	–3.6	–0.8	3,510	(1998–2000)	3,072.4
North Africa	4.1	4.3	3.2	3.5	74,932	(2000–02)	74,931.9
All Africa	2.1	4.3	3.2	1.8	191,098	(2000–02)	191,097.9
Comparator countries	10.5	14.0	8.3	7.0	587,548	(2000–02)	587,547.6
China	15.8	16.5	9.6	7.0	454,679	(2000–02)	454,679.4
India	6.1	12.6	6.0	13.7	73,235	(2000–02)	73,235.3
Indonesia	3.0	4.8	1.9	–1.2	62,480	(1996–98)	59,632.9
South Asia	5.7	10.3	6.9	9.6	99,596	(2000–02)	99,595.7
East Asia	7.8	12.3	3.5	6.1	799,350	(2000–02)	799,350.2

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

REAL IMPORT GROWTH 2.2

	Average annual percentage change 1970–88	1989–2002	2001	2002	Highest 3–year average value since 1970 (millions of 1995 US$)		Average annual value (millions of 1995 US$) 2000–02
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.6	4.7	5.5	7.7	127,881	(2000–02)	127,881.3
Excluding South Africa	–0.6	4.4	8.0	9.7	89,061	(2000–02)	89,061.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	1.4	4.1	7.1	10.0	70,079	(2000–02)	70,078.7
Angola	—	8.5	19.1	61.6	6,173	(2000–02)	6,173.0
Benin*+	1.5	3.0	4.2	1.1	947	(1979–81)	791.8
Botswana	7.1	3.3	0.1	3.8	2,620	(1998–2000)	2,565.2
Burkina Faso*+	4.9	1.6	9.2	6.1	838	(1998–2000)	804.5
Burundi*	6.4	3.7	–5.7	22.5	451	(2000–02)	450.6
Cameroon*+	8.0	4.9	11.7	9.2	3,313	(2000–02)	3,313.2
Cape Verde	6.4	8.1	7.7	11.7	449	(2000–02)	448.9
Central African Republic*+	1.8	–3.5	–3.4	8.1	307	(1990–92)	199.3
Chad*+	1.3	4.1	118.0	59.8	1,410	(2000–02)	1,410.3
Comoros*+	—	1.8	10.7	12.1	107	(2000–02)	106.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.9	–1.7	10.0	37.0	4,463	(1987–89)	3,657.9
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.6	3.1	6.3	24.2	2,427	(1982–84)	1,954.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	3.5	4.3	–1.2	–3.0	4,071	(1997–99)	3,410.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—		—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	24.7	–64.9	–23.7	939	(1998–2000)	573.8
Eritrea*	—	6.1	16.1	–5.3	654	(1997–99)	632.9
Ethiopia*	—	4.5	–0.1	9.6	2,096	(2000–02)	2,096.2
Gabon+	7.2	0.3	2.3	2.8	2,884	(1983–85)	2,012.1
Gambia, The*	0.9	3.3	26.6	–6.7	346	(2000–02)	345.5
Ghana*	–4.6	8.4	7.7	–4.4	3,998	(1997–99)	3,655.9
Guinea*	—	3.8	4.9	7.1	1,454	(2000–02)	1,454.4
Guinea-Bissau*	–1.4	1.0	13.4	–14.8	160	(1972–74)	143.1
Kenya*	–1.8	6.2	5.8	–16.7	3,797	(2000–02)	3,796.6
Lesotho	8.8	2.3	9.5	14.1	1,121	(1996–98)	1,096.0
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—		—
Madagascar*	–4.0	4.5	11.8	–31.0	1,749	(1970–72)	1,467.7
Malawi*	–1.4	0.4	5.5	17.6	842	(1991–93)	767.5
Mali*+	7.8	4.5	25.0	8.5	1,428	(2000–02)	1,427.8
Mauritania*	6.4	2.2	4.8	9.9	741	(2000–02)	740.9
Mauritius	—	5.1	2.3	5.2	3,363	(2000–02)	3,363.3
Mozambique*	—	3.5	–13.3	13.9	1,331	(1999–2001)	1,281.3
Namibia	—	4.5	3.9	15.4	2,607	(2000–02)	2,606.9
Niger*+	2.9	–3.6	—	—	1,163	(1980–82)	—
Nigeria	3.4	5.7	11.3	8.6	29,965	(1980–82)	18,945.9
Rwanda*	9.4	4.7	4.0	–0.6	499	(1997–99)	446.8
São Tomé and Principe*	—	0.3	23.8	7.1	52	(2000–02)	51.6
Senegal*+	2.3	1.4	1.4	1.9	2,011	(1998–2000)	1,977.3
Seychelles	—	10.6	34.1	–13.3	601	(2000–02)	600.5
Sierra Leone*	–6.2	–8.9	61.3	34.6	582	(1970–72)	113.0
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—		—
South Africa	–0.6	5.5	0.3	3.1	38,976	(2000–02)	38,975.8
Sudan	4.4	7.2	–0.3	7.0	1,916	(1997–99)	1,808.6
Swaziland	6.9	5.0	9.7	–0.2	1,638	(2000–02)	1,638.0
Tanzania*	—	2.7	25.2	2.3	2,417	(2000–02)	2,416.6
Togo*+	6.4	–0.1	5.5	3.5	820	(1986–88)	718.4
Uganda*	—	7.3	1.4	20.2	1,560	(2000–02)	1,559.9
Zambia*	–6.3	0.4	27.2	3.5	3,933	(1970–72)	1,408.0
Zimbabwe	3.1	7.0	–0.7	–4.8	3,703	(1997–99)	2,942.5
North Africa	5.1	3.0	4.4	6.5	70,690	(2000–02)	70,690.0
All Africa	2.8	4.1	5.1	7.3	198,598	(2000–02)	198,598.3
Comparator countries	16.1	13.0	9.4	9.4	493,215	(2000–02)	493,215.0
China	14.6	15.2	10.8	12.4	374,663	(2000–02)	374,663.1
India	6.7	13.0	3.5	6.7	68,929	(2000–02)	68,928.9
Indonesia	10.4	4.0	8.1	–8.3	64,369	(1996–98)	49,623.0
South Asia	5.0	10.0	3.6	7.5	102,580	(2000–02)	102,579.7
East Asia	7.7	10.5	4.3	9.2	681,636	(2000–02)	681,635.9

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

TERMS OF TRADE 2.3

	Index (1995=100)					
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	99.8	117.6	123.8	101.5	104.9	108.6
Excluding South Africa	—	142.8	134.1	103.6	111.8	115.8
Excluding South Africa abd Nigeria	—	124.6	110.5	97.8	100.8	107.7
Angola	—	—	128.1	96.1	108.4	156.1
Benin*+	104.8	96.3	82.1	90.4	94.2	96.0
Botswana	—	91.7	91.5	106.2	113.4	113.3
Burkina Faso*+	81.5	55.1	66.5	89.3	89.7	83.7
Burundi*	120.6	175.5	132.9	72.3	44.5	50.1
Cameroon*+	112.0	108.7	94.2	95.7	115.5	110.6
Cape Verde	—	62.9	115.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
Central African Republic*+	186.3	158.4	136.1	92.3	53.9	54.7
Chad*+	154.9	140.0	119.1	115.9	172.7	180.2
Comoros*+	—	—	109.5	105.3	153.3	162.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	82.3	85.4	109.6	107.0	135.3	137.9
Congo, Rep. of*+	251.1	181.1	192.1	128.7	164.1	183.5
Côte d'Ivoire*+	106.6	111.1	73.7	81.7	81.5	81.1
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	113.0	120.3	100.2	100.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	97.8	98.1	97.2
Ethiopia*	—	—	80.2	78.0	61.6	56.1
Gabon+	90.3	129.8	191.6	104.3	112.9	114.0
Gambia, The*	153.8	145.4	111.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ghana*	155.3	147.4	135.8	98.3	97.3	105.6
Guinea*	—	—	135.7	105.1	111.1	111.1
Guinea-Bissau*	—	139.0	181.7	108.7	108.1	102.4
Kenya*	123.0	115.6	80.5	93.8	98.7	94.4
Lesotho	99.0	116.0	101.8	99.3	100.3	100.1
Liberia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	164.2	160.1	118.0	109.9	148.4	143.4
Malawi*	196.6	213.8	156.2	108.1	94.8	93.9
Mali*+	139.1	104.9	108.5	99.3	88.8	90.2
Mauritania*	115.1	94.4	83.2	99.5	96.2	86.6
Mauritius	—	—	97.7	105.6	111.8	109.9
Mozambique*	—	—	145.1	87.0	67.1	67.2
Namibia	—	—	117.8	111.3	120.4	156.9
Niger*+	102.3	93.7	178.2	102.6	—	—
Nigeria	60.8	151.7	230.9	130.5	161.3	165.1
Rwanda*	55.1	59.4	55.6	80.0	73.0	62.6
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	200.3	113.2	116.3	138.2
Senegal*+	116.4	104.2	102.9	88.5	61.6	61.7
Seychelles	—	—	86.4	92.7	97.8	97.8
Sierra Leone*	63.6	62.7	80.4	186.2	390.9	492.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	77.3	98.2	102.4	98.3	94.7	97.1
Sudan	101.1	73.2	95.2	110.4	100.0	111.4
Swaziland	118.5	104.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tanzania*	—	—	139.7	107.8	125.3	134.6
Togo*+	220.5	144.5	130.6	108.3	106.8	104.0
Uganda*	—	—	119.9	66.1	45.6	44.1
Zambia*	284.9	185.0	102.4	70.5	56.1	49.0
Zimbabwe	—	118.5	92.0	101.3	103.6	104.1
North Africa	122.2	157.6	158.1	105.3	115.7	112.6
All Africa	102.3	125.2	133.1	102.7	108.3	109.8
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	123.9	112.1	98.8	89.6	90.3
India	—	81.2	79.8	95.8	90.9	84.5
Indonesia	22.5	57.2	110.3	102.6	105.4	100.1
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, VALUE 2.4

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports (millions of current US$)							
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1999	2000	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	535.9	2,151.3	1,975.0	2,927.8	3,004.2	3,105.8	3,251.7	3,439.5
Excluding South Africa	503.4	2,079.3	1,840.9	2,518.7	2,768.1	2,851.5	3,093.3	3,125.8
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	443.3	1,493.0	1,352.8	2,312.1	2,274.6	2,390.7	2,479.0	2,510.3
Angola	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benin*+	4.5	17.0	15.5	74.1	31.4	18.9	23.5	32.5
Botswana	3.7	28.8	22.0	56.9	55.2	58.3	47.8	6.0
Burkina Faso*+	7.4	23.2	36.0	64.0	81.3	57.1	48.0	20.9
Burundi*	0.9	7.7	7.4	9.1	4.6	8.5	6.2	6.7
Cameroon*+	12.8	34.3	24.2	47.0	91.8	78.4	123.5	74.5
Cape Verde	4.7	11.3	9.0	15.6	18.1	12.6	13.9	11.5
Central African Republic*+	1.9	3.9	5.7	10.4	7.0	5.7	6.7	8.8
Chad*+	3.2	3.3	20.5	14.9	7.4	7.8	10.3	11.0
Comoros*+	2.8	5.4	3.9	15.5	14.1	6.4	7.6	12.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	35.5	76.9	65.2	97.4	56.5	57.0	59.1	59.8
Congo, Rep. of*+	4.0	21.4	19.0	30.3	34.0	32.2	33.3	40.4
Côte d'Ivoire*+	52.2	164.3	96.4	179.5	165.0	142.7	185.2	198.3
Djibouti	2.9	12.9	13.6	18.4	26.6	16.5	7.8	49.9
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.5	0.9	2.9	1.1	2.3	2.5	3.0	2.1
Eritrea*	—	—	—	17.0	11.6	25.2	30.9	30.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	—	136.7	88.2	176.0	156.8	108.2
Gabon+	1.6	9.2	15.3	30.2	17.7	16.7	28.1	37.0
Gambia, The*	1.7	9.0	12.0	28.8	24.9	22.6	14.3	18.8
Ghana*	28.7	54.8	29.1	55.9	76.7	98.9	160.2	183.5
Guinea*	10.6	61.4	28.0	113.7	60.6	51.3	56.9	57.7
Guinea-Bissau*	7.5	5.6	5.4	18.6	17.0	22.9	21.1	5.7
Kenya*	10.5	85.8	41.0	66.7	114.6	240.3	187.4	94.8
Lesotho	7.0	33.9	25.4	70.3	60.2	52.8	52.8	35.5
Liberia	14.4	38.7	38.6	39.1	21.7	33.8	33.7	39.3
Madagascar*	17.1	34.5	34.8	36.0	36.3	59.0	46.6	23.8
Malawi*	3.7	11.2	5.9	63.6	15.1	10.4	27.1	61.9
Mali*+	25.2	42.1	55.5	25.4	35.0	19.8	18.3	18.5
Mauritania*	10.1	26.0	47.3	52.2	99.8	37.3	45.2	69.7
Mauritius	20.2	56.1	36.6	51.8	60.2	52.4	45.5	58.7
Mozambique*	14.6	83.0	111.9	116.0	54.2	64.5	80.9	124.1
Namibia	3.7	7.6	8.6	134.7	121.9	88.9	81.7	23.1
Niger*+	2.4	24.7	47.2	21.8	38.4	35.5	53.6	20.1
Nigeria	60.1	586.3	488.1	206.6	493.4	460.8	614.3	615.5
Rwanda*	1.0	8.5	11.9	26.6	14.8	20.3	18.9	9.2
São Tomé and Principe*	1.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.2	2.4	4.7	5.2
Senegal*+	63.0	114.4	92.2	192.1	207.9	146.8	198.3	225.2
Seychelles	1.6	3.7	2.4	6.6	7.1	9.3	7.3	7.3
Sierra Leone*	11.9	22.5	30.7	83.9	77.0	76.8	84.9	15.7
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	32.4	71.9	134.2	409.1	236.1	254.3	158.4	313.7
Sudan	26.2	71.1	202.5	96.6	142.7	252.2	219.3	241.0
Swaziland	—	—	4.4	10.6	27.6	22.6	21.0	30.7
Tanzania*	5.8	112.9	53.8	44.3	99.6	129.0	117.9	91.3
Togo*+	3.5	12.1	10.1	15.3	16.5	13.5	28.0	34.5
Uganda*	3.2	15.2	3.8	37.0	46.0	47.5	21.3	64.6
Zambia*	7.0	108.6	32.0	41.4	19.8	16.1	30.2	92.5
Zimbabwe	3.2	26.7	22.6	42.2	64.3	41.6	10.2	147.8
North Africa	412.2	1,877.7	2,104.9	2,557.7	2,157.8	2,559.1	2,505.6	2,871.0
All Africa	948.1	4,029.0	4,080.0	5,485.6	5,162.0	5,664.9	5,757.2	6,310.5
Comparator countries	836.0	988.8	350.1	1,892.4	2,111.8	1,080.4	711.8	1,213.6
China	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
India	373.1	127.7	56.9	3.9	231.2	16.9	1.8	1.6
Indonesia	462.9	861.1	293.2	1,888.4	1,880.6	1,063.5	710.0	1,212.0
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization–Trade data, BESD.

STAPLE FOOD IMPORTS, SHARE OF EXPORTS 2.5

	Value of maize, rice, and wheat imports as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services							
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1999	2000	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.7	4.0	3.2	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.2
Excluding South Africa	3.6	3.9	5.7	4.4	4.6	3.8	4.3	4.3
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.6	4.6	4.9	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.7	4.4
Angola	—	—	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Benin*+	5.7	7.7	6.2	18.3	8.2	5.5	6.5	8.5
Botswana	2.6	5.1	3.0	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.7	0.2
Burkina Faso*+	17.3	13.4	23.2	20.9	28.3	24.1	18.5	7.7
Burundi*	2.6	9.5	5.8	7.1	7.4	13.7	14.0	14.1
Cameroon*+	3.5	1.8	0.9	2.3	4.1	2.9	4.6	2.9
Cape Verde	31.7	58.9	29.1	16.6	16.1	8.6	8.4	5.9
Central African Republic*+	2.4	1.9	3.2	4.5	6.0	4.5	5.6	6.9
Chad*+	3.1	1.9	16.7	4.6	3.1	3.3	4.0	4.5
Comoros*+	—	50.4	20.0	33.9	48.0	20.7	21.7	32.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.3	3.2	3.3	6.1	5.1	5.9	6.4	5.7
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.3	2.1	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.2	1.5	1.7
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.8	4.6	3.0	3.9	3.3	3.4	4.3	3.5
Djibouti	—	—	—	9.1	10.6	6.7	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	1.5	—	12.0	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Eritrea*	—	—	—	12.9	17.7	25.8	21.0	16.3
Ethiopia*	—	—	0.0	17.4	9.6	17.9	16.4	11.3
Gabon+	0.4	0.3	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2
Gambia, The*	6.5	8.7	12.1	15.4	12.5	11.2	6.7	9.8
Ghana*	5.4	14.6	6.1	3.5	3.1	4.1	6.7	7.0
Guinea*	—	—	—	14.8	8.0	7.0	6.9	7.4
Guinea-Bissau*	139.3	39.6	38.8	62.8	30.5	33.4	25.9	6.2
Kenya*	1.5	4.2	2.6	2.3	4.3	8.8	6.3	2.9
Lesotho	37.5	37.4	62.3	36.2	26.1	19.9	15.9	9.7
Liberia	4.4	6.3	8.3	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	7.3	6.4	9.9	4.7	4.0	5.0	3.5	3.4
Malawi*	3.0	3.6	2.2	15.0	3.0	2.3	5.6	13.0
Mali*+	43.9	16.0	25.2	4.9	5.1	3.0	2.1	1.7
Mauritania*	6.5	10.0	11.5	9.9	27.0	9.9	11.8	19.2
Mauritius	—	10.4	7.1	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.5	2.1
Mozambique*	—	21.7	87.8	33.1	13.4	13.6	10.8	14.7
Namibia	—	0.4	1.0	7.8	7.8	5.7	5.8	1.6
Niger*+	1.6	4.0	15.8	6.8	12.0	11.1	16.6	5.7
Nigeria	2.5	3.1	10.7	1.7	3.8	2.1	3.2	3.8
Rwanda*	3.0	5.0	6.5	40.0	13.0	13.5	12.0	6.9
São Tomé and Principe*	16.1	26.4	30.9	29.0	13.1	15.6	27.8	23.9
Senegal*+	18.2	14.2	12.5	12.4	14.2	11.2	14.2	14.3
Seychelles	—	3.7	2.1	2.4	1.7	2.0	1.5	1.3
Sierra Leone*	8.4	8.9	24.2	51.8	83.5	70.0	69.7	11.1
Somalia	0.0	0.0	0.0	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.9
Sudan	5.8	8.8	28.3	22.1	17.5	14.0	13.0	12.3
Swaziland	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.0	2.7	2.0	1.8	2.9
Tanzania*	—	—	12.3	4.1	8.4	9.9	8.2	5.8
Togo*+	2.6	2.1	2.7	3.6	3.6	3.4	6.8	7.5
Uganda*	1.1	6.3	0.8	5.4	6.3	7.2	3.1	9.3
Zambia*	0.6	6.8	3.9	3.3	2.8	2.4	3.1	8.7
Zimbabwe	—	1.7	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	0.5	7.4
North Africa	4.7	4.0	5.8	4.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.6
All Africa	3.3	3.3	4.9	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.5
Comparator countries	6.9	1.9	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.2
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
India	11.0	1.1	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	12.8	3.2	1.5	3.6	3.8	1.6	1.2	2.0
South Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank data.

GROSS CONCESSIONAL AID FLOWS 3.1

	Percentage of recipient country GDP						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	2000	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.8	2.1	3.6	3.6	2.8	3.1	3.3
Excluding South Africa	2.6	3.0	4.9	6.8	4.7	4.8	5.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	3.5	4.8	6.1	8.2	5.9	6.1	6.2
Angola	—	—	0.5	5.2	0.7	1.1	1.0
Benin*+	6.3	7.0	6.1	11.8	5.3	10.3	5.9
Botswana	12.3	14.3	9.5	1.5	1.1	0.5	0.4
Burkina Faso*+	10.6	13.1	10.9	10.1	6.2	7.7	6.8
Burundi*	0.3	12.6	12.3	18.2	15.9	15.4	10.2
Cameroon*+	2.8	3.3	2.2	2.6	2.4	1.6	1.4
Cape Verde	0.0	27.6	49.6	17.2	14.8	11.9	11.8
Central African Republic*+	1.0	2.4	5.0	10.8	4.7	3.3	2.8
Chad*+	9.0	3.2	13.8	13.2	8.7	6.8	9.9
Comoros*+	—	20.6	50.0	19.6	5.7	9.7	8.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1.7	2.8	4.3	6.3	3.0	5.2	13.6
Congo, Rep. of*+	1.6	2.9	3.9	3.9	0.9	1.9	0.5
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.0	0.4	2.4	6.0	1.6	0.7	2.3
Djibouti	—	—	8.9	15.8	10.8	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	6.2	—	20.7	7.8	0.3	0.2	0.3
Eritrea*	—	—	—	6.3	40.1	50.1	38.6
Ethiopia*	—	—	12.4	10.8	7.3	14.2	16.8
Gabon+	1.9	0.4	2.0	1.3	0.3	0.4	0.6
Gambia, The*	4.2	11.4	18.2	20.4	12.3	13.6	21.3
Ghana*	2.0	4.4	4.4	14.5	11.0	15.4	7.9
Guinea*	—	—	—	7.4	5.1	7.8	4.6
Guinea-Bissau*	0.0	43.8	14.0	42.0	28.8	27.4	20.9
Kenya*	2.2	2.2	3.4	6.8	4.3	2.7	1.4
Lesotho	0.0	–8.3	44.5	7.8	9.5	6.6	9.2
Liberia	0.2	6.7	3.1	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	6.8	3.8	6.1	6.0	7.4	6.4	7.3
Malawi*	7.5	7.7	6.0	25.4	15.4	12.7	16.1
Mali*+	8.7	8.6	20.8	15.6	11.7	11.5	6.1
Mauritania*	19.8	30.7	30.1	15.5	24.6	16.4	34.8
Mauritius	—	1.4	3.0	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.4
Mozambique*	—	1.6	10.4	24.2	18.6	17.2	18.5
Namibia	—	7.2	23.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Niger*+	10.4	8.7	4.4	7.9	8.7	8.8	10.0
Nigeria	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.1
Rwanda*	13.1	13.4	11.4	27.8	17.6	17.6	18.7
São Tomé and Principe*	0.0	16.9	16.7	78.3	51.2	53.7	35.8
Senegal*+	6.9	8.8	11.7	11.4	6.7	7.9	7.7
Seychelles	3.3	14.0	12.9	3.1	5.2	3.3	3.1
Sierra Leone*	1.6	6.4	5.2	12.1	22.8	22.3	24.6
Somalia	8.6	35.9	11.3	—	—	—	—
South Africa	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sudan	1.2	7.1	3.8	5.3	6.0	6.1	8.3
Swaziland	5.8	26.6	24.0	1.0	8.8	9.3	3.2
Tanzania*	—	—	4.9	13.8	8.1	7.0	7.2
Togo*+	11.2	11.1	16.0	5.2	4.8	3.4	1.9
Uganda*	0.6	1.0	4.8	9.1	9.9	12.9	10.1
Zambia*	3.3	6.8	9.6	18.0	13.3	10.9	13.5
Zimbabwe	0.4	0.9	2.3	3.7	2.1	1.1	2.0
North Africa	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.0	0.9	0.8
All Africa	1.7	2.0	2.7	3.0	2.1	2.2	2.3

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Note: Gross concessional aid flows include loans plus official balance of payments transfers. Group totals are weighted averages.
Source: World Bank data.

DEBT SERVICE RATIO 3.2

	Percentage of exports						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	2000	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.9	11.3	27.0	15.6	11.6	11.5	10.9
Excluding South Africa	9.9	11.3	27.0	19.4	12.4	11.5	10.2
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	11.3	18.0	23.8	20.4	14.1	10.8	10.5
Angola	—	—	—	11.7	20.7	21.7	10.0
Benin*+	1.9	4.9	11.5	11.0	15.3	11.1	13.6
Botswana	1.6	1.9	5.4	3.1	2.0	1.7	2.0
Burkina Faso*+	4.0	5.9	10.5	11.3	14.9	11.9	16.0
Burundi*	—	9.4	20.4	27.6	39.6	41.6	35.6
Cameroon*+	7.6	14.6	23.4	20.9	20.3	12.3	13.8
Cape Verde	—	—	14.0	5.3	7.0	5.5	7.7
Central African Republic*+	6.1	4.9	14.2	6.8	11.1	10.3	0.7
Chad*+	3.7	8.4	13.9	4.9	10.8	9.1	11.6
Comoros*+	—	2.6	8.9	1.7	4.6	3.4	6.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	9.2	22.6	24.8	1.4	2.5	1.8	76.5
Congo, Rep. of*+	7.0	10.6	34.4	13.1	1.6	4.1	1.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	7.6	39.1	34.8	22.6	23.4	13.8	14.3
Djibouti	—	—	—	5.1	5.1	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.0	—	21.7	2.2	0.4	0.2	0.1
Eritrea*	—	—	—	0.1	1.8	2.5	2.7
Ethiopia*	6.4	7.6	28.4	19.1	13.1	18.3	11.1
Gabon+	14.2	15.0	11.6	15.5	11.6	14.3	12.0
Gambia, The*	1.4	5.7	10.8	13.3	9.6	6.0	7.2
Ghana*	4.9	13.1	23.6	24.8	18.8	12.9	8.0
Guinea*	—	19.8	—	23.2	21.1	12.8	17.4
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	—	51.6	29.2	43.6	25.3
Kenya*	9.2	19.7	39.2	30.4	18.9	15.9	13.6
Lesotho	—	1.5	6.8	6.0	11.3	12.6	10.4
Liberia	6.1	8.8	8.6	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	34.7	19.3	38.2	7.1	9.7	5.0	9.6
Malawi*	9.3	27.8	39.0	26.6	12.2	7.6	7.2
Mali*+	7.4	5.1	19.9	13.9	12.9	9.1	7.7
Mauritania*	9.0	17.3	24.5	20.5	19.7	17.4	15.6
Mauritius	—	9.1	26.3	9.6	17.2	6.7	8.4
Mozambique*	—	—	34.5	34.8	11.4	8.8	6.2
Namibia	—	0.3	0.3	0.1	—	—	—
Niger*+	2.0	21.7	33.8	16.7	7.1	8.1	7.4
Nigeria	6.1	4.1	33.6	15.3	8.1	13.2	9.2
Rwanda*	0.2	4.1	10.8	22.8	21.4	10.8	15.6
São Tomé and Principe*	—	5.1	29.0	20.9	25.5	22.7	31.3
Senegal*+	11.0	26.7	20.7	16.6	13.5	11.7	12.3
Seychelles	—	36.2	7.9	8.5	2.9	2.2	2.7
Sierra Leone*	9.3	28.0	13.0	50.9	42.6	83.1	16.1
Somalia	3.7	4.9	14.2	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	—	9.5	9.9	11.6	12.2
Sudan	13.8	20.5	12.2	10.1	3.3	3.2	1.2
Swaziland	—	4.0	9.8	2.0	2.8	2.1	1.7
Tanzania*	4.1	23.4	39.1	21.1	14.6	10.3	8.9
Togo*+	7.6	9.0	28.4	6.2	6.5	6.8	2.6
Uganda*	8.4	17.3	38.0	19.8	10.6	6.9	10.9
Zambia*	31.9	25.2	14.4	195.3	20.8	11.7	27.8
Zimbabwe	2.1	20.7	32.7	23.4	21.0	6.1	2.8
North Africa	9.9	13.7	25.1	24.0	16.3	15.1	16.4
All Africa	9.9	12.5	26.0	18.5	13.3	12.9	13.0
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	—	—	8.3	9.9	9.3	7.8	—
India	19.2	9.8	23.0	27.8	14.0	11.8	—
Indonesia	—	—	28.8	29.9	22.5	23.6	—
South Asia	17.8	12.0	22.2	24.9	14.7	12.7	11.4
East Asia	—	—	22.3	12.8	11.4	12.1	10.9

— Not available.
* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars (net), current prices						
	1973	1980	1985	1995	2000	2001	2002
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	–741	787	880	6,342	18,114	8,777
Excluding South Africa	—	24	1,283	2,136	5,725	7,329	7,683
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	763	938	1,459	4,223	5,533	5,733
Angola	—	—	278	303	878	2,146	1,312
Benin*+	4	4	1	4	75	36	41
Botswana	53	109	52	30	55	55	54
Burkina Faso*+	4	0	0	14	24	12	11
Burundi*	—	1	1	1	6	6	6
Cameroon*+	–1	105	274	–154	280	373	703
Cape Verde	—	—	—	26	34	34	32
Central African Republic*+	0	5	2	4	3	9	6
Chad*+	6	0	53	37	101	462	902
Comoros*+	—	0	0	1	0	0	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	0	0	6	0	–50	–7	12
Congo, Rep. of*+	68	40	13	123	478	218	225
Côte d'Ivoire*+	51	83	29	234	106	100	89
Djibouti	—	—	—	3	9	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	0	93	113	230	106
Eritrea*	0	0	0	—	28	12	20
Ethiopia*	31	0	0	0	51	52	0
Gabon+	16	24	144	–109	–15	–33	–39
Gambia, The*	—	—	1	7	2	5	7
Ghana*	14	16	8	83	65	88	50
Guinea*	—	—	—	25	–47	–58	31
Guinea-Bissau*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kenya*	—	78	13	33	127	50	50
Lesotho	—	4	0	30	128	110	96
Liberia	49	—	–16	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*	11	0	0	10	70	93	9
Malawi*	8	10	1	0	27	28	38
Mali*+	–9	24	3	30	18	21	—
Mauritania*	10	27	4	7	1	4	7
Mauritius	—	0	6	22	13	197	28
Mozambique*	—	0	0	45	139	255	156
Namibia	—	—	—	157	156	312	247
Niger*+	1	44	–10	0	18	30	4
Nigeria	373	–739	345	677	1,502	1,796	1,950
Rwanda*	2	16	15	2	8	4	3
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	0	2	3	4	3
Senegal*+	–9	61	–16	35	62	39	59
Seychelles	—	6	1	30	14	22	38
Sierra Leone*	7	10	3	–5	2	2	4
Somalia	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	–23	–765	–497	–1,256	617	10,785	1,094
Sudan	—	0	0	0	392	0	633
Swaziland	—	18	9	31	73	69	54
Tanzania*	—	—	—	104	463	327	240
Togo*+	2	42	31	5	—	—	—
Uganda*	5	0	30	2	177	144	146
Zambia*	32	62	0	97	122	72	197
Zimbabwe	—	–26	3	98	15	10	153
North Africa	—	–78	384	1,350	2,886	5,519	4,365
All Africa	—	–819	1,170	2,230	9,229	23,633	13,142
Comparator countries	67	0	1,340	39,649	35,275	37,984	749
China	—	—	1,030	33,849	37,483	37,357	—
India	67	0	0	2,057	2,342	3,905	3,000
Indonesia	—	—	310	3,743	–4,550	–3,278	–2,251
South Asia	—	111	104	2,568	3,198	4,543	—
East Asia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

INFANT MORTALITY RATE 4.1

	Deaths per 1,000 live births							
	Estimate							Projection
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997	2001	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	126	118	114	110	108	108	105	—
Excluding South Africa	129	121	117	114	111	110	108	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	132	122	117	114	111	110	107	—
Angola	167	158	155	166	172	172	154	104
Benin*+	138	127	119	111	104	102	94	54
Botswana	81	62	54	45	50	60	80	49
Burkina Faso*+	152	140	129	118	110	108	104	76
Burundi*	127	116	115	114	114	114	114	80
Cameroon*+	116	105	95	85	92	93	96	62
Cape Verde	73	61	53	45	37	34	29	18
Central African Republic*+	135	121	118	115	115	115	115	77
Chad*+	137	124	121	118	118	118	117	80
Comoros*+	140	120	104	88	74	69	59	32
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	139	130	129	128	128	128	129	83
Congo, Rep. of*+	94	88	86	83	81	81	81	39
Côte d'Ivoire*+	136	114	107	100	101	101	102	74
Djibouti	149	137	128	119	111	107	100	75
Equatorial Guinea*+	154	143	133	122	113	109	101	57
Eritrea*	—	112	102	92	81	78	72	42
Ethiopia*	152	143	136	128	122	120	116	82
Gabon+	92	68	64	60	60	60	60	42
Gambia, The*	165	144	123	103	96	94	91	49
Ghana*	102	92	83	74	65	62	57	40
Guinea*	186	175	160	145	129	122	109	57
Guinea-Bissau*	180	173	163	153	143	139	130	84
Kenya*	85	73	68	63	73	75	78	63
Lesotho	120	115	109	102	97	95	91	70
Liberia	169	157	157	157	157	157	157	87
Madagascar*	108	106	105	103	95	91	84	50
Malawi*	173	157	152	146	133	127	114	84
Mali*+	196	171	162	152	147	145	141	92
Mauritania*	134	118	119	120	120	120	120	69
Mauritius	45	33	26	21	20	20	17	9
Mozambique*	152	140	142	143	133	130	125	103
Namibia	94	84	75	65	61	59	55	50
Niger*+	194	191	191	191	176	169	156	83
Nigeria	119	117	116	114	112	111	110	76
Rwanda*	127	130	119	107	122	113	96	79
São Tomé and Principe*	86	83	77	69	63	61	57	30
Senegal*+	146	128	109	90	84	82	79	43
Seychelles	—	—	19	17	18	8	13	6
Sierra Leone*	199	192	189	185	182	181	182	117
Somalia	146	133	133	133	133	133	133	82
South Africa	73	65	55	45	50	52	56	49
Sudan	95	86	81	75	70	69	65	43
Swaziland	116	99	88	77	78	87	106	82
Tanzania*	118	106	100	102	103	103	104	69
Togo*+	117	106	91	88	83	82	79	53
Uganda*	109	108	104	100	90	86	79	57
Zambia*	101	92	100	108	112	112	112	91
Zimbabwe	78	69	61	53	60	65	76	59
North Africa	122	104	84	62	49	44	35	—
All Africa	125	115	109	104	101	100	98	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	48	42	37	38	37	35	31	16
India	120	113	97	80	74	71	67	41
Indonesia	92	79	70	60	46	42	33	20
South Asia	122	115	100	86	78	75	71	—
East Asia	61	53	47	43	40	38	34	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH 4.2

	Actual							Projection
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997	2001	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	46	48	49	50	49	49	46	—
Excluding South Africa	45	47	48	49	49	48	46	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	46	47	49	49	48	48	46	—
Angola	39	41	43	45	46	46	47	50
Benin*+	46	48	50	52	53	53	53	58
Botswana	55	58	60	57	50	47	39	45
Burkina Faso*+	42	44	45	45	45	45	44	49
Burundi*	45	47	47	44	42	42	42	48
Cameroon*+	47	50	52	54	54	53	49	55
Cape Verde	59	61	63	65	67	68	69	72
Central African Republic*+	44	46	47	48	46	45	43	48
Chad*+	40	42	44	46	48	49	48	55
Comoros*+	49	50	52	56	59	60	61	68
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	47	49	51	52	49	47	45	54
Congo, Rep. of*+	48	50	51	51	51	51	51	62
Côte d'Ivoire*+	47	49	51	50	48	47	46	51
Djibouti	42	44	46	48	50	50	45	50
Equatorial Guinea*+	41	43	45	47	49	50	51	61
Eritrea*	45	44	46	49	50	51	51	61
Ethiopia*	42	42	44	45	44	43	42	49
Gabon+	46	48	50	52	52	52	53	64
Gambia, The*	38	40	45	49	52	53	53	57
Ghana*	51	53	55	57	59	60	56	62
Guinea*	38	40	42	44	46	46	46	51
Guinea-Bissau*	37	39	41	42	44	44	45	51
Kenya*	52	55	57	57	53	50	46	52
Lesotho	51	53	56	58	52	48	43	51
Liberia	49	51	53	45	44	47	47	55
Madagascar*	48	51	52	53	53	53	55	62
Malawi*	42	44	46	45	42	41	38	45
Mali*+	40	42	45	45	44	44	41	46
Mauritania*	45	47	48	49	50	50	51	57
Mauritius	64	66	68	70	70	70	72	77
Mozambique*	43	44	44	43	45	45	42	47
Namibia	50	53	55	58	57	56	44	49
Niger*+	40	42	44	45	46	46	46	49
Nigeria	44	46	47	49	50	50	46	51
Rwanda*	45	46	48	40	38	40	40	47
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	62	64	64	65	71
Senegal*+	43	45	47	50	52	52	52	58
Seychelles	—	—	69	70	71	71	73	78
Sierra Leone*	35	35	36	35	36	37	37	47
Somalia	42	43	44	42	44	47	47	54
South Africa	55	57	59	62	58	55	47	53
Sudan	45	48	50	52	55	56	58	63
Swaziland	49	52	54	57	58	58	45	51
Tanzania*	48	50	51	50	49	48	44	50
Togo*+	47	49	51	50	49	49	49	57
Uganda*	50	48	48	47	44	42	43	50
Zambia*	49	50	50	49	45	43	37	44
Zimbabwe	53	55	56	56	49	45	39	46
North Africa	55	58	61	65	67	68	69	—
All Africa	48	49	51	53	52	52	50	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	65	67	68	69	69	70	70	74
India	52	54	57	59	61	62	63	67
Indonesia	51	55	59	62	64	65	66	71
South Asia	51	54	56	58	61	62	63	—
East Asia	62	64	66	67	68	68	69	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES 4.3

	Percentage of population with access to health services (last available data between 1985 and 1995)		
	Total	Urban	Rural
Angola	24 (1991)	24	—
Benin*+	42 (1991)	42	—
Botswana	86 (1988)	86	—
Burkina Faso*+	70 (1985)	70	—
Burundi*	80 (1991)	80	—
Cameroon*+	15 (1988)	15	—
Cape Verde	82 (1988)	82	—
Central African Republic*+	12 (1988)	12	—
Chad*+	26 (1991)	26	—
Comoros*+	82 (1985)	82	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	59 (1991)	59	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	60 (1988)	60	—
Djibouti	37 (1983)	100 (1988)	95 (1988)
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—
Ethiopia*	55 (1991)	55	—
Gabon+	87 (1988)	87	—
Gambia, The*	—	—	—
Ghana*	25 (1992)	25	—
Guinea*	45 (1992)	45	—
Guinea-Bissau*	64 (1985)	64	—
Kenya*	—	—	—
Lesotho	80 (1988)	80	—
Liberia	34 (1988)	34	—
Madagascar*	65 (1988)	65	—
Malawi*	80 (1988)	80	—
Mali*+	20 (1983)	20	—
Mauritania*	30 (1985)	30	—
Mauritius	99 (1991)	100 (1988)	100 (1988)
Mozambique*	30 (1988)	30	—
Namibia	—	—	—
Niger*+	30 (1991)	30	—
Nigeria	67 (1991)	87 (1993)	—
Rwanda*	—	—	—
São Tomé and Principe*	88 (1988)	88	—
Senegal*+	40 (1990)	40	—
Seychelles	99 (1991)	99	—
Sierra Leone*	36 (1985)	88 (1993)	—
Somalia	20 (1985)	50 (1985)	15 (1985)
South Africa	—	—	—
Sudan	70 (1991)	70	—
Swaziland	55 (1991)	55	—
Tanzania*	93 (1991)	94 (1993)	—
Togo*+	—	—	—
Uganda*	71 (1988)	71	—
Zambia*	75 (1988)	100 (1988)	50 (1988)
Zimbabwe	71 (1985)	90 (1988)	80 (1988)
Average	57	55	50

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

CHILD IMMUNIZATION AND ORT USE 4.4

	Percentage use among under-five-year-olds		Percentage of one-year-olds immunized			
	ORT		DPT		Measles	
	1989	1992–93[a]	1996	2001	1996	2001
Angola	12	48 (1992)	28	41	62	72
Benin*+	45	28 (1993)	66	76	60	65
Botswana	66	64 (1993)	83	87	89	83
Burkina Faso*+	15	15 (1993)	37	41	40	46
Burundi*	30	49 (1993)	73	74	79	75
Cameroon*+	84	84 (1993)	46	43	49	62
Cape Verde	5	5 (1992)	—	78	66	72
Central African Republic*+	20	24 (1992)	53	23	46	29
Chad*+	10	15 (1992)	20	27	22	36
Comoros*+	79	70 (1992)	—	70	43	70
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	40	46 (1993)	—	40	21	46
Congo, Rep. of*+	13	67 (1992)	37	31	42	35
Côte d'Ivoire*+	16	16 (1992)	55	57	65	61
Djibouti	51	56 (1992)	41	49	41	49
Equatorial Guinea*+	21	40 (1992)	80	32	81	19
Eritrea*	—	—	67	93	66	88
Ethiopia*	32	68 (1993)	55	56	54	52
Gabon+	10	25 (1992)	62	38	57	55
Gambia, The*	39	51 (1993)	—	96	94	90
Ghana*	21	44 (1992)	71	80	71	81
Guinea*	63	82 (1993)	48	43	61	52
Guinea-Bissau*	5	26 (1993)	53	47	49	48
Kenya*	80	69 (1992)	87	76	81	76
Lesotho	68	78 (1992)	88	85	82	77
Liberia	9	15 (1992)	—	62	—	78
Madagascar*	11	26 (1993)	49	55	46	55
Malawi*	14	50 (1993)	90	90	90	82
Mali*+	41	41 (1993)	52	51	55	37
Mauritania*	54	54 (1992)	50	61	66	58
Mauritius	7	—	90	92	61	90
Mozambique*	30	60 (1993)	60	80	67	92
Namibia	—	75 (1993)	70	63	61	58
Niger*+	54	17 (1993)	23	31	38	51
Nigeria	35	80 (1993)	26	26	38	40
Rwanda*	24	36 (1993)	89	86	76	78
São Tomé and Principe*	46	50 (1992)	—	82	57	69
Senegal*+	27	27 (1992)	70	52	70	48
Seychelles	88	—	99	96	98	95
Sierra Leone*	55	60 (1992)	—	44	—	37
Somalia	7	78 (1992)	21	33	33	38
South Africa	—	—	73	81	76	72
Sudan	36	47 (1993)	56	46	59	67
Swaziland	85	85 (1992)	82	77	82	72
Tanzania*	37	83 (1992)	—	85	78	83
Togo*+	33	33 (1993)	50	64	48	58
Uganda*	15	45 (1993)	57	60	55	61
Zambia*	87	90 (1993)	87	78	86	85
Zimbabwe	77	—	90	75	88	68
Average	38	49	61	62	62	63
Median	33	49	59	62	61	64

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Note: ORT is oral rehydration therapy; DPT is diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.
a. Most recent available data.
Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL PRIMARY ENROLLMENT 4.5

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in primary school						Projection
	1975	1985	1990	1995	1999	2000	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	59	76	74	76	79	86	—
Excluding South Africa	56	76	71	71	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	57	69	66	66	75	83	—
Angola	—	107	92	72	68	74	—
Benin*+	50	68	58	73	86	95	—
Botswana	71	105	113	108	108	108	—
Burkina Faso*+	14	27	33	40	43	44	—
Burundi*	21	53	73	51	62	65	—
Cameroon*+	95	102	101	87	91	108	—
Cape Verde	127	116	121	140	—	139	—
Central African Republic*+	73	75	65	57	—	75	—
Chad*+	35	44	54	51	70	73	—
Comoros*+	64	82	75	75	84	86	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	93	87	70	67	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	136	147	133	114	84	97	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	61	72	67	69	75	81	—
Djibouti	30	40	38	38	37	40	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	125	120	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	56	61	59	—
Ethiopia*	21	38	33	37	58	64	—
Gabon+	—	—	—	—	151	144	—
Gambia, The*	33	68	64	77	84	82	—
Ghana*	72	75	75	72	84	80	—
Guinea*	30	34	37	48	63	67	—
Guinea-Bissau*	65	64	56	66	83	—	—
Kenya*	104	99	95	85	89	94	—
Lesotho	106	112	112	111	104	115	—
Liberia	40	—	29	25	118	—	—
Madagascar*	92	—	103	92	102	103	—
Malawi*	56	60	68	134	135	137	—
Mali*+	25	25	26	41	57	61	—
Mauritania*	20	48	49	75	84	83	—
Mauritius	105	109	109	107	108	109	—
Mozambique*	—	87	67	60	85	92	—
Namibia	—	—	129	133	113	112	—
Niger*+	19	26	29	29	32	35	—
Nigeria	50	104	91	93	—	—	—
Rwanda*	55	63	70	94	122	119	—
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal*+	40	56	59	64	73	75	—
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	38	63	50	53	65	93	—
Somalia	42	14	11	10	—	—	—
South Africa	104	—	122	133	119	111	—
Sudan	47	52	53	50	55	—	—
Swaziland	97	102	111	121	125	125	—
Tanzania*	53	75	70	67	63	63	—
Togo*+	98	93	109	119	124	124	—
Uganda*	44	73	71	74	—	136	—
Zambia*	97	105	99	89	79	78	—
Zimbabwe	70	136	116	114	97	95	—
North Africa	77	88	91	100	103	103	—
All Africa	63	79	78	80	85	90	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
China	122	123	125	118	106	—	—
India	81	96	97	100	102	—	—
Indonesia	86	117	115	113	108	110	—
South Asia	75	86	90	94	97	—	—
East Asia	114	119	121	116	106	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL SECONDARY ENROLLMENT 4.6

	Percentage of school-age children enrolled in secondary school						Projection
	1975	1985	1990	1995	1999	2000	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	10	20	23	26	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa	10	20	19	21	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	10	16	18	18	—	—	—
Angola	9	14	12	12	15	—	—
Benin*+	8	18	12	16	22	—	—
Botswana	15	29	43	63	82	—	—
Burkina Faso*+	2	4	7	9	10	—	—
Burundi*	2	4	6	7	—	—	—
Cameroon*+	13	23	28	26	—	—	—
Cape Verde	7	13	21	43	—	—	—
Central African Republic*+	8	16	12	10	—	—	—
Chad*+	3	6	8	9	11	—	—
Comoros*+	13	28	18	21	21	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	17	23	22	24	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	48	75	53	53	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	12	20	22	23	—	—	—
Djibouti	7	12	12	13	15	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	31	—	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	19	28	—	—
Ethiopia*	6	13	14	12	5	—	—
Gabon+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gambia, The*	9	16	19	25	27	—	—
Ghana*	36	40	36	34	—	—	—
Guinea*	14	13	10	12	—	—	—
Guinea-Bissau*	4	9	9	11	20	—	—
Kenya*	13	21	24	24	—	—	—
Lesotho	13	23	25	31	28	—	—
Liberia	16	—	14	13	23	—	—
Madagascar*	13	—	18	16	—	—	—
Malawi*	4	6	8	17	—	—	—
Mali*+	7	6	7	11	—	—	—
Mauritania*	4	15	14	16	18	—	—
Mauritius	38	49	53	62	107	—	—
Mozambique*	3	7	8	7	14	—	—
Namibia	—	—	44	62	60	—	—
Niger*+	2	5	7	7	7	—	—
Nigeria	8	34	25	32	—	—	—
Rwanda*	4	6	8	14	12	—	—
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal*+	11	14	16	16	—	—	—
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	12	18	17	17	24	—	—
Somalia	4	8	6	6	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	74	95	90	—	—
Sudan	14	21	24	21	29	—	—
Swaziland	32	39	44	53	—	—	—
Tanzania*	3	3	5	5	5	—	—
Togo*+	19	21	24	27	36	—	—
Uganda*	4	10	13	12	—	—	—
Zambia*	15	19	24	27	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	8	42	50	47	45	—	—
North Africa	30	52	62	65	69	—	—
All Africa	14	27	30	33	—	—	—
Comparator countries	—	—	—	—		—	
China	46	40	49	66	63	—	—
India	26	38	44	49	49	—	—
Indonesia	20	41	44	51	55	57	—
South Asia	24	34	39	43	46	—	—
East Asia	42	40	47	62	61	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

FEMALE PRIMARY ENROLLMENT 4.7

	Percentage of total primary enrollment						
	1975	1985	1991	1995	1996	1998	Projection 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	44	45	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa	39	44	45	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	39	44	45	—	—	—	—
Angola	—	45	46	—	—	46	—
Benin*+	31	34	34	36	37	39	—
Botswana	55	52	51	50	50	50	—
Burkina Faso*+	37	37	39	39	—	40	—
Burundi*	39	42	45	45	46	45	—
Cameroon*+	45	46	48	46	46	45	—
Cape Verde	48	49	—	—	—	49	—
Central African Republic*+	36	39	40	—	—	40	—
Chad*+	26	28	32	33	34	37	—
Comoros*+	—	43	45	—	—	45	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	40	39	43	—	—	47	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	47	49	48	48	—	49	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	38	41	42	42	42	43	—
Djibouti	35	41	42	42	42	41	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	—	44	—
Eritrea*	—	—	46	45	45	45	—
Ethiopia*	32	39	42	36	36	38	—
Gabon+	49	49	50	50	50	50	—
Gambia, The*	33	39	41	44	—	46	—
Ghana*	43	—	46	—	—	—	—
Guinea*	34	32	32	34	36	38	—
Guinea-Bissau*	35	—	36	—	—	—	—
Kenya*	46	48	49	49	49	49	—
Lesotho	59	56	55	53	52	52	—
Liberia	34	—	—	—	—	42	—
Madagascar*	43	—	48	49	—	49	—
Malawi*	40	43	46	47	—	—	—
Mali*+	36	37	37	39	39	41	—
Mauritania*	36	40	43	46	47	48	—
Mauritius	49	49	49	49	49	49	—
Mozambique*	—	44	43	42	—	42	—
Namibia	—	—	51	50	50	50	—
Niger*+	35	36	37	38	38	39	—
Nigeria	40	44	44	45	45	—	—
Rwanda*	46	49	50	—	—	50	—
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	—	—	49	—
Senegal*+	42	40	42	44	45	45	—
Seychelles	51	49	49	49	49	49	—
Sierra Leone*	40	—	—	—	—	—	—
Somalia	35	34	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	50	49	—	49	—
Sudan	36	40	43	45	45	46	—
Swaziland	49	50	50	49	49	49	—
Tanzania*	42	50	49	49	49	50	—
Togo*+	35	38	40	41	41	43	—
Uganda*	40	—	46	46	46	47	—
Zambia*	45	47	—	48	—	48	—
Zimbabwe	46	48	49	49	49	—	—
North Africa	39	43	—	—	45	—	—
All Africa	39	44	45	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	43	44	46	46	46	46	—
China	45	45	46	47	47	48	—
India	38	40	42	43	43	45	—
Indonesia	45	48	49	48	48	—	—
South Asia	37	40	41	43	43	44	—
East Asia	46	46	47	48	48	48	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

FEMALE SECONDARY ENROLLMENT 4.8

	Percentage of total secondary enrollment						
	1975	1985	1991	1995	1996	1998	Projection 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Angola	—	—	—	—	—	41	—
Benin*+	—	29	—	—	—	31	—
Botswana	52	53	54	52	—	52	—
Burkina Faso*+	32	34	34	—	—	38	—
Burundi*	31	34	38	—	—	43	—
Cameroon*+	33	38	—	—	—	44	—
Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic*+	18	27	29	—	—	—	—
Chad*+	—	—	—	20	20	21	—
Comoros*+	—	39	—	—	—	44	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	26	30	32	—	—	34	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	36	44	43	43	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	—	—	—	—	—	35	—
Djibouti	27	39	40	42	41	42	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	17	—	—	—	—	27	—
Eritrea*	—	—	—	42	42	41	—
Ethiopia*	—	—	45	43	—	38	—
Gabon+	35	42	—	47	—	46	—
Gambia, The*	27	30	35	38	—	40	—
Ghana*	38	—	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea*	—	26	—	26	—	26	—
Guinea-Bissau*	31	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kenya*	35	38	—	—	—	47	—
Lesotho	56	60	59	—	59	58	—
Liberia	25	—	—	—	—	39	—
Madagascar*	—	—	—	—	—	49	—
Malawi*	22	23	—	—	—	—	—
Mali*+	26	—	31	34	33	34	—
Mauritania*	—	—	34	34	—	42	—
Mauritius	44	47	—	—	50	50	—
Mozambique*	—	31	37	39	—	40	—
Namibia	—	—	55	54	54	53	—
Niger*+	28	—	30	34	35	38	—
Nigeria	—	41	42	—	—	—	—
Rwanda*	52	42	44	—	—	50	—
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	—	—	27	—
Senegal*+	—	33	35	37	37	39	—
Seychelles	56	50	49	49	49	49	—
Sierra Leone*	32	—	—	—	—	—	—
Somalia	24	35	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	—	—	54	—	—	53	—
Sudan	31	42	44	46	47	48	—
Swaziland	46	—	—	—	—	50	—
Tanzania*	31	—	43	45	46	—	—
Togo*+	24	24	25	26	27	29	—
Uganda*	—	—	—	—	—	39	—
Zambia*	—	—	—	—	—	43	—
Zimbabwe	41	—	44	46	46	—	—
North Africa	—	—	—	—	46	—	—
All Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comparator countries	36	37	43	43	42	42	—
China	39	40	42	45	45	45	—
India	30	33	—	37	38	38	—
Indonesia	38	—	45	46	—	—	—
South Asia	29	32	—	37	38	39	—
East Asia	40	41	43	45	45	45	—

— Not available.
* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Source: World Bank data.

POPULATION 5.1

	Millions									
	Estimate						Standard projection[a]		Rapid projection[a]	
	1970	1980	1990	2000	2001	2002	2025	Stabili-zation	2025	Stabili-zation
Sub-Saharan Africa	289.2	382.0	509.1	658.7	673.8	688.6	1,282.9	2,653.5	932.1	1,450.4
Excluding South Africa	267.1	354.5	473.9	615.9	630.5	645.1	1,214.2	2,557.8	876.7	1,377.3
Excluding South Africa & Nigeria	213.9	283.3	377.7	489.0	500.7	512.3	997.3	2,162.4	703.6	1,109.0
Angola	5.6	7.1	9.6	13.1	13.5	13.9	24.5	61.3	17.2	26.3
Benin*+	2.7	3.5	4.7	6.3	6.4	6.6	10.8	19.1	8.5	13.4
Botswana	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	3.6	2.3	3.3
Burkina Faso*+	5.6	7.0	8.9	11.3	11.6	11.8	18.9	47.9	15.3	23.5
Burundi*	3.5	4.1	5.5	6.8	6.9	7.1	10.3	32.0	9.3	14.7
Cameroon*+	6.6	8.7	11.6	14.9	15.2	15.5	22.3	52.9	21.5	32.4
Cape Verde	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.5	0.6	0.9
Central African Republic*+	1.8	2.3	2.9	3.7	3.8	3.8	5.2	11.4	4.9	7.6
Chad*+	3.7	4.5	5.7	7.7	7.9	8.1	15.1	27.7	9.3	13.9
Comoros*+	—	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.9	2.5	1.0	1.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	20.3	26.9	37.0	50.9	52.4	53.8	96.1	170.9	72.0	116.3
Congo, Rep. of*+	1.3	1.7	2.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	5.9	14.2	4.5	7.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	5.5	8.2	11.8	16.0	16.4	16.8	22.9	63.4	24.1	38.4
Djibouti	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.9	2.5	1.0	1.6
Equatorial Guinea*+	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.1
Eritrea*	1.8	2.4	3.1	4.1	4.2	4.3	7.2	22.6	6.0	9.6
Ethiopia*	28.9	37.7	51.2	64.3	65.8	67.3	104.6	416.7	98.0	156.7
Gabon+	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	2.1	6.1	2.0	3.2
Gambia, The*	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.0	4.9	1.4	2.2
Ghana*	8.6	10.7	15.1	19.3	19.7	20.1	28.3	61.5	27.6	42.1
Guinea*	3.9	4.5	5.8	7.4	7.6	7.7	11.1	32.8	9.6	14.8
Guinea-Bissau*	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.0	3.8	1.4	2.3
Kenya*	11.5	16.6	23.4	30.1	30.7	31.3	41.4	124.3	50.7	81.4
Lesotho	1.1	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.5	6.0	3.1	4.6
Liberia	1.4	1.9	2.4	3.1	3.2	3.3	5.4	10.7	4.8	7.0
Madagascar*	6.9	8.9	11.6	15.5	16.0	16.4	27.0	45.3	20.9	31.7
Malawi*	4.5	6.2	8.5	10.3	10.5	10.7	15.8	62.2	15.9	25.6
Mali*+	5.3	6.6	8.5	10.8	11.1	11.3	17.9	57.5	15.5	24.4
Mauritania*	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	4.6	13.7	3.3	5.1
Mauritius	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
Mozambique*	9.4	12.1	14.2	17.7	18.1	18.4	25.8	96.4	26.7	41.3
Namibia	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.3	7.1	3.3	5.0
Niger*+	4.2	5.6	7.7	10.8	11.2	11.5	21.2	71.7	14.3	23.1
Nigeria	53.2	71.1	96.2	126.9	129.9	132.8	199.6	395.4	173.1	268.3
Rwanda*	3.7	5.2	6.9	7.7	7.9	8.2	12.6	65.0	15.3	26.3
São Tomé and Principe*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3
Senegal*+	4.2	5.5	7.3	9.5	9.8	10.0	15.2	43.2	12.8	20.4
Seychelles	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sierra Leone*	2.7	3.2	4.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	7.9	23.0	6.6	10.1
Somalia	3.6	6.5	7.2	8.8	9.1	9.4	18.8	46.7	13.8	20.9
South Africa	22.1	27.6	35.2	42.8	43.2	43.6	48.4	95.7	55.4	73.1
Sudan	14.4	19.3	24.8	31.1	31.7	32.4	48.1	101.5	43.9	66.9
Swaziland	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.4	4.1	1.7	2.7
Tanzania*	13.7	18.6	25.5	33.7	34.4	35.2	50.2	144.3	42.2	66.9
Togo*+	2.0	2.5	3.5	4.5	4.7	4.8	7.1	17.4	6.9	10.8
Uganda*	9.8	12.8	16.3	22.2	22.8	23.4	38.9	90.7	30.1	49.8
Zambia*	4.2	5.7	7.8	10.1	10.3	10.5	13.4	41.3	15.1	25.6
Zimbabwe	5.2	7.1	10.2	12.6	12.8	13.0	15.3	27.6	16.8	24.6
North Africa	69.2	88.4	114.0	137.9	140.3	142.7	216.0	320.5	185.9	248.6
All Africa	358.4	470.4	623.1	796.6	814.0	831.3	1,498.9	2,974.0	1,118.0	1,699.0
Comparator countries	1,483.4	1,816.9	2,162.9	2,484.6	2,513.2	2,541.0	—	—	—	—
China	818.3	981.2	1,135.2	1,262.5	1,271.8	1,281.0	1,460.8	1,885.7	1,572.5	1,841.0
India	547.6	687.3	849.5	1,015.9	1,032.4	1,048.3	1,347.2	1,854.8	1,247.5	1,626.2
Indonesia	117.5	148.3	178.2	206.3	209.0	211.7	269.1	353.9	260.5	339.9
South Asia	711.8	901.3	1,120.4	1,354.2	1,377.8	1,401.1	458.8	742.8	422.7	599.7
East Asia	1,118.0	1,359.4	1,596.7	1,805.6	1,822.6	1,838.4	—	—	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
a. See technical notes for definition
Source: World Bank data.

POPULATION GROWTH 5.2

	Average annual percentage change							
							Standard projection[a]	Rapid projection[a]
	1965–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–2002	2001	2002	2020	2025
Sub–Saharan Africa	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.2
Excluding South Africa & Nigeria	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.2
Angola	1.5	2.2	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.1	1.0
Benin*+	2.1	2.4	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.6	1.6	1.2
Botswana	2.9	3.6	3.5	2.6	1.2	1.0	0.7	1.1
Burkina Faso*+	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4	1.8	1.1
Burundi*	1.9	1.4	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.2
Cameroon*+	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.3	1.1
Cape Verde	3.4	0.8	1.6	2.5	2.7	2.6	1.4	1.1
Central African Republic*+	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.3	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.2
Chad*+	1.8	2.0	2.6	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.3	0.9
Comoros*+	—	—	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	1.5	1.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.3	1.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.6	1.3
Côte d'Ivoire*+	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.0	2.5	2.2	1.0	1.2
Djibouti	6.4	7.0	3.9	2.8	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.1
Equatorial Guinea*+	2.2	–4.1	5.8	2.6	2.6	2.6	1.9	0.8
Eritrea*	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	1.9	1.2
Ethiopia*	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	1.6	1.4
Gabon+	0.0	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.4	1.9	1.0
Gambia, The*	2.8	3.3	3.6	3.4	2.9	2.6	1.3	1.2
Ghana*	1.8	2.3	3.4	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.2	0.9
Guinea*	2.3	1.3	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.1	1.2
Guinea-Bissau*	0.6	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	1.6	0.9
Kenya*	3.3	3.7	3.5	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.0	1.3
Lesotho	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.3	1.2	0.8	1.1
Liberia	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.5	1.9	1.2
Madagascar*	2.4	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.9	1.6	1.2
Malawi*	2.5	3.1	3.3	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.4
Mali*+	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.7	1.0
Mauritania*	2.2	2.4	2.6	3.0	3.2	2.9	1.8	1.2
Mauritius	1.9	1.6	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.5
Mozambique*	2.4	2.5	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.2	1.0
Namibia	2.5	2.4	3.1	2.4	2.0	1.7	0.9	1.1
Niger*+	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.2	2.4	1.1
Nigeria	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.3	2.2	1.6	1.1
Rwanda*	3.2	3.3	3.2	1.2	2.9	2.9	1.4	1.3
São Tomé and Principe*	1.3	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.1
Senegal*+	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	1.5	1.2
Seychelles	2.5	2.0	0.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.0	0.9
Sierra Leone*	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.1
Somalia	2.7	5.8	0.1	2.1	3.5	3.4	2.9	1.2
South Africa	2.2	2.2	2.5	1.9	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8
Sudan	2.4	2.9	2.7	2.3	1.9	2.1	1.2	1.4
Swaziland	2.5	3.0	3.1	3.0	2.2	1.9	1.0	1.4
Tanzania*	3.1	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.2	2.1	1.3	1.1
Togo*+	4.4	2.2	3.4	2.7	2.8	2.4	1.4	1.1
Uganda*	4.2	2.8	2.2	3.1	2.6	2.7	1.8	1.0
Zambia*	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.6	1.9	1.7	0.9	1.2
Zimbabwe	3.3	3.3	3.8	2.1	1.5	1.1	0.9	1.1
North Africa	2.6	2.4	2.6	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.2	0.9
All Africa	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.0
Comparator countries	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.4	1.1	1.1	—	—
China	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.6
India	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.5	0.9	0.7
Indonesia	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.3	0.9	0.7
South Asia	2.4	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.2	1.0
East Asia	2.6	2.0	1.6	1.2	0.9	0.9	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA countries
\+ CFA countries
a. See technical notes for definition
Source: World Bank data.

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 5.3

	Average number of children								
	Actual							Standard projection[a]	Rapid projection[a]
	1975	1985	1990	1992	1995	1997	2002	2020	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.6	6.4	6.1	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.0	—	
Excluding South Africa	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.7	5.2	3.6	2.3
Excluding South Africa & Nigeria	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.2	3.8	2.3
Angola	6.7	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.0	6.8	6.5	4.4	2.3
Benin*+	7.0	6.9	6.6	6.5	6.2	5.8	5.3	3.0	2.2
Botswana	6.5	5.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.3	3.8	2.8	2.1
Burkina Faso*+	7.3	7.3	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.3	4.1	2.3
Burundi*	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.3	5.8	3.6	2.3
Cameroon*+	6.4	6.4	6.0	5.7	5.2	5.1	4.6	2.9	2.1
Cape Verde	7.0	6.0	5.5	5.2	4.1	4.0	3.5	2.1	—
Central African Republic*+	5.8	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.6	3.0	2.2
Chad*+	6.3	7.2	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.2	4.2	2.3
Comoros*+	—	6.9	5.8	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.1	2.3	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	6.4	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.5	6.4	5.9	4.2	2.2
Congo, Rep. of*+	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	5.8	4.2	2.2
Côte d'Ivoire*+	7.4	7.1	6.2	5.7	5.4	5.2	4.6	2.7	2.8
Djibouti	6.7	6.4	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.5	5.2	3.4	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.5	3.5	—
Eritrea*	—	7.3	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.7	5.3	3.3	—
Ethiopia*	5.9	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.2	5.9	5.5	3.6	2.3
Gabon+	4.3	4.8	5.1	5.2	4.6	4.3	4.1	3.4	2.2
Gambia, The*	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	5.5	5.2	4.8	2.9	2.4
Ghana*	6.6	6.3	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.5	4.0	2.4	2.2
Guinea*	5.9	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.0	2.7	2.5
Guinea-Bissau*	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.6	3.6	2.6
Kenya*	8.1	6.9	5.6	5.2	4.9	4.7	4.2	2.6	2.1
Lesotho	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.2	2.6	2.5
Liberia	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.3	5.8	3.8	2.1
Madagascar*	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.2	2.9	2.3
Malawi*	7.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	6.6	6.4	6.1	4.0	2.4
Mali*+	7.1	7.1	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.1	3.8	2.3
Mauritania*	6.5	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.3	4.9	4.4	3.4	2.3
Mauritius	3.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Mozambique*	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3	5.6	5.3	5.0	3.3	2.8
Namibia	6.0	5.7	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.8	2.7	2.1
Niger*+	8.0	8.0	7.6	7.4	7.5	7.4	7.1	4.7	2.3
Nigeria	6.9	6.5	6.0	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.1	3.6	2.2
Rwanda*	8.4	7.7	7.2	7.0	6.5	6.2	5.7	3.5	2.3
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.7	4.3	2.6	—
Senegal*+	7.0	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.7	5.4	4.9	2.9	2.3
Seychelles	—	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	—
Sierra Leone*	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.1	5.6	3.6	2.4
Somalia	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	6.9	5.4	2.3
South Africa	5.3	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.1
Sudan	6.4	5.8	5.4	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.4	2.4	2.2
Swaziland	6.5	5.8	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.2	2.6	—
Tanzania*	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.0	3.0	2.3
Togo*+	6.6	6.9	6.6	6.6	5.4	5.2	4.9	2.9	2.2
Uganda*	7.1	7.2	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.0	3.7	2.3
Zambia*	7.1	6.7	6.3	6.2	5.9	5.6	5.1	3.0	2.2
Zimbabwe	6.8	5.8	4.8	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.7	2.8	2.1
North Africa	6.0	4.9	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	2.9	2.2	2.1
All Africa	6.5	6.1	5.7	5.5	5.2	5.1	4.6	—	—
Comparator countries	4.6	3.5	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.4	—	—
China	3.4	2.4	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1
India	5.3	4.4	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	2.9	2.2	2.1
Indonesia	5.0	3.6	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.3	2.1	2.1
South Asia	5.6	4.7	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.1	2.4	2.2
East Asia	3.8	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA countries
+ CFA countries
a. See technical notes for definition
Source: World Bank data.

CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE 5.4

	Percentage of women or their spouses using contraception		
		Target	
	Latest survey	2010	2025
Sub-Saharan Africa	13 (2000)	—	—
Excluding South Africa	13 (2000)	38.0	72.0
Excluding South Africa & Nigeria	13 (2000)	38.0	72.0
Angola	1 (1977)	33.0	69.0
Benin*+	16 (1996)	40.0	71.0
Botswana	33 (1988)	65.0	75.0
Burkina Faso*+	12 (1998)	38.0	68.0
Burundi*	9 (1987)	40.0	72.0
Cameroon*+	19 (1998)	29.0	72.0
Cape Verde	53 (1998)	—	—
Central African Republic*+	15 (1994)	38.0	69.0
Chad*+	4 (1996)	43.0	71.0
Comoros*+	21 (1996)	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	1 (1977)	34.0	73.0
Congo, Rep. of*+	—	30.0	74.0
Côte d'Ivoire*+	15 (1998)	30.0	74.0
Djibouti	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—
Eritrea*	8 (1995)	—	—
Ethiopia*	8 (2000)	34.0	73.0
Gabon+	33 (2000)	40.0	76.0
Gambia, The*	1 (1977)	33.0	65.0
Ghana*	22 (1998)	45.0	73.0
Guinea*	6 (1999)	32.0	64.0
Guinea-Bissau*	1 (1977)	36.0	68.0
Kenya*	39 (1998)	57.0	80.0
Lesotho	23 (1991)	48.0	73.0
Liberia	6 (1986)	41.0	72.0
Madagascar*	19 (1997)	37.0	68.0
Malawi*	31 (2000)	35.0	74.0
Mali*+	7 (1996)	35.0	71.0
Mauritania*	8 (2000)	35.0	68.0
Mauritius	75 (1991)	81.0	77.0
Mozambique*	6 (1997)	29.0	67.0
Namibia	29 (1992)	—	—
Niger*+	8 (1998)	30.0	70.0
Nigeria	15 (1999)	38.0	73.0
Rwanda*	13 (2000)	38.0	78.0
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—
Senegal*+	10 (1999)	46.0	73.0
Seychelles	—	—	—
Sierra Leone*	4 (1982)	39.0	67.0
Somalia	0 (1983)	35.0	69.0
South Africa	62 (1998)	71.0	79.0
Sudan	10 (1993)	36.0	69.0
Swaziland	20 (1988)	—	—
Tanzania*	25 (1999)	34.0	70.0
Togo*+	24 (1998)	57.0	81.0
Uganda*	15 (1995)	35.0	73.0
Zambia*	26 (1996)	29.0	72.0
Zimbabwe	54 (1999)	71.0	80.0
North Africa	56 (2000)	63.0	74.0
All Africa	22 (2000)	—	—
Comparator countries	—	70.0	75.0
China	83 (1999)	79.0	79.0
India	51.8 (1999)	64.0	73.0
Indonesia	57 (1998)	68.0	71.0
South Asia	49.1 (2001)	55.0	72.0
East Asia	59.4 (2001)	—	—

— Not available.
* SPA countries.
+ CFA countries.
Source: World Bank data.

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANS (EAP) 5.5

	Completed as of fiscal 1999	Expected completion date after 1999	No action
Angola			■
Benin*+	■		
Botswana[a]	■		
Burkina Faso*+	■		
Burundi*	■		
Cameroon*+	■		
Cape Verde	■		
Central African Republic*+	■		
Chad*+		■ 2003	
Comoros*+	■		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of			■
Congo, Rep. of *+	■		
Côte d'Ivoire*+	■		
Djibouti			■
Equatorial Guinea*+			■
Eritrea*	■		
Ethiopia*	■		
Gabon+	■		
Gambia, The*	■		
Ghana*	■		
Guinea*	■		
Guinea-Bissau*	■		
Kenya*	■		
Lesotho	■		
Liberia			■
Madagascar*	■		
Malawi*	■		
Mali*+	■		
Mauritania*		■ 2003	
Mauritius	■		
Mozambique*	■		
Namibia			■
Niger*+	■		
Nigeria	■		
Rwanda*	■		
São Tomé and Principe*	■		
Senegal*+	■		
Seychelles	■		
Sierra Leone*	■		
Somalia			■
South Africa			■
Sudan			■
Swaziland			■
Tanzania*	■		
Togo*+	■		
Uganda*	■		
Zambia*	■		
Zimbabwe	■		
Total	36	2	10

* SPA country.
\+ CFA country.
Note: For the Africa Region, the environmental action plan is considered an in-country, demand-driven process. It is not possible in many cases to identify definitive completion dates even though the process may be in an advanced stage, because completion depends on government approval.
a. National Conservation Strategy in lieu of Envirionmental Action Plan.
Source: World Bank data.

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 6.1

	Percentage of GDP										
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Australia	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Austria	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06
Belgium	0.27	0.23	0.22	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.15
Canada	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
Denmark	0.11	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.23
Finland	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.06
France	0.18	0.16	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.15	0.12	0.13	0.10	0.18
Germany	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
Ireland	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.16
Italy	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.07
Japan	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.23	0.17	0.22
Netherlands	0.06	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.11	0.16	0.22	0.23
New Zealand	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Norway	0.10	0.20	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.21
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.19	0.24	0.10	0.08
Spain	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
Sweden	0.13	0.22	0.24	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.15
Switzerland	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07
United Kingdom	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.06
United States	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Average	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10

Source: OECD; GDP, World Bank.

GROSS ODA EXTENDED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 6.2

	Millions of U.S. dollars										
	1973	1980	1985	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Bilateral											
Australia	2.0	21.1	33.3	60.5	60.6	49.3	36.3	33.3	34.1	22.7	25.5
Austria	0.7	9.6	15.5	76.1	94.5	66.5	78.1	116.2	63.9	115.0	121.5
Belgium	122.0	284.5	185.0	202.3	205.2	215.1	268.9	167.1	198.0	236.8	360.2
Canada	91.2	198.7	337.3	275.1	271.5	231.4	286.7	225.2	179.7	182.3	356.5
Denmark	32.8	127.5	128.3	463.1	463.9	403.1	442.7	441.9	399.7	427.6	396.8
Finland	6.0	36.1	69.9	81.7	82.7	68.9	72.3	94.5	64.1	74.5	74.3
France	472.6	1,097.6	1,157.6	3,323.6	3,180.6	2,895.6	2,109.8	1,804.4	1,642.5	1,357.2	2,636.8
Germany	163.2	1,020.1	761.5	1,315.6	1,277.6	970.3	1,077.6	909.7	783.1	661.2	1,042.2
Ireland	0.0	6.5	11.0	61.6	75.6	89.2	90.4	90.3	103.4	125.7	190.6
Italy	33.4	60.3	458.5	585.3	333.3	290.7	461.0	253.8	285.8	202.7	814.1
Japan	18.7	243.4	296.2	1,431.5	1,144.3	864.8	1,031.4	1,005.6	1,076.5	930.3	689.1
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.9	30.2	30.4	34.3	32.5	44.9	33.7	47.2
Netherlands	39.5	382.2	271.0	769.4	705.4	580.7	651.1	453.0	575.0	858.4	952.7
New zealand	0.2	1.3	0.6	3.6	3.8	5.7	4.0	5.2	5.1	5.3	6.3
Norway	22.3	126.7	179.0	376.9	393.1	389.0	358.0	322.0	296.7	275.9	397.5
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	161.4	151.9	161.8	164.1	213.8	255.9	112.6	96.3
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	90.1	228.4	213.0	178.9	133.3	122.7	101.7	178.0
Sweden	74.7	288.0	259.4	387.6	464.6	392.5	357.1	335.9	368.9	315.5	362.4
Switzerland	11.3	52.2	95.3	218.7	192.9	182.0	163.6	165.3	149.2	144.5	176.3
United Kingdom	156.2	515.3	336.0	642.1	666.6	645.9	911.6	803.7	1,150.3	1,228.3	1,000.5
United States	142.0	616.0	1,345.0	1,059.0	642.0	831.0	722.3	968.7	1,146.1	1,381.2	2,384.9
Total bilateral ODA	1,388.7	5,087.1	5,940.4	11,610.8	10,668.6	9,576.8	9,500.1	8,575.2	8,945.4	8,792.9	12,309.7
Multilateral											
International Development Association	108.7	436.5	886.3	2,395.7	2,585.0	2,403.0	2,283.5	3,139.8	2,446.6	2,676.2	3,164.4
European Development Fund	215.2	633.4	711.1	1,848.1	2,128.9	1,917.6	1,814.5	1,644.8	1,253.3	1,847.5	2,208.7
Africa Development Fund	0.0	96.5	209.5	595.3	605.7	609.6	594.2	426.8	343.7	429.6	706.9
International Fund for Agricultural Development	0.0	4.0	80.0	83.1	99.5	63.6	75.3	98.0	91.1	97.9	89.7
United Nations Children's Fund	8.7	56.7	100.9	310.4	284.3	164.0	151.0	153.6	166.4	182.0	168.9
United Nations Development Program	87.1	194.3	225.0	174.1	228.3	294.3	248.4	210.6	145.7	127.3	132.8
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	16.3	159.4	208.7	427.3	155.8	151.0	132.3	148.0	190.2	228.4	280.5
United Nations Population Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
World Food Program	40.2	175.0	352.7	616.8	214.8	87.5	117.5	177.6	191.4	215.7	216.4
Other UN	12.9	66.2	79.1	84.1	73.0	6.2	4.9	4.4	61.2	96.8	94.7
Total multilateral ODA	489.1	1,821.9	2,853.2	6,534.8	6,375.3	5,696.8	5,421.5	6,003.9	4,889.7	5,901.3	7,063.0

Note: Disbursements of grants and loans and other long term capital, amount extended. ODA is official development assistance.
Source: OECD data.

LENDING BY THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE IMF TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 6.3

	Millions of U.S. dollars								
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
World Bank Group									
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development									
Commitments	133	68	7	10	108	0	5	93	57
Disbursements	392	274	229	263	159	89	75	56	55
Amortization	1061	1055	948	832	741	685	550	437	459
Net flows	–669	–781	–719	–569	–582	–596	–475	–382	–404
Interest payments	694	629	526	406	331	294	213	184	200
Net resource transfers	–1,363	–1,411	–1,245	–975	–913	–890	–687	–565	–604
International Development Association									
Commitments	2858	2403	2596	1718	2947	1875	3012	4099	2875
Disbursements	2887	2392	2585	2397	2099	1968	2193	2442	2860
Amortization	101	120	140	154	184	230	226	244	304
Net flows	2785	2273	2446	2243	1915	1739	1967	2198	2557
Interest payments	149	178	185	192	202	219	199	200	285
Net resource transfers	2,636	2,094	2,260	2,051	1,714	1,520	1,768	1,998	2,272
Total IBRD and IDA									
Commitments	2,991	2,471	2,604	1,728	3,056	1,875	3,017	4,192	2,932
Disbursements	3,279	2,666	2,814	2,660	2,258	2,058	2,268	2,498	2,915
Amortization	1,162	1,174	1,088	985	925	915	776	681	763
Net flows	2,117	1,492	1,727	1,674	1,333	1,143	1,493	1,816	2,153
Interest payments	843	808	711	598	533	513	412	383	485
Net resource transfers	1274	684	1015	1076	801	630	1081	1433	1667
International Monetary Fund									
Total purchases	917	2994	648	523	801	512	525	590	1224
Repurchases	467	2372	597	1065	1104	560	462	477	759
Net flows	451	622	51	–543	–302	–48	62	113	465
Charges	170	559	124	101	65	55	43	35	143
Net resource transfers	281	63	–72	–644	–367	–102	20	78	322

Source: World Bank and IMF.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES 7.1

	Percentage of GDP					
	1993	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Angola[a]	12.5	(22.3)	11.4	21.6	4.9	3.1
Benin*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	4.5	3.1	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.5
Burkina Faso*+	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6
Burundi*	3.7	6.4	6.6	6.3	6.0	8.1
Cameroon*+	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
Cape Verde	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.3	0.8
Central African Republic*°	1.5	—	—	—	—	—
Chad*+	2.7	1.1	0.9	1.3	1.5	1.5
Comoros*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Rep. of*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire*+	1.4	0.9	—	—	—	—
Djibouti	5.6	4.5	4.4	—	—	—
Equatorial Guinea*+	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea*[b]	21.4	13.5	29.0	27.5	—	—
Ethiopia*	[2.9]	3.4	6.7	10.8[c]	9.8	6.2
Gabon+	—	—	0.3	—	—	—
Gambia, The*°	0.7	1.9	0.9	0.8	(1.1)	(1.0)
Ghana*	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.6
Guinea*	1.4	1.2	1.5	—	(1.5)	1.7
Guinea-Bissau*[d]	—	0.7	1.4	—	4.4	3.1
Kenya*	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.6	[1.8]
Lesotho	2.3	2.9	3.2	3.1	3.1	—
Liberia	23.3	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar*[e]	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	—
Malawi*	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8
Mali*+	[2.4]	2.2	2.0	2.2	[2.5]	2.0
Mauritania*°	3.2	2.3	2.2	2.1	—	—
Mauritius	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Mozambique*	5.0	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3
Namibia	2.5	2.3	2.3	3.2[f]	3.4	2.8
Niger*+	—	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	—
Nigeria[g]	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.4	0.8	1.1
Rwanda*	4.6	4.1[h]	4.4	4.6	3.8	3.9
São Tomé and Principe*	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal*+[i]	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5
Seychelles	2.8	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8
Sierra Leone*	3.0	(1.1)	—	—	(3.6)	—
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Africa	2.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.6
Sudan[j]	2.8	1.0	2.2	2.6	3.0	—
Swaziland	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.5
Tanzania*	1.2	1.3	(1.3)	(1.3)	—	—
Togo*+	4.0	—	—	—	—	—
Uganda*°	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1
Zambia*	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.0	[0.6]	—
Zimbabwe	3.4	3.4	2.7	4.8[k]	4.9	3.2

— Not available
* SPA country
\+ CFA country
° current/operating expenditures only
( ) Uncertain figure
[ ] SIPRI estimates
a. Economic statistics are highly uncertain because of the impact of war on the Angolan economy.
b. Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in May 1993.
c. Includes an allocation of 1 billion birr in addition to the original defense budget.
d. This country has changed currency during the period.All figures have been converted to the most recent currency.
e. Figures include expenditure for the gendarmerie and the National Police.
f. Does not include contigency provision for the Namibian military presence in the DRC.
g. Data before 1999 are understated because of the use by the military of a favorable specific dollar exchange rate.
h. Does not include demobilization allowance of 1.0 billion francs. For later years only the official defense budget is given. Other estimates indicate substantially higher defense expenditures.
i. Data do not include expenditure for paramilitary forces.
j. This country has changed currency during the period.All figures have been converted to the most recent currency.
k. Includes a supplementary allocation of 1,800 million Zimbabwe dollars.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2002.

TECHNICAL NOTES

Most macroeconomic data (in particular, national accounts, balance of payments, government finance statistics, and trade) reflect data maintained by World Bank country desks, often referred to as operational data.

Annual data shown for country groups are totals, averages, or medians for the countries included in the group, as indicated on the relevant table. These group aggregates can be either simple (arithmetic)—where missing data are not imputed—or gap-filled—where weights are used to adjust group totals for missing countries.

Most group averages are weighted according to the relative importance of the countries in the group total for that indicator, based on simple addition across countries when the indicator is expressed in reasonable comparable units. Group averages for analytical ratios (for example, imports to GDP) can be either weighted or simple.

Period averages are calculated from time series (levels, ratios, growth rates, or medians) for both countries and country groups. They are either simple averages or average annual percentage growth rates, which are computed using the least-squares method and are usually based on real-term series. The least-squares growth rate is estimated by fitting a least-squares linear regression trend line to the logarithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant period. It takes into account all observations in a period and reflects general trends that are not influenced by exceptional values, particularly at the end points.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

The time series for national accounts are based mainly on national sources as collected by World Bank country economists. They are generally in accord with the UN System of National Accounts. A conversion factor is used to convert national currencies to U.S. dollars, both in this section and in the trade section.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth—provides average annual growth rates calculated from GDP at market prices (also known as purchaser values), expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars.

Gross domestic savings (GDS)—calculated by deducting total consumption from GDP in local currency at current prices, expressed as percentage of GDP.

Gross domestic investment (GDI)—gross domestic fixed capital formation plus net changes in the level of inventories, expressed as percentage of GDP. GDI comprises outlays by the public sector and the private sector. The ratio is calculated in local currency at current prices.

Real agricultural growth—calculated from the value added of agriculture at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of forestry, hunting, fishing, and cultivation of crops and livestock production, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

Real industrial growth—calculated from the value added of industry at factor cost, in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. It comprises the gross output of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity water, and gas, less the value of their intermediate inputs.

GDP deflator—the implicit GDP deflator for national currency is obtained by dividing, for each year of the time series, the value of the GDP at current prices by the value of the GDP at constant 1995 prices, both in national currency.

Real gross national product (GNP) per capita—calculated by the World Bank Atlas method, which uses three-year averages of exchange rates that smooth out sharp fluctuations from year to year, expressed in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GNP measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents. It comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labor and capital), less similar payments made to nonresidents who contributed to the domestic economy.

Food production per capita—annual per capita production in kilograms of cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses, from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)–Agricultural Production database.

TRADE

Real export growth and real import growth (goods and nonfactor services)—data for exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services refer to all goods and nonfactor series provided to, or by, the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactor services. The values of factor services, such as investment income, interest, and labor income, are not included. Calculations use 1995 U.S. dollar series, which are generally estimated on the basis of foreign trade statistics from customs declarations.

Terms of trade—measure the relative movement of export and import prices. This series is calculated as the ratio of a country's export unit values or prices to its import unit values or prices. It shows changes over a base year (1995) in the level of export unit values as a percentage of import unit values.

Staple food imports, value—calculated by adding the import value (from FAO–TRADE databases) of wheat, wheat flour, wheat germ, paddy rice, husked rice, broken rice, milled paddy rice, rice bran, rice flour, maize, maize germ, maize flour, and maize bran, all expressed in current U.S. dollars.

Staple food imports, share of exports—as above, but as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services in current U.S. dollars.

CAPITAL FLOWS

The principal sources for information on debt are reports to the World Bank, through the Debtor Reporting System, from its member countries that have received either International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans or International Development Association credits. Additional information on debt has been drawn from the files of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Gross concessional aid flows—all concessional credits plus official transfers as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars. This does not include technical assistance.

Debt service ratio—service on long- and short-term debt, including IMF credit, as a percentage of exports of goods and services plus workers' remittances in current U.S. dollars. All figures reflect actual cash payments.

Foreign direct investment—the net amount invested or reinvested by nonresidents to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises in which they exercise significant managerial control. Investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital. The net figures subtract the value of direct investment abroad by residents of the reporting country.

HUMAN CONDITION

Infant mortality rate—the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. The estimates are based on an analysis of all available information: survey- and census-based indirect and direct estimates, census age structures, health information (especially immunization completeness), and vital registration adjusted for incompleteness. The outcome is a figure that cannot be linked with a single empirical source but that is usually consistent with the demographic situation. Projections are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Life expectancy at birth—the number of years newborn infants would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of their birth were to stay the same throughout their life. Data are World Bank estimates based on data from the UN Population Division, the UN Statistical Office, and national statistical offices. Projections are extrapolations made at the World Bank on the basis of past trends, and they incorporate the effects of AIDS mortality.

Access to health services—refers to the percentage of the population that can reach appropriate local health services by local means of transport in no more than one hour. Data are presented separately for total, urban, and rural population (WHO data).

Child immunization and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) use—child immunization measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A child is considered adequately immunized against DPT (diphtheria, pertussis or whooping cough, and tetanus) after receiving two or three doses of vaccine, depending on the immunization scheme. Oral rehydration therapy use is the percentage of all cases of diarrhea in children under five years of age treated with oral rehydration salts or an appropriate household solution (WHO data).

Total primary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the primary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for primary education in a given country. Figures shown may be more than 100 percent since the total enrollment includes pupils above and pupils below the primary school age, as well as repeaters.

Total secondary enrollment—total number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the official school age for secondary education in a given country. Secondary level (general) refers to education in secondary schools that provides general or specialized instruction based on at least four years of previous instruction at the first or primary level and that does not specifically aim at preparing the pupils directly for a given trade or occupation.

Female primary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at the primary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools but may exclude certain specialized schools and training programs.

Female secondary enrollment—female pupils as the percentage of total pupils at secondary level. It includes enrollments in public and private schools.

POPULATION

Population—usually projections from the most recent population censuses or surveys. Projected figures were prepared by the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department. These projections assume average, or standard, fertility decline. The rapid projection figures are World Bank projections assuming rapid fertility decline, defined as twice the rate of standard fertility decline experienced by developing countries during recent decades. Both standard and rapid fertility decline variants assume that the use of contraception will increase in all countries. But to achieve the rapid projections, contraceptive use has to increase at a much more rapid pace. Mortality levels are assumed to be identical in both variants and incorporate mortality from AIDS. Population figures under the heading stabilization are World Bank projections of the size of the stationary population. Stationary populations are those in which age-specific and sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a long period, and in which fertility rates have remained at replacement level—meaning that women bear, on average, only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population.

Population growth—derived from the population figures in table 5.1.

Total fertility rate—average number of live children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. These estimates are derived from the UN World Population Prospects (1990), demographic and health surveys, censuses, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, official estimates, World Bank estimates, and Eurostat data.

Contraceptive prevalence rate—percentage of married women of childbearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception (modern or traditional). Childbearing age is generally defined as 15 to 49, although for some countries contraceptive use is measured for other age groups.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure project. SIPRI calculates the ratio of military spending to GDP in domestic currency using current prices. Although common guidelines are used, it is not possible to adhere to a common definition of military spending in all countries, and there are considerable variations between countries in what is included in official defense spending data.

SIPRI collects data from a variety of sources, including an annual questionnaire that is submitted to each country's ministries of finance and defense, national statistical office, and central bank. Data also come from a wide range of national and international publications, including government budgets and statistics. IMF data are used for GDP. Other IMF, UN, and Economist Intelligence Unit data are used as well.